Antitrust Stories
Authors:
Fox, Eleanor M. / Crane, Daniel A.
Edition:
1st
Copyright Date:
2007
18 chapters
have results for Antitrust Stories
Introduction 17 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This volume attempts to bring a baker’s dozen of great antitrust cases to life in the story-telling tradition. At least sometimes, the story is in the eyes and mind of the teller; for story-telling depends on perspective and in nearly all of the great cases there are the proverbial two sides to the story. We have assembled an exciting group of authors—historians, legal scholars, economists, scholarly litigators, and former antitrust officials; and we let them tell their stories.
- Thus draws to an end these stories of antitrust; from the great combination that stamped out competition during the ecomonic transformation that transpired between the Civil War and World War I to the great world vitamins cartel on the wave of globalization. The book ends with the implicit suggestion that globalization, comity, convergence, and efficiency are likely to be threads of the antitrust stories of the second century of antitrust.
- This is a volume of antitrust stories. They are stories of power or imagined power. The storytellers of
- Antitrust law is full of stories and also, some would say, myths. Peter Carstensen and Harry First dismantle the free rider story—or perhaps myth—which today is viewed nearly universally as justifying the exclusive territory system condemned in should not be understood, as it often is, as a rigidly rule-based holding, but rather as a transitional case in the direction of a more flexible mode of antitrust adjudication.
- We have chosen thirteen cases that are not only among the canon of the greats but that also reflect the ebb and flow of antitrust attitudes and assumptions. We hope that our case selection will provide a snapshot of thirteen particular moments in the evolution of antitrust and that the composite of emerging pictures will allow the reader to see the formation of patterns and themes that emerge over time and will surely continue in the future. We hope that reading these stories side-by-side the case opinions will add a depth to the casebook study of antitrust law.
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Chapter Four: The Story of Alcoa: The Enduring Questions of Market Power, Conduct, and Remedy in Monopolization Cases 41 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Story of Standard Oil
- case is first and foremost the story of aluminum, it is also the story of a quirky chemist who invented a new industry, the investors who joined the inventor in commercializing the new way to smelt aluminum, a diminutive boarding house acquaintance of the inventor who worked his way up from laborer to chairman of the board over nearly sixty years with the company, one of the most prominent financier families in American history who bankrolled Alcoa’s development and expansion, a crusading head of the Antitrust Division who finally brought Alcoa to trial for monopolization, and one of the most famous Second Circuit judges who had to step in to author the landmark opinion when the Supreme Court could not muster a quorum to hear the case.
- During its early years Alcoa also was subject to a number of private antitrust cases. Most of these cases ended in dismissal of the allegations or in minor settlements that did not result in any significant change in the company’s operations. Alcoa would not, however, be so lucky in the next round of government antitrust challenges.
- , ANTITRUST STORIES (2007).
- The case that culminated in the famous 1945 second circuit opinion by Learned Hand was filed by the government just as Robert Jackson became head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. The Antitrust Division itself had only been created in 1933, and had done relatively little to enforce the antitrust laws during the early years of the New Deal. Instead, the New Deal emphasized government-business planning through various industry codes, akin to the cartels, promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act. to change dramatically in 1937. The mild recovery from the Great Depression abruptly ended and the nation slid back into recession. Ever the pragmatist, President Roosevelt began to shift his focus from the approach of the NIRA, which had been declared unconstitutional anyway by the Supreme Court, towards a renewed interest in market competition and antitrust enforcement as a cure for the nation’s ills.
