Employment Discrimination Stories
Author:
Friedman, Joel W.
Edition:
1st
Copyright Date:
2006
15 chapters
have results for Employment Discrimination Stories
Introduction: The Story of Ten Employment Discrimination Stories 24 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Introduction: The Story of Ten Employment Discrimination Stories
- The object of each individual volume in the Stories series is to provide interested readers with a three-dimensional view of landmark cases that are discussed prominently in law school courses dealing with the named subject matter. By providing additional information and insight into both the players involved in the case and the dispute’s underlying factual and social context, we hope to provide a deeper appreciation of the role these judicial opinions have played and continue to play in the development of the relevant law. Moreover, since litigation often concerns a dispute involving real people, it is both useful and interesting to gain insight into the story that often lies underneath the formal legal dispute. And cases involving employment discrimination law are prime examples of suits which invariably involve real people and interests that often transcend the precise legal contours of their conflicts. These are intensely and intimately human stories involving prolonged...
- Whereas Percy Green’s case against McDonnell Douglas serves as the Supreme Court’s foundational opinion addressing the manner of proving and defending individual claims of intentional discrimination under Title VII and, over time, other antidiscrimination statutes such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Deans Stewart Schwab and Steven Willborn focus in Chapter 2 on the story behind the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hazelwood School District v. U.S. ...opinion addressing the use of statistical evidence to establish claims of systemic intentional discrimination in “pattern or practice” suits. And where Percy Green was the driving force behind his suit, the action brought against the Hazelwood School District was filed by the U.S. Justice Department after its investigation revealed a paucity of African–American teachers in this suburban school district located, ironically, in a suburb of Percy Green’s home town of St. Louis, Missouri, a city with a significant...
- Much has been written about the development of affirmative action programs designed to respond to the nation’s sad history of discrimination on the bases of race and sex. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, the Supreme Court clearly and forcefully proclaimed the lawfulness of race-based affirmative action and set forth the conditions under which private employers voluntarily could implement race-based affirmative action policies without running afoul of Title VII’s seemingly unambiguous and unqualified ban on racial discrimination. In Chapter 6, Professor Deborah Malamud provides a unique and absorbing account of the story behind this signal development in Title VII jurisprudence. She tells the previously unrevealed story of the indispensable role played by unions generally, and the United Steelworkers of America in particular, in the formulation and implementation of affirmative action programs.
- an employment practice highly valued by workers and their unions as a crucial guarantor of job security and fair treatment. The government’s primary litigation strategy aimed at enforcing federal antidiscrimination policies was to challenge the continued use of seniority systems that were implemented before the enactment of Title VII and not adopted with any discriminatory intention, but which, as a consequence of the employers’ pre-Title VII, and therefore lawful, adherence to racially discriminatory employment and initial job assignment policies, continued to affect adversely African–American employees and job applicants. So, from the union’s perspective, as Professor Malamud carefully documents, the story behind voluntary affirmative action programs is a story principally about seniority, even though Brian Weber’s case was not.
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Employment Discrimination Stories 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
Contributors 13 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Employment Discrimination Stories
- received his B.A. from Siena College, his LL.B. from Harvard University and his LL.M. from New York University. He has practiced privately in New York and has taught at the University of South Carolina and the University of Arkansas. Dean Sullivan has published in the areas of employment discrimination, antitrust and contracts. He is co-author of Employment Discrimination: Law & Practice (3d ed. 2002; 2d ed, 1988; and 1st ed., 1980), Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination (6th ed. 2003, 5th ed. 2000; 4th ed. 1997; 3d ed. 1994; 2d ed. 1988; 1st ed. 1982), and Cases and Materials on Employment Law (1993). He is currently co-authoring a casebook Employment Law: Private Ordering and Its Limitations, to be published by Aspen. Professor Sullivan has written a number of law review articles, mostly recently having published in the Georgetown Law Journal, the Northwestern Law Review, and the William & Mary Law Review. An elected member of the American Law Institute, he joined the...
- is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development at Golden Gate University School of Law, in San Francisco. Following his graduation from Harvard Law School, Dean Oppenheimer clerked for California Chief Justice Rose Bird. He thereafter worked as a staff attorney for the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, prosecuting discrimination cases, and was the founding director of the Boalt Hall Employment Discrimination Clinic. Professor Oppenheimer has presented scholarly papers on discrimination law at numerous universities, including Yale, Stanford, Columbia, Berkeley, Duke, Oxford and the University of Paris, and at the annual meetings of the Association of American Law Schools and the American Political Science Association. He has published articles on discrimination law in the Pennsylvania Law Review, the Cornell Law Review, the ...s Law Journal, the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, Droit et Cultures, and many others, and was a...
