High Court Summaries on Civil Procedure (Keyed to Friedenthal)
Author:
Staff, Publisher's Editorial
Edition:
12th
Copyright Date:
2019
175 chapters
have results for High Court Case Summaries
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Rehnquist, J.) No. A party moving for summary judgment does not necessarily bear the burden of supplying evidence or affidavits showing the absence of a genuine dispute about a material fact. The plain language of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the holding in [the party moving for summary judgment must establish the absence of a genuine issue, when viewed in a light most favorable to the opposing party]. This holding should not be construed to mean that the burden is always on the moving party to produce evidence showing the absence of a material fact in dispute. Rather, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,...
- (White, J.) I agree that a moving party must not always support a summary judgment motion with evidence or affidavits showing the absence of a genuine dispute of a material fact. However, the movant may not simply discharge his burden by asserting that the opposing party has no evidence to prove his or her case. The case should be reversed for the Court of Appeals to consider whether Catrett (P) revealed enough evidence to defeat the motion for summary judgment.
- (Brennan, J.) The Court has not clearly explained what is required of a moving party seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case. I believe that Celotex (D) has failed to meet its burden of production. The burden on the party seeking summary judgment has two components. First, the party bears the initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party. Second, the moving party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. The decision as to whether the moving party has discharged its initial burden of production depends upon which party will bear the burden of persuasion on the challenged claim at trial. If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion, it must support its motion with credible evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. On the other hand, if the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, then the party moving for summary...
- The majority, led by Justice Rehnquist, clearly desired to expand the scope of summary judgment motions following the restrictive holding in They accomplished this goal by significantly reducing the burden borne by the party moving for summary judgment. As a result of this holding, a moving party meets its burden by simply alerting the court that the nonmoving party has failed to establish evidence sufficient to prove its claims. Indeed, this holding furthers the general goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were designed to secure speedy and inexpensive determinations of controversies. However, the majority may have been too willing to grant summary judgment. As Justice Brennan’s well-reasoned dissent mentions, the Court failed to establish what is required of a moving party. While the Court stated that a moving party cannot simply assert that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case, this seems to be exactly what Celotex (D) did. The dissent presents a...
- Mrs. Catrett (P) sued Celotex Corp. (D) and others for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability, alleging that her husband’s death was caused by exposure to products containing asbestos manufactured by Celotex (D) and the other defendants. Celotex (D) moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Catrett (P) failed to produce any evidence that any Celotex (D) product caused the injuries. In response, Catrett (P) produced three documents which she claimed demonstrated that a genuine factual dispute existed. Celotex (D) argued that the three documents, including the husband’s deposition and two letters, were inadmissible hearsay. The District Court granted Celotex’s (D) motion for summary judgment because there was no showing that Mr. Catrett was exposed to Celotex’s (D) product. The Court of Appeals reversed since Celotex (D) made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, in support of its motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court...
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Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- As a general rule, only final decisions are appealable to higher federal courts. While there are numerous exceptions, which are addressed throughout this chapter, this case involves a straightforward application of the final judgment rule. The only difficult task is defining what exactly constitutes a final judgment. According to many commentators, a final judgment is one rendered after all possible issues have been determined by a trial court. Stated differently, a final judgment ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Thus, a decision addressing only liability but not considering possible remedies, as in this case, is not a final judgment. Consider briefly the rationale for the final judgment rule. Trial courts make several decisions, ranging from minor orders to grants of summary judgment, throughout the course of the trial. It would obviously cause a substantial disruption in the trial process if each decision were...
- (Rehnquist, J.) No. A Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the granting of partial summary judgment. Such orders are interlocutory in nature, and thus are not final judgments within the meaning of . Moreover, § 1292 is not applicable as a basis for jurisdiction in the instant action. If the District Court had granted injunctive relief, this interlocutory order would have been appealable under § 1292(a)(1). However, the District Court granted no relief whatsoever when it decided on the issue of Liberty Mutual’s (D) liability. In addition, Rule 54(b) does not apply to cases like this, which are actions on a single claim, and the requirements of § 1292(b) are not satisfied. Were we to allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over cases like this, we would condone the procedure whereby any district court could render an interlocutory decision on liability which would be immediately appealable. Although Congress has provided for exceptions to the “final...
- Wetzel (P) sued Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (D) in federal district court, alleging that Liberty Mutual’s employee insurance benefits and maternity leave provisions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Wetzel (P) sought a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and damages. The District Court granted Wetzel (P) partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, holding that the policies did indeed violate Title VII. However, the judgment did not provide any of the relief sought by Wetzel (P). Liberty Mutual (D) appealed this grant of partial summary judgment. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that it had jurisdiction and affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the Supreme Court now analyzes the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
- Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (D) appealed the grant of partial summary judgment against it, and the Supreme Court now considers the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
- Writ of certiorari reviewing jurisdiction of Court of Appeals following affirmance of partial summary judgment finding liability for violations of the Civil Rights Act.
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Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Twenty-seven years after the Supreme Court established the burden-shifting analysis for employment discrimination cases, the Court unanimously rejected the notion that a plaintiff must establish “pretext-plus” to prevail at trial. In ., the Supreme Court held that a case may go to the jury if the plaintiff establishes nothing more than a prima facie case of discrimination and that the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge is false. Basically, makes it more difficult for the court to take a case from the jury, and for the employer to achieve summary judgment in its favor.
- (O’Connor, J.) No. A discrimination plaintiff’s case may be sufficient to submit to the jury if it consists of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence that the defendant’s proffered explanation for its action was merely a pretext for discrimination, without the need for additional, independent evidence of discrimination. Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because of such individual’s age. In order for liability to be found, the plaintiff’s age must have actually played a role in the decision-making process and had a determinative influence in the outcome. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and then the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence supporting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the job action. Reeves (P) met his burden here by making his prima facie case, such that the burden then shifted to Sanderson (D), which also met its burden by offering admissible...
- THE COURT MUST CONSIDER ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IN THE DISCRIMINATION PLAINTIFF’S CASE
- A discrimination plaintiff’s case may be sufficient to submit to the jury if it consists of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence that the defendant’s proffered explanation for its action was merely a pretext for discrimination, without the need for additional, independent evidence of discrimination.
- Is the defendant employer entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the discrimination plaintiff’s case consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action?
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Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- CERTIORARI: A common law writ still in practice today which is issued by a higher court to a lower court to see the record for and choose the cases it may wish to hear.
- ...Phi Beta Kappa key” I] Apparently, Brilliant had been investing money for Surowitz (P) and had bought some Hilton (D) stock because they were relatively fool-proof. However, when Surowitz (P) received a letter from Hilton (D) asking to buy a large amount of its own stock, she got concerned and Brilliant got involved. After arriving, at the Hilton’s (D) Chicago headquarters, it did not take Brilliant long to discover that Hilton (D) was engaged in a fraudulent scheme. After explaining this to Surowitz (P), Brilliant convinced her to file a suit in her name and explained to her everything he was putting in the complaint before she signed it. Thus, claims Surowitz (P), she knew what the lawsuit was about but she could not have read and understood the complaint as written in English, especially when a lawyer drafted it! Surowitz’s (P) minimal English became apparent to Hilton (D) during deposition so they moved the court for dismissal. Hilton (D) claimed that Mrs. Surowitz’s (P)...court
- ’s verification requirement that the allegations in the complaint are true to the best of petitioner’s knowledge and belief is intended to discourage “strike suits” not bona fide claims. In this case, neither Surowitz (P) nor her counsel sought to do any injury to Hilton (D) or indicated any bad faith. Rather, Surowitz (P) honestly and reasonably relied on the advice of her son-in-law about the complaint she signed and verified. This was neither intended to nor did cause any actual harm to Hilton (D). Furthermore, the serious fraud charges and heavily researched pleading allegations merited an adjudication of the issues. Instead, the lower courts rigidly and erroneously dismissed the complaint without ever even making Hilton (D) answer it. The three years of pleading and appeals it has taken Mrs. Surowitz (P) to be heard is too long. The dismissal is reversed and the case is remanded for trial on the merits.
- Should an otherwise meritorious case be dismissed when the Federal Procedural
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Swanson v. Citibank, N.A. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Civil procedure scholars have extensively discussed the Rule 12(b)(6) standard articulated by the Supreme Court in . Some say that the standard for a motion to dismiss has evolved in such a way as to make the motion to dismiss the new summary judgment motion. A significant distinction between the two motions, however, is that no discovery is conducted before a decision under Rule 12(b)(6), whereas discovery is complete before the court considers a motion for summary judgment. There is a lot more for the court to base its decision on in a Rule 56 motion. Even so, in both instances inferences are to be drawn in favor of the moving party—not the bank. A motion to dismiss will not be granted if it appears from the complaint that the plaintiff has a chance at proving her case.
- Federal circuit court review of the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s case.
- (Posner, J.) The complaint here alleges that Citibank (D) was the second bank to turn down the plaintiff’s loan application. This reinforces the plausible inference that she was not qualified for a loan. Moreover, an appraisal error is a more plausible inference in this case than discrimination. Errors in appraisals are common. The Supreme Court established a plausibility standard in the case. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully. Here, the plaintiff has an implausible case of discrimination, but she will now be entitled to serve discovery demands on the bank that will require hours of attention from Citibank (D) executives. The threat of such an imposition may induce Citibank (D) to consider settlement even if the suit has no merit. We should affirm the dismissal of the suit in its entirety.
- THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT NEED TO PROVE HER CASE TO SURVIVE A MOTION TO DISMISS
- her case, but all we are deciding at this juncture is that she deserves an opportunity to do so. Reversed.
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Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing 14 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In 1994 the IRS seized real property belonging to Grable & Sons (P) in order to satisfy Grable’s (P) tax delinquency. Grable (P) was thereafter notified, by certified mail, that the IRS was selling the seized property to Darue Engineering (D). Grable (P) did not exercise its right to redeem the property, so, after the statutory redemption period had expired, the government gave Darue (D) a quitclaim deed to the property. Five years later, Grable (P) tried to get the property back in a state-court quiet title action, alleging that the notice it had received was deficient because the relevant statute requires personal service, not service by certified mail. Darue (D) removed the case to federal court. Grable (P) tried to get the case remanded back to state court, arguing that it did not raise a federal question, but the district court found that a federal question did exist and granted summary judgment in Darue’s (D) favor. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted...
- REMOVAL: The transfer of an action from state to federal court. In removing a case to federal court, a litigant must timely file the removal papers and must show a valid basis for federal court jurisdiction.
- EVEN CASES THAT FEDERAL LAW MAY JUSTIFY THE EXERCISE OF FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
- After the IRS seized Grable’s (D) property and sold it to Darue (D), Grable (P) brought a quiet title action, claiming that the notice it received was defective, and Darue (D) removed the case to federal court.
- . In that case, the Court held that a suit for damages to a business caused by a threat to sue under the patent law was not itself a suit under the patent law. Whether the defendant’s act was wrong or not depended on the law of the state where the act was done, the Court explained, not on the patent law, and therefore the suit arose under the law of the state. A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action, and the fact that the justification for the wrongful acts in that case may have involved the validity and infringement of a patent was no more material to the question of under what law the suit was brought than it would have been in an action of contract.
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Alderman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The overriding policy consideration of judicial efficiency once again surfaces, this time in the context of a motion for summary judgment. As you will discover later in the course, a motion for summary judgment essentially dismisses a complaint at the very early stages of litigation. Where a complaint fails to state sufficient facts on which relief can be granted, and where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate additional facts in support of her claim, it is in the best interests of the judicial system to dismiss the complaint before precious judicial resources are expended. If a plaintiff has no chance of winning, why allow a case to go all the way to a jury? This efficiency consideration must, of course, be balanced against fairness. Where the facts indicate even a slight chance of a party prevailing on her claim, that claim should go to trial rather than being summarily dismissed. It is important to note the difference between a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss. A...
- (Moore, J.) Yes. In order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the facts forming the basis for the cause of action can be established. In the instant action, West Virginia law supplies no precedent governing purported releases from liability contained on a railroad pass. However, the Supreme Court has held that this limitation of liability protects a railroad against liability for negligence, but that it does not amount to a release of liability for willful or wanton acts [No, it is not a coincidence that Alderman (D) amended her complaint to allege such conduct!]. In order for an act to be considered willful or wanton, the actor must have been conscious of his conduct and must have known that an injury would likely result from his conduct. In the case at hand, Alderman’s (P) complaint failed to state facts sufficient to demonstrate that the Railroad (D) acted willfully. In order to establish willfulness, Alderman (P) must have shown that the Railroad (D)...
- SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE WHERE NO MATERIAL ISSUES ARE IN DISPUTE
- Summary judgment is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate sufficient factual support for her claims.
- Ruling on motion for summary judgment on action for damages for willful and wanton conduct.
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Griggs v. Miller 3 results
- This case presents a good overview of the basic components of an execution. Essentially, an execution is a court-issued document which instructs a sheriff to seize or assert dominion over the property of the judgment debtor. The execution may authorize the sheriff to levy against real property, personal property, or even income of the judgment debtor. Furthermore, if the judgment creditor is owed money, the sheriff has the authority to sell any property at an execution sale. Any proceeds up to the amount of the judgment are transferred to the judgment creditor, and the remainder is returned to the judgment debtor. However, a judgment debtor often gets the short end of the deal, as the property often sells for far below market price. In the instant action, Brookshire (D) suffered this fate at the hands of an inconsiderate sheriff. The sheriff should have attempted to parcel the land and, hopefully, receive a higher selling price. However, the court’s logic can be questioned, since...
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- ..., to recover the market value of the land. A sheriff conducting an execution sale is an agent of both the property owner and the judgment creditor. His duty is to protect the interests of both, which did not occur in the case at hand. While the sheriff could have offered Brookshire’s (D) land for sale in parcels, his failure to do so resulted in a sale for much less than the actual value of the property. Pursuant to Missouri statutes, a judgment debtor has a right to elect what portion of his estate is sold in order to pay the judgments. Brookshire (D) attempted to exercise this right by sending a letter to the sheriff limiting the execution sale to only the northeast 40 acres of land. The sheriff’s failure to follow these instructions, or at least the failure to parcel the property and sell something less than the entire tract of land, requires setting aside the execution sale. Thus, the decree will be reversed, provided Brookshire (D) repays the $20,600 he received from the...
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Chapter Sixteen. Appellate Review 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (D) appealed the grant of partial summary judgment against it, and the Supreme Court now considers the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
- U.S. Customs Agents argued that the case against them should have been dismissed once the case against the government was dismissed, but the court denied their motion and they appealed.
- Parties to an antitrust action sought a writ of mandamus to reverse an order of La Buy (P), the District Court judge, referring the case to a Master.
- A grant of partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is an interlocutory order and is not appealable.
- Pullman-Standard (D) contends that the Court of Appeals incorrectly avoided the “clearly erroneous” standard when reviewing the District Court’s determination that the company did not discriminate.
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Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Shore (P), a stockholder, brought a class action suit against Parklane (D) alleging that the latter had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a merger. Before, the instant case reached trial, the SEC filed suit against Parklane (D) based on the same allegations as Shore (P). In that action, the District Court ruled in favor of the SEC, and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Subsequently, Shore (P) moved for summary judgment, asserting that Parklane (D) was collaterally estopped from litigating the same issues which had been resolved against it in the suit by the SEC. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that the estoppel would deny Parklane (D) its Seventh Amendment Right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
- Remember that traditionally, collateral estoppel could be used by a party only if that party was bound by the earlier judgment. That is, I could use collateral estoppel against you if and only if you could use collateral estoppel against me. However, in this case, the party seeking to assert collateral estoppel against the other party was not even involved in the earlier action. We did encounter the same scenario in the case. However, the collateral estoppel in that case was called defensive collateral estoppel. This means that the defendant in that case, was asserting collateral estoppel against a party who was a plaintiff in the earlier action. In this case however, we are encountered with offensive collateral estoppel, where the plaintiff in the instant action is asserting the judgment of the court against the defendant in the earlier action. Note that in both cases the party asserting the estoppel was not involved in the earlier action. That is why we call the doctrine “non-...
- Trial courts have broad discretion to apply the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel, even in cases where the defendant will be deprived of a jury trial.
- (Stewart, J.) (1) Yes. A party can be precluded from re-litigating facts resolved adversely to the party in prior equitable proceedings where a court has determined that the party has had a fair and full opportunity to litigate the facts. This case involves offensive collateral estoppel, where a plaintiff is seeking to estop a defendant from re-litigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost in an earlier action. This court resolved that the ...case involved defensive collateral estoppel. Contrary to defensive collateral estoppel, offensive collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy. Since the plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to wait before bringing an action against the defendant, in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment. Also, offensive collateral estoppel may be...
- THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES GIVES COURTS BROAD DISCRETION IN DETERMINING WHEN AND WHERE OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE APPLIED
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Executive Software North America, Inc. v. U.S. District Court 13 results (showing 5 best matches)
- WRIT OF MANDAMUS: An order from a higher court directing a lower court to take some action.
- (Nelson, J.) No. A court cannot look beyond the express exceptions listed in test and the exceptions listed in subsequent cases. Where claims are part of a common nucleus of operative fact, federal courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction only in the four situations enumerated in section 1367(c). For example, a district court may decline jurisdiction over state law claims if those claims (1) raise a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) “substantially predominate” over the federal claims, or (3) if the district court has dismissed all federal claims. In addition, section 1367(c)(4) permits discretionary remand when “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” This catch-all provision should be construed in the same nature of the other three provisions. The court must conclude that declining jurisdiction best accommodates the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. The court must
- section 1367. As you will recall, cases following section 1367. Subsection (a) reiterates the basic notion that supplemental jurisdiction is proper as long as the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. Subsection (c) presents four exceptions to this general notion. The big question is whether these exceptions constitute the exclusive means by which supplemental jurisdiction can be declined. This court thinks so. And in many ways, the court’s holding makes sense. By broadly wording section 1367(c)(4). The majority and dissent differ in how this subsection should be applied. While they agree that the subsection allows district courts to consider economic factors and general fairness, the majority and dissent disagree as to what constitutes “exceptional circumstances” that warrant the denial of supplemental jurisdiction.
- Donna Page (P), a black woman, had been employed by Executive Software North America, Inc. (“ESNA”) (D). Page (P) refused to comply with ESNA’s (D) requirement that all employees study the teachings of the Church of Scientology. As a result, Page (P) contends, ESNA (D) charged Page (P) with a number of errors in her work and eventually fired her. Page (P) filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the termination was a subterfuge for illegal discrimination against non-believers, women and racial minorities. Page’s (P) complaint alleged two federal causes of action as well as three state-law causes of action (for unlawful discrimination, wrongful termination and negligent supervision). ESNA (D) removed the action to federal district court. Subsequently, the court issued an order to show cause why the state-law claims should not be remanded to state court. The district court reminded the parties of the requirements for supplemental jurisdiction in .... In addition, the court...
- (Leavy, J.) I disagree with the majority’s holding that the district court committed clear error. In my opinion, the ground stated by the district court for denying jurisdiction (i.e., the expenditure of substantial additional judicial time and effort) would be sufficiently compelling. Nothing else in the district court’s order indicates that it relied on a ground not authorized by section 1367(c). Courts should be allowed to weigh the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims.
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Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp. 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- , a “plenary action” is a complete, formal action heard on the merits; a “summary proceeding” is a shortened, simplified process used to expedite the disposition of a case).
- (Becket, J.) Yes. The general rule is that an appellate court will break down the issues into their legal and factual components and engage in plenary review of the legal components and deferential review of the factual components. While ordinarily factual components are reviewed only for clear error, the Authority (P) argues that here they should not be. We reject the Authority’s (P) contention that, because the district court issued its findings orally a few hours after trial without the benefit of proposed findings submitted by the parties post-trial, the findings are not entitled to deference. We also reject the Authority’s (P) contention that because the court adopted verbatim many of the defendant’s proposed findings they warrant review under the abuse of discretion standard. A district court’s findings, when adopted verbatim from a party’s proposed findings, do not demand more stringent scrutiny on appeal. We hold that the district court’s factual finding that the Authority’s...
- The public water supplier sued an adjacent landowner for allegedly contaminating the water supply, but the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant; on appeal, the water supplier challenged both the methodology and the substance of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in the defendant’s favor.
- Federal appellate court review of the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in the defendant’s favor.
- n an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The findings and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the court.”
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World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- WWVW is the first real indication of a serious split in the Court over what constitutes sufficient minimum contacts. Sometimes, as here, Brennan loses out. Sometimes he wins. And sometimes it’s totally unclear if anyone came through the debate alive, let alone with a majority behind them. The split stems from two different views on what the most important concern should be in exercising personal jurisdiction: the due process rights of the defendant, or the interests of the forum state in the litigation. Here, the winning side focused more on the former, and Brennan, on the losing side, focused more on the latter. The great irony of this case, however, lies in the fact that neither side really cared whether or not Oklahoma had jurisdiction over Seaway (D) or World-Wide (D), or whether either of these defendants even stayed in the case—after all, Audi and Volkswagen were still in the case, and they were most likely capable of satisfying any judgment which the Robinsons might be able...
- contacts with the state. For instance, in this case, if the Robinsons’ car had blown up in Texas the Oklahoma courts would obviously not have jurisdiction over the case. But the fact the defendants did sell the Robinsons the actual car which did reach Oklahoma and did blow up there, should be enough. Perhaps the Court is right to mock the idea of all chattels being treated in this way, but surely an exception should be made for a car, which by its very nature is meant to travel. It would be difficult to believe that the defendants truly believed that none of the cars they sold would ever leave the New York area. It is true that the contacts between Seaway (D) and World-Wide (D) and Oklahoma were not extensive, but given the other factors that must be considered—fairness and convenience—it is certainly reasonable to subject them to Oklahoma’s jurisdiction for this case. There is no doubt that Oklahoma is the most efficient forum in which to try the case. The witnesses are there. The...
- ...for the actions of others, such as the action of the Robinsons in driving their car through Oklahoma. However, the minimum contacts requirement also stems from the idea that each state’s jurisdiction is limited, not just to protect defendants, but to protect the interests of other states. It has been becoming less and less difficult for defendants to defend themselves in other states, as technology progresses, but the interests of other states in not having their own sovereignty infringed remains constant, as provided for in the Constitution. Unless a defendant had chosen to avail itself somehow of another state, that state’s exercise of jurisdiction might very well conflict with the sovereignty of the state which the defendant did choose. It has been argued that the defendants in this case should have foreseen that their product might wind up in Oklahoma, especially given the mobile nature of automobiles. However, it is not the foreseeability that a given product might travel...
- Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, for its denial of the defendants’ writ of prohibition to restrain the trial court judge from exercising personal jurisdiction over them.
- ...Robinson family—Harry, Kay, and their two kids—purchased a new Audi from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (“Seaway”) (D), in Massena, New York. A year later, as the Robinsons were en route from their old home in New York to their new home in Arizona, disaster struck. While passing through Oklahoma, another car rear-ended the Robinsons’ Audi, rupturing the gas tank and starting a fire that severely injured Kay and both children. Since the driver of the other car was unfortunately not wealthy, the Robinsons brought a product liability suit against the car’s manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft (“Audi”), claiming that the gas tank and fuel system had been defective. They filed the action in Oklahoma state court, and named as additional defendants the car’s importer, Volkswagen of America, Inc. (“Volkswagen”), its regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation (“World-Wide”), and Seaway, the retail dealer where they had purchased the car. World-Wide (D) and Seaway (D...
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Hart v. American Airlines, Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Frank, J.) Yes. Offensive nonmutual estoppel may be utilized in a court that is part of a judicial system different from the court that rendered the prior judgment. Landano (P) and Kirchstein (P) do not dispute that they were not parties to the Texas action. Nevertheless, the issue of American Airlines’ (D) liability is identical in both actions. In addition, American Airlines (D) had a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision in the 19-day trial and appeal of the Texas action. Thus, the requirements for collateral estoppel are met. American Airlines (D) contends that the Full Faith and Credit Clause prevents the Texas decision from having preclusive effect. However, this Clause is implicated only when a judgment of another court is sought to be enforced in a different jurisdiction. In our case, Landano (P) and Kirchstein (P) do not seek to enforce the Texas decision, but rather to utilize the issue decided against the airline. American Airlines (D) further argues that...
- Hart (P), Landano (P), Kirchstein (P), and other plaintiffs brought actions against American Airlines, Inc. (D) arising out of the crash in Kentucky of an American Airlines (D) airplane that was flying from New York to Kentucky. The crash resulted in the death of 58 out of the 62 persons aboard. Comparable actions had been brought in various state and federal courts. The first action to be tried to conclusion was brought in federal district court in Texas, resulting in a verdict against American Airlines (D) that was affirmed on appeal. It is undisputed that the issue of American Airlines’ (D) liability in the current action is identical to the issue determined in the Texas action. American Airlines (D) moves for a joint trial, and Landano (P) and Kirchstein (P) cross-move for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Landano (P) and Kirchstein (P) argue that the Texas decision is conclusive on the issue of American Airlines’ (D) liability in this action. American Airlines (D)...
- Cross-motion for summary judgment on issue of liability for damages arising out of airline crash.
- This case reaffirms the doctrine of offensive nonmutual estoppel, and it applies the doctrine to preclude an issue in a jurisdiction different from the court that originally rendered the judgment. It makes sense that American Airlines (D) should be precluded from relitigating the identical issue that was decided in Texas, because American Airlines (D) had a full opportunity to contest the issue in Texas. As the opinion notes, a party who has had his day in court should not be permitted to litigate the same question anew. In addition, this avoids the condition where one fact-finder could, on the same set of facts, find a party liable while another exonerates him, leading to inconsistent results which are a blemish on a judicial system.
- Offensive nonmutual estoppel can be utilized by courts that are part of different judicial systems from the rendering court.
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Connecticut v. Doehr 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- John F. DiGiovanni (D) sued Brian K. Doehr (P) for assault and battery. Pursuant to a Connecticut attachment statute, DiGiovanni (D) submitted an application for a $75,000 attachment of Doehr’s (P) home. The suit did not involve Doehr’s (P) real estate, and DiGiovanni (D) had no pre-existing interest in the home. A Connecticut Superior Court granted the attachment upon a brief ex-parte affidavit of DiGiovanni (D) showing probable cause [five one-line conclusory assertions!]. Doehr (P) then filed suit in a federal district court, claiming that the statute was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. The District Court upheld the statute and granted summary judgment for DiGiovanni (D). The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- Writ of certiorari reviewing reversal of summary judgment holding that property-attachment statute did not violate due process.
- While the majority purports to render a wide-sweeping opinion on the constitutionality of prejudgment attachment statutes, this case is really only an application of the already-existing ...s (P) interest in having his property free from attachment, plus the large risk of an erroneous attachment, outweighs DiGiovanni’s (D) slight interest in attaching the house. However, the holding is limited to the specific facts of this case. If DiGiovanni (D) did have a substantial interest in the attachment—i.e., if there was a large risk of Doehr (P) selling the property while the suit was pending—then the prejudgment attachment would presumably be acceptable. However, the majority notes that the Connecticut statute remains invalid, since even such exigent circumstances would not justify burdening the property owner’s rights. Thus, perhaps the third prong of the test is of little consequence. Finally, as Rehnquist’s concurrence argued, the majority can be criticized for analyzing a... ...case...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- SUPREME COURT ADOPTS BALANCING TEST FOR PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY
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Hoffman v. Blaski 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- FORUM NON CONVENIENS: Discretionary doctrine whereby a court which has jurisdiction over a case may decline to exercise it, as there is no substantive reason for the case to be brought there, or if in presenting the case in that court it would create a hardship on the defendants or witnesses.
- A federal court in which suit was properly commenced was not entitled under § 1404(a) to transfer a case to a district in which the plaintiff could
- The pertinent rule in this case is § 1404 of Title 28 in the U.S. Code which allows a defendant to request a change of venue. The statute states that “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” Aside from the possibility of automatic waiver of venue transfer by failing to raise an objection at the proper time, a defendant may object to the plaintiff’s chosen venue either if it is improperly chosen or if it is properly chosen but it is not the most convenient and just. When a § 1404 motion to transfer venue on grounds of inconvenience is granted, however, the Supreme Court has stated in that the substantive laws of the transferor court carry over to the receiving transferee court. In ...The transfer could also be intended to throw off the plaintiff’s attorney, who is probably more familiar with the rules of the court in which he...
- Blaski (P) is an Illinois resident who brought a patent infringement action in Texas against Howell, who runs his corporation in Texas. After being served with process, Howell moved to transfer venue to Illinois under § 1404(a) of the federal venue statute. Blaski (P) moved to remand the action back to Texas because, he alleged, the Texas court had no power to transfer to the Illinois court. Blaski (P) argued that since could not have brought the action in Illinois initially, because that is not where Howell resides or does business, the Texas court could not do so either. Judge Hoffman (D) of the Illinois District Court disagreed and denied Blaski’s (P) motion for remand. Blaski (P) naturally goes over Hoffman’s (D) head, as is done in big business, and petitions for a writ of mandamus in the Seventh Circuit which that court granted. Now that Blaski (P) is where he wants to be, Howell is not. Howell argues that the phrase “where [the action] might have been brought” in § 1404(a)...
- (Frankfurter, J.) A phrase like “where [an action] might have been brought” may carry more than one meaning. The most appropriate determination of that meaning is one which would allow an action in the forum which is most convenient and just. Not only will there be very few forums where a plaintiff has a “right” to sue, but these are not necessarily the most convenient and just forums for both parties. The “plain meaning” analysis by the majority overlooks this crucial policy consideration. The more sensible approach is to reason that because a defendant has the right to object to venue and move for transfer, the transferee court of his choice should be presumed acceptable unless there are strong considerations otherwise. As to the argument that plaintiffs would be strongly discriminated against by allowing defendants to move venue, this is but a factor in whether there are “strong considerations otherwise” in a particular case. Furthermore, a plaintiff is not always automatically...
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Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- FORUM NON CONVENIENS: Discretionary doctrine whereby a court which has jurisdiction over a case may decline to exercise it, as there is no substantive reason for the case to be brought there, or if in presenting the case in that court it would create a hardship on the defendants or witnesses.
- (Marshall, J.) No. In analyzing a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, courts should not give dispositive or even substantial weight to the fact that the alternative forum is less favorable to plaintiffs than the one in which the action was initially brought. At present, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is designed to avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law. Giving substantial weight to such a consideration, however, would render the doctrine effectively moot. On the one hand, if courts give much weight to change in substantive law, they will be forced to interpret the law of foreign jurisdictions to make the determination of which is the more favorable forum. On the other hand, it is clear that plaintiffs initially select the most favorable forum to them so courts won’t even have to consider a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens because any alternative forum will be less favorable to plaintiffs than the one they selected for themselves. Of course,...
- for example, the choice was clearly between the United States and Scotland, both the litigants and the courts were aware of this. The crucial progressive step that takes is to establish a balancing test of the conveniences to all parties, without allowing any one factor to be dispositive. The result of such a balancing test is rarely removal to another country. Most courts would not grant such a drastic forum non conveniens motion until all other jurisdictional possibilities have been exhausted. This is an important policy to keep in mind when you remember that a forum non conveniens dismissal is not equivalent or analogous to a § 1404 transfer of venue. Transfer is usually much easier for a court to execute and more predictable for the parties involved since the transferor court’s substantive law will be applied regardless of the location of the transferee court. Dismissal is obviously a more final, more difficult decision for a court to make and, therefore, it requires a greater...
- A commercial aircraft manufactured in Pennsylvania by Piper (D) crashed in the Scottish highlands. Reports suggested either that the airplane suffered mechanical failure or pilot error. (Legend says only the Lochness monster witnessed it.) At the time of the crash, the plane was registered in Great Britain, operated by a Scottish air taxi service, subject to Scottish air traffic patrol, and full of Scottish residents. Naturally, then, Gaynell Reyno (P), the estate administratrix and legal secretary to the attorney who filed the wrongful death suit on behalf of the Scottish families, brought the action in California state court. Claiming negligence and strict liability, Reyno (P) admits that the choice of forum was determined by the fact that the laws regarding liability, capacity to sue, and damages are more favorable in America than in Scotland. Oddly enough, Piper (D) didn’t see this as a boon and moved to transfer the case to a Pennsylvania District Court and subsequently...
- The Scottish heirs of plane crash victims in Scotland try to sue for wrongful death in an American court because American courts recognize wrongful death as a cause of action and are known generally to be more favorable to plaintiffs than the courts in Scotland.
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Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co. 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Frankfurter, J.) Although we concur with reversal in this case, dissent from the Court’s opinion. In all cases in Ohio, the judge is the trier of fact on issues of fraud. The Court should have continued to follow [Although federal courts are bound by the Seventh Amendment to provide jury trials, states are not under a similar compulsion when entertaining cases under FELA]. Until today, has allowed states to choose the fact-finding tribunal in negligence actions arising under the Act. Ohio should be allowed to maintain its traditional division of law and equity courts, and the resulting division of fact-finding authorities. The majority’s opinion confuses the administration of justice to require federal practice to be followed in state courts in a single class of cases arising under the Act. Nevertheless, we agree that the federal substantive standards under FELA should have been applied by the Ohio courts, and therefore we concur in the reversal of the case.
- As the dissent states, this majority opinion may have gone too far in requiring Ohio courts to apply federal procedures such as the right to jury trial. Typically state courts adjudicating federal claims must apply federal substantive law (the “reverse- doctrine”), a policy with which both the majority and dissent concur. However, state courts are generally free to conduct the trials in line with their own procedural standards. Thus, while the substantive law should be identical regardless of forum, a plaintiff generally takes the state court as he finds it as far a procedures are concerned. Apparently the majority is creating a new standard, requiring state courts to apply federal procedures when they are substantial. This holding may be limited only to cases under FELA, as some scholars have noted in attempting to limit the significance of the majority’s opinion. Nevertheless, it seems to suggest that Congress has the constitutional power to regulate the mechanics of trial in state
- Dice (P), a railroad fireman, was injured in the line of duty. Dice (P) brought an action in Ohio state court against Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co. (D), claiming negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). Akron (D) claimed that Dice (P) had signed a document releasing Akron (D) in full, but Dice (P) contended he had been fraudulently induced to sign the release without knowledge of its content. At trial, the jury awarded $25,000 to Dice (P), but the trial judge entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Akron (D). An Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Ohio Supreme Court, relying on Ohio law, found that Dice (P) was negligent in signing the release and was bound by the release. Further, the Court held that the factual issues as to fraud were properly decided by the trial judge rather than the jury. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT: Procedure by which a judge, re-appraising the evidence of the case, overturns a jury verdict.
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Capron v. Van Noorden 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Capron (P) sued Van Noorden (D) for “trespass on the case,” an old form of negligence, in the federal circuit court of North Carolina. Although Capron (P) alleged in his complaint that Van Noorden (D) was a resident of North Carolina, he did not allege that he himself was a resident of some other state, or of a foreign country. Since the case did not involve any issues of federal law, the case could only have been heard in federal court if there was diversity jurisdiction—that is, if the parties were not both residents of the same state. Thus, since Capron (P) did not allege the necessary elements of diversity jurisdiction, the circuit court should have dismissed the case. However, the circuit court went ahead and heard the case, and Capron (P) lost. Capron (P) then appealed to the Supreme Court, but not on the grounds that he should have won in the trial court. Instead, Capron (P) argued that his own complaint had been defective, and that he should never have been allowed to go to...
- This case underscores the extreme importance of subject matter jurisdiction for the Federal Courts. If it is ever discovered, even after a case has gone through a trial and the complete appellate process, that proper subject matter jurisdiction was lacking, that case will be thrown out. There are several other reasons why a case might not be allowed to proceed to trial in a Federal District Court—such as lack of personal jurisdiction—but once a case has gone to trial, such objections, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, are deemed to have been waived, and cannot be re-opened on appeal. went up to the Supreme Court of the United States, after having had a full trial, and it was still thrown out. And making this case an even stronger statement of the importance of subject matter jurisdiction is the fact that Capron (P), the party responsible for filing a deficient complaint in the first place, was the one to bring the question up on appeal. This sounds bizarre, but it actually works...