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Chapter Three: The Story of United States v. Socony–Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust in the Two New Deals 34 results (showing 5 best matches)
- How could this have happened? If competition policy were merely a rationalistic, expertized, and managerial bureaucratic task as we commonly assume today, the story of would be bewildering. But if antitrust is understood as a sometimes naked expression of powerful ideological impulses, the story makes perfect sense. And so the
- is known for its articulation of the rule of per se illegality for price fixing agreements, but that doctrinal aspect of the case is perhaps less interesting than the story it tells about how quickly antitrust paradigms can shift. ...story begins in the depth of the Depression in a depressed oil industry plagued by overproduction and volatility. Seeking to rationalize and manage the industry, the Roosevelt administration set out on an ambitious regulatory program that involved a combination of central planning by government administrators and a guild-like association of industry executives. After the Supreme Court invalidated key portions of Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act, the oil association voluntarily continued the stabilization program initiated by the government. Next thing they knew, the members of the association were criminally indicted for price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. The very government that prompted the cartel was now calling it a criminal...
- is best remembered not as an articulation of legal doctrine but as a reminder that, despite its dull econometrics and tedious trial records, antitrust enforcement is highly dependent on the ideological commitments of the administration in power in general, and of the leadership of the federal antitrust agencies more particularly. There are many different ways to run an economy other than mandating competition should remind us that the legal apparatus of antitrust enforcement—the rules, the culture, and the institutional players—is only as stable as the values on which it is premised. Since the values underlying antitrust—such as competition, efficiency, deconcentration, and individualism—are often contradictory, it should not be surprising that antitrust enforcement tends toward radical shifts as well.
- Jackson believed it was a time for a sharp change in the administration’s view toward antitrust. The NRA was gone and the Division must now revert to the philosophy of the last serious antitrust enforcing administration—Woodrow Wilson’s—“that free competition is the wisest and most liberal measure of business regulation.”
- But Jackson well understood that he would have to be selective in his reinvigorization of antitrust enforcement. Despite the addition of an economics unit by his predecessor, John Dickinson, resources in the Division were still quite limited. More importantly, despite the failure of the first New Deal, it was not yet clear that the Roosevelt administration as a whole had much of an appetite for vigorous antitrust enforcement. So Jackson resolved “to select for intensive investigation those complaints which show the most flagrant cases of antitrust violation and in which the greatest public interest is involved.” defendants, there was no case that better fit the bill of “flagrant” antitrust violation and “greatest public interest” than the Midwestern dancing partner program.
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Chapter Seven: Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc 25 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement
- He is a prolific author and frequent public speaker, equally well known for his insight and his irreverence. Before going on the bench in 1985, he had served on the Chicago faculty (teaching, among other things, antitrust), beginning in 1979. He was (and is) an enthusiastic proponent of the Chicago School of antitrust. But at the key moment in our story—January 15, 1979—he was serving in the Carter Administration as Deputy Solicitor General.
- With this grand a story, the toughest question is where to begin. “At the beginning” might seem a safe bet—but the beginning was in 1913 and quite disconnected from a 1979 opinion. “At the end” is another common choice—but the story has not yet ended. Instead, let us begin with Frank Easterbrook.
- For a review and commentary on the role of amici in antitrust cases more generally, see Stephen Calkins,
- What a great story! Tin pan alley, media from radio to the internet, client lists that included Aaron Copland and John Philip Sousa, lawyering by three luminary law firms and at least three future courts of appeal judges—and a Supreme Court opinion that managed to be simultaneously a landmark and a mere episode in a saga stretching almost a hundred years and featuring almost that many judicial opinions! Read narrowly, the Supreme Court’s opinion in noteworthy contributions by amici, however, the opinion is also a broadly-applicable explication of issues of fundamental importance to antitrust.
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ANTITRUST STORIES 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- ANTITRUST STORIES
- Chapter Three: The Story of United States v. Socony–Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust in the Two New Deals
- Chapter One: The Story of Standard Oil Co. v. United States
- Chapter Four: The Story of Alcoa: The Enduring Questions of Market Power, Conduct, and Remedy in Monopolization Cases
- Chapter Twelve: GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped – A Story of the Politics of Convergence
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Chapter Twelve: GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped – A Story of the Politics of Convergence 39 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The antitrust story of begins with GE’s Jack Welch setting his sights on Honeywell. It proceeds to the U.S. antitrust clearance of the deal; to the European prohibition; to internal reform and is a story of six years in the life of convergence.