- Australian National University. He is the author of many books and articles on labor and employment law including
- Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination Law
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Chapter 2: The Story of Hazelwood: Employment Discrimination by the Numbers 40 results (showing 5 best matches)
- was not the first Supreme Court case to sanction the use of statistics in proving employment discrimination. We have already discussed how important the case about discrimination in grand juries was to was another case alleging race discrimination in employment. involved discrimination in hiring truck drivers. Because the job required only low-level skills and was one for which most people can become qualified, the Court agreed that the relevant labor pool was the entire adult population. This allowed analysts to use A finding of discrimination leapt immediately from the statistics.
- Regression and other multivariate analyses are now commonly used in employment-discrimination cases. For example, in 1986, the Supreme Court considered the plaintiff’s regression analysis as evidence of salary discrimination.
- For quick evidence of this, consider the dramatic increase in lower-court employment-discrimination cases discussing standard deviations. Running a search on Lexis Nexis for the terms “employment discrimination” or “Title VII” and “standard deviation” between 1965, when Title VII took effect, and March, 30 1977, before
- Statistics can give insights, however, that are invisible in individual situations. A school district hires a white teacher over a black teacher. Perhaps it is an innocuous one-time decision in which race played no role. But if a pattern of such hiring decisions develops, one might suspect discrimination. Such is the theory of , the leading Supreme Court case on the use of statistical evidence in employment-discrimination cases.
- We have already hinted at one of the possibilities in this alternative history. It is likely that affirmative action would have been short circuited. If statistical evidence could not be used to set employment goals, affirmative action would have been flaccid and ineffective, if it had arisen at all. If statistical evidence could not be used to prove discrimination, the situation giving rise to the need for affirmative action—confidence that discrimination has occurred, but the absence of actual victims—would likely have arisen much less often.
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Chapter 9: The Story of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp: Gilmering Antidiscrimination Law 43 results (showing 5 best matches)
- “threat” to the enforcement of Title VII rights in 1975, the rest of the employment discrimination world erred in the other direction; most of us concluded that the Court had definitively rejected arbitration as a substitute for pursuit of discrimination claims in traditional judicial forums. This chapter is, at base, the story of how —arbitration is interchangeable with courts as a forum for deciding employment disputes, even when arbitration is agreed to as a condition of employment in advance of any actual dispute.
- This question received national attention when what appeared to be a garden-variety dispute in North Carolina resulted in a Supreme Court decision that would change the face of employment discrimination, indeed of employment law generally.
- upheld an agreement to arbitrate entered into as a condition of employment, thereby depriving an employee of a judicial forum for his discrimination charges. The matter began when Robert Gilmer filed suit in federal court claiming his discharge by his employer, Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. IJL then moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement Mr. Gilmer had signed when, as required by his employment, he had registered as a securities representative with several stock exchanges. The “Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer” (also known as the U–4) provided that Mr. Gilmer, like all registered agents at the time, agreed “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy” arising between him and his employer as required by New York Stock Exchange Rule 347. That Rule, in turn, provided for arbitration of “any controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization...
- Since this is a book about stories, it might not be inappropriate to start with a personal one. In 1975, having been fired from my first teaching job at the University of South Carolina School of Law, I landed more or less on my feet at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. Mike Zimmer, who had been fired by South Carolina at the same time, ended up at Wayne State. Zimmer and I had, even then, been moving towards the employment discrimination field—and the twin firings gave us invaluable practical experience in the area. Not to mention a renewed sense of empathy for employees.
- fit nicely into that taxonomy, involving as it did an employee whose union had prosecuted his racial discrimination grievance to arbitration. Although there are high-sounding statements in the opinion about the overriding power of the courts to resolve discrimination claims, the Court necessarily focused on the union setting in which almost all arbitration of employment disputes then occurred. And, while the Court’s opinion showed concern about whether arbitration could be trusted to properly safeguard Title VII rights, written in the context of collective bargaining arbitration, which was basically the only employment game in town.
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Chapter 6: The Story of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 65 results (showing 5 best matches)
- , played a central part in this–and many other–Employment Discrimination and Labor Law Stories. The author of this Chapter was an associate at that firm from 1987–1988 and 1989–1992.