- (Justice Not Named) Yes. The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, which means that they cannot hear just any case that is brought before them. In fact, the issue of jurisdiction is so important that, even if it is not discovered that proper subject matter jurisdiction is lacking in a case until after a long, expensive trial which reached a correct result on the substantive issues involved, that case must still be tossed out. Certain areas of jurisdiction were granted to the Federal Courts by the U.S. Constitution, so overstepping these bounds and trying a case properly left to the state courts is a serious breach of the essential compromise at the heart of the American system of government, and an infringement of state sovereignty. Judgment reversed.
- Supreme Court dismissed case because the trial court did not originally have subject matter jurisdiction.
- U.S. SUPREME COURT THROWS OUT CASE FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
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Kearns v. Ford Motor Co. 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- REMOVAL: In federal civil procedure, a case may be “removed” on the defendant’s request from a state court to the federal district court if the case could have been originally brought in the federal court.
- Ford Motor Co. (D) offered three classifications of cars for sale: new, used, and Certified Pre-Owned (CPO) vehicles. Ford (D) put the CPO vehicles through a rigorous inspection process in order to certify their safety and reliability. CPO vehicles were sold at a higher price. Ford (D) charged each dealership an annual fee for its participation in the program, as well as a per-vehicle fee. ...the safety and reliability of its CPO vehicles, and that by making such statements, Ford (D) conspired to mislead dealerships to believe that the CPO program guaranteed a safer, more reliable, and more roadworthy used vehicle. Kearns (D) further alleged that Ford (D) failed to disclose the lack of oversight it had over the certification process. He alleged that the inspection was not rigorous, that the warranty did not cover all components, and that the CPO vehicles were not any safer or more reliable than a regular used vehicle. Kearns (P) filed a class action lawsuit in state court, which was...
- Kearns (P) and others brought a class action against Ford Motor Co. (D) for violations of California consumer protection laws; the case was removed to federal court and dismissed multiple times for failure to plead fraud with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
- Fraud is defined generally as deception, deceit, or trickery. Fraud may consist of an intentional distortion of the truth, or misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, in order to gain an unfair advantage over another to secure something of value or deprive another of a right. Fraud is grounds for setting aside a transaction at the option of the party prejudiced by it, or for recovery of damages. “Actual fraud” involves a deliberate misrepresentation or concealment. A court may infer “constructive” or “legal fraud” either from the nature of a contract or from the relationship of the parties. In any case involving fraud, however, the details supporting the allegations—the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct alleged—must be pleaded with particularity.
- Federal appellate court review of the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to plead fraud with particularity.
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Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Frankfurter, J.) Yes. Federal courts with diversity jurisdiction must apply state statutes of limitation if those statutes would have a substantial effect on the outcome of the litigation. Pursuant to the Erie doctrine, federal courts must apply state substantive common law. State law is substantive if it would have a substantial effect upon the eventual outcome of the case. In the case at hand, the statute of limitations would substantially affect the outcome of this case, precluding York (P) from recovering on the claim. Although statutes of limitation are typically considered procedural, and although federal courts generally follow federal rules of procedure, the mere “procedural” or “substantive” label is not controlling. Statutes of limitation can, in fact, be substantive within the bounds of the Erie doctrine. The intent of Erie was to insure that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction arrive at the same result that a state court would in the same action. And in this
- This case, although purporting to follow the Erie doctrine, actually expanded the Erie doctrine considerably. The Erie decision required a federal court to apply state tort law, since federal courts do not have the authority to create general federal tort law. This case, however, requires federal courts to apply state procedural rules—even if they result in a different ...—whenever the state procedural rules have a substantial effect on the outcome of the litigation. Thus, whenever state and federal procedural rules conflict, the York outcome-determinative test is used to decide if the state law must control. Although it is not specifically stated in the opinion, the obvious conclusion is that the federal statute of limitation, or the more lenient equitable defense of laches, would allow the suit to proceed. This court, as in Erie, wants to prevent forum shopping, discrimination, and non-uniformity in the application of laws that would result if a plaintiff whose statute of...
- York (P) sued Guaranty Trust Co. (D) in federal district court in order to avoid an application of a state statute of limitations, which would have barred the case in state court.
- FIDUCIARY DUTY: A high duty to act on another’s behalf, usually imposed on a party in control of another’s person or property.
- York (P) sued Guaranty Trust Co. (D), a trustee, for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Guaranty’s (D) failure to protect York’s (P) interest in a trust. York (P) brought the action in federal court by diversity of citizenship. York’s (P) claim involved allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, with relief relying on equitable principles. If brought in state court, the claim would have been barred by the state statute of limitations. Guaranty (D) argued that the state statute of limitations should apply to this action brought in federal court. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that a federal district court, hearing a suit brought in equity, was not required to apply the state statute of limitations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere 5 results
- This case raises a number of important holdings related to federal interpleader actions, as the detailed discussion indicates. The court’s approach underlines the fact that interpleader is an equitable remedy, designed to bring justice to the stakeholder and settle all adverse claims while conserving judicial resources. Along these lines, notice how broadly the court construed common law as well as Rule 22 and the Federal Interpleader Act. While the court faced many hurdles to allowing interpleader in the instant case, apparently nothing was going to stop the court from granting the remedy. The court’s conclusion, therefore, is not surprising; however, three elements of the conclusion seem somewhat unusual compared to other interpleader actions. First, the court did not discharge Pan American (P) after granting the interpleader. Isn’t one purpose of interpleader to allow a stakeholder, such as Pan American (P), to deposit the funds at issue and then let the claimants battle over the...
- ...old doctrine of “mutual exclusiveness” is no longer a bar to the interpleader remedy. All that is required is that the claims be adverse. And in the case at hand, the interest of each claimant is to reduce or defeat recovery altogether of the claim of every other claimant. Therefore, the claims are adverse, and it makes no difference that they are not identical in origin or amount. (3) Yes. Interpleader is an appropriate remedy for adjudicating unliquidated tort claims via a jury trial. It is settled that interpleader is available to an insurer whose policy is insufficient to satisfy contract claims even if those claims have not been reduced to a judgment. However, no federal precedent exists with regard to unliquidated tort claims. Three arguments are suggested for denying the remedy of interpleader to a blameless insurer faced with excessive tort claims: (a) Tort claims are more conjectural than contract claims; (b) The insurer’s exposure to tort claims is “remote” until they...
- (1) For a federal interpleader action, must the plaintiff be a disinterested stakeholder? (2) May an interpleader action proceed when the claims are independent of one another or not identical? (3) Is interpleader an appropriate method of adjudicating unliquidated tort claims via a jury trial? (4) Does a federal court hearing an interpleader action have authority to enjoin state court proceedings? (5) Must venue and service of process be proper in order to institute an interpleader action?
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. (P) was the insurer of a large tractor-trailer which collided head-on with a school bus, causing several injuries and four deaths. Further injuries occurred when two cars behind the bus collided moments later. Alleging that three suits and numerous other claims had already been made against it, Pan American (P) brought this action in a Louisiana district court for interpleader of all potential claimants. Pan American (P) deposited a bond for $100,000, the full amount of its policy limits. Although Pan American (P) stated that it was merely a disinterested stakeholder, the company nevertheless denied liability toward any and all claimants. [Perhaps only in the world of interpleader can a deposit of money and a complete denial of liability coexist peacefully!] One or more of the claimants brought a motion to dismiss the interpleader action.
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Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Doctrine established a seemingly easy framework for analysis, namely that federal courts must apply the relevant state law of the courts in which they sit. However, it is often difficult to ascertain precisely what state law is. This case takes a large and sensible step forward in the workings of the Doctrine. If the applicable state law is an outdated precedent which state courts have simply not had the occasion to overrule, federal courts may ignore the law. Rather, based on recent state-court holdings which demonstrate a necessity to, yet do not completely, overrule outdated precedent, federal courts may reasonably predict and apply the trends in the developing body of state law. Nevertheless, as the concurrence mentions, this presents a problem for district court judges, especially in cases where the trend among state court decisions is not as clear-cut as in this case.
- FEDERAL COURTS MAY ANALYZE TRENDS IN STATE LAW AND APPLY THESE TRENDS OVER PREVIOUS CASE AUTHORITY
- (Hartigan, J.) In the case at hand, it is clear that the Mississippi Supreme Court would overrule if given the opportunity. Nevertheless, our holding presents a difficult problem for district court judges who must apply the
- (Magruder, J.) No. A state law that has been undercut by subsequent state court decisions, although not expressly overruled, does not necessarily have to be followed by federal courts. Although the doctrine requires federal courts to apply state substantive law, the harsh rule of is clearly outdated. [Apparently this is outdated because the Court wants it to be outdated!] New trends in Mississippi products liability law point to the inapplicability of the decision, which has lost its binding force and has become eroded over time. Recent decisions by the Mississippi Supreme Court indicate a willingness to overturn , although an appropriate situation for expressly overruling this precedent has not yet arisen. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the court would accept the more modern doctrine if given the opportunity [Perhaps you didn’t know that federal courts were mind-readers.] Order of District Court is vacated and remanded.
- Whit Mason (P) was injured when an emery wheel disintegrated and exploded in his face. Mason (P) sued The American Emery Wheel Works (D), the original manufacturer of the wheel, in a Rhode island federal district court. American Emery (D) had sold the wheel to the Hoover Company, who attached it to a bench grinding machine and sold it to Miller Falls Company, who then sold the machine to Komp Equipment. Mason’s (P) employer, T.H. Pearce Company, purchased the wheel from Komp Equipment. Thus, there was no privity of contract between American Emery (D) and Mason (P). The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that it was compelled to follow an old Mississippi law ( ), which held that a manufacturer was not liable for negligence in manufacture where there is no privity of contract between user and manufacturer. Mason (P) appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
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A.F.A. Tours v. Whitchurch 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A.F.A. Tours, Inc., (AFA) (P) operated a travel and tour business, specializing in deluxe tours to destinations in the Australia and the South Pacific. Desmond Whitchurch (D) was employed by AFA (P) as a tour escort for seventeen years. In that position, Whitchurch (D) was privy to confidential information developed by AFA (P), including customer lists, marketing information, and tour information. AFA (P) claimed that Whitchurch (D), upon resigning from AFA (P), misappropriated the confidential information and organized his own tour business in direct competition with AFA (P). AFA (P) sought an injunction against Whitchurch’s (D) use of confidential information. Furthermore, AFA (P) claimed damages of at least $50,000 [coincidentally, this is the jurisdictional prerequisite for diversity actions] and sought punitive damages for no less than $250,000. Whitchurch (D) moved for summary judgment based on the merits of the case alone, but the district court raised the jurisdictional...court
- The St. Paul Mercury good-faith pleading requirement, applied by this court, shifts part of the jurisdictional burden squarely on the shoulders of the defendant. The defendant must prove to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional requirement, a difficult showing made almost impossible when injunctive relief and punitive damages are also sought by the plaintiff. On the other hand, in order to avoid dismissal and get the case to trial, a plaintiff must make only a good-faith estimate of the amount of the claim. Compare this with the requirement for proving diversity of citizenship, which places the burden of proof upon the plaintiff and which mandates dismissal if the burden is not met. As this court demonstrated, § 1332(a)’s amount-in-controversy necessitates a very brief showing by the plaintiff, and courts should bend over backwards to allow any reasonable cases to go to trial. In effect, then, a claim with any possible chance of being worth more...
- Appeal from summary judgment dismissing misappropriation action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- A.F.A. Tours (P) claimed that a former tour guide misappropriated confidential information, but the district court dismissed the claim for failure to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.
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Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co. 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one. The mere fact that a state law is designed as a procedural rule suggests it reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to operate, and not a judgment about state-created rights and remedies. The text of Rule 23 governs class certification, so the only decision is whether certifying a class in this diversity case would “abridge, enlarge or modify” New York’s substantive rights or remedies.
- The continuing viability of the holding in this case is questionable. The only majority ruling in this case was that § 901(b) may not be used to bar class action suits in federal court. Justice Scalia’s broad analysis of the scope of
- (Stevens, J.) A federal rule cannot displace a state law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right. Justice Scalia’s opinion ignores the balance Congress struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and respect for a state’s construction of its own rights and remedies. The plurality rejects this interpretation for two reasons. The first reason is that an inquiry into the effect of federal rules on state law will enmesh the courts in complex determinations. This is, however, what the law requires. Next, the plurality argues that its reading of the Enabling Act is dictated by The plurality misreads that opinion. In that case, the Court had no occasion to consider whether application of the rules in question violated the Enabling Act.
- The Court’s decision impels me to point out the large irony in today’s judgment. Shady Grove (P) is able to pursue its claim in federal court only by virtue of the recent enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). In CAFA, Congress sought to check what it considered to be the over readiness of some state courts to certify class actions, by allowing class-action suits in federal court based on minimal diversity of the parties.
- (Ginsburg, J.) Our decisions instruct that, in the adjudication of diversity cases, state interests warrant our respectful consideration. The Court, I am convinced, finds conflict where none is necessary.
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Allen v. McCurry 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- McCurry (P) was charged with possession of heroin in a state-court proceeding. The trial judge excluded some of the evidence, holding that it was seized through illegal police search. The jury, nonetheless, found McCurry (P) guilty of the charge. Subsequently, McCurry (P) filed a civil action for damages in federal court based on 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged violations of Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure against Allen (D) and other police officers. The District Court granted Allen’s (D) motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Fourth Amendment issue had already been raised in the state-court proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the rules of issue preclusion should not apply due to the special role of federal courts in protecting the civil rights of individuals. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
- This case involves the effect of collateral estoppel and res judicata on state-court judgments in a federal court. The result is very much like the case. As long as an individual has had the full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and the claims against him, then the earlier judgment can be used against him. This is true even if the earlier judgment emerged from a state court and is then used by a federal court.
- (Stewart, J.) Yes. Federal courts must give preclusive effect to state court judgments even where federal civil rights are at issue. Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged would do so. Nothing in the language of § 1983 indicates the congressional intent to contravene the common law rules of preclusion. Neither does the legislative history of the law indicate such an intent. Through this legislation Congress added to the jurisdiction of federal courts. It did not, however, subtract from the jurisdiction of state courts. This law was intended as a remedy in three situations: (a) where state substantive law was facially unconstitutional, (b) where state procedural law was inadequate to allow full litigation of a constitutional claim, and (c) where state procedural law, though adequate in theory, was inadequate in practice. The law thus, allows federal
- CONGRESS REQUIRES ALL FEDERAL COURTS TO GIVE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT TO STATE COURT JUDGMENTS WHENEVER A STATE COURT ITSELF WOULD DO SO
- Federal courts must give preclusive effect to state court judgments even where federal civil rights are at issue.
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Atlantic Marine Construction Company, Inc. v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Latin] Inconvenient forum. Doctrine that allows a court that has jurisdiction over a case to decline to hear the case out of fairness to the parties if there is another court available that would be more convenient.
- Supreme Court review of a Fifth Circuit decision concluding that the district court had not abused its discretion in refusing to transfer the case.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) also provides that a district court o
- A forum selection clause does not make another venue wrong or improper, but the clause may be enforced through a motion under § 1404(a). That provision allows the transfer of a case “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” A case may be transferred to any district in which venue would be proper or to a district agreed or stipulated to by the parties. Section 1404(a) cannot order transfer to a non-federal or foreign forum, so enforcement of the forum selection clause in such cases is through the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The doctrine is applied when the statute does not apply. There do not appear to be any exceptional factors that would justify refusing to apply the forum selection clause in this case. When parties have contracted in advance to litigate in a particular forum, courts should not unreasonably disrupt the parties’ settled expectations. A forum selection clause may have figured centrally in the...
- Atlantic Marine (D), a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia, entered into a contract with the Army Corps of Engineers to construct a child-development center in the Western District of Texas. Atlantic Marine (D) then entered into a subcontract with J-Crew Management (P), a Texas corporation, which included a forum selection clause stating that all disputes between the parties must be litigated in the Norfolk, Virginia Circuit Court or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. When a payment dispute arose, J-Crew (P) sued Atlantic Marine (D) in the Western District of Texas, and Atlantic Marine (D) moved to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Atlantic Marine (D) also moved to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia.
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La Buy v. Howes Leather Co. 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Clark, J.) Yes. An appellate court possesses the discretionary power to issue a writ of mandamus as a means of reviewing an interlocutory order. Appellate courts are empowered to issue writs of mandamus pursuant to [stating that the Supreme Court and all courts created by Congress may issue writs], and the extraordinary writ of mandamus is appropriate when exceptional circumstances exist. In the case at hand, La Buy (P) contends that appellate courts may not issue writs of mandamus to review interlocutory orders except in those cases where the review of the case on appeal after final judgment would be frustrated. We disagree. Since the Court of Appeals could at some stage of the antitrust proceedings entertain appeals in these cases, it has power to issue writs of mandamus reaching them, provided exceptional circumstances exist. We hold that exceptional circumstances do exist in the present case. La Buy (P) abused his power under Rule 53(b) by referring the case to the Master, as...
- This case details the elements underlying a review of an interlocutory court order via mandamus. It should be noted that mandamus is procedurally different from all other means of review, because it is technically an original proceeding entered in the appellate court against the trial judge. Thus, the writ of mandamus is used to confine trial judges to the lawful exercise of their powers. As the opinion stated, mandamus is an extraordinary type of review, used only in exceptional circumstances. In the case at hand, the Supreme Court held that exceptional circumstances did exist, as La Buy (P) completely abdicated his judicial functions by depriving the parties of a trial before a District Court judge. Although the Court never hesitated in allowing the writ of mandamus in this case, subsequent Supreme Court decisions narrowed the availability of this avenue of review. In modern times, mandamus is available only when the issue goes to the jurisdiction of the court, or when the...
- La Buy (P), a District Court Judge, was presiding over a burdensome and complex antitrust litigation. Fearing that he had no time to try the six-week case, La Buy (P) referred the entire case to a Master to take evidence and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. La Buy (P) based this referral on Rule 53(b) [allowing for references to masters in exceptional circumstances]. Howes Leather Co. (D) and other parties to the litigation filed an action in the Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus ordering La Buy (P) to vacate the reference to the Master. La Buy (P) challenged this action on the grounds that Courts of Appeal have no power to issue such a writ. A unanimous Court of Appeals held that it did, indeed, have the power [what a surprise!]. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- Parties to an antitrust action sought a writ of mandamus to reverse an order of La Buy (P), the District Court judge, referring the case to a Master.
- (Brennan, J.) In hearing this action and granting the writ of mandamus, this court has seriously undermined the long-standing statutory policy against piecemeal appeals. The All Writs Act, § 1651(a), does not confer an independent appellate power in the Courts of Appeals to review interlocutory orders.
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Tickle v. Barton 5 results
- The court in this case, which really does not give persuasive reasoning for why it believes that the alleged actions would constitute fraud, certainly gives the impression that it doesn’t quite believe Barton’s (D) story. It seems to imply that Barton (D) probably won’t be able to prove his story, which he will now have to try to do. However, there are reasons for restricting a court’s jurisdiction, after all, so letting clever lawyers circumvent the system through deceit and trickery probably isn’t good public policy. So Barton (D) should at least get the chance to try to prove his allegations, as such actions are not the kind of behavior the court wants to encourage in attorneys. The most important aspect of this case, however, at least in this part of the course, is primarily to point out the difference between subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, a distinction which confuses many beginning students of civil procedure. Subject matter jurisdiction affects whether a
- CASE VOCABULARY
- WEST VIRGINIA COURT DECLINES TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER INDIVIDUALS ENTICED INTO THE JURISDICTION BY FRAUD
- Question certified to appeals court from denial of demurrer to plea in abatement challenging validity of service of process.
- Tickle (P) was injured in West Virginia by a car owned by Barton (D), a resident of Virginia. Tickle (P) sued Barton (D) in West Virginia court and served notice on him in Virginia. Barton (D) challenged this service, so Tickle (P) tried to find another way to serve notice. Therefore, when Barton (D) was in West Virginia attending a banquet. Tickle (P) served him notice again. Of course, Barton (D) challenged this too, claiming that Tickle’s (P) lawyer had enticed him into West Virginia by fraud, by calling him up and inviting him to the banquet. Tickle’s (P) attorney denied this claim, yet Tickle (P) demurred to this plea, so the court had to take Barton’s (D) claim at face value. Therefore, the question was whether or not the alleged actions of Tickle’s (P) attorney constituted fraud, which would make the service of process invalid.
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Gunn v. Minton 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Minton (P) makes the argument that the state courts’ answer to hypothetical patent law questions could have real-world effect on other patents through claim preclusion. Minton (P) has not identified any such case. Even assuming that a state court case could have preclusive effect, the result would be limited to the parties and patents that had been before the state court. The possibility that a state court will incorrectly resolve a patent claim is not enough to trigger the federal courts’ patent jurisdiction.
- After this case, it seems unlikely that a legal malpractice case would ever be held to “arise under” federal law. The analysis used by the Court with regard to patent matters can be applied equally well to a malpractice claim based on any area of federal law. All legal malpractice cases are necessarily “backward-looking,” and all are important only to the parties involved in them.
- Minton (P) sued Gunn (D) for legal malpractice in regard to Gunn’s (D) handling of a patent infringement action, and the state courts held that the case should have been brought in federal court.
- . Here, resolution of a federal patent question is necessary to the resolution of Minton’s (P) case. In order to prevail in his malpractice action, Minton (P) must prove that he would have been successful in the infringement action if the experimental use argument had been made. The federal issue is also actually disputed; in fact, it is the central point of dispute. But Minton’s (D) argument founders on the next factor. The disputed federal issue is not substantial in the relevant sense. The substantiality inquiry looks to the importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole. The legal malpractice claim is backward-looking, and asks what would have happened if the claim had been raised. No matter how the claim is resolved, it will not change the real world result of the prior litigation. Allowing the state courts to address the issue will not undermine the development of a uniform body of patent law, because federal courts are not bound by state court rulings, and the state
- Gunn (D), an attorney, represented Minton (P) in a patent infringement suit. Minton’s (P) patent was declared invalid. Minton (P) brought a legal malpractice suit against Gunn (D) in Texas state court, claiming that Gunn (D) had failed to raise the “experimental use” exception under federal patent law, which caused the infringement suit to fail. The Texas Supreme Court held that the suit should have been brought in federal court because the malpractice claim turned on a question of federal patent law.
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DiMichel v. South Buffalo Ry. Co. 4 results
- DiMichel (P), an employee of South Buffalo Railway Co. (D), was injured in a fall at work. He sued South Buffalo (D) for damages and during pretrial discovery asked South Buffalo (D) to make available to him any and all surveillance tapes they might have made of him. In personal injury suits surveillance tapes are usually the result of investigative work by the defense, which hopes to show somehow that the plaintiff’s injuries are not as serious as he claims—imagine, for instance, the Pl that follows the supposedly wheelchair-bound plaintiff until he catches him out dancing with his girlfriend. Obviously, not all tapes are this dramatic, but nevertheless it is to the plaintiff’s advantage to know whether the defendant has produced anything that he might have to defend against. In this case, South Buffalo (D) refused to disclose any such material, and DiMichel (P) then moved to compel disclosure. The trial court granted this motion and ordered South Buffalo (D) to turn over all...
- This case Illustrates, for one thing, the increased importance of pretrial discovery in recent years, and not just in federal courts. Many state systems have been greatly influenced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which encourage reliance on discovery, rather than the pleadings, as the best method of developing a case for trial. Of course, while extended skirmishes over the sufficiency of the pleadings have greatly diminished in number, contests over what is discoverable have increased dramatically, as clearly demonstrates. This case also gives a clear indication of the philosophy behind the switch to emphasizing discovery over the pleadings. Discovery aims to help both sides be as prepared for trial as they can be, so that the outcome of the trial depends less on last-minute “Perry Mason” surprise evidence and the ability of the attorneys, and more on the actual merits of a party’s case.
- NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECIDES TO ALLOW DISCOVERY OF SURVEILLANCE FILMS
- ...) Yes. Surveillance films should be considered material prepared for litigation and so subject to a qualified privilege. The defendant has expended time and resources in preparing these films, exclusively in preparation for trial, and therefore cannot be compelled to release all such films it might have made. However, this does not leave the plaintiff without recourse. The privilege protecting these films is qualified and can be overcome by a factual showing of substantial need and undue hardship. Given the potential impact of surveillance films on a personal injury trial, showing substantial need should not be hard to do and has certainly been done in this case. Film, as an apparently objective and unbiased witness, can have an enormous impact on a jury. Yet films can obviously be altered, edited, and spliced to show a version of the “truth” that doesn’t quite correspond to reality, as anyone who’s been to the movies lately would agree. Even film that has not been altered can...
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Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.P.A. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The District Court denied Costa Cruise’s (D) motion for summary judgment without prejudice and granted Krupski (P) leave to amend. Krupski (P) filed an amended complaint and served Costa Crociere (D). Costa Cruise (D) was dismissed from the action. Shortly thereafter, Costa Crociere (D), which was represented by the same counsel who had represented Costa Cruise (D), moved to dismiss, contending that the amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and was therefore untimely. The district court agreed, concluding that Krupski (P) had not made a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party. The court explained that the word “mistake” should not be construed to encompass a deliberate decision not to sue a party whose identity the plaintiff knew before the statute of limitations had run, and the court concluded that Krupski (P) knew of the proper defendant and made no mistake. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that...
- ...July 2, 2007, Krupski’s (P) counsel notified Costa Cruise (D) of Krupski’s (P) claims. On July 9, 2007, the claims administrator for Costa Cruise (D) requested additional information from Krupski (P) to help facilitate settlement. Krupski (P) and Costa Cruise (D) were unable to reach a settlement, and three weeks before the one-year limitations period expired, Krupski (P) filed a negligence action against Costa Cruise (D). Over the next several months, Costa Cruise (D) brought Costa Crociere’s (D) existence to Krupski’s (P) attention three times. Costa Cruise’s (D) answer, served on February 25, 2008, alleged that it was not the proper defendant, as it was merely the North American sales and marketing agent for Costa Crociere (D). On March 20, 2008, Costa Cruise (D) listed Costa Crociere (D) as an interested party in its corporate disclosure statement. Finally, on May 6, 2008, Costa Cruise (D) moved for summary judgment, again stating that Costa Crociere (D) was the proper...summary
- In a portion of the facts not reproduced in this excerpt, the Court notes that Krupski’s (P) ticket required her to submit written notice of her claim to the carrier within 185 days after the date of injury, and any lawsuit had to be filed within one year after the date of injury. Costa Cruise (D) did not notify Krupski (P) that she was pursuing her claim against the wrong party until it served its answer on February 25, 2008, four days after the expiration of the one-year limitation period in her ticket. This is more than six months after Krupski (P) first contacted Costa Cruise (D), during which time the parties had been making efforts to negotiate a settlement. In view of these facts, it is not hard to see why the Court reached the decision it did in this case.
- Certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to review an order affirming dismissal of Krupski’s (P) complaint.
- The Court of Appeals also held that Krupski’s (P) amended complaint did not relate back because Krupski (P) had unduly delayed in seeking to file, and in filing, her amended complaint. The Rule, however, plainly sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation back, and the amending party’s diligence is not among them. Moreover, Rule 15(c)(1) mandates relation back once the Rule’s requirements are satisfied. The Rule does not leave the decision to the district court’s equitable discretion. The mandatory nature of the inquiry for relation back under
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Lacks v. Lacks 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This court does a good job at distinguishing jurisdictional issues from substantive issues. The analysis is straightforward once the court decides that, in a New York divorce action, a party’s residence goes to the merits of the case. Failure to meet the residence requirement is, therefore, equivalent to the failure to satisfy other elements of the cause of action. Mrs. Lacks (D) had ample opportunity to contest Mr. Lacks’ (P) residence at trial, or to raise this as an issue on appeal. Be sure to notice, when reading the subsequent cases, that residence often an important jurisdictional issue in federal courts. The editors apparently chose this case to show the differences between state and federal courts in the area of subject matter jurisdiction.
- (Breitel, J.) No. A state’s residence requirement relates to the merits of the case, not to subject matter jurisdiction—the competence of a court to hear the case. New York’s residence requirement for divorce cases is a substantive limitation on the cause of action, precluding a court from rendering a judgment on the merits if the requirement is not met. Mr. Lacks’ (P) failure to meet the residence requirements could have been raised by Mrs. Lacks (D) at trial or on appeal. However, in this case, Mr. Lacks (P) obtained a
- In a divorce, a state’s residence requirement goes to the merits of the case and does not involve issues of subject matter jurisdiction.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- NEW YORK RESIDENCE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN STATE COURT
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Taylor v. Sturgell 14 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Different federal circuit courts had applied different standards to determine whether a unity of interests existed such that a judgment in one case had preclusive effect in another. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the tests applied in other circuits and devised its own five-factor test. Under the D.C. test, the first two factors—identity of interest and adequacy of representation—were , for virtual representation. In addition, the court concluded, one of three additional factors must be established: either a close relationship between the present party and his or her putative representative, or substantial participation by the present party in the first case, or tactical maneuvering on the part of the present party to avoid preclusion by the prior judgment. Applying that test to Taylor’s(P) case, the court concluded that the necessary conditions for “virtual representation” were met. Taylor (P) appealed, and the Supreme Court granted...
- Virtual representation generally refers to the bringing of an action on behalf of an unnamed party or parties, as in a class action, where a number of people have similar interests to the named party, and upon whom the court’s judgment will be binding. It can also refer to representation by a guardian ad litems or trustees, for instance, who represent the interests of others more than themselves. In the present case, the defendants argued that once Herrick’s claims proved unsuccessful, he engaged his friend to try again on his behalf, essentially tricking the court into giving them another shot at the defendants. The court was unpersuaded that this case presented a proper scenario for application of an exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion, but it gave the defendants one more chance, on remand, to show that Taylor (P) and Herrick colluded to avoid the preclusive effect of the judgment in Herrick’s case.
- After an antique aircraft enthusiast’s Freedom of Information lawsuit proved unsuccessful, Taylor (P), a friend and fellow enthusiast, brought suit seeking the same information, and the court similarly denied his request based on the judgment in the first case; Taylor (P) appealed.
- Did the District of Columbia Court of Appeals apply the correct test to determine whether Taylor’s (P) lawsuit was precluded by the earlier judgment in his friend Herrick’s case?
- VIRTUAL-REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE: The principle that a judgment may bind a person who is not a party to the litigation if one of the parties is so closely aligned with the nonparty’s interests that the nonparty has been adequately represented by the party in court. Under this doctrine, for instance, a judgment in a case naming only the husband as a party can be binding on his wife as well.
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Pennoyer v. Neff 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- jurisdiction stems from the idea that a state has exclusive control over all land within its territory, and means that the state can adjudicate disputes over the status of such property, but only up to the value of the property. In the case before us, the original action was initiated by publication of service. The Oregon state court which heard that case did not exercise either jurisdiction—nor could it have. Neff (P), the defendant in that action, was not within the state of Oregon at the time, and so could not be personally served with process. Service of process is basically a command by a court to appear before it, or suffer the consequences. It dates back to a time when lawsuits were initiated not by a command to appear before the court, but by the sheriff actually taking the defendant into custody and physically bringing him before the court. But an Oregon sheriff could not go into another state—say California—and start hauling California residents back to Oregon to appear...
- In the years prior to the Civil War, as America pursued its Manifest Destiny ever Westward, a young man named Marcus Neff (P) set out for the Oregon frontier—thus setting in motion a chain of events that would eventually culminate in one of the most famous Supreme Court cases ever—as well as the bane of law students everywhere for more than a hundred years. Neff (P) staked a claim for land from the federal government and in 1862 sought advice from a well-known Portland attorney (and future U.S. Senator) named John Mitchell, who specialized in land litigation. Whatever Mitchell did for Neff (P), Neff (P) apparently never paid him for it. Mitchell waited until late 1865, and then brought suit against Neff (P) in Oregon state court to recover the unpaid legal fees. As was totally proper under Oregon law at the time, Mitchell did not serve Neff (P) personally with notice of the suit, but published notice in a local newspaper (so-called “service by publication”). Neff (P), not being an...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- SUPREME COURT SPELLS OUT THEORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
- Neff (P) sought to recover possession of land which had been seized and sold to pay off a default judgment against him, claiming that the judgment was invalid, as the court involved had not had personal jurisdiction over him.
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Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Semtek International, Inc. (P) sued Lockheed Martin Corp. (D) in California state court for breach of contract and various torts. Lockheed Martin (D) removed the case to California federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship and successfully moved for dismissal of the action with prejudice on the merits as barred by the state-law statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Thereafter, Semtek (P) refiled its case against Lockheed Martin (D) in Maryland state court within the Maryland statute of limitations. On the defendant’s motion, the Maryland court dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata, reasoning that the decision of the California federal court was on the merits and precluded the subsequent suit. After a Maryland court of appeals affirmed, Semtek (P) sought a writ of certiorari.
- is controversial, in part, because it endeavors to apply state procedural law in a federal diversity case. Under and its progeny, a federal court sitting in diversity generally applies the substantive law of the state in which the action arose and the procedural rules of the federal court, most notably the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The problem encountered in , however, is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure fail to discuss the claim-preclusive effect of federal diversity judgments. With no procedural rule to enforce, the Court created federal common law to resolve the issue.
- Rule 41(b) does not control the preclusive effect of the federal court judgment, the Court must fashion a rule to be applied. In , the Court applied a since-repealed statute to determine that the law of the state in which the federal court sits properly determines the claim-preclusive effect of a federal diversity judgment. Although does not apply to this matter given its reliance upon a repealed statute, its reasoning continues to be appropriate in diversity actions. Because state law governs the substantive rights involved in a federal diversity action, state law should similarly govern the claim-preclusive effect of a federal court judgment applying state law. As mentioned, any uniform federal rule would create forum shopping and promote removal, when available, for a tactical advantage. Only when federal interests directly conflict with the state-law interests will the federal interests prevail.
- After a California federal court dismissed the plaintiff’s action on the basis of the state statute of limitations, a Maryland state court dismissed a subsequent suit brought by the plaintiff on the same grounds.
- Certiorari to review a decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirming a trial court dismissal of the plaintiff’s action.
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Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services 14 results (showing 5 best matches)
- ARTICLE III CASE OR CONTROVERSY: The constitutional requirement that, for a federal court to hear a case, the case must involve an actual dispute.
- (Kennedy, J.) Yes. Where other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same case or controversy, even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount specified in the statute setting forth the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Federal district courts may not exercise jurisdiction in the absence of a statutory basis. The statute that applies in this case is , which contains a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or controversy, as long as the action is one in which the district courts would have original jurisdiction. The single question before us, then, is whether a diversity case in which the claims of some plaintiffs satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, but the claims of other plaintiffs do not, presents a civil action of which...
- May a federal court in a diversity case exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, if their claims are part of the same case or controversy as the claims of the plaintiffs who do allege a sufficient amount in controversy?
- Section 1367, enacted in 1990, provides federal courts with jurisdiction over claims that are part of the same case or controversy as other claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction includes jurisdiction over both ancillary and pendent claims, which were, prior to 1990, treated separately. Ancillary jurisdiction involved a court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate claims and proceedings related to a claim that was properly before the court. For example, if a plaintiff brought a lawsuit in federal court based on a federal question (such as a claim under Title VII), the defendant could assert a counterclaim over which the court would not otherwise have jurisdiction (such as a state-law claim for stealing company property). Pendent jurisdiction involved court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim over which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction, where the claim arose from the same transaction or occurrence as another claim that was properly...
- Where other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same case or controversy, even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount specified in the statute setting forth the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- So far, we have seen that in order for collateral estoppel to be applicable, the issue in the second case, must be the same exact issue as the one in the previous case. Also, collateral estoppel requires the same issue to have been litigated and determined. This case illustrates the meaning of the word “issue”. The same issue means that all the significant facts and legal principles remain unchanged. In this case, the legal principles which applied in the first case had changed substantially. Thus, the issues were not the same. Note that the court’s decision has a broader perspective than the rights of the parties in the action. The court is more concerned with the inequality, which will result if collateral estoppel applies to situations where legal principles and rights of parties have been changed. For example, in this case, there would be an inequality in taxation between taxpayers in the same class.
- (Murphy, J.) Yes. Collateral estoppel may only be applied in situations where the issue raised in the second suit is identical to the issue in the first suit and the controlling law and facts remain the same. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable to annual income taxes. Each year is the origin of a new liability based on a separate cause of action. Thus, a claim which has been litigated for a particular tax year is res judicata as to any subsequent claim for the same tax year and that same claim. In a similar or different suit in a different year, the principles of collateral estoppel apply. However, collateral estoppel can not be applied where a later modification of certain significant facts or controlling legal principles may make the determination of an issue in a prior suit erroneous, or inapplicable. Thus, the supervening decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States or state courts can not be ignored in determining whether the application of collateral...