- Although there is much talk among antitrust authorities and the bar that convergence of the antitrust laws of the various jurisdictions is the principal goal of “international” antitrust, enthusiasm for the goal seems to diminish when convergence is taken to mean anything other than: “Converge to my way.”
- The team at the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) that vetted the merger had only two antitrust concerns—overlapping business in military helicopter engines, and maintenance and servicing of small jet engines and auxiliary power units. In early May, the DOJ cleared the merger subject to divestitures of overlapping businesses in those fields.
- 2. Firms do not belong to nations; but still, law is political. It is now well-recognized by antitrust authorities that firms and mergers do not “belong” to the nation of their principal establishment. Effects matter, not the location of establishment. If the effects of a merger will be felt throughout the world, the various nations of impact have a proper interest in vetting and controlling the merger. But this point of economics is not accepted by politicians, who still claim mergers as their own. The politicians’ cries are heard at the antitrust agencies; they could be influential at a margin. The politicians’ message (don’t stop our merger; don’t burden our business) may coincide with an antitrust authority’s professional inclinations to bless the conduct. Then, law and politics are synergistic. They appear to interact, however independent the agency.
- in the story of merger law? In the story of conglomerate mergers with leveraging effects that shift market share to powerful firms? What is its place in the puzzle of governance in the new world order in which law is national, transactions are international, more than a few jurisdictions claim the right to regulate the same transaction, and dominant players nudge other nations’ laws to converge with theirs? is predominantly a story about sovereignty and the political dance of convergence. Nesting within this picture are nuts and bolts of conglomerate merger analysis,
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Author Biographies 17 results (showing 5 best matches)
- : Jim May is Professor of Law at the Washington College of Law, American University, where he teaches both antitrust law and United States legal history. Prior to his entry into law teaching, he was an attorney in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice from 1976 to 1982 and Senior Staff Assistant, National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures from 1978 to 1979. His publications on antitrust law and legal history include: Science, Politics, and the Evolution of Law and Neoclassical Economics, 15 Law & Hist. Rev. 333 (1997),
- : George Priest is the John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics at the Yale Law School. Professor Priest is a prolific author on law and economics and antitrust matters. His publications include
- : Stephen Calkins is Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies at the Wayne State University Law School. Between 1995 and 1997, Professor Calkins served as General Counsel to the Federal Trade Commission. He consults with federal, state, and foreign governmental agencies, has testified before Congress and at national hearings, and has an extensive speaking program here and abroad. He is currently serving his third three-year term on the Council of the ABA Antitrust Section. He is the author of numerous publications on antitrust and trade regulation, including the co-authored Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell (West 5th ed. 2004).
- : Peter Carstensen is the George H. Young–Bascom Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin School of Law. From 1968 to 1973, he was an attorney at the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice assigned to the Evaluation Section, where one of his primary areas of work was on questions of relating competition policy and law to regulated industries. His scholarship and teaching have focused on antitrust law and competition policy issues and include
- : Harry First is the Charles L. Denison Professor of Law and Director of the Trade Regulation Program at the NYU School of Law. He is the co-author of casebooks on antitrust and on regulated industries, the author of a casebook on business crime, and the author of numerous articles involving antitrust law, including
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Chapter Five: From Schwinn to Sylvania to Where? Historical Roots of Modern Vertical Restraints Policy 32 results (showing 5 best matches)
- opinion issued the same day. It seems likely that his antitrust views were respected by colleagues. Fortas had started a law firm with Thurman Arnold, a distinguished former head of the Antitrust Division. As a practicing lawyer, Fortas had experience trying antitrust cases.
- For a discussion of Justice Powell’s role in antitrust cases, see E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson,
- But residual anger with Schwinn’s substantial terminations may have stimulated the interest of the Antitrust Division, which convened a grand jury that ultimately led to the civil antitrust complaint filed in 1958.