- One part of the story, told well in existing sources, is that affirmative action was the response of employers to the threat of lawsuits and of loss of lucrative federal contracts for having too-white workforces. Three Federal anti-discrimination agencies—the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) (housed in the Department of Labor, DOL)—had their hand in the field of racial discrimination in employment. So did the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and its independent litigation offshoot, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), the major forces behind many
- is the case in which the Supreme Court established the legality of voluntary race-based affirmative action in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case turned on statutory interpretation, and the battle between Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist is such a classic in that field that the leading casebook on Legislation uses it to great effect as its opening case study. has begun to disappear from Employment Discrimination casebooks. But only by telling the story of
- a class action brought by five black workers to challenge a departmental seniority system that perpetuated pre-Act discrimination. The court held the employer and the union liable under Title VII. The court distinguished protecting only “employment seniority” (as opposed to departmental seniority). Furthermore, using the language of section 703(h), the court held (somewhat circularly) that no seniority system that perpetuates pre-Title VII hiring discrimination can be “bona fide,” because “[o]bviously one characteristic of a bona fide seniority system must be lack of discrimination.”
- Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination
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Chapter 1: The Story of Green v. McDonnell Douglas 35 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Later decisions established that the test was intended to be flexible. As a result, the Green test for a prima facie case of discrimination has been applied: not only for hiring cases, but for promotion not only in race discrimination cases, but in all kinds of employment discrimination cases; and not only in employment cases, but in many other areas of discrimination law as well.
- Second, in language that has become as familiar to employment lawyers as the pledge of allegiance to a school child, the Court set forth the initial burden placed on a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
- “Other evidence that may be relevant to any showing of pretext includes facts as to the petitioner’s treatment of respondent during his prior term of employment; petitioner’s reaction, if any, to respondent’s legitimate civil rights activities; and petitioner’s general policy and practice with respect to minority employment. On the latter point, statistics as to petitioner’s employment policy and practice may be helpful to a determination of whether petitioner’s refusal to rehire respondent in this case conformed to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks…. In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.”
- Thus was Title VII’s private right of action born, making possible private employment discrimination litigation like Percy Green’s case. The bill as amended passed in the Senate on June 19, 1964,
- McDonnell Douglas sought review on the question of whether the circuit court erred in permitting Green to go forward on his discrimination claim, arguing it was procedurally barred by the EEOC’s failure to issue a “reasonable cause” finding, and substantively barred because Green’s participation in unlawful demonstrations directed at McDonnell Douglas provided the company with a legitimate basis for rejecting his application for employment.
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Chapter 4: The Story of Jesperson v. Harrah’s: Makeup and Women at Work 79 results (showing 5 best matches)
- See Cynthia Estlund, The Story of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in Employment Law Stories (Joel W. Friedman eds., forthcoming 2006).
- These questions drive the employment discrimination law story we tell. But for the story to have traction, we first need a background narrative, a prologue, about the constitutive role of cosmetics in women’s lives; about the ways in which makeup has colored women, covered women, marked and inscribed women—quite literally made women up. More than layering women’s faces, makeup has layered the social meaning of women’s identity. In other words, makeup is part of what has made women
- This is a story about gender, makeup and the law. The setting is a casino in Reno, Nevada. The protagonist is Darlene Jespersen, a successful and well-liked bartender whose employer, Harrah’s Casino, terminated her employment because she refused to wear makeup. Jespersen responded with a lawsuit that traveled all the way to the Ninth Circuit. A three-judge panel heard the case, two of whom produced a majority ruling in Harrah’s favor—namely, that neither Harrah’s decision to fire Jespersen nor the casino’s elaborate makeup and grooming requirements runs afoul of Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.
- But none of the above yet answers the question of why, assuming that gay effeminate men and masculine lesbian women are the most vulnerable groups to normative sex stereotyping, Judge Tashima would impose a sexual harassment constraint on normative sex stereotyping. One answer is that Judge Tashima might have believed that normative sex stereotyping against gays and lesbians is likely to take the form of sexual harassment. Given the earlier discussed effeminacy cases, such a conclusion would be reasonable. But wouldn’t a more expansive approach to normative sex stereotyping also capture the effeminacy cases? Surely yes. But such an approach would also capture an awful lot more; arguably an expansive approach to normative sex stereotyping would capture discrimination based on sexual orientation as such. For example, to the extent that a lesbian was denied a promotion or was not granted employment based on her sexual orientation, she would be able to articulate either of those adverse
- misunderstands the nature of contemporary sex discrimination. In today’s employment market, few employers are going to exclude all women from their ranks. Doing so would create legitimacy problems. Male-only institutions are normatively suspect. Moreover, market pressures militate against male exclusivity. Not only are women an important and significant part of the labor force, but many companies likely face the danger that too few women within the company might limit that company’s market reach. Finally, Title VII would be a barrier to an employer’s attempt to completely exclude women from the workplace. That legislation (as we discuss more fully below) was enacted to eradicate precisely that form of blanket or per se discrimination. All of this is to say that sex discrimination today is not usually going to take the form of total exclusion. Companies will employ a number of gendered technologies to screen in some women and screen out others. At the heart of this screening is a...