- Certiorari by the United States Supreme Court to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in action for recovery of taxes.
- Through a series of agreements, Sunnen (D) assigned rights to 10% royalties from his corporation to his wife for no consideration. Sunnen’s (D) wife reported the royalties on her income tax returns and paid the taxes on it. In 1935, the Board of Tax Appeals held that based on a 1928 agreement, Sunnen’s (D) wife, and not Sunnen (D) himself, was liable for taxes between 1929–1931. The Commissioner (P) then contended that the income from royalties from 1937–1941 was taxable to Sunnen (D) himself, and assessed tax against Sunnen (D). The Tax Court, applying the decision of the Board through res judicata held that with the exception of 1937 taxes, all taxes from 1937 to 1941 were assessable against Sunnen (D). The Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s application of res judicata to the 1937 taxes, and reversed the Tax Court’s decision with respect to taxes between 1938–1941 on the ground that the royalty payments were not income to Sunnen (D). The Supreme Court of...
- CASE VOCABULARY
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- This case details some of the factors considered by an appellate court when deciding whether to grant leave to file an interlocutory appeal. As the case demonstrates, the appellate court has ultimate discretion to grant or deny the leave to file, and its decision can have a major impact on the parties to the litigation. Notice that there are actually two levels of discretion required for a Section 1292(b) appeal—the district court must first certify the issue for appeal, and then the appellate court must grant leave for the appeal. The express statutory language states that the appeal should be allowed only where an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The Second Circuit in this case has taken a fairly strict approach to granting Section 1292(b) leaves. As a result, GE is forced to proceed to trial without some important evidence, and its only recourse in case it loses is to go to the expense of filing an appeal. However, the Court...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- General Electric Co. (D) applies for leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s order sustaining Atlantic City Electric Co.’s (P) objections to interrogatories.
- General Electric Company (“GE”) (D) propounded interrogatories upon Atlantic City Electric Company (“ACE”) (P) in pretrial discovery. ACE objected to the interrogatories, which were designed to discover whether ACE had shifted their alleged damages on to their consumers. The District Court sustained the objections, precluding GE’s discovery attempt. However, the District Court also certified its order for appeal pursuant to
- (Per Curiam) No. Discretionary appeals should not be permitted where the party seeking the appeal would have a full opportunity to contest the issue following the trial. In the case
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Pullman-Standard v. Swint 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Marshall, J.) In some cases, such as the case at hand, remand is inappropriate where the facts on the record are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. The findings made by the District Court were entirely based on documentary evidence, and therefore the Court of Appeals could easily reach its own conclusions. I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that a finding of discriminatory intent was compelled by the documentary evidence.
- This seemingly straightforward holding is complicated by a number of issues. On its face, the case simply stands for the proposition that a Court of Appeals must apply the “clearly erroneous” standard when analyzing questions of fact. The case gets complicated when it tackles the appropriate approach to questions of law. If the Court of Appeals believed that the issue of discrimination involved a question of law, then, according to the majority, it was required to remand to the District Court for further factfinding. This makes some sense, as factfinding is one of the central tasks of a trial court. However, the dissent reveals that, at least on some occasions, remand is inappropriate. Where the lower court’s findings are based on purely documentary evidence, then apparently appellate courts can make an independent determination of the issue.
- (White, J.) Yes. A Court of Appeals is bound by the “clearly erroneous” standard of Rule 52(a) in reviewing a question of fact. In the case at hand, Pullman-Standard (D) submits that the Court of Appeals erroneously made an independent determination of the discriminatory purpose behind the seniority system and ignored the “clearly erroneous” standard. We agree. We find that the question of the discriminatory intent was a pure question of fact, and therefore that the Appellate Court could only overturn this factual determination if it was clearly erroneous. Discriminatory intent here means actual motive, not a legal presumption to be drawn from some factual showing. Thus, the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard. And even if the Court of Appeals believed that a question of law was involved, it should have remanded to the District Court for fact-finding. Reversed and remanded.
- Pullman-Standard (D) contends that the Court of Appeals incorrectly avoided the “clearly erroneous” standard when reviewing the District Court’s determination that the company did not discriminate.
- Swint (P) and other black employees of Pullman-Standard (D), a manufacturer of railway freight cars, brought suit against the company for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court held that the purported violations at issue, dealing with the company’s seniority system, were not the result of an intention to discriminate and, therefore, were not violations of the Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Pullman-Standard (D) did intentionally discriminate. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Reeves v. Crownshield 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case accurately sets out the law of civil contempt. First, it is important to note that incarceration is an appropriate remedy for civil contempt. This incarceration is utilized to coerce the judgment debtor into paying on the judgment, not to punish the individual (as in the case of criminal contempt). As the opinion points out, court orders would be meaningless and unenforceable without some contempt sanctions. Notice that the court must examine the unique situation of each debtor, so that only those willfully in violation of the court order—and not those simply too poor to pay—are sent to prison.
- (Finch, J.). No. It is not unconstitutional to hold a party in contempt and incarcerate the party for failure to pay a judgment. In the case at hand, Reeves (D) does not argue that the $20 payment is unjust, inequitable or harsh. He merely contends that courts are powerless to make him pay. Indeed, without contempt sanctions, courts would have no ability to compel judgment debtors to pay their debts. However, there can be no doubt that imprisonment for failure to obey a court order, which order is made with due regard to the needs of the debtor and his family, is not violative of due process. Although courts cannot garnish the wages of a federal employee, once the wages are paid they become part of the employees general income. Courts are free to execute against such general income to the same extent that courts can execute against any property purchased with the income. Affirmed.
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- Reeves (D), a judgment debtor, appeals the constitutionality of his imprisonment for failure to obey a court order to pay his debt.
- A party may constitutionally be imprisoned for failure to heed a court order to pay a judgment.
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Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Black, J.) No. A district court may not deny the right to a jury trial for factual issues through a prior determination of equitable claims. In the case at hand, a common issue between Fox’s (P) claim for declaratory relief and Beacon’s (D) counterclaims for antitrust violations was the reasonableness of the clearances granted to Fox (P). Thus, the effect of the District Court’s order requiring the court, rather than a jury, to determine these issues would be to limit Beacon’s (D) opportunity to fully try before a jury every issue which has a bearing upon its antitrust claims, since a determination of the clearance issue by the judge might operate by res judicata or collateral estoppel to conclude the parties with respect to the antitrust ...be deprived of that right merely because Fox (P) took advantage of the availability of declaratory relief to sue Beacon (D) first. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fox (P) brought an equitable claim for injunctive relief, and a party who is...
- In order to fully understand the rationale of this case, it is important to recognize the distinction between legal and equitable claims and the relation to a right to jury trial. Traditionally, claims brought in equity (such as injunctions) could be determined exclusively by the court, so no right to a jury trial attached. However, modern causes of actions complicate this notion, since parties now bring both legal and equitable claims in the same case. If the claim is primarily equitable, the “clean-up” doctrine allows courts sitting in equity to decide any incidental legal issues that arise in the course of the litigation. This case presents a more complicated scenario, in which purely (or at least primarily) equitable claims are opposed by purely legal counterclaims. Should the party bringing the original equitable claim be entitled to a non-jury determination, or should the opposing party be entitled to a jury trial? According to the majority, the constitutional right to a jury...
- (Stewart, J.) The availability of an action for declaratory judgment should not deprive a court of equity of the power to act. Rather, when declaratory relief is sought, the right to trial by jury depends on the basic context in which the issues are presented. In the case at hand, if Fox (P) had merely asked for a judgment declaring that Fox’s (P) business dealings did not render it liable to Beacon (D) under antitrust laws, then this would have been a simple “juxtaposition of parties” and Beacon (D) could have demanded a jury trial. However, the complaint presented issues cognizable solely in equity, going beyond a mere defense to legal actions. The availability of a declaratory judgment did not, therefore, confer Beacon (D) a right to jury trial with respect to these equitable issues. The majority departs from long-settled principles in holding that, because it is possible to assert a counterclaim involving legal issues, the original claim for equitable relief must be tried by a...
- . However, the District Court viewed Fox’s (P) action as essentially equitable. Thus, the Court directed the issues to be tried before the court prior to a jury determination of the validity of the antitrust allegations. Beacon (D) then sought by mandamus to require the district judge to vacate this order. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused the writ, holding that the district judge acted within his proper discretion in denying Beacon’s (D) request for a jury trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Brennan, J.) Yes. A federal court may hear a plaintiff’s state law claims, based on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, whenever there is a claim arising under federal law and the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. Thus, pendent jurisdiction exists whenever the state and federal claims are so closely related as to comprise one constitutional case. However, pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, based on considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants. A federal court should not exercise pendent jurisdiction if the state issues predominate. Furthermore, pendent jurisdiction is unwarranted if there is a substantial likelihood of a jury confusing the legal theories of the federal and state claims. In the case at issue, the federal district court did not abuse its discretion by taking jurisdiction over Gibbs’ state-law claims (P), since his federal claim clearly arose under federal law, and since the scope of...
- In utilizing the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in this case, the Supreme Court employed a little judicial “slight of hand” in order to escape a thorny constitutional issue and achieve some policy goals. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution extends federal judicial power to only certain types of cases or controversies, including federal questions and diversity of citizenship. The Constitution does not permit federal courts to hear state claims when there is no diversity of citizenship. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, leaped over this constitutional hurdle by finding that the state claims were really just a part of the overriding federal question, as both the state and federal claims arose from a “common nucleus of operative fact.” When the claims are interrelated in this way, pendent jurisdiction allows the court to achieve policy goals. First, pendent jurisdiction is more efficient for courts, since splitting up interrelated state and federal claims into two...
- Paul Gibbs (P) sued the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) (D) on both state and federal claims, and the Supreme Court now reviews the district court’s decision to hear both claims.
- As a result of armed members of the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) (D) forcibly preventing the opening of a mine, Paul Gibbs (P), the mine supervisor, lost his job and was unable to complete a valuable haulage contract. Gibbs (P) brought suit in federal court for both federal and state causes of action, obtaining federal jurisdiction based on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Gibbs (P) claimed that UMW’s (D) actions were a secondary boycott, in violation of § 303 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act, and were an unlawful interference with Gibbs’ (P) contracts of employment and haulage, in violation of state law. Concluding that UMW (D) violated both federal and state law, the jury awarded Gibbs (P) nearly $200,000 in actual and punitive damages. However, on UMW’s (D) motion the court set aside the verdict for damages based on the haulage contract and the federal claim, remitting an award for only the state law claim of interference with Gibbs’ (P) employment...
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In re Peterson 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The petitioner in this case moved the court for a writ of mandamus, or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition. A writ of mandamus is issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform its mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly. A writ of prohibition, by contrast, is an extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court to prevent a lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction, or to prevent a non-judicial officer or entity from exercising a power. A writ of prohibition is a kind of common law injunction that prevents an unlawful assumption of jurisdiction. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal exercising judicial functions in a manner or by means not within its discretion. In the present case, however, the court denied both types of writ.
- (Brandeis, J.) Yes. The Seventh Amendment does not prohibit the introduction of new methods for determining what facts are in issue, nor new rules of evidence. The office of auditor was apparently invented in Massachusetts in 1818. No congressional act has specifically authorized the adoption of the practice in federal courts. But an auditor simplifies the issues in a case, such that his role is essentially the same as that of a pleading. There is no constitutional obstacle to the appointment of an auditor. Courts, in the absence of a legislative prohibition to the contrary, have the authority to provide themselves with the appropriate instruments for the performance of their duties, including the appointment of persons to aid judges in the progress of a case. Nor is there any statute or rule of court excluding auditors’ fees from the items taxable as costs. Motion denied.
- COURTS ARE FREE TO USE NON-COURT PERSONNEL TO AID THEM IN THEIR DUTIES
- The petitioner complained that the court lacked the authority to appoint an auditor to determine the amount due for coal sold and to tax the auditor’s fee as costs.
- Petition for a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition to the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- because high-ranking officials “tend not to be personally involved in the specific actions of lower-level officials down the bureaucratic chain of command.” does not require the court to consider, at the motion to dismiss stage, whether the factual allegations are probably true. On the contrary, the court must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be. The sole exception to this rule is with regard to allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to deny reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences with time travel.
- Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Rule does not contain any factual “plausibility” requirement. Courts have long held that the factual accuracy or plausibility of a party’s claim is not something that is decided before trial. It is part of the fact-finder’s consideration of a case.
- decision should be limited to pleadings made in antitrust cases. That argument is not supported by Rule 8. Iqbal (P) contends that the Court’s construction of Rule 8 should be tempered where, as here, the court has placed controls on discovery. A motion to dismiss a complaint does not, however, turn on limits placed on discovery. Iqbal’s (P) complaint is deficient, so he is not entitled to discovery. Finally, Iqbal (P) claims that Rule 9 allows him to allege discriminatory intent generally, which he equates with a conclusory allegation. The Federal Rules do not require the courts to credit a conclusory statement in a complaint without regard to its factual context. Iqbal’s (P) complaint does not plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action. Reversed and remanded.
- After the 9/11 attacks, Iqbal (P), a Pakistani Muslim, was detained in a maximum security unit as a person of “high interest.” He filed a discrimination suit challenging his detention. The motions of Ashcroft (D) and Mueller (D) to dismiss the complaint were denied.
- The factual allegations of Iqbal’s (P) complaint allege that the FBI, under the direction of Mueller (D), arrested and detained Arab Muslim men and held them in highly restrictive conditions. If taken as true, these allegations are consistent with the designation of detainees as high interest because of their race, religion, or national origin. Given more likely explanations, however, the allegations do not establish such a purpose. Based on the facts ...had potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts. As between that obvious alternative explanation for the arrests and the purposeful, invidious discrimination Iqbal (P) asks the Court to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion. Even if Iqbal’s (P) complaint gave rise to a plausible inference of discrimination, that inference alone would not entitle him to relief. Iqbal’s (P) complaint complains of his detention in the secure unit, not about his initial arrest or detention. It does not show that Ashcroft (...
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Nick v. Morgan’s Foods, Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Nick (P) sued Morgan’s Foods, Inc. (D) in federal court for sexual harassment. Morgan’s (D) was represented by outside counsel, Seibel, but all business decisions were made by inside counsel, Craig. After the parties consented to voluntary mediation, the court issued an order requiring mediation to be conducted in compliance with local rules. Local rules required (1) that no later than seven days before the scheduled mediation, the parties must submit a memorandum stating a summary of the disputed facts and each party’s position on liability and damages; (2) that all parties with authority to settle be present at all mediation conferences; and (3) that settlement be entertained in good faith. Failure to meet a deadline is grounds for sanctions.
- (McMillan, J.) Yes. Sanctions are designed to control litigation and preserve the integrity of the judicial process and lie within the sound discretion of the court. Under , courts have the explicit authority to require pretrial conferences to facilitate settlement of a case. Likewise, local rules empower the court to order civil cases to mediation and establish the procedural requirements expected of the parties to ensure meaningful settlement opportunities. The failure to follow these requirements and to participate in good faith are proper grounds for sanctions. Rule 16 is not limited to the payment of reasonable expenses associated with a pretrial conference, but also authorizes other sanctions deemed appropriate. Sanctions payable to the clerk of court are properly within the court’s discretion.
- Morgan’s (D) outside counsel and a corporate representative with no knowledge of the facts and limited authority to settle were present at the mediation conference. Moreover, Morgan’s (D) failed to file the memorandum of disputed facts and position seven days before the conference and summarily rejected two settlement offers extended by Nick (P), without making a counteroffer. The district court ordered Morgan’s (D) to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Morgan’s (D) responded that the guidelines were nonbinding and compliance would have been a waste of time and money. Nick (P) then moved for sanctions and attorneys’ fees. Morgan’s (D) and its outside counsel were ordered to pay monetary sanctions to the court and to Nick (P). Morgan’s (D) moved the court to reconsider, which motion was denied and resulted in additional sanctions for filing a frivolous motion.
- As a practical matter, it makes little sense to empower a court to order nonbinding mediation but strip the court of the authority to order the parties’ meaningful participation. Nonetheless, sanctions are not appropriate as a matter of course merely because a party declines a settlement offer. Instead, so long as the party participates in good faith and considers the offers presented, the party’s duty of participation is satisfied, even if it never intends to accept any offer presented at mediation.
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Hanna v. Plumer 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Hanna (P) was injured in an automobile accident with Louise Plumer Osgood (D), who was deceased at the time the complaint was filed. Hanna (P) sued in federal district court in Massachusetts, based on diversity of citizenship. Service was made upon Plumer’s (D) executor by leaving copies of the summons and complaint with the executor’s wife, in compliance with Rule 4(d)(1) of the federal rules of civil procedure. Plumer’s (D) executor contended that such service was improper, as it did not conform to Massachusetts’s statutory requirement for personal service upon the executor. The District Court granted Plumer’s (D) executor’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the Massachusetts statute was outcome-determinative and thus, pursuant to York [federal court must apply outcome-determinative state law], service was improper. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Massachusetts statute was substantive and outcome-determinative and must have been followed.
- , granted the Supreme Court the authority to prescribe rules of procedure for federal district courts. The Rule at issue, Rule 4(d)(1), was enacted within the limits of the Rules Enabling Act since it regulates procedures of the district courts. Thus, were there no conflicting state procedure, Rule 4(d)(1) would clearly control and service of process would have been proper in the case at hand. Plumer’s (D) executor counters that federal district courts must apply outcome-determinative state rules, such as Massachusetts’s service statute. However, this argument is flawed for several reasons. As the Court held in Byrd, federal courts may apply federal rules, even if state rules are outcome-determinative, in certain situations. Indeed, at this stage in the proceedings, Massachusetts’s rule is outcome-determinative [Hindsight is 20–20]. However, outcome-determination analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman. When the conflict between federal and state law is outcome-...
- Appeal by writ of certiorari of summary judgment against plaintiff suing for damages for negligence.
- Justice Warren established an important analysis for situations in which a federal rule of civil procedure conflicts with state law, requiring the twin aims of Erie to be sacrificed in order for state law to apply to a given situation. Moreover, the majority opinion asserted the strong national interest in establishing and following uniform federal procedural rules in federal courts. In so doing, Warren may have rescued the Rules of Civil Procedure by providing a simple and clear test for determining the validity of federal procedural rules that conflict with state laws. In considering this case, it is important to take a close look at the Rules Enabling Act, § 2072(a) allows the Supreme Court to establish federal rules of procedure. However, § 2072 require federal courts to use substantive state law. However, the ...to have a substantial impact on the way people conduct themselves outside of court. An alternative test was developed by Ely (Chief Justice Warren’s clerk, who...
- (Harlan, J.) Justice Warren’s majority opinion minimizes the importance of Erie by condensing the case to two aims. Erie was worried about more than just forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws. Rather, Erie’s overlying mandate was that there should not be two conflicting systems of law controlling citizens, and Erie recognized that the creation of substantive state law by federal courts—when such law goes beyond constitutional limits—should be avoided. The proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or federal rule is to inquire if the choice would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct that our constitutional system leaves to state regulation [seemingly the court must be omniscient to apply this test!]. If so, the state law should prevail, even in the face of a conflicting federal rule. Thus, federal rules of civil procedure such as
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Smuck v. Hobson 4 results
- This case presents a thorough and insightful analysis of Rule 24(a)’s requirements for intervention of right. Parties may intervene only when they have an interest in the subject matter of the original action which is not adequately represented by the existing parties. And in rare cases, such as the case at hand, parties may intervene even after a judgment. Typically intervention after judgment is not allowed, as Rule 24 states that intervention must be timely. Nevertheless, the court feels compelled to allow the parents to intervene and appeal the decision in the case at hand.
- Prior to the case at hand, Hobson (D) won a class action suit in federal court on behalf of underprivileged children of District of Columbia schools. The action alleged that the children were being denied their constitutional rights to equal educational opportunities because the schools were operated on a racially and economically discriminatory basis. The Board of Education voted not to appeal, but Hansen, the Superintendent of Schools, and Smuck (P), a dissenting board member, appealed. In addition, Hansen and twenty parents brought motions to intervene in the District Court and the Court of Appeals. The District Court granted the motions to intervene in order to give the Court of Appeals the opportunity to pass on the intervention questions and on the merits of the appeal. The Court of Appeals considered the matter
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- EN BANC: “In the bench”; the full court hearing the matter.
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Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION: Case which presents an entirely novel question of law for the decision of the court; one without precedent.
- (Smith, J.) Yes. In Arkansas, venue is proper in a suit for injuries to land even if the land is located in another state. The leading case on the issue is but none of them are persuasive enough in this case. First is the ground that courts are in no position to pass judgement on land outside their jurisdiction. This is a sound argument if the outside jurisdiction is foreign, but not if it is within the states. Every court possesses the laws of every state in their libraries and they have not hesitated to interpret the laws of other states in transitory actions. Second is the argument that since the tort must take place where land is situated, the remedy for damages to that land should be pursued before the defendant leaves the jurisdiction. This applies to foreign tortfeasors who could be detained at a border, but this does not apply to American citizens who have and use the right to travel freely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Finally, there is the ground that courts should...
- The first thing to note about this case is that the venue law is based on a state statute, which is not to be confused with a federal venue statute. Every state makes a statutory provision for the place of trial, usually designated by county. These statutes are varied from state to state but typically make application distinctions between residents and nonresidents and persons and property. Venue rules are said to have developed for the sake of greatest convenience, but states differ as to whom that convenience is geared, plaintiff, defendant, or someone else entirely. Another distinction between types of venue is the one created between “local action” rules and “transitory action” rules. ...as though the out-of-state property was “brought into” the state. This approach has been highly criticized and the majority of states in this country follow the “local action” rule. This means that a state court takes jurisdiction over property that is located locally and pass on jurisdiction on...
- (McFaddin, J.) Just because every court has a library that includes the laws of other states does not mean that every court is prepared to determine those laws. Furthermore, the fact that is more applicable to foreign defendants is inconsistent with the principle of federalism that each state is like a sovereign unto itself. The majority characterizes them as no more than local administrative units. Finally, the desire not to afford citizens sanctuary from damage actions by citizens of other states is a concern for the Legislature rather than the courts. The “ancient landmark,”
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Will v. Hallock 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- U.S. Customs Agents argued that the case against them should have been dismissed once the case against the government was dismissed, but the court denied their motion and they appealed.
- Did the court properly consider the appeal in this case despite the lack of a final judgment on the merits?
- ...order appeal are that an order (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment. There is only a small class of collaterally appealable orders, and the requirements are stringent. An order rejecting immunity, for instance, may be immediately appealable. If, through rigorous application of the final judgment requirement, the value of the interests that would be lost supersedes the value of applying the general rule, a collateral order appeal may be allowed. Honoring the separation of powers, preserving the efficiency of government, respecting a state’s dignitary interests, and mitigating the government’s advantage over an individual are examples of such interests. Does the claim of the customs agents in this case serve such a weighty public objective? There is no such public interest at stake simply because the “judgment bar”...
- scope of their office] shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” Here, the claim against the government was dismissed. The trial court held that the bar of § 2676 did not apply, however, and refused to dismiss the case against the agents. According to the Supreme Court, the judgment bar of the statute was not the kind of interest that would justify an exception to the application of the final judgment rule.
- U.S. Customs Agents, acting on a warrant, seized computer equipment from the plaintiff’s home. No charges were brought, and the equipment was returned, albeit in a very damaged condition. The plaintiff brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and while that suit was pending, she brought a second suit against the agents, alleging negligence. After the suit against the United States was dismissed, the agents moved for dismissal of the case against them, arguing that the action was barred by a federal statute, (the “judgment bar” urged by the defendants), once the first case was dismissed. The trial court denied the agents’ motion and they appealed, despite the lack of a final judgment on the merits. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the collateral order doctrine justified the appeal, even though there had been no final judgment.
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Rush v. City of Maple Heights 5 results
- as to whether a single or double cause of action arises from one tort nor the language of the syllabus of the lower court in were necessary to decide this case. Neither are appropriate to the question presented in this case.
- Rush (P) was injured in a motorcycle accident. She (P) sued the City of Maple Heights (D) in the Municipal Court of Cleveland. Rush (P) claimed the City (D) was negligent in maintaining the street and this negligence was the proximate cause of her (P’s) damages. The trial court ruled for Rush (P), and damages were fixed at $100. The City (P) appealed, but the judgment was affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. Rush (P) also brought this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga. Rush (P) sought recovery for personal injuries she suffered in the same accident. She (P) moved to set trial on the issue of damages alone. The court granted this motion on the ground that the issue of negligence was res judicata because of the Municipal Court action. The Cuyahoga court entered judgment on a verdict for $12,000 for Rush (P). The Court of Appeals affirmed.
- The limits on the scope of claim preclusion have developed greatly since the turn of the century. As the Restatement (Second) of Judgments explains, the courts used to associate the word “claim” with a plaintiff’s single theory of recovery. This meant that a plaintiff would have as many claims as there were theories of substantive law that he could use to gain relief from the defendant. Thus, a plaintiff could raise several claims from just one injury-causing act or event. For instance, some courts would hold that a denial of relief in a claim for bodily injury did not preclude relief for injury to property. Also, some courts believed that a plaintiff had an amount of claims equal to the amount of his primary rights that were violated. Other courts would find that if certain evidence were used in an earlier claim, then a second action on the same evidence was precluded. At times, this evidence test was used as the sole test; at other times, courts used it as just one test out of...
- (Zimmerman, J.) Without changing conditions to compel upsetting prior decisions of this court, established law should remain undisturbed. There should be some kind of stability that the lower courts and other members of the legal profession can rely on.
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Veale v. Warner 5 results
- Beside being an English case, this is also a case based on the superbly complex common law system of pleadings which current American law no longer utilizes. Nonetheless, the case is an example of early lawyering wizardry with the existing set of laws. The basic process of bringing a case began with a Plaintiff setting forth a claim in his his side of the issue. Basically, demurring meant that no factual dispute existed, just a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the claim. Pleading meant actually challenging the Plaintiff’s right to have the chosen court hear his case or somehow challenging the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff. In response, a Plaintiff could once again ...which could raise new issues and allegations. Defendant would be required to reply to those and the process could go back and forth infinitely until both parties were ready for trial or judgment on the pleadings. As the present case shows, however, a Defendant could not allege new facts in his reply to...
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- Court of King’s Bench, 1.Wms. Saund. 323, 326, Eng.Rep. 463, 468 (1670)
- (Judge Not Stated) No, a defendant cannot introduce new facts in his rejoinder when he has already demurred to plaintiff’s facts in the declaration. Consequently, Warner (D) has waived his right to raise the issue that the debt is void because the original contract was invalid because he has demurred to Veale’s allegation that there was a valid contract. Warner (D) demurred to the legal validity of the debt based on the fact that he had already received a waiver of it NOT based on the fact that the contract on which the debt was based was internally invalid. Thus, Warner (D) seems to be tricking the court in his pleadings by knowingly pleading a bad rejoinder. Judgment cannot be for Warner (D). Instead, Veale (P) is given leave to discontinue on payment of costs.
- Veale (P) brings an action on a contract to collect 2000£ (English currency) which Warner (D) allegedly borrowed and still owes him. Veale shows the court the required sealed “writing obligatory” and accuses Warner (D) of refusing to pay up. Warner (D) responds with a demurrer that Veale (P) no longer has a valid legal claim against him because prior to this action, an arbitration panel forced Warner (D) to pay Veale (P) the full sum of the debt owed to him at the time, 3169£. Warner (D) claims he has already paid Veale (P) and Veale (P) has already signed a full release of the debt. Veale (P) of course denies that payment was ever made to him and in his “replication” traverses Warner’s (D) claim of payment. Nonetheless, Warner (D) replies that he should not have to pay on the debt, regardless of whether or not he has actually paid it, because the contract which formed the debt was not valid to begin with.
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Arguments Proving from Antiquity the Dignity, Power, and Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- CHANCERY: The English king’s secretarial department, the courts of which dispensed equitable relief in cases where there was no relief at common law or in cases seeking relief from the common law.
- The purpose of courts in equity was to achieve justice where the law failed or could not. This argument demonstrates the manner in which equity acted as a check on common law courts. The King (meaning the administration and not necessarily the individual) realized that the strictness of the common law could result in unfair judgments. Accordingly, equity courts were empowered to enjoin individuals from enforcing their common law judgments. Such injunctions, a power held exclusively by courts in equity, were commonly issued in cases of fraud. In many circumstances, common law courts would not hear the defense of fraud; thus, it was up to the Chancellor to grant relief. One can envision the Chancellor as the King’s “kind hand.” This kindness notwithstanding, the American colonies viewed the equity courts as the King’s tool and an enemy of the popular will.
- When the king asked his Attorney General to certify the difference between his Court of Chancery and King’s Bench, a case was presented to him where an individual sought relief from a judgment obtained against him.
- (Justice Not Stated) Yes. The Court of Chancery has the right and power to dispense equitable relief as it finds necessary. It is the duty to the king to provide equal and indifferent justice. When royal subjects seek relief in equity the Chancery Courts should not abandon or expose them to the strictness of our laws. Accordingly, we approve, ratify and confirm the practice of the Court of Chancery. The Chancellor should not desist from giving the king’s subjects relief in equity, notwithstanding any common law proceedings.
- The King was presented with a case where “B” (D) sought relief from a judgment in favor of “A” in an action for a debt of £1000 or for possession of “D’s” manor.
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Martin v. Wilks 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Note, this case was subsequently overruled by an act of Congress which prohibits challenges to employment consent decrees by individuals who had actual notice and reasonable opportunity to intervene, or those whose interest were adequately represented. In this case, we see that the court distinguishes between a voluntary intervention and mandatory joinder. As the word itself suggests, voluntary intervention is “voluntary”; a party whose interests are at stake may choose to join in the action. Mandatory joinder, on the other hand, is when a party to the case seeks to join other parties as plaintiffs or defendants. The decision of the court in this case indicates that even if a party’s rights may be affected, the party is not obligated to intervene. However, when a party in a case wants to make the judgment binding on a nonparty, that party must join the nonparty in the action under the mandatory joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
- (Stevens, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J.) While the consent decree in this case could not deprive the white firefighters of their contractual rights, such as seniority or other legal rights, there is no reason why the consent judgment might not produce changes in conditions at the white firefighters’ place of employment that may have a serious effect on their opportunities for employment or promotion. The fact that one of the effects of the decree is to curtail the opportunities of nonparties does not mean that the nonparties have been deprived of legal rights or that they have standing to appeal from that decree without becoming parties. A person who can foresee that a lawsuit is likely to have an impact on his interests may pay a heavy price if he elects to sit on the sidelines instead of intervening in the action. In this case, the District Court, after conducting a trial and carefully considering the firefighters’ arguments, concluded that the effort of the City and...
- The City of Birmingham (“City”) and the Jefferson County Personnel Board (“Board”) entered into a consent judgment with black firefighters for discrimination in hiring and promotion of the latter. Subsequently, white firefighters (“Martin”) (P) brought an action against the City and the Board (D), alleging that the promotions were in violation of federal law because they were based on race. The City and the Board (D) defended on the ground that the consent judgment precluded the current suit. The District Court, holding in favor of the City and the Board (D), declared that the consent judgment was a defense to the reverse discrimination alleged by the white firefighters (P). The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the consent judgment did not preclude the current suit because the white firefighters (P) were not parties to the previous judgment. In the Supreme Court, the City and the Board (D) argued that the white firefighters could have intervened in the first suit.
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- Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District in discrimination suit.
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Scott v. Shepherd 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In addition to highlighting the obvious technicalities of common law pleading requirements, this case is important because of Justice Blackstone’s prophetic dissent. An act did not need to be unlawful to cause injury and resultant liability and, at the end of the century, the courts saw a boom in suits over vehicular collisions and pedestrian accidents in which injury was caused by acts that were not unlawful in themselves. The suits expanded both trespass and case to include the tort of negligence. Negligence law, as the name suggests, did not require that the initial act be unlawful, just that it be careless and negligent. Thus, as tort cases grew exponentially, the American courts were more and more lax in allowing a plaintiff to select his cause of action in either trespass or case thereby blurring the lines between both.
- (Gould, J.) The only difference between trespass and case is pleading the form of action, not in the type of remedy offered the plaintiff. Therefore, trespass is as appropriate as case in this situation. Simply put, the trespass action will be viewed as though Shepherd (D) threw the squib directly into Scott’s (P) face, without the intervention of the others [one of the many fictions the courts are willing to rely on].
- CASE (a.k.a. “trespass on the case”): Common law cause of action to recover damages for injury caused by the defendant’s wrongful act.
- (Blackstone, J.) No, trespass is not the appropriate form of action in this case. Trespass may only lie where the injury is the immediate result of the wrongful act. When there are intervening acts, however, the action must be in case. The lawfulness of the original act cannot be determinative because trespass may also lie for injuries caused by lawful acts (as in the famous example of chopping down one’s tree and having it accidentally fall onto the neighbor’s property and killing the neighbor himself). Thus, the only issue to be raised is whether Scott’s (P) injuries were direct and immediate or indirect and consequential. Since Scott’s (P) injuries were only consequential, trespass cannot lie against Shepherd (D) but perhaps should lie against Ryal (who could have put the squib out instead of throwing it in Scott’s face). Judgment could have been for Scott (P) only if he had brought an action in case rather than trespass.
- BLURRING DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN TRESPASS AND CASE MARKS THE DAWN OF ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE
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Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION: Cases that can be heard by the federal courts because the case arises under the federal Constitution, acts of Congress or treaties, and involves interpretation of said laws.
- (Moody, J.) No. A plaintiff cannot obtain subject matter jurisdiction simply by anticipating that the defendant will raise federal questions in its defense. Even if the plaintiff’s allegations show that very likely federal questions will arise in the course of litigation, the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint must itself raise the federal questions in order to obtain subject matter jurisdiction. In the case at hand, it is unnecessary to consider the merits of the Mottleys (P) claim, as the federal court was without jurisdiction. There was no diversity of citizenship, and the only possible grounds for federal jurisdiction were as a suit arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. However, the Mottleys (P) cause of action did not raise a federal question. Rather, the Mottleys (P) merely anticipated that the Railroad (D) would defend its cancellation based on an act of Congress. Further, the Mottleys (P) contended that, in response to this defense, they would raise...
- This court, in an apparent reaction to Justice Marshall’s broad reading of the “arising under” language, decided to significantly curtail federal question jurisdiction. The court’s analysis is reasonable, since an alternative holding would allow any plaintiff to obtain federal question jurisdiction simply by alleging that the defendant will raise federal questions in its defense. In effect, the court is telling plaintiffs to mind their own business and state only their own claims, as they will have ample opportunity to contest any defenses later. More importantly, however, it severely limits federal question jurisdiction to causes of action which themselves involve federal questions. This is a fair reading of the “arising under” language. Note that, in an ironic twist, the Mottleys (P) subsequently brought their claim in state court, and the Supreme Court eventually ruled on the merits in favor of the Mottleys (P) three years later.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Mr. and Mrs. Mottley (P) brought suit in federal court for cancellation of a lifetime free travel pass on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad (D), anticipating that the Railroad’s (D) defenses would involve federal questions.
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Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case, announcing the Erie Doctrine, has been called one of the most important cases in American legal history. Indeed, the majority’s decision has far-reaching implications for all diversity cases brought in federal courts. Federal courts must now apply the substantive laws of the states in which they sit, whether statutory or judge-made. The holding affirms the concepts of state sovereignty and autonomy. In addition, the holding accomplishes a vital goal, preventing discrimination and encouraging uniformity by eliminating “forum shopping.” Under , a diverse plaintiff could choose the law most favorable to a claim by selecting either a federal or state forum. The Erie Doctrine results in the same law being applied regardless of forum. Notice that Pennsylvania law was applied in this case, even though the suit was brought in New York district court, since New York’s choice of law rules dictate applying the law of the state where the injury occurred.