- Story
- more in depth but highly partisan and error-ridden policy analysis. The stories behind these litigations tell a more compelling and useful story than anything contained in either of the two Supreme Court decisions. The Government’s brief in
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Chapter Six: Rambling Through Economic Theory: Topco’s Closer Look 21 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Antitrust courts today continue to struggle with achieving the proper balance between predictability, administrability, and accuracy. That struggle is increasingly being played out at the full rule of reason end of the spectrum. Indeed, the Court and the Justice Department today seem as committed to pushing antitrust cases in that direction as the Court and the Justice Department in 1972 were committed to pushing antitrust cases toward the per se end of the spectrum.
- Memorandum For the Attorney General, Re: Proposed Complaint Against Topco Associates, Inc., from Donald F. Turner, Ass’t Attn’y Gen’l, Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., at 3 (“Our theory of the case is a simple one.”) (undated) (authors’ files). At that time, approval of the Attorney General was required before the Antitrust Division could file a case.
- But Shapiro was not as confident of his position as he appeared. Although the Antitrust Division had characterized this case from the start as a “simple” case of horizontal competitors allocating territories, Shapiro actually was dubious about the government’s position. Topco’s main defense was that the territorial restrictions were necessary to enable the Topco members to provide their customers with a “privatelabel brand” and thereby compete better with the “Big Three” chains of the day, A&P, Safeway, and Kroger. Shapiro, as Chief of the Antitrust Division’s Appellate Section, had to defend the Division’s per se approach, but he thought there was some merit to the argument that the better approach would be to balance the pro- and anticompetitive effects of the restrictions—less competition in Topco-branded goods (or even among Topco members) but more competition among supermarkets, just the sort of balancing approach in which the district court judge had engaged.
- On January 27, 1966, the owner of a regional grocery chain complained to the Antitrust Division that Topco had refused to let his business join the organization. The initial investigation treated this primarily as a boycott case.
- Morrison flatly rejected Topco’s proposals as non-negotiable, and defense counsel then sought a meeting with the newly-appointed head of the Antitrust Division, Thomas Kauper. Kauper, the fourth head of the Antitrust Division to deal with
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Chapter Eleven: A Turning Point in Merger Enforcement: Federal Trade Commission v. Staples 23 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The rate of federal enforcement actions (challenges as a fraction of proposed mergers) during the second term of the Reagan administration was roughly half the typical rate before and after. Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 Antitrust L.J. 105, 139 (2002); Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy in the Reagan Administration, 33 Antitrust Bull. 211, 213 (1988).
- One result of energizing government enforcement of antitrust was that the agencies were taken more seriously as litigation opponents, and there was a recognition by the private bar that clients could expect extensive data requests and careful data analysis. Incidentally, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division enjoyed a similar change in attitudes as a result of its successful challenge to business tactics by Microsoft, including respect for the quality of government litigation.
- Merger policy issues have been central in the development of American antitrust policy since the enactment of a federal antitrust law in 1890. Difficult policy questions arise because the consequences of mergers can be good or bad or a little of both. Mergers can eliminate rivals and then the combined firm can raise prices to consumers. Mergers can also be a problem by reducing the number of firms in a market with the result that the remaining firms can coordinate sales policies and act like monopolists by coordinating their marketing efforts. There is also a general policy view that high levels of concentration undermine incentives to achieve efficiency and to innovate.
- opinion solidified the view that antitrust theory grew primarily from initiatives of the enforcement agencies (guidelines and cases) and cases in the lower courts, largely because the Supreme Court had not reviewed a merger case on the merits since 1974.
- , 19 Antitrust 8, 9 (Spring 2005).
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Chapter One: The Story of Standard Oil Co. v. United States 24 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Growing public alarm prompted not only new state and federal legislative investigations of anticompetitive behavior, but also the passage of state antitrust laws beginning in the late 1880’s. By the 1888 presidential election, both political parties adopted antimonopoly planks in their party platforms and both presidential candidates spoke out against anticompetitive business conduct. The push for legislative action culminated in 1890 with the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which, like state antitrust legislation, built upon common law doctrines addressing anticompetitive conduct.