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Chapter 7: The Story of Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: Federal Common Lawmaking for the Modern Age 44 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Victims of intentional sexual or religious discrimination in employment terms and conditions often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering. This distress often manifests itself in emotional disorders and medical problems. Victims of discrimination often suffer substantial out-of-pocket expenses as a result of the discrimination, none of which is compensable with equitable remedies.
- as an example of federal judicial lawmaking will be augmented to the extent that they influence liability rules under other federal and state law. That influence already extends to other federal employment discrimination prohibitions and to some state employment discrimination laws as well.
- J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 Va. L. Rev. 273 (1995); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055 (1972).
- represent an extraordinary example of the Supreme Court exercising its authority to engage in lawmaking in the manner of a traditional common law court, albeit in the cause of interpreting a federal statute. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act assigns liability for employment discrimination to the “employer,” defined to include “any agent of such [employer].” recognizing hostile environment harassment as a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII, the Court had briefly addressed the question of employer liability. The
- , Kang v. U. Lim America, Inc., 296 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2002) (national origin discrimination); ., 164 F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 1999) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim as well as sex discrimination claim);
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Chapter 10: The Story of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc: Narrowing the Reach of the Americans with Disabilities Act 35 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The step was thought to be relatively easy because the ADA built upon well-established principles of anti-discrimination law. Congress had created the basic framework of American anti-discrimination law twenty-six years earlier with the adoption of Title VII which bans discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. This framework was further refined by the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) which prohibits disability-based discrimination by federal employers, contractors, and grant recipients. In his signing speech, President Bush underscored the anticipated ease of implementing the ADA by noting that the new statute “incorporates the already existing law and standards of the Rehabilitation Act.”
- Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) bans discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.
- 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2004). The ADA is codified in five separate titles. Title I prohibits disability discrimination in employment. at §§ 12111–17. Title II bans discrimination on the basis of disability in programs and services provided by state and local government entities,
- In the ADA’s “findings and purposes” section, Congress found that “discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social problem” But, unlike individuals protected by existing anti-discrimination laws, “individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.”
- 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Neither Title VII nor the ADEA generally impose any affirmative obligation on employers to assist employees in satisfactorily performing the essential functions of the job. These statutes, instead, merely invoke a negative prohibition against discrimination. L. 19, 40–44 (2000) (contrasting how the ADA employs a different treatment model of discrimination while most anti-discrimination statutes employ an equal treatment model of discrimination). While Title VII does impose a duty on an employer to accommodate the religious observances and practices of its employees,
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Chapter 8: The Story of Mandatory Retirement, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia and Ageism 54 results (showing 5 best matches)
- to secure passage of a fair employment practices bill containing, inter alia, a ban on age discrimination in the workplace. But by the time the Congress took up consideration of the proposals that ultimately would coalesce into Title VII, the prohibition of age discrimination had disappeared. Accordingly, during debate on the proposed legislation, amendments were offered to reinstate age in the list of proscribed bases of discrimination. In part, the efforts to amend the bill were motivated by constituent complaints received by various members of Congress. In part, also, the amendments were justified by reference to testimony that had been received by a subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Committee during the preceding three years in the course of hearings regarding fair employment practices.
- Aside from its impact on the important right to work, involuntary age-based retirement, according to Justice Marshall, merited heightened judicial concern because “older workers … constitute a class subject to repeated and arbitrary discrimination in employment.” This was so even though the quantity and quality of discrimination to which the elderly were subjected admittedly was of lesser dimension than that experienced by “traditional suspect classes such as Negroes [and] … (quasi-suspect) classes such as women or illegitimates.” This differential in levels of victimization was confirmed, Marshall observed, by the political successes that the elderly had been able to secure: “The elderly are protected not only by certain anti-discrimination legislation, but by legislation that provides them with positive benefits not enjoyed by the ...elderly were still disadvantaged, in the employment arena. So Marshall concluded that it was necessary to apply a “sliding-scale” approach to...