- While walking along a footpath on Erie Railroad Co.’s (D) right of way in Pennsylvania, Harry Tompkins (P) was struck by a bar extending from the side of Erie Railroad’s (D) train. Tompkins (P) sued Erie (D) for negligence based on diversity jurisdiction in a New York federal district court. Tompkins (P) argued that, pursuant to Swift (Federal courts must follow only state statutory laws, not state judge-made common law) the “general law” of most states—that a railroad owes a duty of ordinary care to pedestrians such as Tompkins (P)—should govern the case. However, Erie (D) contended that Pennsylvania common law should govern, under which a traveler like Tompkins (P) would be regarded as a trespasser to whom Erie (D) only owed a duty to avoid wanton negligence. The District Court and Court of Appeals sided with Tompkins (P) and applied the general law, awarding Tompkins (P) $30,000 in damages. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- (Brandeis, J.) No. A federal court is required to apply the common law of the state in which it sits rather than federal common law. First, was based on a misinterpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Research into § 34 has revealed that the Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts exercising diversity of citizenship jurisdiction to apply the unwritten common law of the state in which they sit, in addition to the written statutory law. [How convenient for Brandeis that this research had been conducted!] Second, has led to discrimination against parties sued in federal courts via diversity jurisdiction. Under ’s construction of § 34 was itself unconstitutional, allowing federal courts to create federal common law and giving federal courts much more power than the Constitution allows. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in state actions, and hence Congress could not have delegated this power to federal
- (Butler, J.) Erie’s (D) petition for a writ of certiorari presented only the question of whether Tompkins’ (P) claims should have been decided based on Pennsylvania common law and, if so, whether Tompkins (P) was guilty of contributory negligence. No constitutional question was suggested or argued, and the consideration of no constitutional question was necessary in adjudicating this case. Thus, the majority has overstepped their bounds. Moreover, where a constitutional question is forwarded, the procedure established by Congress requires the court to certify the issue to the Attorney General so that the United States might intervene as a party and be heard on the constitutional question. [Apparently the U.S. Supreme Court is incapable of formulating the astute arguments that the Attorney General would raise.] Rather, the judgment below should have been reversed on the grounds of Tompkins’ (P) contributory negligence.
- LANDMARK U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION REQUIRES FEDERAL COURTS TO APPLY STATE SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW
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Dioguardi v. Durning 4 results
- In an unusual display of concern, the court expresses its desire that Dioguardi (P) employ legal assistance for the remand and other proceedings of his case. However, it does seem unlikely that the court would have been as accepting of Dioguardi’s (P) confused and ineffective legal arguments if they had been prepared by a paid attorney rather than an innocent immigrant subject to the intricate web of complexities that is the American legal system. As sympathetic as this plaintiff may have been, the court received sharp criticism for its decision in this case as being too liberal. ...of Civil Procedure as requiring from the complaint little beyond mere “notice.” As notice pleading came to replace fact pleading as the norm, the advantages of the new system became clearer. No longer did courts battle over classification distinctions between “ultimate facts” and “conclusions of law.” No longer did a party need to take up precious “statute of limitations” time to research and... ...case...
- Rule 8(a), a party need only make a “short and plain statement” which shows that he is entitled to relief. Meaning the only issue for a reviewing court to resolve is whether the opposing party has been sufficiently about the claim to be able to prepare a defense to it. Thus, despite Dioguardi’s obvious problem with the English language, his complaint disclosed enough information to inform Durning (D) that he was being charged with wrongfully converting property in violation of Treasury Regulations and other federal statutes. This is ample notice to a defendant of the type of action brought against him. If Durning (D) truly required more information, he could have easily obtained it through discovery. Judgment for defendant is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Hopefully, Dioguardi will accept legal assistance to advise him for the duration of his case.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- ...of medicinal tonics from Italy, and he is not fluent in English. Without a detailed account as to why, Dioguardi’s (P) tonics ended up being placed for sale at public auction, presumably as “unclaimed customs merchandise.” In his complaint, Dioguardi (P) states that when Durning (D) sold the tonics at auction, he sold them to another bidder for $10 less than Dioguardi’s bidding price of $120. Dioguardi also states that three weeks before the auction sale, two cases with 38 bottles of tonic disappeared. In less than flowing prose, Dioguardi (P) authored his own complaint without the assistance of an attorney and, in it, claimed $5,000 in damages, not including interest and costs. Durning (D) replied with a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts “sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” The motion was granted, but after Dioguardi (P) submitted his amended complaint, Durning (D) again moved for dismissal on the same grounds and got it. [If...
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Case v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Cameron) Yes. A complaint will be dismissed if it fails to set forth facts upon which a court could possibly grant relief. This is true even if the court could imagine some other claim that the plaintiff might have made, but didn’t. In this case, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the insurance companies (D) had effectively terminated his contract. There is nothing that can be said to this, except: So what? The insurance companies had every right to terminate his contract. There is no relief to be had. So there is nothing the court can do. Case (P) did argue in support of his complaint that the insurance companies (D) might have interfered with his civil rights, but there is nothing in the complaint itself to support this. Case (P) could have amended his complaint to reflect this argument, or others, and the outcome might have been different, but he did not. Therefore, the complaint as it stands does not set forth facts upon which a court might grant relief and must be...
- This case illustrates the importance and complexity of correct pleading. One of the first steps in any lawsuit is the filing of a complaint. If the complaint is not extremely carefully drafted, a case can be thrown out for a variety of reasons, as was shown in Case. This is less true under the Federal Rules, but was certainly the case before they were adopted, and to this day in many state court systems. Often, a case will be dismissed regardless of the ultimate
- Case (P), an insurance agent who represented three insurance companies (D) in his area, entered the race for County Supervisor of Adams County, Mississippi, in 1959. The insurance companies (D) then began to threaten that they would terminate his contract with them unless he dropped out of the race. Case (P) sued the insurance companies (D) for what he called “malicious” “meddl[ing] and interfer[ing]” with his work. The court interpreted this to mean that Case (P) was suing for wrongful termination, but the contract that existed between Case (P) and the insurance companies (D) gave the insurance companies (D) the right to terminate Case (P) without cause—that is, for any, or no, reason at all. Therefore, what Case (P) was accusing them of doing was perfectly within their rights, so Case’s (P) complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- APPEALS COURT RULES THAT LOWER COURT CANNOT ASSUME WORDS TO BE IN PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
- A complaint should not be dismissed if it alleges facts upon which a court could possibly grant relief, but this doesn’t mean that the court should invent a basis for relief when the complaint does not state one.
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Des Moines Navigation & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co. 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Waite) Yes. Until a case is judicially annulled, vacated, or set aside, it still has the power to bar future cases involving the same claim or cause of action, under the doctrine of res judicata. It is true that the federal courts did not properly have jurisdiction over this matter when it was first litigated, or at least over those parts of it as between the Iowa Homestead Co. (P) and the Des Moines Navigation & Railroad Co. (D), both being citizens of Iowa. However, the Iowa Homestead Co. (P) had every opportunity to object to the jurisdiction on appeal, and did not do so. If the jurisdiction had been attacked, the judgment could have been set aside as erroneously entered into, but Iowa (P) did not attack it; it has thus lost the ability to challenge the jurisdiction in another court. Since the jurisdictional matter was not challenged at any stage of the proceedings, all the way up to the Supreme Court, it was effectively settled. Thus all other courts are required to accept that...
- The Iowa Homestead Co. (P), a citizen of Iowa, originally brought suit for unpaid taxes against the Des Moines Navigation & Railroad Co. (D), another citizen of Iowa, along with quite a few other defendants, in a state court. Some of those other defendants were citizens of New York, and they moved to remove the suit to federal court. Apparently the whole suit got moved into federal court, even though there wasn’t complete diversity. Nobody brought this up, though, and the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court with no discussion of jurisdiction. When the Iowa Homestead Co. (P) lost, they tried to give it another shot by bringing another action in Iowa state court against at least the Iowa defendant, claiming that the federal verdict was null and void due to the lack of proper subject matter jurisdiction. Well, the Iowa courts bought it, even the Iowa Supreme Court, but the U.S. Supreme Court got a little angry that anyone would call their verdicts “nullities,” and said that the...
- This case is useful for introducing the idea of res judicata, an extremely important concept to learn. Yet this case is otherwise rather confusing to introduce at this stage of a Civil Procedure course. By far the most important thing to remember at this point, at least with respect to federal subject matter jurisdiction, is that it can be brought up and challenged at any time, even on appeal, by any party or the court itself. This distinguishes it from personal jurisdiction, which is waived if not objected to right away, at the very beginning of a case. Subject matter jurisdiction is extremely important. The fact that it can’t be attacked collaterally (i.e., in a separate, subsequent lawsuit) has actually not been addressed that often, and not recently. And it just isn’t likely to be as big an issue when you study subject matter jurisdiction in depth. What you should remember from this case, however, is the idea of res judicata. Literally, this means something like “thing judged,”...
- SUPREME COURT RULES THAT ITS JUDGMENTS ARE FINAL, EVEN IN CASES WHERE IT DID NOT PROPERLY HAVE JURISDICTION
- Iowa Homestead Co. (P) sued for back taxes and lost, then tried a second time because the first suit had been tried in federal courts, which had not had proper jurisdiction over the case.
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Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Marshall, J.) Yes. A simple two-part analysis covers cases in which federal statutes conflict with state law. First, the court must determine whether the statute is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the court. In the case at hand, § 1404(a) is broad enough to cover the issue of whether to transfer the case to a Manhattan court in accordance with the forum selection clause. Section 1404(a) allows a district court, in its discretion, to weigh a number of factors in determining whether transfer is appropriate. The forum selection clause is a significant factor in this analysis, and the district court must analyze the convenience of the forum, the parties’ preferences, the fairness of the transfer, and the parties’ relative bargaining power in agreeing to the clause. A state policy—such as Alabama’s—that focuses on only a subset of these considerations by specifically disfavoring forum selection clauses, cannot co-exist with ...for a federal court system carries...
- Relying on a forum selection clause in their dealership agreement, Ricoh (D) attempted to transfer a case from Alabama to New York district court.
- Stewart Organization (P) entered into a dealership agreement to market the copier products of Ricoh (D). The agreement contained a forum-selection clause, requiring all disputes arising out of the contract to be litigated in Manhattan court. However, when relations soured between the companies, Stewart (P) sued Ricoh (D) in an Alabama district court. Ricoh moved to transfer the case to a New York district court, pursuant to and in reliance on the forum selection clause. Holding that Alabama law controls the transfer motion, and noting that Alabama looks unfavorably upon contractual forum-selection clauses, the District Court denied the motion. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the venue question was governed by federal law, under which the forum selection clause was enforceable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- Justice Marshall finally manages to consolidate and simplify the analysis for situations where federal statutes conflict with state law. There is really only one step to this analysis, as the constitutional question in all of these cases can be settled by a cursory reference to Congress’ power. The more-difficult step has been stated in various ways in cases from The previous explanation, that the federal statute must be in direct conflict with a state law, has been changed slightly by Marshall, who now declares that the federal statute must be sufficiently broad to control the issue before the court. These two tests are really saying the same thing. The “issue before the court” is, of course, one for which state law supplies an answer. Thus, state law is necessarily broad enough to control the issue. Furthermore, where a federal rule is also sufficiently broad, there exists a definite conflict between the rule and state law. This new approach perhaps helps explain the questionable...
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Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case clearly overrides the statement in that “[t]here is no federal common law.” However, the Court gives little justification for going against this established precedent. The case would have made much more sense had it conducted an analysis under § 1652, the Rules of Decision Act. As construed by , this Act requires federal courts to apply state common law In the case at hand, an Act of Congress (the Federal Emergency Relief Act) authorized the United States (P) to write the check. However, there was a gap in the statute, since it did not address situations in which an endorser forged the signature. In order to establish a cohesive, uniform federal law to cover the situation, the Court fills the statute’s gap by creating specialized federal common law. Congress could have filled this gap itself, or Congress could have delegated powers to federal courts to fill gaps in statutes. Although Congress took neither approach, apparently Justice Douglas presumes that federal courts...
- A check issued by the United States (P), for services performed under the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1935, was stolen and fraudulently cashed by an unknown person at a J.C. Penney store. J.C. Penney endorsed the check to Clearfield Trust (D), and Clearfield Trust (D) in turn endorsed the check, guaranteeing all prior endorsements, and collected the funds from the government. Neither J.C. Penney nor Clearfield Trust (D) suspected forgery. Furthermore, federal officials did not inform either of these endorsers of the forgery until eight months after learning that the intended recipient had not received the check. The United States (P) sued Clearfield Trust (D) in federal court. The District Court applied Pennsylvania law, under which the United States (P) was barred from recovery due to the unreasonable delay in giving notice of the forgery, and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- doctrine does not apply in this situation, and the federal court may apply federal common law. The rights and duties of the United States (P) in commercial paper should be governed by federal rather than local law. [This sounds good, but the court does not justify why it is true!] In the instant action, the check was issued for services performed under a federal statute, but the statute failed to cover situations of forgery. With regards to commercial paper issued by the United States (P), there is a strong national interest in applying a uniform body of law. In ascertaining what federal law should govern this action, the Court can look to ...precedent to suit]. While the Court now holds that the lack of prompt notice may be a defense, Clearfield Trust (D) failed to prove that its injury was caused by the United States’ (P) delay. Rather, Clearfield Trust’s (D) neglect in accepting the forger’s signature occasioned its own loss. Furthermore, Clearfield Trust (D) can still maintain...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Federal courts may create federal common law in order to serve national interests and fill gaps in federal statutes.
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Chapter One. A Survey of the Civil Action 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Supreme Court dismissed case because the trial court did not originally have subject matter jurisdiction.
- In the Federal Courts, a case will be thrown out for lack of subject matter jurisdiction even if it has already made it to the appellate stage by the time the problem is discovered.
- Iowa Homestead Co. (P) sued for back taxes and lost, then tried a second time because the first suit had been tried in federal courts, which had not had proper jurisdiction over the case.
- Summary judgment is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate sufficient factual support for her claims.
- A complaint should not be dismissed if it alleges facts upon which a court could possibly grant relief, but this doesn’t mean that the court should invent a basis for relief when the complaint does not state one.
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T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This court affirms the Supreme Court’s narrow readings of “arising under” language, retreating from Justice Marshall’s broad interpretations in Not every action involving a copyright is subject to federal jurisdiction. Certainly, to grant such jurisdiction could clog the federal courts. State courts typically deal with issues of contractual assignments and breaches of contract, and contract law is almost entirely state- created. Indeed, this case can be analogized to a simple breach of contract case, where a plaintiff alleges that a defendant failed to supply the promised number of banana squashes. Such an action would not be a federal question, and a copyright assignment issue should not be either.
- , only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act, or presents a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the claim. In the case at hand, the crucial issue is whether or not Eliscu (D) assigned his rights in the copyright to Dreyfus—rights to which Harms (P) was a successor. The case does not involve any act or threat of copyright infringement, which would be dealt with under the Copyright Act. Likewise, Harms’ (P) claim does not disclose a need for determining the application of the Copyright Act. Finally, there is no distinctive policy of the Copyright Act which requires federal principles to govern this claim. The case involves contractual assignment issues, and the Copyright Act does not create an explicit right of action to enforce or rescind assignments of copyrights. State laws of property and contracts should govern these issues.
- NOT EVERY COPYRIGHT CASE IS SUBJECT TO FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
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- Edward Eliscu (D) was a songwriter. T.B. Harms Co. (P) alleged that Eliscu (D) assigned his rights in some copyrights of his songs to Max Dreyfus, and that Harms (P) was a successor to these assigned copyrights. However, Eliscu (D) denied this original assignment, maintaining that he properly renewed the copyrights and assigned then to Ross Jungnickel (D) nearly thirty years after the original alleged assignment. Harms (P) initiated an action in a New York district court for equitable and declaratory relief against Eliscu (D) and Jungnickel (D). Harms (P) predicated federal jurisdiction on , conceding that no diversity of citizenship existed. The district court granted Eliscu (D) and Jungnickel’s (D) motion to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction. Harms (P) appeals this dismissal.
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Chapter Six. Ascertaining the Applicable Law 16 results (showing 5 best matches)
- York (P) sued Guaranty Trust Co. (D) in federal district court in order to avoid an application of a state statute of limitations, which would have barred the case in state court.
- Federal courts must follow only state statutory laws, not state judge-made common law, in cases in which state law applies.
- Relying on a forum selection clause in their dealership agreement, Ricoh (D) attempted to transfer a case from Alabama to New York district court.
- Harry Tompkins (P), a pedestrian who was injured when a bar protruding from an Erie Railroad (D) car struck him, sued in federal court and alleged that federal common law should govern the action.
- Federal courts are required to apply the substantive common law of the state in which they sit.
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Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- FEDERAL COMMON LAW: The judge-made law of federal courts, excluding the law in all cases governed by state law; specifically, the body of decisional law derived from federal courts adjudicating federal questions and other matters of federal concern, such as the law applying to disputes between two states, as well as foreign-relations law.
- (Stevens, J.) While the judicial process may involve some measure of lawmaking, courts should carefully determine the proper decisionmaker before embarking on the creation of law. Because this case involves the creation of new legal doctrine, it would be better placed in the hands of legislators.
- (Brennan, J.) Had the defendant built the helicopter for a commercial operation, it certainly would have been liable for any negligent design in the helicopter. Yet, because the design defect occurred during the performance of a government contract, the defendant is relieved of any breach of duty that would otherwise result in liability. Congress has refused to acknowledge such a distinction, and the Court should not step in to legislate where Congress has declined to do so. firmly established that “[t]here is no federal general common law,” and federal courts are not vested with authority to fashion substantive law. Whether or not the Court’s rule will further the interests of the national Treasury by eliminating the contractual costs associated with potential tort liability to government contractors, that power properly belongs to Congress.
- (Scalia, J.) Yes. In the absence of a federal statute, legal issues “so committed by the Constitution and the laws of the United States to federal control” are governed by federal common law, which preempts the application of state law. The obligations and rights of the federal government under its contracts are a matter of federal law. Although this case involves the tort liability of a third party, it arises out of the defendant’s performance under a government contract. So, too, is the civil liability of government officials a matter of federal law. While the defendant is an independent contractor, not a federal official, the same interest of achieving a government purpose is involved. The government depends on federal immunity to ensure that its chosen contractors accept government contracts at a price beneficial to the public. The case thus involves sufficient federal interests to invoke federal law.
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Chapter Four. Jurisdiction over Subject Matter of the Action—the Court’s Competency 13 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Minton (P) sued Gunn (D) for legal malpractice in regard to Gunn’s (D) handling of a patent infringement action, and the state courts held that the case should have been brought in federal court.
- After the IRS seized Grable’s (D) property and sold it to Darue (D), Grable (P) brought a quiet title action, claiming that the notice it received was defective, and Darue (D) removed the case to federal court.
- Where other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same case or controversy, even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount specified in the statute setting forth the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.
- Paul Gibbs (P) sued the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) (D) on both state and federal claims, and the Supreme Court now reviews the district court’s decision to hear both claims.
- In a divorce, a state’s residence requirement goes to the merits of the case and does not involve issues of subject matter jurisdiction.
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Swift v. Tyson 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Story, J.) Yes. The phrase “laws of several states” in the Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts to follow state statutory law but not state common (judge-made) law. In ordinary language, the phrase “laws” does not encompass the decisions of courts. Likewise, the Supreme Court has consistently presumed that the Rules of Decision Act is limited only to positive statutes of states. In the case at hand, even though New York’s common law would provide a defense to Tyson (D), federal courts are not required to apply this law.
- Federal courts must follow only state statutory laws, not state judge-made common law, in cases in which state law applies.
- Does the phrase “laws of several states” require federal courts to follow only state statutory laws and not state judge-made common law, in cases where state law applies?
- The Supreme Court took an extremely narrow view of the phrase “laws of several states.” In modern times, it seems clear that state judge-made common law is just as important and valid as state statutory law. Thus, it is difficult to understand Justice Story’s logic that, in ordinary language, the decisions of courts do not constitute laws. However, Story’s opinion must be placed in its appropriate context. The case was decided at a time where common law was rapidly developing, and Justice Story felt that a federal judge should be able to consult all available authorities (including the newly-developing common law of England and laws of other jurisdictions) in order to make a decision. Story did not want the federal judge’s discretion limited by the decisions of some lowly state-court judge in New York. Furthermore, the Court had strong policy reasons for desiring to enforce Tyson’s (D) note, since the government was seeking stability in interstate commerce and wanted to encourage...
- George Tyson (D) purchased land from Maine land speculators by giving a negotiable instrument to the speculators and receiving a bill of exchange. Tyson (D) did not know at the time that the speculators did not own the land. One of the speculators then delivered Tyson’s (D) note to Joseph Swift (P), a Maine banker, to satisfy a pre-existing debt. [Presumably the speculator headed west shortly thereafter, since he was not named in the suit]. Swift (P) sought payment from Tyson (D), but Tyson (D) refused to pay on the grounds that he had been fraudulently induced to purchase the property. Swift (P) then sued Tyson (D) in federal court in New York based on diversity jurisdiction. The principal question of the case was whether New York common law or other newly-developing common law should govern. Pursuant to New York judge-made contract law, the speculator’s fraud would provide Tyson (D) with a defense. However, pursuant to the law of negotiable instruments developing in England, Swift...
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Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Ginsburg, J.) Yes. A state statute governing reexamination of jury awards can be given effect by federal appellate courts without violating the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause. The New York statute’s “deviates materially” standard is both procedural and substantive. It is substantive in that the standard controls how much a plaintiff can be awarded, and it is procedural in that it assigns decision-making authority to New York appellate courts. We feel that federal courts can adequately apply the “deviates materially” standard. The standard is “outcome-affective” because failure to apply it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum state or be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court. In the case at hand, the Second Circuit utilized the “deviates materially” standard. We agree with Gasperini (P) that the Second Circuit did not attend to an essential ...of the federal court system when it applied the New York statute. The federal... ...court...
- (Scalia, J.) The majority holds that a state practice, relating to the division of duties between state judges and juries, must be followed by federal courts. This is contrary to our prior cases. The Seventh Amendment was designed specifically to preclude federal appellate reexamination of facts found by a jury. It puts to rest apprehensions of new trials by appellate courts. Federal appellate courts cannot review the factual issues such as the measure of damages. At common law, reexamination of facts found by a jury could only be undertaken by trial courts. And it is not possible to review the denial of a new trial without engaging in a reexamination of the facts tried by the jury. Changing the standard by which trial judges review jury verdicts does, contrary to the majority’s statement, disrupt the federal system and is plainly inconsistent with federal policy. The majority commits the classic ...reached in this case. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the standard to...
- This complicated case illustrates how courts can shape the determination of whether federal or state law applies. By characterizing the New York statute as “substantive,” the majority justifies its tenuous holding that the reviewing appellate court (the Second Circuit) should have applied New York’s “deviates materially” standard of review of a jury verdict. The majority further justifies its position by returning to the outdated outcome-determinative test. All in all, the holding seems to be in clear violation of the clear mandate of the Seventh Amendment. But the majority thinks that the holding is not inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment and that the federal and state interests can be accommodated. Justice Scalia’s dissent is well-reasoned and merits close attention. The review of jury verdicts does, as Scalia points out, necessarily require a reexamination of the facts of the case. Federal courts are constitutionally forbidden to undertake such factual inquiries. Finally,...
- (Stevens, J.) While I agree with the majority’s reasoning, I would affirm the judgment of the Second Circuit. The district court had the power to consider the propriety of the jury’s award, and it erred. Nothing prohibits the reviewing court from correcting the judge’s error. I do not agree that the “abuse of discretion” standard is relevant. simply requires federal appellate courts to apply the damage control standard state law supplies.
- William Gasperini (P) was a journalist who photographed events in Central America beginning in 1984. He supplied 300 slides to The Center for Humanities, Inc. (“Center”) (D). The Center (D) lost the slides and could not return them to Gasperini (P). Gasperini (P) sued in federal district court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The Center (D) conceded liability, and the issue of damages was tried before a jury. Gasperini’s (P) expert witnesses testified to the “industry standard” and valued a lost slide at $1,500. Accordingly, the jury awarded Gasperini (P) $450,000 in compensatory damages. The Center (D) moved for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was excessive. The district court denied the motion, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment. The Second Circuit applied New York law, which required that a state appellate division must determine whether an award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation. Based on state holdings, the Second...
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Corcoran v. City of Chicago 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Contrary to popular belief, appellate courts often are as involved with the facts of a given case as with the law at issue. While appellate courts cannot receive new evidence concerning the facts, they can analyze the facts and determine if the facts were sufficient to warrant a particular jury verdict. As this court held, such authority does not deny a party’s constitutional right to trial by jury. Although the court did not go into detail on the constitutional issue, apparently the fact that the party initially had the opportunity to present the facts to a jury satisfies the party’s constitutional right.
- (Murphy, J.) Yes. An appellate court may set aside a verdict on the grounds that the findings of fact were not supported by the evidence. Prior to the enactment of the Illinois statute, only trial courts could rule on motions for new trial, pursuant to the old maxim that “the judges respond to the law, the jury to the facts.” However, in modern times appellate judges have as much power as trial courts to set aside a verdict if the facts do not support the verdict. Thus, the appellate court in the instant action was empowered to set aside the verdict. Affirmed.
- APPELLATE COURTS MAY ANALYZE THE SUFFICIENCY OF FACTS AND MAY OVERTURN ORDERS DENYING NEW TRIALS
- John Corcoran (P) argued that an appellate court has no authority to determine whether a verdict is supported by the evidence presented at trial.
- An appellate court may set aside a verdict on the grounds that findings of fact are not supported by evidence.
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Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Court in this case seems to say that there is no general jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation. represented an unusual case in which the out-of-state defendant existed, if at all, in the forum state. The factual situation in that case (defendant unable to do business because of the wartime occupation of the jurisdiction by an enemy power) is unlikely to recur. In most situations, it would appear as though the question of the level of contacts an out-of-state defendant has with the forum state is moot, unless the suit arose out of those contacts.
- The North Carolina courts relied on the placement of tires in the “stream of commerce” in order to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. This analysis elides the difference between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction. The flow of products into a jurisdiction may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction, but will not give a forum general jurisdiction. In the corporate defendant had ceased doing business during the Second World War, and the records of the corporation were kept and maintained in Ohio. The claim involved in the suit did not arise in Ohio, but the Supreme Court held that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Ohio courts would not violate due process. In ...in Houston, and purchasing helicopters and training services from businesses located in Texas. The defendant was not licensed to do business in Texas and had no place of business in the state. Measured against these two cases, North Carolina is not a forum in which it would be...
- (Ginsburg, J.) No. Sale of an out-of-state manufacturer’s products in a forum state will justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction only with regard to the product that was sold in the state. The Court in , endeavored to give specific content to the concepts of fair play and substantial justice. In that case, the Court classified two types of cases involving out-of-state corporate defendants. The first is when the defendant’s in-state activity was continuous and systematic and that activity gave rise to the lawsuit. Second, a single or occasional transaction could support jurisdiction, even with regard to matters unrelated to the forum connections. These two categories of cases are referred to as “specific jurisdiction.” Specific jurisdiction is distinguished from general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction will arise when continuous corporate operations in a state are so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suits on causes of action arising from dealings entirely...
- The sons of Brown (P) and Helms (P) were killed in a bus accident in France. The cause of the accident allegedly was a failure of the tires on the bus. The tires were manufactured by subsidiaries (D) of Goodyear (D) at a plant in Turkey. Brown (P) and Helms (P) brought wrongful death suits against Goodyear (D) and its subsidiaries (D) in North Carolina state court. The subsidiaries (D) were three corporations. One was incorporated in France, one in Luxembourg, and one in Turkey. They had no physical presence in North Carolina and did not market tires in North Carolina. A small number of specialty tires manufactured by the subsidiaries (D) were sold in North Carolina, but the type of tire involved in the bus accident was not sold in the United States. The subsidiaries were not registered to do business in North Carolina. The subsidiaries moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the denial.
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J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro 15 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Breyer, J.) It is unwise to announce a broad rule based on changes in commerce and communication. The outcome of this case is determined by precedent. The incident at issue in this case does not implicate modern concerns. No prior case has found that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort engaged in by McIntyre (D), is sufficient for a finding of personal jurisdiction. The relevant facts found by the New Jersey court show no regular flow or regular course of sales in New Jersey.
- (Kennedy, J.) No. Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant requires some showing that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the state. The relevant inquiry is whether a defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. Personal jurisdiction calls for a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis. The question is whether a defendant followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy within a jurisdiction, so that a sovereign may lawfully render judicial judgment over the defendant. In addition, because the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant could be subject to the courts of the United States, but not the courts of any particular state. Such a situation would be an exceptional case. A defendant who is a domestic domiciliary has the courts of its home state available, and those courts can exercise general jurisdiction. If another state were to exercise...
- SPECIFIC JURISDICTION: Jurisdiction stemming from the defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum state, such that the court may hear a case arising from those minimum contacts.
- (Ginsburg, J.) McIntyre (D) has avoided the jurisdiction of state courts, except perhaps in those states where it sells a sizeable quantity of its machines. There is no dispute that McIntyre (D) is not subject to general jurisdiction in New Jersey. There is also no issue of the fair and reasonable allocation of adjudicatory authority among the states in this case. The constitutional limits of a state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not state sovereignty. The Court has previously made clear that legal fictions such as “presence” and “implied consent” should be discarded.
- The conclusion that the authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends on purposeful availment does not resolve all of the questions of jurisdiction that will arise in the future. The defendant’s conduct and economic realities will differ across cases, and judicial exposition will clarify the contours of that principle. In the case at bar, McIntyre (D) directed marketing and sales efforts at the United States. Congress may be able to authorize jurisdiction in appropriate cases, but it is not necessary to decide that issue. Nicastro (P) did not show that McIntyre (D) engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey, and the trial court found that the only contact shown was that the machine that injured Nicastro (P) ended up in New Jersey. McIntyre (D) may have intended to serve the U.S. market, but that does not show an intent to avail itself of the New Jersey market. Reversed.
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Russell v. Place 5 results
- As we saw in the previous case, one of the requirements of collateral estoppel is that the precise issue in the case must have been litigated and determined in the previous suit between the parties. Whereas in this case, in which the record of judgment is not clear as to which issue was the basis of the court’s judgment, then parties may rely on extrinsic evidence to prove what the precise issue in question was. However, where this is not proven, parties
- Russell (P) invented a product for which a patent was issued. The patent being defective, Russell (P) amended it and was issued a new patent. Russell (P) then sued Place (D) for patent infringement for the manufacture and use of Russell’s (P) invention. The court rendered a judgment in favor of Russell (P) for damages. Subsequently, Russell (P) brought another action against Place (D) alleging further manufacture and use of Russell’s (P) products. The latter sought to use the previous court’s judgment on the issue of patent infringement. The Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Russell’s (P) argument. The latter appeals.
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- A JUDGMENT OF A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, UPON A QUESTION DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ONE SUIT, IS CONCLUSIVE AS TO THAT QUESTION IN ANOTHER SUIT BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES
- ...in the former suit. If it appears that several distinct matters may have been litigated, upon one or more of which the judgment may have been passed, without indicating which of them was thus litigated, and upon which the judgment was rendered, the uncertainty must be removed by extrinsic evidence showing the precise point involved and determined. In this case, the judgment in the previous action does not indicate the nature of the infringement. The patent contains two claims for two different processes: one is for use of fat liquor in the treatment of leather and the other for a process of treating bark tanned lamb or sheep skin. In does not appear from the record of the judgment in the previous action, which of the two claims the plaintiff’s recovery was based on. A recovery for the infringement of one claim of the patent is not conclusive of an infringement of the other claims and there is no extrinsic evidence offered to resolve the uncertainty. Thus, the record does lack...
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Rios v. Davis 5 results
- So far we have seen that in order for collateral estoppel to apply, the precise issue in question in a suit must have been litigated and determined in the previous suit between the parties. Another requirement of collateral estoppel is that the issue must have been necessary and essential to the judgment of the previous suit. Thus, if the issue is not essential to the outcome of the case, collateral estoppel does not apply to the issue. Notice another way that the court looks at this problem: In the previous judgment in the instant case, Rios and the truck driver both were found negligent, however, the final judgment was in their favor and against Davis. The court in the instant case indicated that since the judgment was in favor of ...to appeal the issue of his negligence. Additionally, if the issue of his negligence was essential to the outcome of the case, the judgment would not have been in his favor. Thus, not having been essential to the outcome, collateral...
- IN ORDER FOR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO APPLY, THE DETERMINATION OF AN ISSUE MUST HAVE BEEN ESSENTIAL TO THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IN THE PREVIOUS CASE
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- Rios (P), Davis (D), and Popular Dry Goods (“Popular”) got into an automobile accident. Popular sued Davis (D) to recover for the damages suffered. Davis (D) contended that both Popular and Rios (P) were negligent, and joined Rios (P) as a third party defendant. The jury returned a verdict, finding Davis (D) negligent and both Popular and Rios (P) proximately negligent. The jury also denied recovery to all parties. Subsequently, Rios (P) brought suit against Davis (D). The latter defended on the ground that Rios (P) was contributorily negligent, and urged the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the judgment in the previous suit between Davis (D) and Popular. The District Court ruled in favor of Davis (D). Rios (P) appeals.
- (Collings, J.) No. A finding of fact which is not material or essential to the judgment of a suit between two parties is not binding on the parties in a later suit. In the previous action, the sole basis for the judgment as between Rios (P) and Davis (D) was the findings concerning the negligence of Davis (D). Rios’ (P) negligence was not essential to the judgment. If Rios’ (P) negligence was in fact the basis of that judgment, the result would have been different. However, since the judgment was in favor of Rios (P), he had no opportunity to appeal from the finding that he was guilty of negligence even if such finding had been without any support whatever in the evidence. It is the judgment and not the conclusions of fact filed by a trial court, which constitutes the estoppel. A finding of fact which does not become the basis of the judgment rendered is not conclusive against either party to the suit. (Reversed and Remanded.)
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- This case provides a straightforward rule of law. Only parties with an interest in the subject matter of the litigation may maintain a suit. Furthermore, parties who have already been fully compensated for their damages do not have an interest in the subject matter. In modern times, this would be a simple case of subrogation, where the insurer takes over the insured’s claim as a real party in interest. Most state courts allow for subrogation, and even where they do not, district courts often follow federal rather than state rules regarding real parties in interest and subrogation. If this case had arisen in federal courts, which utilize a real parties in interest rule (Rule 17) similar to Kansas’s, International Harvester (D) could have simply filed a
- (Parker, J.) Yes. Every lawsuit must be prosecuted in the name of a real party in interest, pursuant to Kansas statute. In the case at hand, Ellis (P) was no longer directly interested in the subject matter of the litigation, since he had already been paid by The Potomac Insurance Company. Thus, Ellis (P) was not a real party in interest. If the insurer desires to recover the money paid to Ellis (P), then the insurer may, and indeed must, bring the action as the real and only party in interest. Any previous Kansas decisions to the contrary are now overruled by this court. Affirmed.
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- Ellis Canning Co. (P) alleged that, while servicing Ellis’ (P) tractor, International Harvester Co. (D) negligently started a fire resulting in $479 of damage. Ellis (P) admitted that its insurer, The Potomac Insurance Company, had already compensated Ellis (P) for the loss. Thus, Ellis (P) brought this claim to recover money damages for the benefit of its insurance company. [Maybe Ellis failed to realize that the insurance company itself could bring suit!] International Harvester (D) contended that the insurance company, and not Ellis (P), was the real party in interest and, therefore, that Ellis (P) could not bring this suit. The trial court overruled Ellis’ (P) demurrer to this answer, and Ellis (P) appealed.
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Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Rehnquist, J.) (1) Yes. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over absent class members even if the members do not possess the minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over a defendant. As this Court has held in several cases, due process requires that a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state in order for a court to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Phillips Petroleum (D) argues that, likewise, the Kansas courts may not assert personal jurisdiction over class members who neither affirmatively consent to jurisdiction nor have sufficient minimum contacts with Kansas. However, there are significant differences between jurisdiction over a ...class actions are not haled anywhere to defend themselves upon threat of default judgments. In class actions, both the court and the class representatives protect the interests of absent class members. Moreover, absent class members do not have to hire counsel or appear,...