- In this setting, the Standard Oil Company, along with those who led it, became the leading symbol of rising corporate power, concentration, and abuse in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century America. The subject of both intense praise and condemnation in those decades, Standard Oil ultimately became the preeminent target of antitrust efforts to check anticompetitive conduct and concentration. Concern over its activities significantly contributed to the passage of both state antitrust laws and the Sherman Antitrust Act.
- A little over two years after the reorganization of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Vice–President Theodore Roosevelt, the former progressive governor of New York, became President of the United States in the wake of the September, 1901 assassination of President William McKinley. Roosevelt was particularly interested in government investigation and publicity concerning business, and pushed for the establishment of a Bureau of Corporations within the new Department of Commerce and Labor to pursue such efforts. Roosevelt, however, also supported the reinvigoration of federal antitrust efforts, substantially increasing the number and importance of antitrust cases brought by the government as compared with his predecessor. Antitrust efforts were enhanced in 1903 with the first specific appropriation for Department of Justice antitrust efforts and the passage of the Expediting Act. ...circuit court panel of antitrust cases the Attorney General certified to be of “general...
- In its reply brief, the government sought to buttress its case, in substantial part, by invoking a number of state cases decided since the submission of its main Supreme Court brief. In these cases the courts had held the appellants’ holding company and similar combinations unlawful under state antitrust laws. The government declared that those laws were substantially similar to the Sherman Act, except that they applied to intrastate rather than interstate commerce. The government noted that antitrust statutes and constitutional provisions had been adopted in 36 states and asserted that “[t]hey evince a great public policy of this nation, which is a material consideration in this court.” The government observed that state courts had declared the 1882 Standard Oil trust, the 1899 establishment of New Jersey Standard as a holding company, and similar combinations invalid under state antitrust laws like the Sherman Act in every case in which the issue of their validity had arisen.
- More than just the wording of Chief Justice White’s opinion or the source of its emphasis on judicial reason, however, animated Justice Harlan. Nearing the end of his life, this most fervent of antitrust supporters on the Court feared that the Court’s opinion at the very least might encourage the type of “rule of reason” interpretation of the Sherman Act that he vigorously had opposed for years and that he believed would make it excessively hard to hold defendants accountable in future antitrust cases.
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Chapter Thirteen: United States Courts and the Optimal Deterrence of International Cartels: A Welfarist Perspective on Empagran 48 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Following the bulk of modern academic commentary on antitrust, we posit that the primary goal of U.S. antitrust policy, if not the exclusive goal, is the promotion of economic welfare. Accordingly, this section offers a welfarist perspective on the issues raised by . We begin with some background considerations relating to optimal antitrust remedies against cartels in a closed economy, and then proceed to consider the issues introduced by the fact that the vitamins cartel was international in scope.
- case as a vehicle to examine the effects of globalization on U.S. antitrust law. In particular, how do some common themes of antitrust law take on a different shape or form in a world of greater economic interdependence? What should the form and substance of U.S. antitrust law and policy be in this globalized setting? We begin in Section I with a discussion of the decision itself and for the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (henceforth, “FTAIA”),
- The District Court deferred ruling on the motion with respect to the domestic plaintiffs’ claims until they provided more specific factual allegations about how the defendants’ conduct had injured those plaintiffs in United States commerce. In sharp contrast, Judge Hogan granted the defendants’ motion with respect to the foreign plaintiffs. He dismissed the foreign purchasers’ claims under federal antitrust law, the ones they pressed through supplemental jurisdiction under the competition laws of foreign nations, and their claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act for violations of customary international law proscribing the cartel’s conduct. The District Court’s dismissal of the foreign plaintiffs’ federal antitrust claims shaped the question that came before the Supreme Court in ...other two claims, its finding that there is no customary international law of antitrust and its discussion of the multiplicity of foreign tribunals weighing foreign purchasers’ claims against the vitamins...