- , Joint Hearing before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities, Comm. on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, and Subcomm. on Health and Long–Term Care, Select Comm. on Aging, U.S. House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), at 4. By 1986 the legal mandatory retirement age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, was age 70. This data also indicated that [r]elatively few older workers were actually mandatorily retired because financial inducements, poor health or societal expectations caused most workers to retire early, that is, before age 65. The Removal of Age Ceiling Cap Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
- The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where It’s Been, Where It Is Today, Where It’s Going
- The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where It’s Been, Where It Is today, Where It’s Going
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Chapter 3: The Story of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 71 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Hopkins faced several major hurdles in her discrimination claim. First, at the time she first filed suit, it was unclear whether Title VII applied to her case. Title VII applies only to discrimination against “employees”; it was uncertain at the outset whether the law applied to the decision whether to make an employee into a partner. As a result, Hopkins’ first lawsuit was filed in D.C. Superior Court under the D.C. Human Rights Act. But the issue was already pending in the Supreme Court in that the decision whether to promote an employee to partner was an employment decision covered by Title VII: “If … the parties contracted to have petitioner considered for partnership, that promise clearly was a term, condition, or privilege of her employment”; discrimination in that process thus violated Title VII.
- So Hopkins could not prove what Price Waterhouse had claimed she had to prove to show discrimination: that she would have been made partner “but for” her gender and unlawful gender-based motivations. But the court judged this “an impossible burden of proof,” and instead shifted to Price Waterhouse the burden of proof on the counterfactual issue: “[O]nce a plaintiff proves that sex discrimination played a role in an employment decision, the plaintiff is entitled to relief unless the employer has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the decision would have been the same absent discrimination. Price Waterhouse has not done so.”
- The relationship between the perhaps-unconsciously biased views of individual partners and Price Waterhouse’s liability for discrimination is less starkly presented by the plurality than it was by the district court. The plurality is less insistent than the district court, and less articulate about why it was, that the comments and the biases they exhibited alone would not have been enough to establish Price Waterhouse’s liability. Still, the decision does offer some clues to plaintiffs seeking to prove–and to employers seeking to avoid–subtle discrimination in subjective employment decisions made by groups of decisionmakers.
- The issue that most prolonged Hopkins’ litigation, and thrust it into the legal limelight, was the dispute over the proper allocation of burdens of proof in “mixed motive” cases, the resolution of which has since been superseded. But on the issue of sex stereotyping, and on the broader issue of discrimination in subjective employment decisions, Hopkins’ legacy lives on.
- The only other aspect of the case that arguably points toward the narrower double-bind theory is the dramatic demographics–the virtual absence of women in Price Waterhouse’s leadership cadre. That piece of evidence arguably framed Hopkins’ whole narrative, transforming it from a story of gender nonconformity to a story of group disadvantage: Hopkins, given her own personality, had collided with one half of the double-bind, and had brought into sharp relief Price Waterhouse’s demands for gender-conformity; common sense pointed to the tacit demands for masculinity that doomed many other women’s prospects. The severe underrepresentation of women makes it plausible that not only gender nonconformists like Hopkins but also gender of the same sex were subject to discrimination. If the dramatically skewed statistics were an essential part of the stands for the double-bind story, then it may work only in the context of manifest group underrepresentation and disadvantage.
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Chapter 5: The Story of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 41 results (showing 5 best matches)
- There was good reason for the Court’s studied avoidance of the words of the statute, for it is far from clear that an intention to reach disparate impact discrimination is expressed through the statutory text. The key provision here is the definition of unlawful employment practice(s) in § 703(a):
- Second Generation Employment Discrimination
- Many academic commentators today urge that Title VII jurisprudence needs to shift its focus to “unconscious” discrimination, in the form of supervisor judgments informed by an “organizational culture” reinforcing psychological predispositions towards making invidious treatment of racial and ethnic minorities. See, e.g., S
- On the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition of the job seeker be taken into account. It has—to resort to the fable—provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
- But it is doubtful that this provision deals only with “accidental” acts, for in the employment context the challenge is typically, as in one could say that the provision serves to ensure that employers are not held responsible for unconscious acts of discrimination such that for Title VII remedies to be levied, employers must know, at the conscious level, that they are discriminating against, or least causing detriment to, blacks or members of other protected groups. Even on this reading, however, the Dirksen amendment cuts against disparate impact liability, as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recognized in its very early years:
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- Publication Date: December 19th, 2005
- ISBN: 9781587788888
- Subject: Employment Discrimination
- Series: Law Stories
- Type: Overviews
- Description: Like all the volumes in the Stories collection, this book provides students with a three-dimensional picture of the most important cases that are addressed in nearly every employment discrimination casebook and course. These stories give the students and faculty members a deeper understanding of the historical and cultural background of the cases and insight into their long-term impact on the development of employment discrimination law.