- Justice Rehnquist presents a thorough and logical analysis of difficult issues in class actions, including requirements for personal jurisdiction and the application of appropriate law. The due process protections afforded to defendants in ordinary civil actions simply do not parallel the protections necessary for plaintiffs in class actions, since class action plaintiffs do not suffer similar hardships and are adequately protected by the court and by the class representatives. Phillips Petroleum’s (D) arguments, that every class member must “opt in” to class actions and must have minimum contacts with the forum state, would obliterate class actions involving numerous plaintiffs residing in several different states and countries. Clearly, the efficiencies provided by class actions outweigh the minimal needs to obtain consent or for the forum to have minimum contacts with each class member. In the case at hand, the 33,000 potential class members were treated fairly, as 3,400 opted...
- Phillips Petroleum (D) obtained natural gas from leased land in eleven different states. Shutts (P) and several other lessors brought an action against Phillips Petroleum (D) in a Kansas state court, seeking to recover interest on royalty payments due under the leases. The Kansas trial court certified a class consisting of 33,000 royalty owners, and the class representatives provided each class member with notice by mail and with an opportunity to opt out of the class action. [Don’t worry, the $100,000 in postage could later be recovered by the representatives!] The final class consisted of 28,100 class members residing in all fifty states and in foreign countries. Nevertheless, the trial court asserted personal jurisdiction and applied only Kansas contract law, finding Phillips Petroleum (D) liable for interest on suspended royalties to all class members. Phillips Petroleum (D) argued that the Due Process Clause prevented the Kansas court from adjudicating the claims of the non-...
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- Shutts (P) and several other holders of royalty interests brought a class action against Phillips Petroleum (D) to recover royalty payments. The Kansas court obtained personal jurisdiction over all parties and applied Kansas law to all claims.
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- Traditionally, a plea of res judicata was allowed by a party (and against a party) who was a party, or in privity with a party in the earlier action. Additionally, courts imposed a mutuality requirement for a plea of res judicata. Estoppel under this doctrine is mutual if the party asserting the estoppel would have been bound by the earlier judgment had the judgment gone against him. Thus, in many instances, a party in a later suit could not assert a plea of res judicata because the party lacked mutuality. Many courts now look at mutuality from a different perspective. The court first looks at the party who is asserting the estoppel. There is no reason according to many modern decisions, including the instant case, for the party asserting the estoppel to have been a party to the earlier litigation. Then the courts look at the party against whom the estoppel is asserted. The requirement of due process requires such a party to have been a party or in privity with a party in the...
- (Traynor, J.) Yes. A party may assert res judicata even though he was not a party, or in privy with a party in the earlier litigation. Many courts have stated that res judicata may only be asserted when there is privity and mutuality of estoppel, thus allowing only parties to the former judgment or their privies to take advantage of or be bound by res judicata. The estoppel is mutual if the one taking advantage of the earlier judgment would have been bound by it had it gone against him. Res judicata may not be asserted against a party who was not bound by the earlier judgment in which the matter in question was decided. However, there is no reason for requiring that the party asserting the estoppel must have been a party to the earlier action. Most courts have abandoned the mutuality requirement where the liability of the defendant asserting res judicata is dependent or derived from the liability of one who was exonerated in the earlier suit brought by the same plaintiff upon the...
- Mrs. Clara Sather, living with Mr. and Mrs. Cook, asked the latter to transfer her account from the Security First National Bank of Los Angeles to the First National Bank of San Dimas. The account was opened in the name of “Clara Sather by Charles Cook.” Thereafter the bank in Los Angeles transferred $4,155.68 to the new account in San Dimas. Subsequently, Mr. Cook withdrew the whole amount and transferred it to a new account in the name of himself and his wife. After the death of Mrs. Sather, Mr. Cook became the executor of the estate. After having administered the estate for a few years, Mr. Cook resigned, filing an account with the probate court, but making no mention of the money which he withdrew from Mrs. Sather’s account. Helen Bernhard (P), and other beneficiaries of the estate, objected to the accounting, and the probate court determined that the money in that account was given as a gift to Mr. Cook during Mrs. Sather’s life. Later, Bernhard (P), as the administratrix of...
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- THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA REJECTS MUTUALITY AS A REQUIREMENT OF RES JUDICATA
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Nollenberger v. United Air Lines, Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case illustrates a district court judge taking control, perhaps to an inordinate degree, over a jury verdict. The general holding of the case is sound, since Rule 49(b) does not specifically allow a court to submit additional interrogatories to the jury after it has rendered its verdict. Furthermore, Judge Hall’s conclusion that the general verdict was unreconcilable with the answers to the special interrogatories might be correct. However, the language of Rule 49(b) verdict in recalculating the damages award. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals subsequently noted in overturning Judge Hall’s judgment, nothing compels a jury to calculate damage awards based on a fixed mathematical formula. The jury could have included factors extending beyond the eleven special interrogatories in arriving at the $114,655 figure. Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, no definite conflict existed between the answers and the general verdict.
- (Hall, J.) No. A court may not submit additional interrogatories after a jury has returned its verdict answering the special interrogatories and returning a general verdict. The special interrogatories answered by the jury are not harmonious or reconcilable with the general verdict of $114,655. In these circumstances, Rule 49(b) permits the Court to choose from three alternatives, including re-submitting the matter to the jury for further consideration. However, the Rule does not permit the court to submit additional interrogatories after the jury has returned its verdict. If this were the intention of the Rule, it would have so provided. Although the Rule allows a court to grant a new trial under these circumstances, the Court must first attempt to make calculations from the special interrogatories and enter a judgment thereon. I calculate the damages at $171,702, and a judgment shall be entered for that amount.
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- A COURT MAY NOT SUBMIT ADDITIONAL INTERROGATORIES FOLLOWING A JURY’S VERDICT AND SPECIAL ANSWERS, BUT IT MAY RECALCULATE THE DAMAGE AWARD IN THE FACE OF INCONSISTENCY
- After a jury has returned a general verdict and answered special interrogatories, the court may not submit additional interrogatories but may recalculate the damage award based on the answers.
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Mathews v. New York Racing Association, Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The courts in both determined the scope of preclusion according to the “transaction approach.” This method is often praised for its flexibility, allowing courts to adjust their findings based on the particular facts of the case. This flexibility, however, does impose certain disadvantages. A party, in failing to raise certain parts of his or her action, could end up forfeiting those parts because a judge may interpret the claim much more broadly than the litigant had anticipated. To protect against this outcome, a plaintiff may likely raise every last possible allegation connected to his or her case, and thus advance claims that he or she would otherwise have not brought to court.
- Motion for summary judgment in false arrest action for damages and injunctive relief.
- New York Racing Association, Inc. (Association) (D) operates Jamaica Race Track. The Association employs Thoroughbred Protective Association Inc. (Thoroughbred) (D), a private detective agency, to provide security. Matthews (P) sued the Association and Thoroughbred (D), claiming that on April 4, 1958, he (P) was “assaulted,” “kidnapped,” “falsely arrested,” and “falsely imprisoned” by Thoroughbred (D) employees. In addition, he (P) claims that the Association and Thoroughbred (D) charged him with disorderly conduct and maliciously caused him to be prosecuted and convicted in the Magistrate’s Court of the City of New York on April 10, 1958. In this action, Matthews (P) is asking for money damages and an injunction restraining the Association and Thoroughbred (D) from interfering with his attendance at the racetracks, from printing libelous statements about him (P), and from acting against peace officers. The Association and Thoroughbred (D) moved for summary judgment under
- Can one party in a dispute sue another party to the same dispute again after a judgment on the merits of the case has already been reached?
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Hicks v. United States 5 results
- This case introduces one of the great secrets of the first year in law school: that is, that judges do not always do what they say they are doing in their opinions. It is well-known that appellate courts must give great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact, but can review their findings of law at will. (Sometimes this will be referred to as “de novo” review, which basically means “anew,” or sort of “from the beginning, with no preconceived notions.”) So if you really don’t like the way the case came out, call it a matter of law and go right ahead and review it. Well, it’s not always that easy, of course, but it does seem to be what happened here. The appellate court, in declaring that all the testimony was basically in agreement, was right there changing the facts from what the trial court had found. The government’s expert witness testified that the doctor had exercised “average judgment,” and this is obviously what the trial court chose to believe. Believing a different...
- (Sobeloff) No. The general rule that a judge’s findings should not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous does not apply when the judge’s conclusions are based on undisputed testimony and evidence. This rule (embodied in Federal Rule 52(a): “Findings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . . ”) stems from an appreciation of the fact that the trial judge is in a unique position with respect to his or her ability to evaluate the credibility of conflicting witnesses. The trial judge is actually there, watching and listening to the witnesses, and can get a much better sense of which witness(es) to believe or disbelieve than appellate judges can from the written record. In a case with conflicting witnesses, the appellate court should give a lot of weight to the trial judge’s decisions. In this case, however, the witnesses were all in agreement about basic facts. There is thus no question of what those facts are (i.e., what the doctor did in his...
- ...abdominal pain and continuous vomiting, she sought emergency treatment at the dispensary of the U.S. Naval Amphibious Base in Little Creek, Virginia. She was examined by a doctor, given some pain pills, and sent home. Several hours later, she fell unconscious, and was rushed back to the dispensary, but to no avail. She was declared dead shortly after her arrival, from a “high obstruction” in her intestines. Hicks (P), the administrator of Mrs. Greitens’ estate, brought suit against the doctor who had examined Mrs. Greitens at the dispensary, charging that he had negligently misdiagnosed and treated her, and that he did not meet the requisite standard of care and skill required by the law of Virginia. Various expert witnesses testified, and all of them seemed to agree that the doctor had not used ordinary care in making his diagnosis, and had not followed locally standard procedures. Nevertheless, the trial judge, sitting without a jury, held that the doctor had not been...
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- COURT RULES THAT FACTUAL DETERMINATION OF WHETHER CERTAIN CONDUCT CONSTITUTES NEGLIGENCE IS SOMETIMES QUESTION OF LAW, NOT FACT
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Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Marshall, J.) No. When deciding whether a federal and state rule are in direct conflict, the federal rule should be read based on its plain meaning. Indeed, in cases of direct conflict between a federal rule and a state rule, should be followed [federal rules of civil procedure within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act control over state outcome-determinative rules]. However, in the case at hand, a plain reading of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reveals no conflict with the Oklahoma statute of limitations [the court failed to explain how, exactly, to conduct a “plain” reading]. Rule 3 simply states that a cause of action is commenced upon the filing of a complaint in federal court. The Rule does not state an intention to toll a state statute of limitations, and it certainly does not purport to displace state tolling rules. Thus, ...action filed within two years, where service was not affected within the requisite period, since the Court could not give the cause...
- This case presents the final piece in the somewhat puzzling analysis that a federal court must undergo when the application of a federal rule and state rule would cause disparate results. The first question is whether the federal rule directly conflicts with the state rule. In court finds that a plain reading of directly conflict with the Oklahoma statute, the court would have to look to the Rules Enabling Act, particularly Rule 3 abridged a substantive state law. Since the purpose and effect of the Oklahoma statute was to give potential defendants some peace of mind if not served within the required period, this statute was probably substantive, in which case state law would prevail. However, if directly conflict with the Oklahoma statute, as the Supreme Court found, then a federal court may not circumvent the outcome-determinative state law. To do so, where the Federal Rule does not control the issue, would require a federal court to create federal common law, expressly...
- STARE DECISIS: A doctrine requiring courts to adhere to previously-decided case law.
- Walker (P), a carpenter, was injured while pounding a nail manufactured by Armco Steel (D) when the head of the nail shattered and struck Walker (P) in the eye. Since there was diversity of citizenship, Walker (P) sued Armco (D) for negligence in an Oklahoma district court. Walker (P) filed the complaint within two years of the injury, but service of process was not made on Armco’s (P) authorized agent until more than two years and three months after the injury. Armco (P) filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that Oklahoma’s 2-year statute of limitations was not met, since Oklahoma law does not deem an action “commenced” until service of process upon on a defendant. Walker (P) countered that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should control this federal-court action. Pursuant to Rule 3, an action is commenced upon filing a complaint with a federal court. The District Court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Oklahoma statute of limitations, and the Court of Appeals...
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Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 v. Terry 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Kennedy, J.) The Court initially determined that the duty of fair representation action is more similar to cases tried in equity than cases tried in courts of law. Thus, our inquiry should end and there should be no right to jury trial. However, the majority overcomes the equitable nature of the claim by noting that Terry (P) must prove a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement as one element of the claim. I disagree with Justice Marshall’s reliance on previous cases to reach this conclusion. Having determined that the duty of fair representation claim is equitable in nature, the cases relied upon by Marshall are inapplicable. Absent certain procedural justifications, we have never parsed legal elements out of equitable claims. The Court also rules that Terry (P) and the other employees have a right to jury trial because they seek money damages. However, we have consistently held that an award of monetary relief must not necessarily be legal in nature. I believe that the...
- (Stevens, J.) I believe that the Court has made this case unnecessarily difficult by exaggerating the importance of finding a precise common-law analogy. Duty of fair representation suits are ordinary civil actions similar to contract and malpractice disputes. There is no ground for excluding these actions from the right to jury trial.
- This case demonstrates that the majority of the Supreme Court remains committed to an expanded view of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. Although the Court recognized the equitable nature of Terry’s (P) claim, the majority takes great strides to find that the cause of action was legal in character. Further, the opinion underscores the importance of the two-pronged approach to determining the Seventh Amendment right. Justices Brennan and Stevens, in their concurring opinions, raised valid points about the difficulties courts face in attempting to find analogies between modern causes of action and English common-law claims. While the majority seems unwilling to abandon this historical analysis, it is interesting that the court essentially sidesteps the issue when the result—that the “duty of fair representation” claim parallels a common-law equitable action—argues against the right to jury trial. Thus, perhaps the Court would have been better off abandoning the historical...
- Several employees sued their union, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 (D), for alleged violations of the Union’s duty of fair representation. Against the Union’s protest that the claim was equitable in nature, the District Court and Appellate Court granted a right to jury trial.
- (Brennan, J.) I agree that Terry (P) and the other employees seek a remedy that is legal in nature and, hence, that the Seventh Amendment mandates a jury trial. However, I believe that the historical inquiry conducted by the Court can and should be simplified. In expounding the historical test, this Court has repeatedly discounted the significance of the analogous form of action at English common law. I think it is time we dispense with it altogether. Trial judges, who neither have the training nor time necessary to adequately conduct this historical inquiry, should not be required to expend vast judicial resources trying to match a modem claim against an antiquated one. Of course, courts will still be required to examine the nature of the remedies sought and to determine whether they are legal or equitable in nature.
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State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire 4 results
- Justice Fortas’ majority opinion presents a sensible approach to interpleader in the context of complex tort litigation. Where several parties are potentially liable for injuries, the insurer of one of the parties should not be allowed to require all of the underlying litigation to be resolved within one interpleader action. It is interesting that the Court does not overrule, or even disagree with, one of the holdings in [a federal court hearing an interpleader action has broad authority to enjoin state court proceedings and control the underlying litigation against all alleged tortfeasors]. Perhaps the two cases are factually distinguishable, since ...a situation in which a number of claimants were battling over just one insurance fund. In the case at hand, the sheer number of potential tort plaintiffs and tortfeasors, and the minimal dollar value of State Farm’s (P) policy in comparison to the large damages, militates against similar treatment. It should also be noted... ...case,...
- A Greyhound bus collided with a pickup truck in California, killing two bus passengers and injuring other passengers as well as the truck driver and its passenger. Four injured passengers filed suit in California state courts seeking over $1 million in damages against Greyhound Lines, Inc.; Nauta, the bus driver; Clark, the truck driver; and Glasgow, the truck passenger. Before these cases came to trial, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (P) brought this action for interpleader in an Oregon district court. At the time of the collision, State Farm (P) had a policy covering Clark for bodily injury liability up to $10,000 per person and $20,000 per occurrence. [Apparently Clark never contemplated colliding with a Greyhound bus head-on!] State Farm (P) paid $20,000 into the court and asked the court to require all claimants to establish their claims against Clark and State Farm (P) in the interpleader action and to discharge State Farm (P) from further obligations. State Farm (P) joined Clark,...
- an interest in the fund which is the subject of the action. This statute is to be liberally construed. If an insurance company were required to await reduction of all claims to judgment, the first claimant to receive such a judgment could appropriate a disproportionate slice of the fund. This race for judgment would result in difficulties for the insurance company and inequities for the claimants. The interpleader statutes were designed to avoid these inequities. (3) No. The effect of interpleader should not necessarily be to confine the total litigation to a single forum and proceeding. In some situations, a court may enjoin the prosecution of all suits against the insurance company and the insured. For example, where a stakeholder is faced with rival claims to the fund, and where the fund itself marks the outer limits of the controversy, interpleader may result in all claims being litigated in one proceeding. However, in the present interpleader action, the court ...this court...
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Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case establishes a balancing test which modifies York’s outcome-determinative test in some instances. Specifically, when strong federal policies outweigh weak state policies, even an outcome-determinative state law may yield to federal rules. The Supreme Court thus managed to save federal law, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from partial extinction that federal law faced following York. While this decision seemingly restores a proper balance between applying federal and state law, it proved to be not nearly as easy to apply as a strict York outcome-determinative test. Indeed, courts often experienced difficulties in objectively determining whether state or federal policies were stronger in a given instance. Moreover, a careful reading of the case reveals a fundamental question: Why did the Supreme Court conduct a Rules of Decision analysis, since according to the Supremacy Clause, the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution should ...that the Court wanted to...
- ...potentially outcome-determinative should not necessarily be followed in every instance. The factual determination of Byrd’s (P) employment status may have been substantially different depending on whether a judge or jury decides the outcome. Nevertheless, York’s outcome-determinative test is not the sole test to be applied in this situation. Rather, a balancing test should be used, weighing the state policies behind the rule against countervailing federal policies. Consistent with the Erie doctrine, state procedural rules which affect the outcome of a suit should be applied if they are an integral part of some substantive right [whatever that means!]. In the case at hand, South Carolina common law required the determination of a person’s status as a statutory employee to be determined by the judge. However, South Carolina’s rationale for the rule was not to further some substantive state policy and was not bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties...
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- BALANCING TEST ALLOWS FEDERAL COURTS TO APPLY SOME FEDERAL RULES, EVEN WHERE STATE RULES ARE OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE
- Federal courts may apply federal rules, even if state rules are outcome-determinative, if federal policy in enacting the rules outweighs state policy.
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Hansberry v. Lee 4 results
- This case presents a different type of due process analysis from the jurisdictional cases encountered early in this book. While due process in the jurisdictional context typically focused on the adequacy of notice and opportunity to be heard, the Supreme Court now focuses on the adequacy of class representation. This makes sense in the class action context, given the potentially sever res judicata effects of a judgment on an absent class member. In effect, the Court is saying that people such as Hansberry (D) and the sellers were not adequately represented in the original litigation. Thus, they are not to be considered members of the original class. Conversely, if they were class members, the Court asserts, then the original judgment would be binding. Note that the “adequacy of representation” argument presents a timing problem, namely, at what point in time should the adequacy of representation be judged? The U.S. Supreme Court apparently assumed that the adequacy of representation...
- This class action suit was brought in an Illinois state court to enforce a racially restrictive covenant involving some land in Chicago. The covenant provided that it was not effective unless signed by 95% of the landowners. In the complaint, Lee (P), a white person, sought to enjoin the purchase of some restricted land by Hansberry (D), a black. Lee (P) alleged that the seller had signed the covenant, and that an earlier state court decision had held that the covenant was effective, since 95% of the landowners had signed the agreement. Hansberry (D) and other defendants argued that they were not bound by the res judicata effect of the earlier judgment, since they had not been parties to the suit. Thus, Hansberry (D) and the others argued that their due process rights were being violated. The Illinois Circuit Court and Supreme Court held that the original action was a class suit, and therefore that the holding was binding on all class members, including Hansberry (D) and the sellers...
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- ...absent members. In a typical litigation, notice and an opportunity to be heard are requisite to due process, and a judgment in which a person is not designated as a party does not have a res judicata effect on that person. An exception exists, however, in the class action context [Just when you thought you understood due process, class actions confuse the issue!]. Judgments entered in class or representative suits may bind members of the class or those represented who were not made parties to it. However, there is a failure of due process where the procedure adopted does not fairly insure the protection of the interest of absent parties who are to be bound by it. In the original case at hand, which found the covenant effective, the procedure did not adequately protect the interests of Hansberry (D) and the sellers. First, the restrictive agreement did not purport to create a joint obligation or liability. Rather, the racially restrictive covenant was a series of several...
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Beeck v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive Corp. 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Benson, J.) No. A court does not abuse its discretion by allowing an amendment to an answer which initially admitted responsibility for the manufacture of the product at issue but now seeks to deny manufacturing it. There is substantial authority for this decision both in case law and in the Federal Rules. In the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, leave to amend is fully within the discretion of the district court. This holding is rooted in which declares that leave to amend should be “freely given when justice so requires.” Applying these principles to the case at hand, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing either the amendment or the trial on the issue. The trial court searched the record for evidence of bad faith and rightfully found none. After all, Aquaslide (D) legitimately relied on the findings of separate insurance adjustors until its president made his own belated investigation and...
- Defendant admits manufacturing the defective water slide at issue in the case but a year later moves the court to amend the answer to deny manufacture.
- The sympathetic reader may be inclined to feel sorry for the poor injured plaintiff who, as a result of the leave to amend, has lost the opportunity to refile his claim against a different defendant because the statute of limitation has run out. The issue of manufacture, however, would have to be resolved by the trier of fact in any case, so Beeck (P) was not really deprived of a fair trial. He was just deprived of a trial on the issue of negligence. This is not necessarily a bad thing because going to trial on all the issues when manufacture was really the essential one would have been a waste of judicial resources. Not to mention, Aquaslide (D) would have been forced to expend much time and money to defend itself against a claim for which it could not have been responsible. While a day in court belongs to everyone who has a legitimate complaint, it should not be afforded at the expense of other parties.
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- AN ADMISSION IN A PLEADING CAN BE CHANGED TO A DENIAL IN THE COURT’S DISCRETION
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Upjohn Co. v. United States 5 results
- (Rehnquist, J.) (1) Yes. The attorney-client privilege protects communications made between a corporation’s employees and the corporation’s general counsel. The Court of Appeals adopted a restrictive “control group” test, which protected only those communications made by certain high-level corporate employees. This view overlooks the fact that the attorney-client privilege exists to protect the giving of information to a lawyer to enable him to give sound advice. Even low-level employees can embroil a corporation in serious legal difficulties, and these employees often possess relevant information needed by corporate counsel. The control group test frustrates the purpose of the privilege by discouraging this communication of relevant information, and it makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice. In the case at hand, the attorney-client privilege protects all communications made between Upjohn (D) employees and Thomas, the general counsel. The Court of...
- While this opinion presents a thorough analysis of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product exemption in the corporate context, it does not, by its own admission, articulate a set of rules controlling these doctrines. Rather, with respect to the work-product exemption for oral statements, it simply applies the high standard stated in that opposing parties should not easily avail themselves of the fruits of another attorney’s labor. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the majority’s holding is equally sensible. A corporation is a fictitious entity and, as such, cannot have any direct communications with its counsel. In the corporate setting, therefore, it must be determined which communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals’ “control group” test was far too narrow, since corporate counsel often must rely on communications with low-level employees. These communications deserve the same amount of protection as ...high-level...
- ...an internal investigation of “questionable payments” allegedly made by Upjohn’s (D) foreign subsidiaries to foreign government officials in order to secure government business [a.k.a. “bribes”!]. In the investigation, foreign managers of Upjohn (D) were questioned about possibly illegal payments, and the responses were forwarded to Thomas, Upjohn’s (D) general counsel. When the investigation was concluded, Upjohn (D) sent a report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Internal Revenue Service immediately began an investigation to determine the tax consequences of the payments. [Yes, the IRS haunts even corporation’s activities in foreign countries!] The IRS issued a summons demanding production of all files relative to the investigation. However, Upjohn (D) refused to produce the documents, contending that they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product exemption. The United States (P) filed a petition in a Michigan district court seeking...
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- MAGISTRATE: An inferior government judicial officer who may make recommendations to federal courts.
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Garrity v. State Board of Administration 3 results
- This is an interesting decision which holds that Garrity’s (P) cause of action was in contract for the purpose of statute of limitations but in tort for the purpose of liability. The court does not provide satisfying guidelines as to why they chose to treat the case this way, but a few reasons may have contributed to the outcome. First, historically, governments are presumed to be immune from tort actions unless they expressly waive their immunity. Thus, the court may have thought that Garrity (P) waived the tort action to trick the court into allowing him to sue the government for essentially the same tort just by calling it something different. It seems that if the Administration (D) could have been a liable defendant under either a tort or a contract theory, the court would not have cared which theory Garrity (P) had advanced. Another possible explanation for the outcome is that the court was not really concerned with the theory of the pleading at all but instead wanted to...
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- (Porter, J.) Yes. If a petition states sufficient facts for more than one cause of action, then plaintiff can waive one and proceed only on the other. Thus, Garrity (P) can waive the cause of action in tort and not be limited by the statute of limitations to bring their cause of action for breach of contract. However, a party can only proceed with the cause of action if it can be maintained against the named defendants. In this case, Garrity cannot bring an action for breach of contract against the Administration (D) because the act which constructed this board to replace the regents only gave them the power “to execute trusts or other obligations now or hereinafter committed to.” Thus, the Administration (D) cannot be made liable for torts committed by the regents and Garrity (P) cannot, just by waiving the tort, make the Administration liable by calling the action breach of contract. The judgement is affirmed for defendant.
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- The following complex web of claims, counterclaims and cross-claims arose out of the construction of the Memphis, Tennessee City Hall. Only those claims relevant to the holding are summarized herein [Of course, if you really want to confuse yourself, examine the summary of claims at the beginning of the opinion]. Southern Builders (D), the principal contractor, subcontracted with Alexander Marble and Tile Co. (Alexander) (D) to install marble, and Alexander (D) subcontracted with LASA Per L’Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni (LASA) (P) to supply it with marble. LASA (P) sued Alexander (D) and Southern Builders (D) in District Court for the balance due on the contract. Alexander (D) and Southern Builders (D) filed counterclaims against LASA (P) for breach of contract. Alexander (D) filed a cross-claim against Southern Builders (D) for money due on that contract and for damages for injuring Alexander’s (D) business reputation. In turn, Southern Builders (D) filed a cross-claim...
- the multiplicity of litigation, all of the issues should be tried at one time. If a substantial fear of confusing the jury exists, as demonstrated at trial, Rule 42(b) allows the District Judge to order separate trials on the confusing issues. Thus, this case should be remanded in full to the District Court, for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.
- As this case demonstrates, the policy goal of avoiding multiplicity of litigation often comes at the expense of a thoroughly confusing relationship between the parties and their various claims. The basic issues can, however, be summarized succinctly. Two original defendants, Southern Builders (D) and Alexander (D) wanted to settle their own conflict within the framework of the original lawsuit. Thus, they brought cross-claims, as allowed by ...the third-party complaint, which will be addressed in a later section of this chapter. While the various claims may be confusing, it seems to make sense to handle all of the various disputes in one lawsuit. Thus, the majority’s opinion promotes judicial efficiency. The holding also parallels earlier court decisions in giving a broad reading to “same transaction or occurrence,” whether the issue deals with counterclaims (between adverse parties) or cross-claims (between co-parties, such as co-defendants). Even a somewhat stretched...
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Shaffer v. Heitner 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This is undoubtedly one of the most important of all of the cases pertaining to jurisdiction. In one broad opinion, Justice Marshall overturned the traditional approach to in rem jurisdiction, equating the in rem test with the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction. Thus, in rem jurisdiction is appropriate only where a defendant purposefully availed himself to the benefits and protections of the forum state, or where there is sufficient relatedness between the cause of action and the forum state. Arguably, neither were present in this case. Of course, Marshall could have simply chosen to invalidate the sequestration statute, but instead he took this opportunity to alter the constitutional in rem analysis substantially. The opinion makes a number of logically sound conclusions on the way to its revolutionary holding. First, it is indeed true that in rem jurisdiction can affect a person just as much as in personam jurisdiction. Both affect a person’s rights in money or...
- (Brennan, J.) While I agree that the minimum-contacts analysis represents a sensible approach to the exertion of state court jurisdiction, I dissent from the ultimate holding of the case. The majority has treated Delaware’s statute as a long-arm statute requiring a minimum contacts analysis. However, the Delaware statute expressly denied such an approach. State court jurisdiction is proper only with notice and an applicable long-arm statute, and there was no such statute applicable in this case. Jurisdiction might indeed be in Delaware’s best interest, and the problems with other states applying Delaware’s laws argues against denying Delaware jurisdiction over this matter. Nothing noted in the majority opinion persuades me that it would be unfair to subject the officers and directors to suit in Delaware. They certainly associated themselves with the State of Delaware, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
- (Marshall, J.) Yes. In rem jurisdiction is subject to a minimum contacts analysis. Traditionally, courts have ignored the lack of contacts between a defendant and a state in asserting quasi in rem jurisdiction. While the law governing in personam jurisdiction has expanded dramatically in recent years, no such change has occurred in the law governing in rem jurisdiction. In [Due process requires that minimum contacts exist for in personam jurisdiction]. We recognize that the presence of property in a State may impact this minimum contacts analysis, as a defendant having property in the state would normally have purposefully availed himself of the jurisdiction of the state. However, in this case, we focus on a different type of quasi in rem action, in which the property serving as the basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to Heitner’s (P) cause of action. Since the assertion of jurisdiction over property is really just an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner...
- Heitner (P), a nonresident of Delaware, owned one share of stock in Greyhound Corp., a business incorporated in Delaware. Heitner (P) filed a shareholder’s derivative suit in Delaware state court, naming 28 officers or directors of Greyhound as defendants. Heitner (P) alleged that the officers and directors had breached their fiduciary duties. At the same time the complaint was filed, Heitner (P) filed a motion for sequestration of shares of approximately 82,000 shares of stock owned by 21 of the officers and directors, as allowed by Delaware law. Those 21 defendants entered a special appearance in Delaware, contending that the sequestration procedure violated due process and that the property was incapable of attachment in Delaware. In addition, the 21 defendants asserted that they did not have sufficient minimum contacts to justify Delaware jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Delaware had a sufficient...
- (Powell, J.) While I reserve judgment on whether ownership of property in a State may provide the contacts necessary for jurisdiction, I favor the preservation of the common law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction in the case of real property.
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Denman v. Spain 5 results
- This case focuses on the evidentiary burden that a civil plaintiff must meet in order to obtain a jury verdict. Inasmuch as a judgment n.o.v. is proper only where a plaintiff has failed to meet this standard, the case also demonstrates the standard required for a judgment n.o.v., i.e., a demonstration that the opposing side has failed to meet her burden. In nearly every civil cause of action, the party bringing the action must prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence. As this case adequately demonstrates, the preponderance of evidence standard does While Betty Denman (P) provided some evidence supporting her side, Spain (D) presented absolutely no evidence to dismiss Ross’s negligence. Spain (D) most likely realized that Betty (P) would have a difficult time proving her case, since no eyewitness information or empirical data existed demonstrating the precise cause of the accident, and in any case the defendant does not have to prove that he was not negligent. Nevertheless,...
- Is a judgment n.o.v. proper for a defendant where the plaintiff fails to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence?
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- ....o.v. is proper for a defendant where the plaintiff fails to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence. In this action, Betty Denman (P) failed to meet this required evidentiary standard. The photographs only depict a terrible accident scene and do not depict a reasonable or plausible explanation why the accident occurred, or who was responsible for it. Furthermore, Barnett’s testimony is inadmissible, since his knowledge of the Plymouth’s speed was based on what he saw nearly a mile south of the accident. Buckley’s testimony, while admissible, does not indicate the place in the road where the vehicles collided. There was no showing of the speed of the Ford, or as to which car was on the wrong side of the road. Thus, the tragedy is completely shrouded in mystery. Betty Denman (P) bore the burden of proving Ross’s negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, and several possible conclusions may be made about who was at fault. Verdicts cannot be based on possibilities,...
- ...recollection of how the collision occurred. Evidence demonstrated that the accident occurred at dusk on a rainy, foggy day. Two witnesses, who were driving along the same stretch of road, testified on behalf of Betty (P). First, John Barnett testified that Ross had passed him, traveling at seventy miles per hour [on a foggy day!] some three-fourths of a mile from the place of the accident. Second, Hal Buckley testified that Ross passed him about two hundred yards from the place of the accident, traveling at seventy-five or eighty miles per hour, and that he saw Ross’s car until the time of the accident. In addition, Betty (P) offered several pictures of the accident scene. The issue was submitted to the jury on this evidence submitted by Betty (P), with Spain (D) offering no evidence on behalf of Ross [who was, unfortunately, unavailable for comment!]. The jury returned a verdict and judgment for Betty (P) for $5000, but the court sustained Spain’s (D) motion for a judgment non...
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- Claim and issue preclusion apply to cases where the judgment is final, valid, and on the merits of the case. This is known as the “quality” of the judgment. In this case, the court determines that a consent judgment should be viewed as a contract, and that they do not act automatically preclude a future action based on the same claim. The preclusive effect of the consent judgment depends on the intent of the parties as to what issues and claims they indeed settled upon. This view allows parties to reserve certain issues for future litigation. However, such reservation is only effective where both parties consent to it and the claim which is reserved appears on the plaintiff’s original complaint.
- (Staton, J.) Yes. The preclusive effect of a consent judgment should depend upon the intent of the parties entering into the consent judgment. A consent judgment is both an agreement between the parties settling the underlying claim, and an entry of judgment on the pending claim or action. Thus, consent judgments are seen by some courts as an agreement, or a contract, the preclusive effects of which depends on the intent of the parties. Proponents of this view are of the opinion that any harsher view of consent judgments would discourage parties from entering into such agreements in fear that they will “miss” something, and will never have the chance to bring an action against the other party for the same claim. Other courts however, view consent judgments as one which possesses the same force as a judgment by a court with regards to collateral estoppel and res judicata. This court agrees that consent judgments should be viewed as contracts, and holds that the preclusive effect of...
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- ...D) entered into an agreement with Hanover Logansport (“Hanover”) (P) to lease a parcel of property from Hanover (P). Anderson (D) filed suit against Hanover (P) for breach of the lease, upon the latter’s failure to deliver the premises on the agreed date. Before the trial, Hanover (P) agreed to deliver the property. Anderson (D) accepted this offer only as mitigation of damages and not as settlement of the damages that Anderson (D) incurred as a result of the breach of the contract. Subsequently, Anderson (D) and Hanover (P) filed a stipulation of their settlement, and recorded it in the judgment record book of the county. Hanover (P) filed a motion to dismiss Anderson’s (D) earlier suit. The trial court denied the motion. Hanover (P) appeals on the ground that the settlement between Hanover (P) and Anderson (D), and the latter’s acceptance of the real estate, precluded any further litigation based on the same claim. Anderson (D) defends on the ground that both Hanover (P) and...
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Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, Subscriber Assigned IP Address 108.51.209.163 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- According to Rule 26(f), the parties must confer as soon as practicable—and at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b)—to consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case. At the conference, the parties must also make or arrange for the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1), discuss any issues about preserving discoverable information, and develop a proposed discovery plan. It is unusual for discovery to be ordered before this conference is held, but, as this case demonstrates, in extraordinary cases pre-conference discovery may be necessary. The court also acknowledged that Rule 26(c) came into play here to prevent the misuse of any information obtained by the subpoena.
- (Kelly, J.) Yes. A court will authorize discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference only when the party seeking discovery has good cause and at least a good faith belief that such discovery will show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The plaintiff in this case has satisfied the good cause standard. The suit cannot move forward without the plaintiff being able to identify the defendant so that service can be effected. The plaintiff has also established a good faith belief that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, based on the use of geolocation technology. Reliance on this type of technology has been held sufficient to justify a good faith belief. The court also finds, however, that a protective order is warranted here. Just because the IP address is tied to a particular physical address does not mean that the owner of that IP address is the infringer. Anyone with access to the IP address—a son, daughter, houseguest, or neighbor, for...
- A court will authorize discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference only when the party seeking discovery has good cause and at least a good faith belief that such discovery will show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
- A judicial order requiring a person to appear before the court (or at a deposition) and to give testimony with respect to a dispute before the court.