- The United States is indeed a party to a handful of international agreements relating to antitrust, including bilateral agreements with Australia, Canada, the European Union, and Japan. These agreements oblige the United States to cooperate with foreign competition policy authorities along certain dimensions such as the exchange of information and the coordination of simultaneous investigations. World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations also place some limited constraints on U.S. antitrust policy. A violation of the GATT national treatment obligation (a non-discrimination principle) would arise, for example, if U.S. antitrust law were to impose quadruple damages on foreign defendants but only treble damages on domestic defendants.
- Of course, any application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign conduct can interfere with another country’s capacity to regulate its economy. When the antitrust law is invoked to remedy domestic antitrust injury, the Court has found that interference reasonable. But the Court sharply distinguishes the situation, as in
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Chapter Nine: The Superior Court Trial Lawyers Case—A Battle on the Frontier Between Politics and Antitrust 45 results (showing 5 best matches)
- As Commissioner Pertschuk mentioned in his dissent, the DC Government was conspicuously quiet, sitting on the sidelines, even though it was the “victim” of the alleged antitrust violation. Rather, it accepted the “strike” as an understandable political exercise under the circumstances, instead of an illegal antitrust boycott. If the political leadership thought an antitrust violation was involved, the DC Corporation Counsel could have used the DC Antitrust Act to stop the boycott. In any event,
- The split on the Court seemed unusual and illuminating. Justice John Paul Stevens, a liberal and a generally pro-antitrust jurist, wrote a stirring majority opinion in favor of the per se rule on behalf of himself and several generally conservative Justices who had frequently expressed concern about per se antitrust rules (Scalia, O’Connor, and Rehnquist). They were joined by Justices White and Kennedy, who had less pronounced histories. Meanwhile, three liberal Justices—who had authored some of the most important government victories in antitrust cases—dissented on First Amendment grounds. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun clearly saw the First Amendment rights and values as being predominant.
- The FTC may have expected to get a nice “we won’t do it again” consent order rather than an all-out legal battle with well-armed opponents. But the willingness of some very experienced antitrust lawyers to energetically represent the ideologically-committed respondents on a pro bono basis seems to have been critical to this local battle becoming a national landmark. (Pro bono cases for antitrust defendants are rare indeed!)
- The staff recommendation generated a considerable amount of internal discussion about the interesting issues presented by the unusual mixture of political and legal agendas. Internally, many staff members probably agreed with the FTC: Watch comment: “The staff recommendation for an administrative complaint puts the Commissioners and their agency in a delicate political situation. While economists and antitrust practitioners may tend to see the SCTLA action as a classical antitrust violation, the public at large is more likely to view the matter as a ‘poor person’s’ issue.”
- I had joined the firm in September 1983, just a week before the CJA “strike.” Sutherland was an Atlanta-and-Washington firm with a distinguished practice in the tax area, but also a history of concern about civil rights issues, particularly in the South. It had recently become a more significant antitrust firm, led by long-time litigator, Willis Snell. By September 1983, the firm had at least seven full-time antitrust lawyers. The four partners included two former Justice Department leaders (Douglas Rosenthal and myself) and a younger litigator who would go on to become Chairman of the ABA Antitrust Section, Mike Denger. The four partners all worked extensively on the SCTLA case, along with associate Will Tom, who eventually argued the case in the Supreme Court.
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Chapter Ten: U.S. v. Microsoft: Lessons Learned and Issues Raised 39 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The resolution of important antitrust issue in a dynamic, high technology industry is the most important legacy of the Microsoft case. Some of these issues concerned the economics of the new economy; others concerned antitrust law itself.
- Richard A. Posner, “Antitrust in the New Economy,” 68
- Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” (April 6, 1995), § 2.0.