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- This case essentially changes the entire nature of peremptory challenges in civil proceedings. By definition, peremptory challenges to prospective jurors may be made for had already undermined this basic concept by precluding the use of such challenges to eliminate potential black jurors in criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, in that case, the state-action requirement for equal protection violations was clearly satisfied, since a government prosecutor was engaging in the discriminatory behavior. In the case at hand, conversely, only private litigants are involved in striking certain black jurors. Regardless, the Court desired to eliminate such discriminatory treatment using the only vehicle it saw possible, the equal protection clause. In doing so, the Court quite possibly stretched the concept of state-action beyond its logical extreme. As the strong dissent by three justices accurately noted, peremptory challenges in civil suits involve only the actions of private litigants. The...
- Thaddeus Donald Edmonson (P), a construction worker, sued the Leesville Concrete Company (D) in district court for negligence after one of the company’s trucks pinned Edmonson (P) against some construction equipment. Edmonson (P) asserted his Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. At voir dire, Leesville (D) invoked two of its three peremptory challenges to remove black persons from the prospective jury. Edmonson (P), a black man, requested that the District Court require Leesville (D) to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges. [Yes, peremptory challenges used to require no reason whatsoever.] The District Court denied the request on the ground that the cited case, ...including eleven whites and one black, found Edmonson (P) 80% contributorily negligent and returned a partial damages verdict for Edmonson (P). Edmonson (P) appealed [apparently feeling that his meager $18,000 award was racially-motivated]. An en banc panel of the Court of Appeals...
- ...and racial discrimination violates the Constitution only when it may be attributed to state action. However, the entire process of jury selection retains an element of state action. A trial judge exercises substantial control over voir dire in the federal system. Further, the objective of jury selection is to determine representation on a governmental body. The fact that the government delegates some portion of the jury-selection process to private litigants does not change the governmental character of the power exercised. When private litigants participate in the selection of jurors, they serve an important governmental function and operate with its substantial assistance. The injury caused by racial discrimination in jury selection is made more severe because the government permits it to occur within the courthouse itself. It only remains to consider whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination has been established in the instant action, requiring Leesville (D) to...courts
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Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The important thing to note about this case is that it interprets and applies a is divided according to category of action—diversity cases, federal question cases, suits against federal agents—but each category provides that venue is proper in the district where a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” This language is the product of a 1990 amendment from the litigation-breeding phrase “where the claim arose.” As you can imagine, there are varying degrees of difficulty in determining where a claim arose which depend on the nature of the claim. For example, if a claim is neither for a physical injury or even for an easily identified injury, it is hard to pinpoint the locus of the damage and the plain language of the phrase fails to clarify matters. The new venue-granting phrase, whose meaning was evolving out of cases like ...the venue options to a single district. By allowing the courts discretion to pick from a few districts, the...
- FEDERAL QUESTION CASE: Cases arising under the Constitution, acts of Congress or treaties, and involving their interpretation and action.
- (Newman, J.) Yes. Venue exists in the district where the debtor resides and to which a collection notice was forwarded, regardless of the collection agency’s lack of intent to forward the notice. The applicable federal venue statute allows an action to be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” This language is the result of a 1990 amendment from “the judicial district in which the claim arose.” That earlier language was reviewed in the landmark case, considered a number of factors which are relevant to selecting the best venue because the case holding is based on the presumption that only one district can be the place “where the claim arose.” This does not apply with equal force to the new version of the statute since there can be more than one district where a “substantial part of the events” occurred. In the instant case, it is also inconsequential that the collection notice was not forwarded to...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- COURT DECLARES VENUE IS PROPER IN, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO, THE DISTRICT WHERE A DEBTOR RESIDES IF THAT IS WHERE A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE EVENTS GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIM AROSE
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- The court applies the historical common-law background of interpleader to the facts of this case, although the decision focuses on the broad applicability of interpleader as required by California statutes. In brief, the analysis allows for liberal construction of the common law four-prong approach in order to meet the ultimate goal of judicial efficiency. While the opinion can be questioned for failing to convincingly demonstrate how Hancock Oil’s (P) complaint satisfied the common law analysis, it nevertheless reaches a just result. Unfortunately, the opinion does not present the “big picture” of an interpleader action. Interpleader is, of course, designed to determine the rights of rival claimants over some property held by the person seeking the interpleader. In this case, the person seeking the interpleader was the tenant, and the rival claimants were landlords or others claiming a right to the rents. Typically, interpleader suits have two stages. First, the court must...
- ...incurred no independent liability to any of the claimants. These historical limitations on interpleader have been broadened by California statute, which allows a party facing conflicting claims to bring an action against the conflicting claimants and force them to interplead their claims among themselves. According to the modem statute, interpleader lies even if the adverse claims are not derived from a common source. Interpleader cannot be maintained if the claims are mutually exclusive, but the fact that an identical right is not asserted by each claimant does not preclude the use of interpleader. In the case at hand, Hancock Oil (P) asserted that IDC (D) and the Hopkinses (D) each claim the right to receive rents under the lease. Furthermore, Hancock Oil (P) is a disinterested stakeholder, since the corporation does not care to whom rents should be paid. With regard to the fourth prong of the common law analysis, IDC (D) and the Hopkinses (D) assert that the obligation to pay...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- W.L. Hopkins (D) and Gertrude Ann Hopkins (“the Hopkinses”) (D) leased real property to Hancock Oil Company (P). Subsequently, a copartnership named Independent Distributing Co. (IDC) (D) asserted that the Hopkinses (D) held the real property in trust for the copartnership. Hancock Oil (P) brought this action, against IDC, the Hopkinses (D), and four other Hopkinses (D) who were trustees, to determine to whom the rent should be paid. IDC (D) filed an answer alleging that they were the owners of the property, that the Hopkinses (D) were holding the property in trust for IDC (D), and that IDC (D) was therefore entitled to all rents. The Hopkinses (D) demurred to the complaint on the ground of uncertainty. Hancock Oil (P) appeals the court’s order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The District Court certified a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart (D) in an employment discrimination case, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the certification.
- The Court blends the threshold criterion of Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry is meant to test whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. If courts must conduct a “dissimilarities” analysis at the Rule 23(b)(3). The Court’s “dissimilarities” position is far reaching. Individual differences should not bar a Rule 23(a) threshold is met. The “dissimilarities” approach leads the Court to train its attention on what distinguishes individual class members, rather than on what unites them.
- Was the case properly certified as a class action?
- CASE VOCABULARY
- DISPARATE IMPACT: The adverse effect of a practice that discriminates against persons because of their race, sex, national origin, age, or disability even though the practice appears neutral on its face. Discriminatory intent is irrelevant in a disparate impact case.
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Lavender v. Kurn 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The opinion in this case gives a very clear explanation of the function and purpose of the jury, as well as how a jury’s verdict should be regarded. The jury is supposed to review conflicting opinions, testimony, and evidence, and come to a conclusion about which facts should be accepted as true in a given case. Once a jury has come to a decision, “it would be an undue invasion of the jury’s historic function for an appellate court to weigh the conflicting evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses and arrive at a conclusion opposite from the one reached by the jury.” But the implications reach even deeper. The institution of the jury is firmly established in the U.S. Constitution, so ignoring a proper jury verdict is, in effect, denying the parties to that action a Constitutionally protected right. Therefore, a jury’s verdict should always receive an extreme amount of deference, and once the reviewing court has discovered that there is any evidentiary basis to support that...
- ...Railway Company (Frisco), and the Illinois Central Railroad Company. One dark December night in 1939, Haney was working as usual in the railyards outside Grand Central Station in Memphis, Tennessee, when a Frisco train pulled into the station. Haney opened a switch to permit the train to enter on the correct track, but did not close the switch after the train had passed, as he was required to do. When station personnel went to investigate, they found Haney lying dead, face-down near the track. He had been struck in the back of the head by some fast-moving, small, round object. At trial, Lavender (P) contended that Haney had been struck by a mail-hook attached to the train that had passed him, while the railroad companies (D) contended that Haney had been killed by a hobo. There was extensive evidence for and against both possible explanations, but the jury found that Haney had been killed by the mail-hook, and awarded damages accordingly. The Missouri Supreme Court... ...case...
- U.S. SUPREME COURT REBUKES MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR WRONGLY OVERTURNING A JURY’S VERDICT WHEN THERE WAS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT VERDICT
- Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court after Missouri Supreme Court reversed judgment for plaintiff in action for negligence.
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Slade’s Case 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Debt was a form of action for breach of contract which could only lie when an agreement had been fully performed by one party who was now entitled to payment for his performance. Case, however, was the chosen cause of action for most plaintiffs because its lengthy history and familiarity made it seem somehow safer. Out of case grew the action of assumpsit, which established a remedy for nonperformance of a promise. However, for a long time assumpsit could only lie if a promise to pay was made explicitly and separately from the initial bargain between the two parties. Thus, for example, not only would Slade (P) and Morley (D) have to have agreed to exchange goods for money but Morley would then separately have to say, “I promise to pay you for this grain you have brought before me.” If this seems rather superfluous to you, it did so to many courts as well who, as in
- (Judge Not Stated) Yes. When two parties enter a bargain and one of them breaches it, the nonbreaching plaintiff may select any cause of action from those available to him. Thus, just because other plaintiffs in Slade’s (P) position traditionally bring an action of debt on the contract does not mean Slade (P) cannot bring an action in case, if it applies equally. Assumpsit, an action developed from case, is as much a remedy as “debt” because every “contract executory” includes an assumption of indebtedness to the other party.
- WHEN ACTIONS IN CASE AND ON THE CONTRACT ARE BOTH MAINTAINABLE, PLAINTIFF CAN CHOOSE EITHER
- When an action could have been viably brought on the case or on the contract, a plaintiff may choose whichever action is preferable to him even though it may not be defendant’s preference.
- If an action could have been brought either on the case or on the contract, can a plaintiff choose whichever one is preferable to him?
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Magnani v. Trogi 5 results
- (Coryn, J.) Yes. Where an incoherent jury verdict could be construed in two ways, each providing for different distribution of the award, a trial judge may grant a new trial. In the case at hand, the general jury verdict did not detail whether the damages award was based on the first or second cause of action or on both of them. It might be that the verdict was based on the wrongful death action and non-liability as to the medical expense cause of action. However, the jury verdict gives no indication of the jury’s determination as to what portion of the $19,000 it attributed to damages for wrongful death and what portion, if any, it attributed to damages for medical and funeral expenses. In this situation, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to grant a new trial. A trial court is generally allowed great latitude in granting a new trial, in order to permit the judge to correct errors that he or the jury might have made during the course of the trial. In the case at...
- This case analyzes the scope of a state court judge’s discretion to grant a new trial. In general, as the majority notes, judges are allowed broad discretion to grant new trials in order to correct errors that they or the jury made during the course of the trial. However, in the case at hand, it is questionable whether the jury or judge actually made any such errors. The jury simply returned a verdict based on the form submitted to it. Unfortunately, this form did not compel the jury to specify which cause of action, if any, it based its damages award upon. Nevertheless, this error was caused by attorney incompetence in not preparing two separate verdict forms. Trogi (D) clearly had the opportunity to submit different forms, forcing the jury to explain whether damages were being awarded for the wrongful death action, for the reimbursement action, or for both. The dissent therefore raises a valid point. Perhaps Trogi (D) should not have been allowed to bring a post-trial motion for...
- A COURT MAY GRANT A NEW TRIAL IN RESPONSE TO INCOHERENT JURY VERDICTS
- After the jury returned a verdict for Magnani (P) for $19,000 on one or both of her causes of action, the trial court granted Trogi’s (D) motion for new trial based on the incomplete nature of the jury verdict.
- (Stouder, J.) Although a trial judge has broad latitude in granting a new trial, this rule has limitations. A judge is not allowed to set aside a verdict simply because he does not agree with it. In the case at hand, the trial judge granted a new trial because he found that the forms of verdict submitted to the jury were improper. I am unable to find that Trogi (D) made any objection to the forms of verdict at any time prior to his post-trial motion. Thus, Trogi’s (D) motion for a new trial should have been denied.
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Duk v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Did the trial court properly resubmit the case to the jury for a second verdict after the first trial?
- (Hawkins, J.) Yes. Where the jury is still available, a district court’s decision to resubmit an inconsistent verdict for clarification is within its discretion. If the district court judge does not push the jury in one direction or another, resubmission is the most sensible solution. In defendant had qualified immunity, but awarded the plaintiff damages nonetheless. The jury’s second verdict found that the defendant did not have qualified immunity, and still awarded the plaintiff damages. Although resubmission opens the door to the possibility that the jury will reach an improper “compromise” verdict, we have to trust the jury system. Rarely is a court entitled to disregard a jury verdict that is supported by substantial evidence. But allowing a jury to reconcile inconsistencies is only possible if the jury is allowed to resume its deliberations. In this case, it is quite plausible that the jury changed the apportionment of liability because it redeliberated and changed its mind or...
- The jury was instructed, pursuant to Nevada’s comparative negligence law, that if Duk (P) was more than fifty percent at fault, he should not be awarded damages. Nonetheless, the jury returned a verdict finding Duk (P) sixty-five percent negligent, but awarding him $3.3 million in damages. The court returned the verdict form to the jury and reinstructed the jurors, and they returned a second verdict assigning forty-nine percent of the negligence to Duk (P), and leaving the damages award intact. MGM Grand (D) moved for a new trial based on the inconsistency of the verdicts, and the court granted the motion. At the second trial, the jury entered a verdict for the defendant. Duk (P) appealed, arguing that the second verdict from the first trial was legitimate and that a new trial should not have been granted. MGM Grand (D) cross-appealed, arguing that the case should have been disposed of after the first verdict, wherein Duk (P) was found more than fifty percent negligent; in the...
- This case involves consideration of the plaintiff’s comparative negligence. The court explained to the jury that if Duk (P) was more than fifty percent at fault for his own injuries, he could not recover at all. Not all states’ comparative negligence laws are like Nevada’s. Some states apply “pure comparative negligence”—the principle that liability for negligence is apportioned according to the percentage of fault that the factfinder assigns to each party, and the plaintiff’s percentage of fault reduces the amount of recoverable damages but does not bar recovery. “Modified comparative negligence,” by contrast, is the principle that liability for negligence is apportioned in accordance with the percentage of fault that the factfinder assigns to each party, and the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the percentage of negligence assigned to the plaintiff—but the plaintiff’s recovery is barred completely if the plaintiff was more at fault than the defendant(s).
- CASE VOCABULARY
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- COURT HOLDS CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED EVEN THOUGH TRIAL JUDGE GAVE INCORRECT JURY INSTRUCTION
- To understand this case fully, it is necessary to understand the breakdown in functions between judge and jury in a jury trial. As it is often put, the judge is the trier of law, and the jury is the trier of fact. This means that the judge is responsible for deciding what law should be applied in a particular case, and the jury must decide what the true facts are, i.e., which witnesses to believe, etc. What usually happens is that the judge will decide what law should apply and instructs the jury on this point. This is the “charge,” or the “jury instruction.” Of course, as with everything else in the adversary system, lawyers from both sides have a hand in the charge as well. Often each side will submit to the judge a list of which laws they believe should apply, as well as the particular phrasing of the charge, and the judge will review these submissions in deciding on the charge. The lawyers for each side are supposed to instruct the judge on the law that applies and bring to his...
- COLLOQUY: A high-level serious discussion; conference.
- (Swan) No. Or at least, not usually, and certainly not here. It is required by Federal Rule 51 that, when the trial judge incorrectly charges the jury with respect to any part of the law, that charge must be objected to before the jury retires for deliberations. Without this rule, there would obviously be a danger of too many frivolous appeals being filed, after the party who ended up losing had a chance to go over the judge’s charge with a fine-tooth comb looking for anything that might arguably be wrong or even ambiguous. Rule 51 limits appeals based on error in the jury instructions to those cases where the charge was actually objected to, and the judge had time to correct the mistake. Of course, there are cases where the judge is so egregiously wrong, and the mistake so central to the outcome of the case, that an exception will be made and the error corrected on appeal regardless. But this is not one of those situations. Likewise, there are sometimes situations in which a party...
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- A federal court in which suit was properly commenced was not entitled under § 1404(a) to transfer a case to a district in which the plaintiff could not have properly commenced suit.
- The Scottish heirs of plane crash victims in Scotland try to sue for wrongful death in an American court because American courts recognize wrongful death as a cause of action and are known generally to be more favorable to plaintiffs than the courts in Scotland.
- Alleging federal statutory violation, debtor sues a Pennsylvania collection agency in New York court and asserts jurisdiction is proper because their collection notices were forwarded to him in New York.
- Atlantic Marine Construction Company, Inc. v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
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Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp. 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case raises a number of important issues regarding Rule 11’s 21-day-safe-harbor provision is especially important, providing parties and their attorneys the opportunity to correct their errors before sanctions are imposed. The case also explains the grounds for sanctioning attorneys for failing to investigate the truthfulness of their client’s representations before submitting them to court. Obviously, if an attorney knows that his client’s statements are untruthful, the attorney should not submit them to the court. But to what extent must an attorney investigate the truthfulness of the statements? In general, an attorney is entitled to rely on any objectively reasonable statements. The new
- Hadges (P) was a racehorse driver, trainer and owner who was licensed by the New York State Racing Board. His license was suspended on two occasions. Following his second reinstatement in 1989, Hadges (P) was denied the ability to work at a number of racetracks. Hadges (P) sued the Yonkers Racing Corporation (“YRC”) (D) in both state and federal court. The federal claim was dismissed and the state court ruled against Hadges (P). Hadges (P) appealed the state decision and filed a Rule 60(b) motion in federal court, requesting that the federal dismissal be vacated. At issue in the federal case was Hadges’ (P) ability to work at other racetracks besides Yonkers Raceway. Hadges (P) claimed that other tracks had barred him from working. Hadges (P) and his attorney (William Kunstler) signed statements saying that Hadges (P) had not worked in four years, and they neglected to mention the state appeal. YRC (D) presented evidence that showed Hadges (P) had worked at other racetracks. YRC (D)...
- Rule 11 sanctions, it is necessary to strictly comply with the procedural requirements. YRC (D) should have served Hadges (P) with the request for sanctions 21 days before presenting it to the court. This would have enabled Rule 11, an attorney is entitled to rely on the objectively reasonable representations of the client when submitting the client’s affidavit to the court. Kunstler was required to make an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether an objectively reasonable basis for the statements existed. As a reviewing court, we must look at the pretrial proceedings and determine whether they provided evidentiary support for the factual misrepresentations with which the court is concerned. We conclude that the record contained evidentiary support for the claim that Hadges (P) had not worked for four years, and for the claim regarding the scratching incident. Moreover, Hadges (P) was not required to mention the state court proceeding, as the state court...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- RULE 11 ESTABLISHES STRICT GUIDELINES FOR SANCTIONING PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS FOR SUBMITTING MISREPRESENTATIONS TO COURT
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Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case presents an unusual situation—a party appealing from a favorable judgment. But given the facts of the case, it is easy to see why EFC (D) would want to appeal the decree, since the trial court expressly held that there was some validity to Thomas & Betts’s (P) patent infringement claim against EFC (D). Courts have generally held that only parties aggrieved by a judgment can appeal from it. And a party can only be aggrieved by those findings of law or fact that were actually necessary for a decree, since unnecessary findings cannot be the basis for collateral estoppel. In other words, EFC (D) could not appeal the decree if they would not be bound by it in subsequent suits. Such a rule is reasonable, as it protects the rights of the parties while avoiding needless appeals.
- Thomas & Betts Co. (P) sued Electrical Fittings Corp. (“EFC”) (D) for patent infringement. The district court entered a decree adjudging one of Thomas & Betts’s (P) claims as valid, but dismissing the bill for failure to prove infringement. EFC (D) appealed the portion of the decree which adjudged the one claim as valid. The court of appeals dismissed on the ground that, because the litigation terminated in its favor, EFC (D)was not entitled to appeal the decree. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- (Roberts, J.) Yes. An appellate court may, in some circumstances, entertain an appeal by the party who won at trial. Indeed, a party may not appeal a favorable judgment for the purpose of reviewing certain findings which were not necessary to support the decree. However, where a decree stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated, the decree may be appealed from, even by the victorious party. The district court adjudicated the validity of the patent infringement claim, and its decree is subject to appeal by EFC (D). Reversed and remanded.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS VICTORIOUS PARTY’S RIGHT TO APPEAL
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Chapter Seventeen. The Binding Effect of Prior Decisions: Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Trial courts have broad discretion to apply the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel, even in cases where the defendant will be deprived of a jury trial.
- After on antique aircraft enthusiast’s Freedom of Information lawsuit proved unsuccessful, Taylor (P), a friend and fellow enthusiast, brought suit seeking the same information, and the court similarly denied his request based on the judgment in the first case; Taylor (P) appealed.
- Offensive nonmutual estoppel can be utilized by courts that are part of different judicial systems from the rendering court.
- Federal courts must give preclusive effect to state court judgments even where federal civil rights are at issue.
- After a California federal court dismissed the plaintiff’s action on the basis of the state statute of limitations, a Maryland state court dismissed a subsequent suit brought by the plaintiff on the same grounds.
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- When the king asked his Attorney General to certify the difference between his Court of Chancery and King’s Bench, a case was presented to him where an individual sought relief from a judgment obtained against him.
- Slade’s Case
- : When an action could have been viably brought on the case or on the contract, a plaintiff may choose whichever action is preferable to him even though it may not be defendant’s preference.
- Arguments Proving from Antiquity the Dignity, Power, and Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery
- The Court of Chancery has the right and power to dispense equitable relief as it finds necessary.
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Chapter Eight. Modern Pleading 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Kearns (P) and others brought a class action against Ford Motor Co. (D) for violations of California consumer protection laws; the case was removed to federal court and dismissed multiple times for failure to plead fraud with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
- Defendant admits manufacturing the defective water slide at issue in the case but a year later moves the court to amend the answer to deny manufacture.
- Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to charges brought in federal court irrespective of the source of the subject matter jurisdiction, and irrespective of whether the substantive law at issue is state or federal.
- A court does not abuse its discretion by allowing an amendment to an answer which initially admitted responsibility for the manufacture of the product at issue but now seeks to deny manufacturing it.
- An attorney and his client were sanctioned for submitting factual misrepresentations to a district court.
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Chapter Ten. Class Actions 2 results
- The District Court certified a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart (D) in an employment discrimination case, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the certification.
- Shutts (P) and several other holders of royalty interests brought a class action against Phillips Petroleum (D) to recover royalty payments. The Kansas court obtained personal jurisdiction over all parties and applied Kansas law to all claims.
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Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts 5 results
- (Parker, J.) (1) Yes. A trial court may grant a motion for new trial under circumstances insufficient to direct a verdict or grant a judgment n.o.v. A trial judge may not direct a verdict against a party where there is substantial evidence in support of that party’s case. Nevertheless, the judge may set aside a verdict supported by substantial evidence where he is of the opinion that the verdict is contradictory to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or will result in a miscarriage of justice. The judge must prevent a miscarriage of justice, even if the evidence is sufficient to preclude the direction of a verdict. (2) Yes. A trial judge’s decision to deny a new trial is not reviewable upon appeal, save the most exceptional circumstances. The granting or refusing of a new trial is a matter resting in the sole discretion of a trial judge. In the case at hand, while the trial judge might very properly have granted the motion for new trial, we...
- Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (P) sought a declaratory judgment stating that Yeatts (the insured) (D) was engaged in the performance of a criminal abortion at the time of his acts, the liability for which Aetna (P) was not obliged to cover. The jury rendered a verdict in support of Yeatts (D). The sufficiency of the evidence was not challenged before the verdict. Aetna (P) moved for a judgment non obstante veredicto and a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the credible evidence in the case. The court denied these motions, and Aetna (P) appeals.
- This case demonstrates a trial judge’s considerable power with respect to granting new trials. When sufficiency of the evidence is an issue, the overlap between new trials and directed verdicts or judgments n.o.v. can be somewhat confusing. All of these potential judicial tools are based on legal insufficiency of the evidence, but the difference is one of degree. As this case demonstrates, a new trial may be granted even though the amount of insufficiency fails short of the standard required to support a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. In other
- A TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION TO GRANT OR DENY NEW TRIALS BASED ON SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
- (1) May a trial court grant a motion for new trial under circumstances insufficient to direct a verdict or grant a judgment n.o.v.? (2) Is a trial judge’s decision to deny a new trial not reviewable upon appeal, save the most exceptional circumstances?
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International Shoe Co. v. Washington 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Black, J.) Jurisdiction was proper in this case. The U.S. Constitution granted to each state the right to tax and subject to suit any corporation whose activities within a state affect that state’s citizens and businesses. Period. This Court should not have the power to invalidate a state’s assertion of jurisdiction merely because the members of this Court have a different opinion of what is “fair” or “reasonable.”
- the cause of action arises from those activities, but even in some cases where the cause of action does not arise from those activities. In some cases even a single, isolated contact with a state has been enough, when that contact gives rise to the cause of action. Obviously, a corporation that has no contacts at all with a state should not be subject to that state’s jurisdiction. But a corporation that does conduct activities within a state also enjoys the benefits and protections of the state’s laws and should therefore be held subject as well to those laws, and to actions brought to enforce those laws. There is no mechanical way to decide whether, in a particular case, a corporation’s contacts with a state have reached the level necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction; instead, the nature and extent of those contacts must be evaluated under traditional concepts of fairness and justice to determine whether it would be reasonable to require the corporation to defend a suit in...
- changed the trend in defining the court with jurisdiction away from the court with immediate power over the defendant, to the court where the parties may most conveniently settle their dispute. It also began a trend in defining due process law away from the emphasis on territorial limitations of courts, and towards an emphasis on providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. ...ways. First, a defendant may have sufficient contact with the forum to warrant asserting jurisdiction over it for all matters; this is termed “general jurisdiction.” Second, a defendant may have sufficient contact with the forum to warrant asserting jurisdiction over it for matters related to its activity with the forum without having sufficient contact with the forum to warrant general jurisdiction. In such a case, the jurisdiction is termed “specific jurisdiction.” Whether a corporation is subject to specific or general jurisdiction, however, depends on the nature and number of contacts it has...
- CAPIAS AD RESPONDENDUM: Method of commencing a court action in which the defendant is physically seized by the sheriff, and kept in custody until he is brought before the court.
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Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- After wading through the intricacies and somewhat verbose opinion of this case, a sensible approach to mandatory joinder surfaces. This approach provides a logical federal substitute to the often clouded state-court holdings regarding “necessary and indispensable” parties. First, Rule 19(a) is used to determine if a party is necessary. If so, the party must be joined if feasible. However, if joinder is not feasible (due to jurisdictional or venue problems), the court does not necessarily have to dismiss the suit. Indeed, the suit must be dismissed only if the absent party is indispensable. This case, along with ..., the absentee, and the public [no easy task!]. Three prongs of the test are easily satisfied, leaving only the considerations of Dutcher’s best interests. Clearly, the continuance of the suit without Dutcher’s presence is not in Dutcher’s best interest, since his insurance funds will be depleted by the judgment. The Court sidesteps this prong, however, noting that...
- Rule 19(a) requires joinder of such a party where feasible. However, it was not feasible to join Dutcher, since Dutcher could not be joined without destroying diversity. In this situation, must a court dismiss the action? Pursuant to Rule 19(b) presents an “equity and good conscience” approach, allowing a court to dismiss such an action if only countervailing interests are not satisfied. However, .... Third, Dutcher would not be substantially prejudiced by the suit continuing without his joinder. Dutcher would only have a need to relitigate the issues if his insurance fund was used to pay judgments against Cionci. Although this is the probable result of the judgment, Dutcher nevertheless is not foreclosed by the lack of joinder since he is not bound by res judicata to a judgment in which he did not participate. Fourth, considerations of judicial efficiency, in which both the courts and the public share an interest, warrant upholding this judgment rather than dismissing it. By the...
- Donald Cionci, John Lynch, and Thomas Smith died, and John Harris was severely injured, when Cionci negligently drove Edward Dutcher’s car, with Lynch and Harris as passengers, over the median line of a highway and collided with a truck driven by Smith. Provident Tradesmens Bank (PTB) (P), the administrator of Lynch’s estate, obtained a claim for $50,000 against Cionci’s estate. However, the estate was without any funds. Thus, PTB (P) sued Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (LMCC) (D), the insurer of Dutcher’s automobile, in federal district court for a declaration that the car had been driven with the permission of Dutcher (under which circumstances the insurance policy would cover Cionci’s liability). Harris and Smith’s administratrix were joined as tort plaintiffs against LMCC (D). The trial court awarded declaratory judgments in favor of PTB (P) and the tort plaintiffs. LMCC (D) appealed on various state law grounds. However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- FEDERAL COURTS DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO DISMISS SUITS WHERE IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO JOIN A NECESSARY PARTY
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Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- There is definitely something to be said for the argument that the manufacturer of a defective product should be answerable for injuries caused by that product wherever they are caused, as a matter of public policy. So it’s understandable that the Supreme Court of Illinois wanted to find a way to hold Titan (D) liable in Illinois. But to base their argument on minimum contacts . . . well, it’s what they had to work with, but to say that Titan (D) really had any contact with the state of Illinois is to stretch the word contact beyond its everyday meaning. It certainly shows that ...-arm provisions authorizing jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis of the defendant’s business within the forum often require that the plaintiff’s cause of action “be related to” or “arise from” the business transacted within the state. Under these provisions, jurisdiction will not exist when the cause of action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. This case was not reviewed by...Court
- SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS DECLARES THAT ILLINOIS COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER CORPORATIONS WHICH CONDUCT NO BUSINESS WHATSOEVER IN ILLINOIS
- (Klingbiel) Yes. A state can exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that does no business within the state, provided that the act giving rise to the suit has a substantial connection to the state. In the context of this case, Illinois can exercise jurisdiction over an Ohio corporation whose only contact with the state was the sale, outside the state, of a product that was incorporated into another product which in turn caused injury in Illinois. Illinois law provides for service on defendants who commit tortious acts within the state, and, since for purposes of this law the actual injury-causing event is what counts as the “tortious act,” the law does apply to Titan (D). Nor does this application violate the requirement of due process. Under the rule of ...the defendant and the forum state when the cause of action arises from those contacts, as is the case here. Even single contacts have been held to suffice, so long as that contact has a substantial connection to the... ...case...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- ...that made valves. It had no personnel in Illinois, and conducted no business there. It sold its completed valves to the American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation (“American Radiator”) (D), which incorporated them into its water heaters, which were manufactured in Pennsylvania. American Radiator then sold its water heaters in several states, including Illinois. One of the water heaters sold in Illinois exploded, injuring Phyllis Gray (P), who brought suit against Titan (D) and American Radiator (D) for negligence. American Radiator (D) then filed a cross claim against Titan (D). Titan (D) was served notice in Ohio, under an Illinois statute authorizing long-arm service of process on all out-of-state actors who commit “a tortious act” within the state of Illinois. Titan (D) moved to dismiss, arguing that it had not committed a tortious act within Illinois, and therefore fell outside the reach of the statute. The trial court granted Titan’s (D) motion and dismissed both the...
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- Charged with several claims for asbestos poisoning that lead to the death of Mr. Catrett, Celotex (D) moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Mrs. Catrett (P) failed to produce evidence to support the claims.
- In a summary judgment motion, a moving party may meet its burden of persuasion by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to supply sufficient evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact.
- When a case is called for trial and is at issue, the failure of a defendant to appear does not warrant a default judgment against him.
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Curtis v. Loether 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Marshall, J.) Yes. The Seventh Amendment’s right to jury trial applies to actions enforcing statutory rights, and a jury trial is available if the statute creates legal rights and remedies enforceable in an action for damages in the courts of law. Curtis’s (P) damages action under § 812 is an action to enforce legal rights within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment and, hence, a jury trial must be available. Curtis (P) argues that the Seventh Amendment is inapplicable to causes of action created by Congress. However, we have often found the Seventh Amendment applicable to causes of action based on statutes. Curtis (P) relies upon [Jury trial not available in NLRB unfair labor practice proceeding, because case involved a statutory proceeding and not a suit at common law]. This case is distinguishable, as ...since a jury trial in bankruptcy proceedings would dismember the statutory scheme of the Bankruptcy Act. In the case at hand, Congress expressly provided for the enforcement...
- Curtis (P), a black woman, brought an action under Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to redress violations of Title VIII (the fair housing provisions of the Act). Alleging that Loether (D) refused to rent an apartment to Curtis (P) because of her race, Curtis (P) sought injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining Loether (D) from renting the apartment to anyone else pending a trial on the merits [pretty steep penalty before trial!]. The injunction was subsequently dissolved with Curtis’s (P) consent, and the case went to trial on the issues of damages. Although Loether (D) made a demand for a jury trial, the District Court denied the request. At a trial on the merits, the District Judge awarded $250 in punitive damages to Curtis (P). The Court of Appeals reversed on the jury issue, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- This is the first case in this chapter that specifically addresses the seemingly narrow language of the Seventh Amendment. By a plain reading of the Amendment, it appears that the right to jury trials extends only to suits at common law. However, the Court easily overcomes this obstacle, noting that the constitutional right to jury trials for causes of action based on statutes is “a matter too obvious to be doubted.” The Court then takes this liberal reading of the Seventh Amendment one step further. Although the Court recognizes that a victim of discrimination could be deprived of a well-deserved verdict based on jury prejudice, it states that “these considerations are insufficient to overcome the clear command of the Seventh Amendment.” Where does the Seventh Amendment state this command? Surely not in the text of the Amendment, which refers only to suits at common law. Thus, this opinion may be criticized for an overly broad reading of the Seventh Amendment.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Curtis (P), who sued for damages and injunctive relief for alleged discrimination in violation of Title VIII, challenges the Court of Appeals’ grant of jury trial to this statutory action.
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Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Friedland, J.) No. The language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 neither provides nor implies that demonstrating an administratively feasible way to identify class members is a prerequisite to class certification. Rule 23 sets forth an exhaustive list of prerequisites to class certification, and administrative feasibility is not one of them. Although we acknowledge that the Third Circuit has held otherwise, requiring class proponents to satisfy an administrative feasibility prerequisite conflicts with the well-settled presumption that courts should not refuse to certify a class merely on the basis of manageability concerns. With regard to absent class members, Rule 23 requires only the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances. Courts have long employed ...Nor does the Due Process Clause require actual, individual notice in all cases. Notice by publication in a periodical, on a website, or even at an appropriate physical location is sufficient to satisfy due...
- Rule 23 provides that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” According to the court in this case, this list is exhaustive, and no additional requirements should be applied when determining whether to certify a class.
- Federal appellate court review of a district court decision certifying the class.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Did the district court err in declining to condition class certification on the plaintiffs’ proffer of an administratively feasible way to identify putative class members?
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Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Court unanimously held in this case that the California state court could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Asahi (D). The Court followed a two-step analysis it had developed in its previous decisions. First, inquiry was made into the sufficiency of Asahi’s (D) contacts with the forum state, and then those contacts were examined in light of fairness considerations to determine if the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. Justice O’Connor, in her plurality opinion, understood the teaching of ...manufacturer’s contacts must be “more purposefully directed at the forum State than the mere act of placing a product in the stream of commerce.” Asahi’s (D) mere awareness that the valve assemblies it sold to Cheng Shin eventually would end up in California was not sufficiently purposeful, in her opinion, to establish minimum contacts. The Court divided sharply on this point with three members endorsing the conclusion reached by Justice O’Connor. Given the division...
- (Stevens, joined by White and Blackmun, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) We don’t need to decide for this case. It is quite obvious that it would not be fair to require the Japanese defendant to defend itself in California, especially when there are no American parties left in the case. But if we did need to formulate here a test requiring minimum contacts, the Court has not done so correctly. Asahi (D) did have sufficient knowledge that its product was being sold in California and should therefore be held to have had sufficient minimum contacts with that state.
- Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of California for its reversal of the Court of Appeal’s writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to quash service of summons on cross-complaint for indemnification in action for damages for negligence.
- ...as one of the defendants Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd., the tire tube’s Taiwanese manufacturer. Cheng Shin in turn filed a cross-claim—for indemnification in the event it was found liable—against the other defendants, and against Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. (D), the Japanese manufacturer of the tire tube’s valve assembly. Zurcher eventually settled out of court with Cheng Shin and all the other defendants, leaving Cheng Shin’s cross-claim against Asahi (D) as the sole remaining issue to be tried. Asahi (D) argued that California could not exert jurisdiction over it, since it lacked sufficient contacts with the state. Asahi (D) did not do business in California and did not import any products into California itself. Rather, it sold its valve assemblies to Cheng Shin and various other tire manufacturers. The sales to Cheng Shin took place in Taiwan, and the valve assemblies were shipped to Taiwan. Cheng Shin bought valve assemblies from other manufacturers as well...