- While antitrust had seemed like a dry subject to the public and the press, let alone to a generation of law students, this trial marked a sea change. The courtroom was packed every day of the trial, with the press claiming a substantial share of the seating capacity. It is often thought that there are few surprises at trial, because both sides are well informed by the discovery process; but there were surprises at this trial. One of the first resulted from Microsoft’s decision not to call CEO Bill Gates as a witness to tell Microsoft’s story. That decision was not surprising. Gates had been subjected to three days of videotaped deposition by the Government. His answers to numerous questions appeared nonresponsive and evasive, and he failed to recall a number of significant e-mails concerning browser competition. But, in a surprising turnaround, the Government chose to introduce Gates’ testimony, in the form of excerpts from his videotaped deposition, as part of
- was the antitrust case of the 1990s and perhaps for decades before that. The investigation, the trial, and its aftermath received wide press coverage throughout. A number of the major actors in the drama became household names, as much a result of the public relations battle among the parties as of the litigation itself. There remains however, substantial debate as to the ultimate legal import of the case. In this essay, we will explain why we believe the case was indeed a significant antitrust case that has important implications for antitrust enforcement in the 21st Century. not only proved that the Government could litigate a complex case in a dynamic, high technology industry in a timely fashion, but also reinvigorated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The case provided a foundation for antitrust enforcement in the “new economy.”
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Chapter Two: ‘Nervine’ and Knavery: The Life and Times of Dr. Miles Medical Company 16 results (showing 5 best matches)
- But unlike Lurton’s opinion, the Court maintained a studied silence toward the question of whether a valid consignment contract would provide a safe harbor from antitrust liability. Instead, Justice Hughes found contract provisions, loopholes, that permitted outright sales to discounters like Park. The implication was that the property right retained in a proper consignment could have shielded the price restraints from antitrust scrutiny.
- it from acquiring PERUNA outside the price restraints of the standard sales contract. Park’s answer reprised its antitrust challenge to the nationwide system of contracts.
- The lower court rejected Park’s antitrust challenge and issued a preliminary injunction. But the appeals court would accept the antitrust defense, find the contract system unenforceable, and dissolve the injunction. This case, like the subsequent
- violation of the antitrust laws. But Miles would carry the question to the Supreme Court.
- The court rejected Platt’s antitrust defense, citing the common law doctrine that “trade secrets … owners … may sell them on such terms as they please, may withhold them from one person while selling to
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Chapter Eight: Aspen Skiing: Product Differentiation and Thwarting Free Riding as Monopolization 18 results (showing 5 best matches)
- As shall be explained, the case is important historically: It stands at the mid-point of the Supreme Court’s shift from the populist interpretation of the antitrust laws of the 1950s and 1960s should be viewed as a transition case. Though not generally appreciated, the case represents an attempt by the Court to redefine the standards for the analysis of monopolistic practices under Section 2 along the lines of the new economic approach to antitrust jurisprudence where the dominant value is effect on consumer welfare.
- The Antitrust Paradox
- To be generous: the Court’s antitrust interpretations during those years were not entirely consistent with a coherent populist theory.
- The Antitrust Paradox
- The second ski area to be developed in Aspen, Aspen Highlands, the plaintiff in the underlying antitrust action against the Ski Company, was founded in 1957. The U.S. Forest Service
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- Publication Date: August 24th, 2007
- ISBN: 9781599410920
- Subject: Antitrust Law
- Series: Law Stories
- Type: Overviews
- Description: Drawing on history, economics, politics, and law, Fox and Crane’s Antitrust Stories provide a glimpse behind the texts of well-known legal opinions into the larger-than-life personalities and struggles of their antagonists and protagonists. Cases have been selected to provide a historical sampling of different eras of antitrust enforcement. They range from Standard Oil at the founding of U.S. antitrust to Microsoft in the new economy. This title is an invaluable supplement to any antitrust casebook, and the inclusion of cases with international aspects, including GE/Honeywell, Empagran, and Alcoa, makes it useful for courses on comparative or international competition policy. It is also useful as an assigned text for an undergraduate course in economic history or business regulation.