- (Brennan, joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) Yes. It is sufficient, for purposes of establishing that the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, to show that the defendant has intentionally placed its products into the stream of commerce. The “stream of commerce” referred to here indicates the regular and continuous flow of products from manufacture to consumption, not unanticipated and random single occurrences. Since Asahi’s (D) products were regularly and steadily flowing into California, with Asahi’s (D) knowledge, Asahi (D) was benefiting from the laws of California and should be held to have the necessary contacts with California to be subject to its jurisdiction. However, the Court is correct in its analysis of the fairness aspect of the test for jurisdiction, as it would be fundamentally unfair and unreasonable to require Asahi (D) to defend this suit in California. Therefore, the Court was correct in...
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Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In determining whether an issue must be decided by a jury under the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has typically looked to determine whether that issue was left to the decision of a jury under English common law. Here, explaining that English common law provides no answer to the issue of the construction of a patent claim, the Court relies on functional considerations and unanimously finds that judges are better suited than juries to find the meaning of language used in a patent claim. Patent claims are generally interpreted as they would be understood by those skilled in the art, trade, or profession with which the patent is concerned. Typically, expert testimony by such people is used as support for an interpretation of a patent claim. Markman’s (P) argument is that the jury should be the decision maker in judging the credibility of the experts. Emphasizing their own experience with the complexities of document interpretation, the justices reject the notion that the case...
- ...statutory policies that ought to be furthered by our decision. Here, since legal precedent provides no conclusive answer, we must decide the question solely as a matter of the sound administration of justice. We find that judges are better suited than juries to find the meaning of the terms of a patent. Patent claims have become highly technical due to special rules relating to their form and scope that have developed in the government’s Patent Office. A judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to be right in giving a proper interpretation to patent instruments than a jury can be expected to be. Markman (P) argues that a jury should decide a question of meaning peculiar to a trade or profession simply because the question is a subject of testimony requiring credibility determinations, which are a strong point of a jury. While in theory, there could be a case where a simple credibility judgment would be enough to choose between experts whose testimony was equally...
- Appeal, following a grant of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, of a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirming a federal trial court’s decision to overturn a jury verdict and direct a verdict as a matter of law on a suit for patent infringement.
- ...coded tickets that could be read by portable optical scanners. Markman (P) sued, asserting that Westview (D) had infringed on his patent grant, emphasizing that the language of his patent claim stated that his product could be used to “maintain an inventory total.” Westview (D) countered by arguing that there was no infringement of the patent grant because its system functioned merely to record an inventory of receivables by tracking invoices and transaction totals, rather than to record an inventory of articles of clothing. Markman (P) had an expert witness testify as to the meaning of the language of his patent claim. The case was tried before a jury which found an infringement of Markman’s (P) patent by Westview (D). Following the jury’s verdict, Westview (D) moved for a judgment as a matter of law in its favor. The trial judge granted Westview’s (D) motion, concluding from his own construction of the language of the patent claim that there was no infringement of the patent...
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- (Gibson, J.) Yes. Joinder of absent parties is required only where the parties are both necessary and indispensable to the litigation. Modern California statutes follow the common law of equity courts, requiring a court to bring in parties when a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of these parties. In other words, an action may not proceed when necessary and indispensable parties are absent. Parties are “necessary” when they are so interested in the controversy that they should be made parties in order to enable the court to do complete justice. However, necessary parties are not necessarily indispensable. [Thus, they aren’t really “necessary” at all!] Parties are “indispensable” only when their rights or duties would be adversely affected by a judgment. For example, where a number of persons have undetermined interests in the same property, and where one person seeks to recover a portion of the property, the others are indispensable since a...
- This opinion presents a thorough discussion of mandatory joinder in terms of common law and California statutes. Mandatory joinder encompasses all situations in which a court force a plaintiff to expand his or her lawsuit to include (or serve) other defendants. As the opinion explained, a court is not required to join parties as defendants unless those parties are both necessary and indispensable to the litigation. In brief, “necessary” parties are those who be joined if feasible, since they have some interest in the litigation. Thus, joinder of necessary parties avoids a multiplicity of suits and is a matter of convenience. Nevertheless, joinder of necessary parties is not mandatory unless those parties are also “indispensable.” Some courts have interpreted “indispensable” parties to mean that the court would have no jurisdiction to proceed without these parties, since their absence would achieve undesirable consequences beyond merely impairing judicial efficiency. This court...
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- (Executor) v. (Court)
- Mandatory joinder requires courts to join all necessary and indispensable parties to an action.
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- Sanctions for failure to comply with discovery requests can be very harsh. Because Cine (P) was barred from entering any evidence regarding damages, the most it could hope for at trial would be an injunction. Nevertheless, the holding is a sensible reaction to an almost unbelievable lack of responsibility on the part of Cine (P) and its attorney. The magistrate and district court apparently offered Cine (P) every possible opportunity to comply with the requests. Further, Cine (P) could have moved for a protective order under Rule 26(c) if the discovery requests were oppressive. By completely failing to comply with the discovery requirements, Cine (P) deserved the harsh sanctions it received. However, it is interesting to note the reluctance with which the District Court and Court of Appeals handed out the sanctions. Traditionally, judges were extremely reluctant to apply sanctions to curb abusive discovery practices. This case, and others cited in the opinion, demonstrates that
- ..., J.) Yes. A party who exhibits gross negligence in responding to discovery requests is subject to the most severe discovery sanctions. The range of discovery sanctions, specified in Rule 37, serve three purposes. First, sanctions ensure that a party will not be able to profit from a failure to comply with discovery. Second, sanctions may seek to secure compliance with a particular discovery order. Third, and most extreme, sanctions may be imposed as mere penalties, in order to deter similar conduct by other litigants in other lawsuits. If a party makes good faith efforts to comply with discovery requests, the most sever sanctions including dismissal of the complaint should not be employed, as this would amount to a deprivation of a property interest without due process. However, in the case at hand, Cine’s (P) failure to respond to discovery was not in good faith and was either a willful failure to comply or at least grossly negligent. In this situation, the full range of...
- A COURT MAY ORDER STRICT SANCTIONS FOR GROSS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY REQUESTS
- ...Corp. (Cine) (P), the operator of a movie theater in New York City, alleged that Allied Artists Pictures Corp. (Allied) (D) and other theater owners entered into a conspiracy to cut off Cine’s (P) access to first-run films. Thus, Cine (P) filed an antitrust suit seeking $3,000,000 in damages and an injunction against the alleged anticompetitive practices. In 1975, the eleven defendants served Cine (P) with a set of interrogatories. Cine (P) deferred discovery until it could retain an expert, but it nevertheless filed inadequate responses to these interrogatories four months after the deadline. Three years later, Cine (P) had still failed to retain an expert or adequately respond to the interrogatories. A magistrate ordered Cine (P) to answer the interrogatories, and Cine’s (P) response was again late and inadequate. At a formal hearing, the magistrate recommended that the district court preclude Cine (P) from introducing any evidence with respect to damages, the subject matter...
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State ex rel. Sivnksty v. Duffield 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case demonstrates that immunity from process is limited in some situations. A criminal defendant who allegedly committed a crime while voluntarily in another state, and who is imprisoned pending the criminal trial, is not immune from service of process for civil suits. Of course, in the modern age of extensive long-arm statutes, such immunity would be rather meaningless, since the civil plaintiff could simply serve the nonresident defendant via a long-arm statute. Nevertheless, at the time of this case, Sivnksty (D) certainly appears to suffer some unfairness in the application of the immunity laws. The majority reasons that Sivnksty’s (D) voluntary presence in the state removes him from the immunity protections. However, as the dissent notes, Sivnksty’s (D) presence became involuntary once he was incarcerated. Perhaps the majority’s holding can best be justified by analyzing the public policy behind immunity. Immunity is designed to protect courts and nonculpable persons from...
- (Riley, J.) No. A person confined in jail on a criminal charge is not immune from process in a civil action. The original purpose for the privilege of immunity from civil process was to protect the court itself from interference with the judicial process. However, when the intended recipient of civil process has been charged with a crime, immunity also furthers the public policy to ensure that a nonresident charged with a crime will not be deterred from appearing before the criminal court by the threat of civil process. Thus, we have held that a nonresident who voluntarily submits himself to jurisdiction, in an answer to an indictment against him, is privileged while attending court from service of process in a civil suit. Nevertheless, in the instant case Sivnksty (D) entered Gilmer County, West Virginia, on his own volition rather than in response to criminal process. At the time of entry, Sivnksty (D) had not yet committed a crime. In such situations, we follow the rule that a...
- WRIT OF PROHIBITION: Means by which a superior court, such as a court of appeals, restrains an inferior court from determining matters outside of the inferior court’s jurisdiction.
- (Lovins, J.) In the case at hand, I think that whether Sivnksty (D) came into Gilmer County voluntarily or involuntarily is irrelevant. His presence in the county involuntary when he was confined in jail. As a result of this court’s holding, Sivnksty (D) will be forced to trial in a county far from his residence. Furthermore, in an age of increased travel by motor
- While vacationing in West Virginia, Sivnksty (D) was arrested on charges of reckless driving after his automobile struck two pedestrians [Not a good way to end one’s vacation!]. Sivnksty (D) was incarcerated in county jail, as he was unable to post a bond. While in jail awaiting trial, Sivnksty (D) was served with process in a tort action brought by one of the pedestrians. Subsequently, Sivnksty (D) was found guilty of the crime. He made a special appearance in the civil action and filed a plea in abatement, arguing that the court was without jurisdiction. Sivnksty (D) claimed that he was immune from service since he was a nonresident of the county and a prisoner in county jail at the time of service. The court sustained a demurrer to Sivnksty’s (D) pleas in abatement. Then Sivnksty (D) petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeals for West Virginia for a writ of prohibition against the judge of the trial court.
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Texas Employers’ Ins. Assn. v. Price 2 results
- This case presents an extremely narrow approach to the application of a juror’s personal knowledge in jury deliberations. On one hand, trial by jury requires ordinary citizens to decide a case based solely on the facts and law at issue. On the other hand, jurors necessarily must utilize their own general personal experiences in arriving at a verdict. Therefore, a line must be drawn between general experience and special knowledge. In the case at hand, the ...on the juror’s special knowledge of employment of disabled persons. The court held that this juror overstepped the permissible bounds of jury deliberation. Perhaps application of the knowledge would not have amounted to jury misconduct if the juror simply kept the knowledge to himself, or if he opined regarding more general considerations of total disability. Nevertheless, this restrictive holding can be criticized for infringing into the normally private arena of jury deliberation. Jurors are typically encouraged to...
- (Collings, J.) No. A juror may not relate to other jurors his personal experiences as original evidence of material facts to be considered in their deliberation. In the case at hand, a juror related his personal experiences to the jury concerning the practices of employers in hiring workmen. He contended that Price (P) could not get a job in any company that had a union contract or employee benefits. The purpose of such statements was to show that Price (P) was totally incapacitated. We hold that the jury verdict was not necessarily against the weight of the evidence, even though the verdict conflicted with the testimony of Price’s (P) doctor. However, the juror’s use of his personal experiences in arguing that Price (P) should be considered permanently disabled constitutes material misconduct. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for new trial.
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- Just when the res judicata effect of class action judgments seemed clear, this case has muddled the issue considerably. As stated in previous cases, a class action decree will be binding on all class members, provided all the requirements and prerequisites for a class action have been satisfied. Thus, the decree in favor of the Bank (D) in this case should be binding on all class members, since there were no allegations of improper class action procedure. Then why are the individual members allowed to subsequently litigate individual claims for discrimination? In all likelihood, it is because the class action complaint sought an extremely broad, general conclusion. The original class action only sought to prove—unsuccessfully, as the Court of Appeals later held—that the Bank (D) was engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of discrimination. The individual litigants including Baxter, on the other hand, sought redress for specific discriminatory actions. Logically, an employer...
- The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission commenced an action against the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (Bank) (D), alleging that the Bank violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to promote blacks on the basis of race. Four individuals, including Cooper (P), were allowed to intervene. The District Court then certified a class pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), including all black employees of the Bank who had been discriminated against. Phyllis Baxter and five other employees (the Baxter petitioners) received notice of the action and made no attempt to opt out of the class. The District Court found that the bank had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination only against employees at pay grades 4 or 5, but the Court did not order relief. [Why not?] The Baxter petitioners filed a separate action alleging that each had been denied a promotion because of their race in violation of ...than 4 or 5, and that the District Court’s holding that there...
- (Stevens, J.) No. A general holding that there has been no pattern and practice of widespread discrimination does not preclude an individual member of a class from subsequently litigating specific individual claims for discrimination. Indeed, the basic principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to class actions. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff class merges any subsequent claim a class member may have into the judgment granting relief. Further, a judgment in favor of the defendant, such as the Appellate Court’s judgment for the Bank (D), bars subsequent actions on that claim. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that the Baxter petitioners, as members of the class, are bound by the adverse judgment. However, the court erred in the preclusive effect it attached to that prior adjudication. The judgment only bars the class members from bringing an action against the Bank (D) alleging a
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Payne v. S.S. Nabob 4 results
- This case takes an extremely broad reading of Rule 16(e) specifically requires a judge to enter a binding pretrial order following a pretrial conference. Such orders typically include the parties’ contentions, as well as exhibit lists and witness lists. However, in the case at hand, the judge failed to draft a pretrial order. In spite of this shortcoming, the appellate court reaches a sensible result in granting a binding effect to the judge’s pretrial report. If the report had been labeled an “order,” then there would be no question of its binding effect. Indeed, as the opinion notes, allowing a party to deviate substantially from pretrial memoranda would eviscerate the important policy goals of pretrial procedure. Further, since Payne (P) had an adequate opportunity to amend his ...unfairness in the judge’s decision to deny the continuance. Although judges are usually inclined to assist parties by providing continuances when necessary, the facts of this case clearly do...
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- Payne (P) brought a personal injury admiralty action, apparently alleging that the S.S. Nabob (D) was unseaworthy. In his opening argument, Payne’s (P) attorney alleged that the ship’s employees improperly handled the loading. This issue was outside of the scope of Payne’s (P) pretrial memorandum, which stated that he was relying on the condition of a winch to prove his claim. Thus, the trial court sustained an objection to this argument. In addition, the court refused to allow two witnesses, who were not listed on the pretrial memorandum, to testify. Payne (P) moved for a continuance, but it was denied. Payne (P) appeals on grounds that the pretrial memorandum was merely preparatory to the pretrial conference and was not, therefore, binding on the parties.
- (McLaughlin, J.) Yes. Parties may be bound by statements, including contentions of fact and witness lists, contained in their pretrial memoranda. Even if a pretrial order is not entered by the judge, pretrial steps can produce binding results. In the case at hand, the judge issued a pretrial report, which referenced the pretrial memoranda of Payne (P) and other parties. This report fulfilled the letter and spirit of
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Fassett v. Sears Holding Corp. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In products liability cases, the determination of whether a product was negligently designed turns on whether an alternative, feasible, safer design would have reduced or eliminated the plaintiff’s injuries. Accordingly, information regarding different models of a product is relevant if those products share with the injury-causing product characteristics pertinent to the legal issues raised in the litigation. In this case, the court held that warranty information, testing data, and any other materials evidencing over-pressurization or geysering corresponding to four free-venting cap designs were relevant to a number of the plaintiffs’ theories. Accordingly, those materials were discoverable, as long as they were not work product.
- The plaintiffs in this case lack nearly all avenues of discovery other than judicially sanctioned ones to obtain the requisite records that rest in the defendant’s possession, yet this is a matter of grave import for litigants like Fassett (P). Accordingly, warranty information, testing data, and other materials evidencing over-pressurization or “geysering” corresponding to various free-venting cap designs are relevant to a number of the plaintiffs’ theories, and are materials from all cases involving free-venting caps are not so broadly admissible. In products liability cases, evidence of prior accidents involving the same product under similar circumstances is admissible to show notice to the defendant of the danger, to show existence of the danger, and to show the cause of the accident. The almost universal requirement, however, is that the prior occurrence must involve facts and circumstances that are substantially similar to those involved in the case under consideration. With...
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- WORK PRODUCT: In civil practice, a class of materials that are given protection from discovery, such as work done by an attorney in the process of representing her client. The adverse party may obtain discovery only upon a showing of substantial need of the materials in preparation of her case and that she is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means.
- Federal district court consideration of the scope of discovery.
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National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The purpose of the lease clause at issue in this case is clear. It was inserted by the plaintiff and agreed to by the defendant to ensure that litigation arising under the lease would take place in New York. The parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether. This case would be different if the defendants had not in fact received notice, because then they could argue that the failure to transmit the summons and
- The lessor sued the lessees in 1962 for failure to make rental payments. It delivered two copies of the summons and complaint to Weinberg, who mailed them the same day to Szukhent (D) and other defaulting lessees. In addition, National Equipment Rental (P) notified the lessees in writing, by certified mail, that Weinberg had been served as their designated agent for acceptance of service, in accordance with the lease agreement. The defendants moved to quash the service, however, and the court granted their motion, reasoning that although Weinberg had in fact mailed the summons and complaint to the defendants, the lease agreement did not require that she do so, such that there was a failure of the agency arrangement. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- (Black, J.) New York, not federal, law should determine the outcome here. Upholding the service in this case, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, does in fact raise serious due process concerns.
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- Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to review a decision in favor of the defendants.
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Robb v. John C. Hickey, Inc. 4 results
- (Leyden, J.) No. Where a self-contradictory jury verdict fails to clearly indicate the intent of the jury, a judge may not mold the verdict to coincide with the substance of the jury’s declaration. The verdict recommended by the jury in the case at hand was self-contradictory, since it noted that the decedent was negligent but nevertheless recommended an award of $2000 in favor of the decedent and Robb (P), suing on the decedent’s behalf. This verdict was defective in substance and in form. When a jury’s informal verdict is incoherent, a court may mold this verdict only where the real purpose and intent of the jury clearly, sufficiently and convincingly appears. However, the jury’s informal verdict in this case was uncertain and ambiguous. Thus, Hickey’s (D) motion to mold the verdict is denied, and a new trial will be granted.
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- Robb (P) sued John C. Hickey, Inc. (D) for negligence on behalf of a decedent. The jury was instructed to rule for Hickey (D) if any contributory negligence on the part of the decedent was shown. The jury verdict stated that the jury found negligence on the part of both parties. Nevertheless, the jury concluded that Hickey (D) was more negligent than the decedent, so it recommended an award of $2000 in favor of Robb (P). [Apparently the jury wanted to formulate its own legal standard!] Both Robb (P) and Hickey (D) are dissatisfied with the verdict. [In trying to be fair, the jury upset both parties!] Robb (P) contends that the verdict is ambiguous, inconsistent, and contrary to the charge of the court. Thus, Robb (P) moves to set aside the verdict. Hickey (D) moves for the court to mold the verdict into one in favor of Hickey (D), arguing that this was the true intent of the jury.
- What should a judge do when a jury verdict is self-contradictory or fails to accurately apply the legal standards stated in the jury instructions? This is a difficult issue for the trial judge. In some situations, as this opinion notes, a judge may mold a jury verdict into a correct statement of law. However, this option is only available where the purpose and intent of the jury clearly, sufficiently and convincingly appears in the verdict. In the case at hand, the jury
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Mosley v. General Motors Corp. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “all persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.” Rule 20(b) and Rule 42(b) vest in the district court the discretion to order separate trials or make such other orders as will prevent delay or prejudice. In this manner, the scope of the civil action is made a matter for the discretion of the district court, and a determination on the question of joinder of parties will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. The purpose of Rule 20 is to promote trial convenience and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits. Single trials generally tend to lessen the delay, expense, and...
- DECLARATORY RELIEF: A judgment of the court to express an opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be done.
- questions of law and fact raised by the dispute be common. Yet, neither does it establish any qualitative or quantitative test for commonality. With respect to employment discrimination cases under Title VII, courts have found that the discriminatory character of a defendant’s conduct must be basic to the class, and the fact that the individual class members may have suffered different effects from the alleged discrimination is immaterial for purposes of the prerequisite. The right to relief here thus depends on the ability to demonstrate that each of the plaintiffs was wronged by racially discriminatory policies on the part of General Motors (D) and the Union. The plaintiffs have met this burden. Thus, the second prerequisite for joinder under Rule 20(a) is also met by the complaint.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Application to permit an interlocutory appeal after the district court ordered each plaintiff to bring a separate cause of action.
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Fisch v. Manger 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (In Result) (Heher, J.) The power to conditionally increase a jury verdict through additur does not follow from the power to conditionally decrease it through remittitur. In the case of additur, no jury has ever passed on the increased amount of damages, and the practice has no precedent in common law. Where an inadequate verdict is increased by the court there is a bald addition of something which in no sense can be said to be included in the jury’s verdict. This contravenes the essence of the common-law right of jury trial.
- (Jacobs, J.) Yes. A trial court may constitutionally apply the practice of additur. Under this procedure, a trial judge may make his denial of a motion for new trial conditional on the other party’s acceptance of an increased award of damages. Fisch (P) contends that the court had no legal power to condition the grant of a new trial upon Manger’s (D) failure to consent to the $4500 increase in the jury verdict. Stated another way, Fisch (P) did not feel that Manger (D) should be allowed to escape a new trial by agreeing to increase the damage award. Courts have historically applied the practices of additur and remittitur, although some federal courts have held that additur is prohibited by the Seventh Amendment. However, the Seventh Amendment differs somewhat from our constitutional provision regarding jury trial, and thus the Seventh Amendment has no application to these proceedings. The highly desirable practices of remittitur and additur have been recognized in New Jersey. They...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Following a jury verdict in his favor for $3000, Fisch (P) objected to the court’s use of additur, by which the decision to deny Fisch’s (P) motion for new trial was made conditional on Manger’s (D) acceptance of an increased damages award.
- A court may employ the practice of additur without violating the constitutional right to a jury trial.
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United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co. 5 results
- This case brings forth two important concepts regarding counterclaims. When should counterclaims be considered compulsory pursuant to Rule 13(a)? The Rule itself states two requirements. First, the claim must arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. As demonstrated by this court, a broad reading of this section of the Rule requires only some logical relation between the claims, which seems fairly easy to satisfy. Second, and apparently not a factor in this case, the counterclaim cannot require the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Once a counterclaim is considered compulsory, it automatically needs no independent jurisdictional basis, since ancillary subject-matter jurisdiction requires the claims to arise from a common nucleus of operative fact. This is essentially identical to
- This case involves two subcontracts between D’Agostino Excavators (D’Agostino) (P) and the Heyward-Robinson Company (Heyward) (D). One contract was with the federal government for the construction of naval barracks (the Navy job), and the other contract was for the construction of a private plant for Stelma, Inc. (the Stelma job). D’Agostino (P) sued Heyward (D) under the Miller Act in Connecticut District Court to recover payments due on the Navy job. Heyward (D) counterclaimed for alleged overpayments in the Navy job and the Stelma job. D’Agostino (P) counterclaimed to this counterclaim to recover monies due on the Stelma job. At trial, the jury found that Heyward (D) had breached both subcontracts and that Heyward (D) owed D’Agostino (P) over $63,000 on both jobs. Heyward (D) appealed, contending that the District Court had no jurisdiction over D’Agostino’s (P) counterclaims on the Stelma job. Heyward (D) argued that these counterclaims were permissive, not compulsory under Rule...
- (Van Pelt Bryan, J.) Yes. Federal courts should give broad meaning to the language of the federal rule regarding compulsory counterclaims. Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a counterclaim is compulsory “if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” In practice the phrase “transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter” has been broadly interpreted to require only a logical relationship between the claims, thereby avoiding a multiplicity of suits. In the case at bar, there was no independent basis for jurisdiction over either Heyward’s (D) or D’Agostino’s (P) Stelma counterclaims. However, the counterclaims were compulsory within the meaning of
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Should a court broadly interpret the federal rule regarding compulsory counterclaims?
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Wyman v. Newhouse 4 results
- This case illustrates two important rules regarding service of process. First, service of process is invalid when a defendant is tricked into appearing in the forum state. However, this opinion fails to state one important requirement for this rule to apply. The forum state (Florida, in this case) must have a statute which makes fraudulent service invalid. Fortunately for Newhouse (D), Florida had such a statute Fraudulent service renders the court’s jurisdiction invalid. Second, a defendant may collaterally attack any default judgment when the rendering court had insufficient jurisdiction. The edited version of this opinion leaves out some important facts in this regard. Following the default judgment, Wyman (P) attempted to enforce the judgment in New York. Because service was improper, Newhouse (D) was allowed to collaterally attack the judgment in the New York enforcement proceeding. Note that a sister state (New York) may only refuse to enforce a judgment if the rendering state...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (Manton, J.) Yes. Service is invalid when procured through fraudulent means. In the case at hand, Newhouse (D) was fraudulently induced to enter the jurisdiction of the state of Florida. Any such judgment, procured fraudulently, lacks jurisdiction and is null and void. Furthermore, Newhouse (D) was not required to argue the merits in the original action in Florida. An erroneous judgment may be attacked collaterally. Thus, the complaint was properly dismissed. Affirmed.
- ...married man and resident of New York, had engaged in meretricious relations with Wyman (P), a married woman. Wyman (P) desired to sue Newhouse (D) for money loaned, money advanced, and seduction under the promise of marriage. Wyman (P) induced Newhouse (D) to travel to Florida in order to serve process upon Newhouse (D). She accomplished this feat by falsely representing that her mother was ill, stating that she was leaving the United States for good to go to her mother, and saying that she could not go without seeing Newhouse (D) one more time. Tricked by her profession of undying love, Newhouse (D) flew to Florida and was met by a deputy sheriff who served him with process in the $500,000 lawsuit. Newhouse (D) ignored the process, and a default judgment was entered against him in Florida. Subsequently, Newhouse (D) collaterally attacked the judgment, alleging that Florida jurisdiction was improper. The Florida court upheld Newhouse’s (D) motion to dismiss the complaint, and...
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Coulas v. Smith 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case is notable, first and foremost, for the incompetence demonstrated by Coulas (D) and his counsel. Certainly Coulas (D) is not a party for whom the court should have much sympathy. Although he answered the complaints and cross-claims, he did nothing else to warrant lenient treatment by the court. Even if Coulas (D) did indeed fail to receive notice of the continued trial date, he certainly should have known that the date had been changed if he appeared for the original October 10 trial. In all likelihood, either Coulas (D) or his attorney completely dropped the bail, failing to appear at the motion in which the trial date was continued, and failing to appear at either the October 10 or December 10 trial date. His efforts to vacate the adverse judgment, made nearly two years after the original trial, demonstrate a considerable lack of competence. Nevertheless, the irony of the holding bears some attention. If Coulas (D) had appeared in the action but failed to answer any of...
- (Udall, J.) No. Once an answer on the merits has been filed and the case is at issue, default judgment may not be entered against a defendant who fails to appear at trial. Thus, in the case at hand, the judgment entered against Coulas (D) was not a default judgment. Rule 55(b). However, in the situation at hand, the case was at issue at the time of trial and Smith (P) and Bray (D) bore the burden of proof with respect to their claims against Coulas (D). Thus, each of these parties were still required to prove their cases against Coulas (D), even though Coulas (D) was not represented at trial. Both Smith (P) and Bray (D) met their burdens of proof. Coulas’s (D) contention that he did not receive notice of the new trial date is not substantiated, since parties are presumed to have received notice by the clerk. In addition, if Coulas (D) did not receive notice of the new date, he certainly would have learned of the change when he appeared for trial on October 10. Moreover, Coulas (D)...
- When a case is called for trial and is at issue, the failure of a defendant to appear does not warrant a default judgment against him.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- AT ISSUE: The state of a case in which adverse parties have stated conflicting positions, such as when a defendant answers a complaint by denying the allegations.
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Thompson v. Thompson 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case sheds an interesting light on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and indirectly raises some collateral estoppel issues. In order for either the full faith and credit doctrine or the collateral estoppel doctrine to operate, the prior judgment must be considered “final.” The problem with most child custody judgments, as the opinion notes, is that they are rarely “final.” Rather, they are subject to modification in the best interests of the child. As a result, custody determinations were not enforceable and could not necessarily be given preclusive effect in other states, creating the kidnaping crisis. In the case at hand, Louisiana initially honored California’s decision regarding Matthew’s sole custody. This was probably based upon the PKPA, because the California judgment was not “final” for purposes of collateral estoppel. Once the California court changed its determination, all David Thompson (P) had to do was file an action in Louisiana to enforce the California decree....
- In July 1978, Susan Thompson (D) filed a petition in California state court seeking marital dissolution and sole custody of her son, Matthew. The court initially awarded joint custody to Susan (D) and her husband, David (P). The joint custody arrangement became infeasible once Susan (D) desired to move to Louisiana for a new job. The court then entered an order awarding Susan (D) sole custody once she left for Louisiana, but it reserved the right to change the custody determination once the court investigator submitted his report. Susan (P) moved to Louisiana and filed a petition in Louisiana state court for enforcement of the California custody decree. In April 1981 the Louisiana state court granted the petition and awarded Susan (P) sole custody. In June 1981, however, the California court changed its original order, after receiving the investigator’s report, and awarded sole custody to David (P). David (P) then filed a petition in California federal court to have the Louisiana...
- THE RES JUDICATA EFFECT OF A MODIFIABLE CHILD CUSTODY DECREE SHOULD BE ASSERTED IN STATE COURT AND NOT IN FEDERAL COURT
- CASE VOCABULARY
- The PKPA precludes a state court from maintaining the ability to reopen child custody proceedings.
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Doutre v. Niec 4 results
- (Kavanagh, J.) No. A court may not separate the issue of liability from the issue of damages and grant a partial new trial on the issue of liability alone. The questions of liability and damages are so closely intertwined that they may not usually be separated. Our cases have allowed retrial of the issue of damages where liability is clear. However, no compelling reason exists to extend this rule to a retrial of liability alone. Any liability was determined pursuant to a trial in which an admitted error pertaining to liability was committed. Thus, justice requires that the jury which determines liability should have the responsibility for measuring damages. Further, there is no merit in Doutre’s (P) contention that evidence regarding standard of care in the industry was rightfully excluded. The trial court’s order for a new trial shall be extended to both the issue of damages and of liability.
- Doutre (P) sued Niec (D), the operator of a beauty shop, after Doutre (P) was given a bleach and color treatment without a pretreatment patch test. Doutre (P) received head and facial injuries and sued for damages. At trial, Niec (D) was not allowed to testify as to the standard of care of beauty shops in the area. [Perhaps all beauticians in the area recklessly disregarded the safety of their patients!] The jury awarded $10,000 to Doutre (P). Niec (D) moved for a new trial, and the court granted a partial new trial limited to the question of liability only. Both parties appeal the order for partial new trial. Doutre (P) alleges that the court was correct in ruling that the testimony on the standard of care was not admissible. Niec (D) alleges that the new trial should not have been limited to the issue of liability because questions of liability and damages are closely intertwined.
- May a court separate the issue of liability from the issue of damages and grant a partial new trial on the issue of liability alone?
- This case reveals that partial new trials are generally not favored. Judges granting partial new trials must take great care to ensure that the issues not being retried are separable from those actually being retried. However, the opinion notes that the issue of damages alone may be retried when liability is clearly established. Why, then, cannot the question of liability be retried when the measure of damages is clear? The answer is simple. There can be no damages without liability. If a new jury must reconsider the question of liability, the very ...the amount of damages is set already decides, to a large degree, the question of liability, since damages are only granted when one party is liable. Perhaps this problem could have been remedied in this case by informing the second jury that they are under no duty to find liability, but if they do find liability then the amount of damages must be $10,000. Nevertheless, this approach fails to account for the very nature of liability,...
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Tatman v. Collins 4 results
- Dr. Amico was deposed during discovery and gave his opinion that there was a causal link between the accident and the rupturing of the aneurysm. A scheduling conflict prevented Dr. Amico from coming to the trial, and Tatman (P) sought to introduce his deposition into evidence. Tatman (P) pointed out Dr. Amico’s scheduling conflict, and noted that he was more than 100 miles from the courthouse. The court excluded the deposition because it was taken early in the case as a discovery deposition, such that Collins’s (D) counsel should not be “chargeable” with it. The court also refused to allow Dr. Amico’s deposition because Columbus was not more than 100 miles from the northern border of the Southern District of West Virginia. The only other witness linking the ruptured aneurysm to the accident, Dr. Wecht, relied on the testimony of Dr. Amico, so his testimony was stricken. The court entered a directed verdict for Collins (D) on Tatman’s (P) wrongful death claim, and the jury returned a...
- Tatman (P) sought to introduce at trial the deposition testimony of a doctor who had treated her late husband; the court disallowed the testimony, as well as that of another physician based on it, even though the treating doctor was unavailable to testify at trial, and Tatman (P) appealed.
- (Hall, J.) The district court misstated the 100-mile rule, and there is no categorical exclusion of discovery depositions at trial. The majority was incorrect, however, on the issue of admissibility of expert testimony.
- provides that a deposition may be offered at trial, subject to the rules of evidence, as though the witness were present and testifying. The Rule makes no distinction with respect to the purpose for which the deposition was taken. While the rule makes distinctions as to when depositions of parties and witnesses may be used, if a witness is unavailable, the deposition of that witness may be used for any purpose. In the instant case, Dr. Amico’s deposition was duly noticed and all parties had the opportunity to attend (and did attend).
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Cromwell v. County of Sac 5 results
- So far we have seen that res judicata (also known as claim preclusion) bars a party from re-asserting a claim on which final judgment was rendered. This case stands for another policy oriented rule which is known as collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. Under collateral estoppel, a right, a fact, or an issue which is directly determined in a court, can not be re- ...later suit is based on a different cause of action. Again, this doctrine gives finality to matters that have been determined by a competent court, and enhances judicial efficiency. Thus, remember, while under res judicata a whole claim or cause of action is barred, under collateral estoppel only the issues which have already been determined are estopped from re-litigation. Collateral estoppel has several requirements: 1) The later suit must involve the same issue as the previous suit, 2) The issue must have been actually litigated, 3) the judgment in the previous action must have been final, valid, and on the merits...
- Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States on Writ of Certiorari from error in the Circuit Court in lowa.
- (Field, J.) Yes. Estoppel of a judgment in one cause of action to an action arising out of another cause of action applies when the issue in question was actually litigated and determined in the first action. However, a party ought not to be precluded from contesting, in a later action, other issues arising out of the same cause of action. The findings in the Samuel Smith case indicate that Smith had become, before maturity, the holder of 25 coupons attached to the bonds issued by the County. However, there was no finding that he had ever given any value for them. The judgment for the County was affirmed because it was found that the bonds were void against the County in the hands of parties who acquired them before maturity without paying value for them. However, the bonds, as negotiable instruments, would be valid against the County if the holder had paid value for them before their maturity. The facts of the previous case can not preclude the present plaintiff from showing that...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Cromwell (P) brought an action against the County of Sac (“County”) (D) on four bonds and four coupons issued to Cromwell (P) by the County (D). In an earlier similar action by Samuel Smith against the County (D) for the same bonds, the court ruled in favor of the County (D). The latter sought to estop the present action in reliance on the judgment rendered in the earlier action and by proof that the earlier action was instituted for the sole benefit of Cromwell (P), who was at all times holder of the bonds.
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Temple v. Synthes Corp. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Rule 19(b) allows a court to dismiss a suit if such joinder is not feasible. In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals held that the doctor and hospital should have been joined pursuant to Rule 19(a), it is not necessary that all joint tortfeasors be named as defendants to a lawsuit. Rather, the doctor and the hospital were merely permissive parties, whose joinder is not required. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.
- This case provides an early glimpse into the complex rules of joinder in federal courts. Basically, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure detail the circumstances under which a party must be joined to a pending lawsuit. For example, if complete relief cannot be afforded ...overriding goal of judicial efficiency, as it is in the public interest to have all related claims tried in the same lawsuit. While it is not yet necessary to understand all of the workings of joinder at this point in the course, close attention should be paid to the recurring theme of judicial efficiency. Often judicial efficiency, in itself, mandates certain steps in a civil trial. However, these policy considerations are balanced by the rights of the parties. In the case at hand, Temple (P) was not required to bring suit against all of the defendants in the same action, although this certainly would have been more efficient. Notice that Temple (P) benefits from not having to sue the manufacturer, doctor and...
- Temple (P) underwent a surgery in which a plate and screw device, manufactured by Synthes, Ltd. (D), was inserted in Temple’s (P) spine. Following the surgery, the device’s screws broke off inside Temple’s (P) back. Temple (P) sued Synthes (D) in a Louisiana federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction, alleging that the design and manufacture of the device were defective. In addition, Temple (P) initiated a state administrative proceeding against the surgeon and the hospital in which the surgery was performed. [Why didn’t Temple bring only one action? Did he have a screw loose?] At the conclusion of the administrative proceeding, Temple (P) sued the doctor and hospital in a state court in Louisiana. Synthes (D) filed a motion to dismiss the original claim for failure to join the doctor and hospital in the suit. The District Court ordered Temple (P) to join those parties. However, Temple (P) refused, and the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice. The Fifth...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING: A form of litigation before administrative agencies, rather than before a court.
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- (Ginsburg, J.) No. A complaint alleging securities fraud under the PSLRA will survive a motion to dismiss only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged. In determining whether this standard is met, the court must consider more than whether the complaint alleges facts from which a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent. The court must engage in a comparative evaluation, considering not only the inferences urged by the plaintiff, but also any competing inferences rationally drawn from the alleged facts. The strength of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum. The inquiry is inherently comparative: How likely is it that one conclusion, as compared to others, arises from the underlying facts? Because the lower courts did not have an opportunity to decide the case under this standard, the judgment below is vacated.
- Did the district court and court of appeals apply the correct analysis in determining whether the plaintiffs alleged a violation of the PSLRA with sufficient particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss?
- CASE VOCABULARY
- On certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act requires plaintiffs to state with particularity the circumstances constituting the alleged violation and the facts establishing scienter—i.e., the defendant’s intention to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In particular, the plaintiffs must state with particularity the facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. The defendants in this case brought a motion to dismiss under
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Hess v. Pawloski 5 results
- ...), a resident of Pennsylvania, negligently struck and injured Pawloski (P). (It is important to note that Pawloski (P) was the original plaintiff, and Hess (D) the original defendant, although the opinion refers to Pawloski (P) as the “defendant in error,” and Hess (D) as the “plaintiff in error.”) Pawloski (P) filed suit against Hess (D) in Massachusetts, under a statute which conditioned the use of public roads in Massachusetts by nonresidents on their implied agreement to consent to the jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts if they were involved in a accident while using those roads. The statute provided that any non-resident using Massachusetts roads would be assumed to have designated the registrar as his agent, for purposes of receiving service of process, provided that the non-resident thereafter received actual notice of any such service from the registrar. Hess (D) did receive actual notice of Pawloski’s (P) suit, and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction....
- for a while longer, but was certainly the beginning of the end for that case’s strict territory-based theory of jurisdiction. Once these types of laws were approved by the courts, states effectively had the power to exercise jurisdiction over non-residents not found within the state. A valid in personam judgment could be obtained, which the driver’s home state was obliged to honor under the full faith and credit clause.
- SUPREME COURT APPROVES SCHEME TO GIVE STATES JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT DRIVERS INVOLVED IN ACCIDENTS ON PUBLIC ROADS
- Writ of Error to the Superior Court of Worcester County, Massachusetts, from its judgment in action for negligence.
- . New Jersey could require nonresident drivers, before allowing them to use its roads, to file a document designating a New Jersey agent for service of process.] The difference between this being done explicitly and implicitly is immaterial, at least with respect to whether a non-resident’s due process rights are infringed—which they are not, in either case. Judgment affirmed.
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Diniero v. United States Lines Co. 4 results
- ...No. It is not an abuse of discretion to withdraw from the jury previously submitted written interrogatories. Here, the judge submitted 8 questions to the jury, over which they deliberated for several hours, and of which they asked for clarification. The problem centered around question number 1, which was a truly ambiguous and confusing question. Withdrawing all the questions was an attempt to eliminate the confusion that the improperly worded question had caused, not an attempt to bias the jury, or to encourage the jury to ignore the law and decide for whichever party they liked better. The alternative to withdrawing the questions would probably have been to declare a mistrial and start over again—a course not to be recommended if it can be avoided, considering the extra expense involved and the extra burden on the courts. And it is certainly also relevant that the jury deliberated for almost as long a time after the questions were withdrawn as before. Of course, there have been...
- This case introduces the concepts of “general” and “specific” verdicts. It is still most common for judges to ask for a general verdict, which is basically just the jury finding in favor of one side over another. A special verdict, however, requires the jury to answer a series of specific questions about the facts of the case. The judge will then take these answers and apply the law himself to reach a general verdict. Another variation is for the jury to be asked to declare a general verdict, but in addition to answering interrogatories. This enables the judge to determine whether the jury’s findings of fact are consistent with its general verdict. Both of these methods are used to control the jury, and to keep them from ignoring the law and deciding cases based on emotion, or prejudice.
- COURT HOLDS IT TO BE NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR JUDGE TO ISSUE AND THEN WITHDRAW WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY
- ...operated by United States Lines Co. (“U.S.L.”) (D), filed suit against U.S.L. (D) alleging that he had suffered permanent injury to his back as a result of his shipboard duties. After a long, complicated trial the judge submitted the case to the jury in the form of 8 written interrogatories. The jury deliberated for several hours and sent the judge several notes asking for clarification of the first question. The judge attempted to explain the question, but the jury was still unable to reach a verdict. After the jury had deliberated for almost 4 hours, they sent the judge a note saying that they did not think agreement would be possible, and he then withdrew all the interrogatories and asked them if they could reach a general verdict. After another 4 hours or so, they did, finding for Diniero (P). U.S.L. (D) appealed, claiming that, though the submission of written interrogatories is authorized, the withdrawal of such interrogatories, once submitted, is not authorized and is an...
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Schlagenhauf v. Holder 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case demonstrates the complexities in dealing with orders that could force a party to surrender his right to bodily autonomy. Even the most basic notions of privacy argue against anyone being forced to submit to an unpleasant, invasive physical or mental examination. These concerns are easily overcome in some cases, such as when a plaintiff puts his conditions at issue in a suit for bodily injuries. However, the case at hand is very different. Schlagenhauf (D) did nothing, other than colliding with a tractor-trailer, which should force him to submit to doctors’ examinations. He did not choose to be a party to the lawsuit, and he never defended on the grounds of being mentally or physically fit. In this light, it seems somewhat unfair that Schlagenhauf (D) could be forced to submit to examinations, as the court held in the first part of the opinion. And as Douglas’ dissent notes, doctors examining defendants would likely run numerous tests and strive to find anything wrong with...
- (Black, J.) In a lawsuit based on a traffic collision, the mental or physical health of the drivers is of the highest relevance. Allegations showed that the tractor-trailer was in plain sight of Schlagenhauf (D), and there was allegedly ample time to avoid the collision. Schlagenhauf’s (D) failure to avoid the collision certainly calls into question his mental or physical health, sufficient to put the question “in controversy.”
- An action was brought in district court seeking damages arising from the collision of a tractor-trailer, owned by Contract Carriers (D) and National Lead Company (D), and a Greyhound (D) bus. Robert Schlagenhauf (D) was the driver of the bus at the time of the accident. Numerous cross-claims were filed among the defendants. First, Greyhound (D) cross-claimed against Contract Carriers (D) and National Lead Company (D) for negligence in the operation of the tractor-trailer. Then Contract Carriers (D) and National Lead Company (D) petitioned the District Court for an order directing Schlagenhauf (D) to submit to four mental and/or physical examinations, alleging that the mental and physical condition of Schlagenhauf (D) was “in controversy.” National Lead (D) then cross-claimed against Greyhound (D) and Schlagenhauf (D) for damage to its trailer. The District Court ordered Schlagenhauf (D) to submit to nine examinations [Although only four were requested!]. Schlagenhauf (D) applied for...
- (Goldberg, J.) (1) Yes. Rule 35 physical or mental examinations may be made on any party to a lawsuit. On its face, Rule 35 applies to all parties, which would normally include a defendant. However, Schlagenhauf (D) contends that the application of the Rule to him would constitute an unconstitutional invasion of his privacy. Previous cases have held that plaintiffs must submit to physical examinations, as noted in ...for the belief that Schlagenhauf (D) was suffering a neurological illness warranting mental examinations. In fact the only allegation made in support of examinations was the contention that Schlagenhauf’s (D) eyes and vision were impaired. Thus, if Contract Carriers (D) and National Lead Company (D) had sought to obtain only a visual examination, they might have made the required showing. Nevertheless, there is an insufficient basis for finding that Schlagenhauf’s (D) health was in controversy so as to require the battery of tests ordered by the District Court....
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Bushel v. Miller 4 results
- This case exemplifies one of the predominant causes of action in “case” during the eighteenth century. Trover was an action which came to replace the action of detinue, both dealing with the loss and detention of personal property. Detinue was an undesirable action because it required a plaintiff to take back the goods in controversy if the defendant could return them, regardless of the state they were in by the time of trial. Understandably, most plaintiffs preferred just to get the money value of the property instead. Consequently, trover became the action of choice because it was based on the fiction that because defendant took plaintiff’s property and will not give it back [which he would have preferred to do ...), was that it required the element of conversion. The defendant had to have actually taken the property at issue for his own use. It was not enough if he only handled it but never took it in possession. For whatever reason, the courts were not willing to overlook...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Court of King’s Bench, 1 Strange 128, 93 Eng.Rep. 428 (1718)
- COMMON LAW COURT DEEMS CONVERSION AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF TROVER
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- ...intensive case illustrates some of the fundamental principles of res judicata. It is essential to remember that res judicata may be asserted only against a party or one in privity with a party to an earlier decision. The first key issue of this holding is whether the state was in privity with a party to the PERB decision. Here the opinion gets a bit tricky. Although a state agency (Retirement and Benefits) is in charge of administering PERS, it is not actually a party to any PERS proceeding. In these circumstances, it makes sense not to grant a preclusive effect against the state for PERS decisions. After all, res judicata is fair only if the party to be precluded had a full opportunity to litigate a claim in a prior proceeding. Because the state only administers PERS, it theoretically would not care if Holmberg (P) won or lost in the PERS proceeding. The second important concept of this opinion deals with the finality of judgments. Once a judgment is rendered and appealed, the...
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- ...) had been employed by the State of Alaska, Division of Risk Management (“Risk Management”) (D) since 1979. She had a history of back injuries. In February 1988, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (“AWCB”) denied Holmberg’s (P) claim for permanent disability benefits. Holmberg (P) appealed this decision. While the appeal was pending, Holmberg (P) sought disability benefits from the Public Employees Retirement System (“PERS”). The State Division of Retirement and Benefits, which administers PERS, awarded non-occupational disability benefits, but her claim for occupational disability benefits was denied. Holmberg (P) appealed, and in April 1988 the Public Employees Retirement Board (“PERB”) reversed the decision, finding that Holmberg (P) was permanently and totally disabled as a result of accidents at work. Holmberg (P) then sued Risk Management (D) in superior court. She argued that the AWCB decision should be reversed because of the preclusive effect of the later PERB...
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 5 results
- The defendants moved the court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12 (b) provides that “[e]very defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required.” However, the Rule goes on, a party may assert the following defenses by motion, as in this case: “(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficient process; (5) insufficient service of process; (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.” A motion asserting one of these defenses generally must be made before the defendant files its answer, unless no responsive pleading is required, in which case it can be raised at trial. “No defense or objection is waived by joining it with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or in a motion.”
- Supreme Court review of a Second Circuit decision reversing the federal district court’s dismissal of the complaint.
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- A group of telephone and Internet subscribers sued their local telephone companies, alleging that the companies were violating antitrust laws by agreeing not to compete with each other and to exclude other potential competitors in their market areas. The plaintiffs further alleged that as a result of this “parallel” conspiracy, each local company benefited from monopoly power in its own market. The district court dismissed the complaint on the pleadings, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff’s allegations satisfied the “short and plain statement” requirement of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
- . But the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy that requirement in this case. Although
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- This case states the essential due process requirements for notice, which typically includes a summons and a copy of the complaint. Whenever legal proceedings affect the life, liberty or property interests of parties, these parties must be provided with notice reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise them of the proceedings and give them an opportunity to be heard. There is a wide spectrum of potential notice devices, ranging from personal service (the best form of notice) to notice by publication (the least reliable method). Whenever possible, personal service should be provided, although this may be impossible when the number of parties are numerous or when the parties reside in distant states. In such circumstances, it is easy to see that mailed notice is sufficient, even though some of the parties might not receive the notice. However, courts generally disfavor notice by publication. Indeed, notice by publication is really just a legal fiction, since no...
- SURROGATE COURT: A court with jurisdiction over probate matters, including wills and trusts.
- ...trusts were pooled into one fund for investment administration. Central Hanover (P) petitioned the Surrogate’s Court of New York for judicial settlement of this account as common trustee. If granted, the decree would settle all questions respecting the management of the common fund, terminating all rights of beneficiaries against the trustee for improper management. Pursuant to New York statute, all beneficiaries of this common trust were notified by publication in a local newspaper for four successive weeks. [After all, everyone reads the “legal notices” section of the newspaper, don’t they?] Mullane (D), who was appointed special guardian for all beneficiaries not otherwise appearing in the action, entered a special appearance in New York in order to object to the notice. According to Mullane (D), the Trust Company (P) should have provided notice by mail, as the company had actual knowledge of the names and addresses of the beneficiaries. Therefore, Mullane (D) argued that the...
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- Rule 8(b)(4) provides that a party that intends to deny only part of an allegation must admit the part that is true and deny the rest. Here, the defendants failed to respond to every part of certain allegations, in violation of the Rule. Moreover, there is nothing in the Rule stating that no response is required to conclusions of law. A defendant must admit or deny an allegation, or state that he does not have enough information, or access to enough information, to admit or deny it. There is no “conclusion of law” exception. And lastly, if a party is claiming insufficient knowledge to form a belief about the truth of the allegations, that statement must be true. An allegation is generally deemed admitted if it is not properly denied, but, as the court demonstrated in this case, those admissions do not necessarily result in judgment for the plaintiff; rather, the court deemed it proper to give the defendants another chance to submit appropriate answers.
- RATHER THAN GRANTING JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, THE COURT GAVE THE DEFENDANTS A CHANCE TO SUBMIT A MORE RESPONSIVE ANSWER
- Federal district court consideration of the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
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Lamine v. Dorrell 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This is a rare example of the bending of the rules in which the English courts were willing to engage for the sake of justice. It is obvious that Dorrell (D) should not have kept the money he made essentially through fraud and theft and the court was not too proud to play favorites when it was this clear who was in the right. Regardless of motive, this type of reform was essential because many contracts and bargains were made on implied assumptions that one party would do something and the other party would pay for it. It was important that the promises to pay could be understood by the courts as implied because many of the lawful interference with another’s property right. Thus, Lamine’s (P) case in trover could be disproved by his own initially chosen cause of action in assumpsit.
- J.S. died intestate but left property in his estate which included some Irish debentures. Before a trustee was appointed to the estate, Dorrell (D) falsely proclaimed himself to be a trustee and sold off the debentures for his own profit. Soon thereafter, Dorrell’s (D) administration was repealed and Lamine (P) was officially appointed as trustee. Upon discovering the sale of the debentures, Lamine (P) brought this cause of action in an “indebitatus assumpsit” to recover from Dorrell (D) the money he unlawfully received from their sale. Dorrell (D) motioned the court to throw the case out because an assumpsit action implies the receipt of money for the use of the plaintiff, but Dorrell (D) clearly intended the money for his own use [and he’s not too ashamed to admit it]. Therefore, Lamine (P) could only have brought an action for trover or detinue.
- (Powell, J.) Yes. An action for assumpsit may lie even if the agreement to pay the debt is reasonably implied from the facts and not actually stated. Thus, in this case, it is only fair and reasonable to assume that Dorrell (D) sold the debentures with Lamine’s (P) consent and received the money from them for Lamine’s (P) rather than his own use.
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- Court of Queen’s Bench, 2 Ld.Raym. 1216, 92 Eng.Rep. 303 (1705)
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Koenig 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Easterbrook, C.J.) No. Just as questions from the bench can provide insight that helps lawyers make a stronger case, so too can questions from the jury help lawyers tailor their presentations. Here, the SEC had made a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence relating to Koenig’s (D) motive, but the court denied the motion, and as a result the trial dragged on for twelve weeks. Research shows that a jury cannot comprehend a trial that lasts more than twenty days. The jury understandably had questions as the lengthy trial progressed, and the judge passed some of them along to the witnesses, to be answered in court. Koenig (D) argued that allowing the jurors to participate in this fashion was error. Although the judge failed to ask the witnesses some of the jurors’ questions, allowing the questions was not error. The litigation was not taken over by the jurors. Affirmed.
- Appeal to the federal circuit court from a federal district court decision imposing civil penalties on the defendant.
- Just as questions from the bench can provide insight that helps lawyers make a stronger case, so too can questions from the jury help lawyers tailor their presentations.
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- Did the trial court improperly manage Koenig’s (D) trial by allowing the judge to ask the witnesses questions submitted by the jury during the course of the trial?
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Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Brennan, J.) No. Once minimum contacts with a state are established, there is a presumption that it would be fair to require the defendant to defend a suit there. This presumption can of course be overcome, but it is the defendant who must show that it would be unfair to require him to defend there, and not the proponent of jurisdiction that must show that it would be fair. In deciding the question of fairness, the court may look to and balance the forum state’s interest in the litigation, the plaintiff’s interest in efficient and convenient relief, the demands and best interests of the federal system as a whole, and the defendant’s interest in not having to defend a suit in an extremely remote or disadvantageous forum. In the case at hand, Rudzewicz (D) deliberately and voluntarily entered into a 20-year-long contract with a Florida corporation, governed by Florida law. That contract required that someone associated with the new restaurant attend training in Florida at Burger King...
- Supreme Court review of the federal circuit court’s reversal of a judgment finding jurisdiction.
- Rudzewicz (D) and MacShara, both Michigan residents, entered into a franchise agreement with Burger King Corporation (P), a Florida company. The contract licensed Rudzewicz (D) and MacShara to use Burger King’s (P) trademarks and service marks for a period of 20 years in connection with their operation of a Burger King restaurant in Michigan. The contract further provided that the agreement would be governed by Florida law and called for payment of all franchise fees and royalties to Burger King’s (P) Miami headquarters. MacShara attended a training course at Burger King University in Miami. After operating the restaurant for a while, Rudzewicz (D) and MacShara fell behind in their monthly payments to Burger King (P). Burger King (P) instituted an action in federal court in Florida, based on diversity jurisdiction. Rudzewicz (D) and MacShara claimed that they did not have sufficient contacts with Florida to be subjected to jurisdiction there. The district court found that Florida...
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- ourts had been inconsistent in their rulings as to what extent business contracts could constitute sufficient contacts to uphold jurisdiction. Here, the Supreme Court helped resolved the inconsistency. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that the test for determining the constitutionality of a forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is whether the defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum. The additional element of foreseeability is also important. This element is critical, however, only to the extent that a defendant’s activities in a forum are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. If a defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of a forum’s laws, it is reasonable to require him to submit to suit there.
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Jones v. Winsor 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The citation of this case indicates that it was decided in the United States, as opposed to England, and it was based on several procedural reforms which occurred at the end of the nineteenth century. The previously separate courts of law and equity were brought together. Parties were allowed to testify as their own witnesses. Most importantly, though, Code pleading was introduced to replace the common-law system of civil procedure. The ideology behind this transition was that the substantive law would remain unaltered but the procedural laws would become clearer and more consistent. Nonetheless, Code pleading was not immediately the panacea that it was designed to be. Judges who were trained under the older system were less than thrilled to have to retrain themselves in the new one. As ...liberally with an aim toward justice between the parties. Justice Corson, however, continues to insist that a singular “theory of the case” (a.k.a. “cause of action”) is the prerequisite...
- (Corson, J.) No. A complaint may not state facts and allegations of two or more distinct and inconsistent causes of action in one suit. Not only would that be unfair to defendants, who would not know against which counts to defend themselves, but it would generally introduce into the law elements of uncertainty and ambiguity in pleading which would only mislead the courts and opposing parties. [Are these elements missing from the law as we know it?] On demurrer to a complaint, a court must always first establish what the cause of action is of the complaint and then determine if the facts are sufficient to state that cause of action. (Citing, ) Since Jones’ (P) complaint does not state one distinct cause of action, Winsor’s (D) demurrer should be sustained. Judgement is for the defendant, overruling the order of the circuit court.
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- TWO IS NOT BETTER THAN ONE: COURT SAYS MORE THAN ONE CAUSE OF ACTION IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AT ALL
- Appeal by the defendant from an order of the circuit court overruling his demurrer to the complaint.
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Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc. 3 results
- This case revisits the . Recall that this statute permits the adoption of Federal Rules so long as the Rules do not abridge, modify or enlarge a state substantive right. Apparently Swift (D) believes that the Minnesota law is a substantive right, and that Rule 14(a) infringes on this right by allowing impleader for indemnity purposes. The Court presents a sensible approach to recognizing substantive rights under Minnesota law while upholding the purposes of Rule 14(a). Impleader allows the entire matter to be decided in one proceeding, accomplishing the goal of judicial efficiency. At the same time, the substantive aspects of Minnesota law are satisfied by staying any judgment for indemnity against Swift (D) until B/G Foods (D) pays the judgment against it. Without impleader, B/G Foods (D) would first have to pay any judgment and then seek indemnity. The court’s holding accomplishes the same result but does so in one proceeding tried by one jury.
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- Jeub (P) sued B/G Foods (D) in a Minnesota District Court after allegedly eating contaminated ham at one of B/G Foods’ (D) restaurants. B/G Foods (D) obtained an ex parte order making Swift and Company (D) a third-party defendant. B/G Foods’ (D) third party complaint alleged that the ham was produced by Swift (D) as “Swift Premium Ham” and that Swift (D) would therefore be liable to indemnify and reimburse B/G Foods (D) for any judgment recovered by Jeub (P). Swift (D) brings a motion to vacate the order, arguing that no right of indemnity exists under Minnesota substantive law.
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Chapter Fourteen. Trial 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A discrimination plaintiff’s case may be sufficient to submit to the jury if it consists of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence that the defendant’s proffered explanation for its action was merely a pretext for discrimination, without the need for additional, independent evidence of discrimination.
- Several employees sued their union, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 (D), for alleged violations of the Union’s duty of fair representation. Against the Union’s protest that the claim was equitable in nature, the District Court and Appellate Court granted a right to jury trial.
- The public water supplier sued an adjacent landowner for allegedly contaminating the water supply, but the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant; on appeal, the water supplier challenged both the methodology and the substance of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in the defendant’s favor.
- Just as questions from the bench can provide insight that helps lawyers make a stronger case, so too can questions from the jury help lawyers tailor their presentations.
- A court may not deny a jury determination of factual issues through a prior determination of equitable claims.
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- REMOVED: Transferred a case from one jurisdiction to another before the case had been finally adjudicated.
- court has exemplified the compromises available to parties when the state of the pleadings may be less than satisfactory. When courts sense from the pleadings that some type of action may be made out on them, they are loath to quickly dismiss a complaint because it may deprive a plaintiff of his deserved day in court. Instead, the courts will allow plaintiffs to amend the original pleadings. While this seems like a fair alternative, problems may arise when the party moving for dismissal or amendment is actually crossing the line from simple notice pleading requirements and asking for more detailed common law pleadings. Obviously, it is to the moving party’s advantage to require as specific a set of pleadings as the court will allow. On the one hand, this may provide that party with strategical knowledge of their opponent’s strengths and weaknesses. On the other hand, this may force the opposing party to expose their insufficient knowledge of the facts. In ...the court’s decision...
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- ...case at trial entitling him to some relief, even if he did not explicitly allege every element of his claim. Thus, even though Garcia’s (P) cause of action is defectively stated for failing to have alleged the publication of the slanderous remarks, the complaint does state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Despite the conclusive manner in which Garcia (P) states that he was “falsely and slanderously accused,” it would be unrealistic for Hilton (D) to claim that they do not understand the claim as implicitly alleging publication. Hilton’s (D) other reason for the motion to dismiss Garcia’s (P) complaint is the defense of conditional privilege. This fails to show cause for dismissal as well. It is established law that privilege is automatically conclusive as a defense only when it is absolute. However, when privilege is conditional, as it is alleged to be by Hilton (D), it may be lost because, at trial, plaintiff may prove abuse of the privilege or actual malice....
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International Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Services, Inc. 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- By way of further explanation of the court’s holding, the court ruled in the plaintiff’s favor on its tort cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, but found that the defendant did not breach its contract with the plaintiff. In the process, the court reduced the plaintiff’s recovery by fifty percent because of its contributory negligence. Because the plaintiff neglected to file a cross-appeal on the amount of damages awarded, it was not entitled to challenge the reduction of damages, although the appellate court determined that the
- (Undisclosed judge.) Yes. Generally, when a party fails to file a cross-appeal, the party may not oppose a trial court’s adverse decision in an appeal by an adverse party. However, a party may urge any matter appearing in the appellate record without filing a cross-appeal, even if the trial court’s reasoning is challenged in the process. The court has discretion to dispense with the strict cross-appeal requirement when the party’s challenge is based on the record. The court may, therefore, uphold the breach of contract claim. However, a party who fails to cross-appeal may not enlarge its rights under the judgment by seeking larger damages or equitable relief. Reversed.
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- APPELLATE COURTS HAVE DISCRETION TO DISPENSE WITH THE CROSS APPEAL REQUIREMENT
- After the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on a negligent misrepresentation claim but dismissed its contract claim, the defendant appealed the negligent misrepresentation judgment.
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Burnham v. Superior Court 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Francie Burnham (P), a resident of California, brought suit for divorce against her husband, Dennis Burnham (Burnham) (D), in California state court. Mr. Burnham (D) was served with the summons and complaint while voluntarily visiting California for three days. Burnham’s (D) presence in California did not relate to the divorce action, as he was initially on business and later traveled to San Francisco to visit his daughters [That’s what he gets for trying to do something nice!]. Subsequently, Burnham (D) made a special appearance in California Superior Court, moving to quash the service of process. Burnham (D) argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because his only contacts with the state were a few short trips on business and to visit his daughters. The Superior Court denied the motion. Thereafter, the California Court of Appeal denied mandamus relief, holding that physical presence and personal service in the forum state constituted valid grounds for jurisdiction. The...
- MANDAMUS: A proceeding in some superior court, seeking an order for an inferior court to perform some duty, such as quashing a service of process.
- This is an extremely important case in ascertaining the correct application of minimum contacts test, Justice Scalia’s opinion makes it clear that this is not the case. Rather, the traditional notion of jurisdiction based on physical presence can survive even absent sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum State. While Justice Scalia’s unyielding rule has the advantages of certainty and judicial efficiency, his reliance on history should nevertheless be questioned. Indeed, it makes little sense to rely on historical notions of jurisdiction in this case, when prior cases like
- (Stevens, J.) I am concerned with the broad reach of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. However, the historical evidence identified by Justice Scalia, the considerations of fairness identified by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by Justice White convince me that this is a very easy case. I agree that the judgment should be affirmed.
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- A court will authorize discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference only when the party seeking discovery has good cause and at least a good faith belief that such discovery will show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
- Tatman (P) sought to introduce at trial the deposition testimony of a doctor who had treated her late husband; the court disallowed the testimony, as well as that of another physician based on it, even though the treating doctor was unavailable to testify at trial, and Tatman (P) appealed.
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- If the concern raised by a contention interrogatory before discovery is completed is that the answer to the interrogatory may limit the party’s proof at trial, that concern is misplaced. The trial court may, among other things, permit the withdrawal or amendment of an answer to an interrogatory. In the case of
- The 2007 amendments to Rule 33 provide that “[a]n interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, but the court may order that the interrogatory need not be answered until designated discovery is complete, or until a pretrial conference or some other time.” The amendment changed the language of the Rule from “is not necessarily objectionable,” because, as the Advisory Committee states, that seemed to imply that an interrogatory might
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Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case presents an early and extremely narrow view of permissive joinder of plaintiffs. The Ryders (P) were allegedly injured by a single act, which included a rude rousing from their room and unkind allegations about Edith Ryder (P). However, the Ryders (P) were prohibited from joining as plaintiffs, despite the nearly identical tort claims arising out of this one occurrence. The court narrowly interpreted the South Carolina statute in holding that each spouse’s claim did not affect the other spouse. The dissent’s stance seems more reasonable, since the unfortunate events occurred because the Hotel (D) felt that the Ryders (P) were not married. Thus, the alleged injuries seem more like injuries to a partnership than injuries to separate individuals. The majority’s holding essentially destroys the concept of permissive joinder, allowing joinder only when the parties are united in interest. If the parties are indeed united in interest, then they would be
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- The Ryders (P), an allegedly married couple, were roused from their room and verbally insulted by the staff of the Jefferson Hotel (D). The Ryders (P) brought separate tort claims in one action in a South Carolina court.
- (Gary, J., and Cothran, J.) The Ryders (P) were expelled from the hotel under the allegation that they were not married. Thus, the injuries to Edith (P) and Charles (P) were joint, similar to an injury to a copartnership. When a copartnership is injured, the partnership can bring an action for injury, even though the injuries to each partner may not be identical. The same should be true in this case, as the alleged tort affected the Ryders’ (P) relationship as husband and wife.
- Charles Ryder (P) and Edith Ryder (P), allegedly husband and wife, were guests of the Jefferson Hotel Company (D). According to the complaint, a servant of the Hotel (D) roused the Ryders (P) by rapping upon their door, and the servant insulted Edith Ryder (P). Apparently the couple was expelled under the allegation that they were not husband and wife. As a result, the Ryders (P) were compelled to give up their accommodations and find another lodging place in the middle of the night. The Ryders (P) sued the Jefferson Hotel (D) in South Carolina state court in a joint action for personal torts against Charles (P) and Edith (P). The Hotel (D) demurred to the complaint on the ground that the two causes of action had been improperly joined. The Hotel (D) appeals an order overruling this demurrer.
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Hickman v. Taylor 5 results
- .... In arguing that such discovery is permissible, Hickman (P) erroneously maintains that the Rules were created to do away with the “battle of wits” between counsel, effectively placing all counsel on equal footing. Discovery was never intended to diminish the adversarial nature of common law trials. Requiring an attorney to recount every statement a witness has uttered would create severe hardship for that attorney. It is almost impossible to accurately record the exact accounts of a witness, and whenever a witness’s testimony at trial differed slightly from the attorney’s account, the opposing counsel could impeach the witness using the attorney’s account. Moreover, in the situation at hand, Hickman (P) gives no reason why he cannot interview the witnesses himself. In addition, Hickman (P) has no right to use the signed statements acquired by Fortenbaugh in the case at hand. Production of such statements is governed by Rule 34, which requires the party seeking discovery to...
- (Murphy, J.) No. Even with liberal discovery rules, not all of an attorney’s files are open to discovery by the opposing party. Rule 26(b) provides necessary limitations on discovery when the inquiry encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. In the case at hand, the memoranda, statements and mental impressions in issue and in Fortenbaugh’s possession fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Nevertheless, they are not freely discoverable by Hickman (P). Hickman (P) had an adequate opportunity to seek discovery of the same basic facts, through inquiries and production requests propounded on Fortenbaugh and on the parties to the lawsuit, and through direct interviews with the witnesses themselves. Hickman (P) showed no compelling reason why he should be entitled to the information in Fortenbaugh’s files, and he did not indicate that the denial of such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of his case. An attorney’s work product may be discovered...
- This case analyzes the extent to which a party has access to an opposing attorney’s “work product,” information obtained by counsel in preparation for trial. The literal language of the initial Federal Rules allowed virtually unlimited access to the discovery of such information However, this case creates an exception to the unlimited access approach, requiring the party to show a need for obtaining an opposing counsel’s work product. And as the opinion states, this need must be substantial. A party who can question the same witnesses, and obtain much the same information in other ways, has no right to reap the benefits of another party’s or another attorney’s hard work. This holding is sensible, since an alternative view would discourage attorneys from actively investigating the issues. Notice that this work-product exemption applies only to materials prepared in anticipation of trial. Thus, statements of witnesses taken in the ordinary course of business, outside of a pending...
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- ...out of the mysterious sinking of the tugboat “J.M. Taylor,” an accident which killed five crew members. Hickman (P), the representative of a deceased crew member, brought suit against the tug owners and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, whose cars were being tugged at the time of the accident. The tug owners were represented by Fortenbaugh, an attorney who privately interviewed the survivors and other witnesses prior to the institution of the lawsuit. Hickman (P) submitted interrogatories to the tug owners seeking the production of written statements and other memoranda acquired by Fortenbaugh, as well as detailed accounts of any oral statements made to Fortenbaugh. The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, declined to answer some interrogatories or produce the documents, claiming that the requests called for privileged matter and constituted an attempt to obtain Fortenbaugh’s private files. The District Court, sitting en banc, held that the requested matters were not privileged....
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- Mitchell (P) brought this action for an accounting against Federal Intermediate Credit Bank (Bank) (D). Mitchell (P) claimed that, at the urging of the Bank’s (P’s) agent, he (P) sold his potato crop and used the proceeds as security for two notes for loans from the Bank (D). These loans equaled $9,000, but Mitchell (P) claimed that the proceeds actually amounted to $18,000. Mitchell (P) claimed he never received any of these proceeds, and that the Bank (D) did receive the proceeds. Previously, the Bank (D) had pursued an action on these notes. Mitchell (P) had pleaded these same facts in his (P’s) earlier answer, but had not counterclaimed or asked for relief. Mitchell (P) had prevailed in the first case. Here, the Bank (D) claimed that Mitchell’s (P) claim was merged in the earlier judgment. The trial court upheld the Bank’s (D) contention and barred Mitchell’s (P) more recent claim.
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- [Varney was not entitled to recover in first action on contract to build additions to O’Connor’s house because Varney’s intentional neglect of project amounted to more than he sued for], the court wrote that a party “may allege specific breaches of the contract declared upon, and rely on them in defense. But, if he intends to claim . . . more than the amount of for which he is sued, he must not rely on the contract in defense, would seem to be exactly the situation in the present case. When the Bank (D) sued Mitchell (P) on the two notes, he (P) had the option to position his (P) current claim either as a defense to the Bank’s (D) action, or as a means of obtaining a judgment against the Bank (D). The transaction at issue here is the same one which served as the basis of Mitchell’s (P) earlier defense. Mitchell (P) could have recovered in the previous action. Instead, he (P) chose to split his cause of action in
- Rule 13(a) bars a plaintiff from raising counterclaims in subsequent litigation in federal court if he or she chose not to raise it in the beginning. Usually, the wide scope of this compulsory-counterclaim preclusion makes considerations of whether and how defense preclusion might apply irrelevant. Such questions of defense preclusion do matter, however, in the many state jurisdictions where compulsory-counterclaim rules are Rule 13(a), parties do not have to include claims that are already pending in another suit, and some courts have found the Rule to be inapplicable where the action was terminated by default, settlement, or dismissed on a party’s motion.
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Mas v. Perry 4 results
- ], and it delineates the requirements for effecting a change of domicile. In this regard, note that domicile is different from residence, and a party’s intention to remain in a new domicile is required before a change occurs. This standard is somewhat vague, requiring courts to determine subjective intent without providing guidance as to how long a party must intend to remain in the new domicile. Apparently, Mrs. Mas’ (P) intention to remain in Louisiana for a couple of years was insufficient to effect a change in domicile. In addition, note that the domicile of all parties is determined at the time of filing the suit, since otherwise a defendant could avoid diversity jurisdiction simply by taking up residence in the same state as any plaintiff and demonstrating an intention to remain there. Finally, if this case arose today and Mr. Mas was considered a permanent resident alien and Louisiana domiciliary, he would not be able to bring his claim based on a lack of diversity, since a...
- Jean Paul and Judy Mas (Ps), who lived and worked in Louisiana, were married at Judy Mas’ (P) home in Mississippi. After the marriage, the couple returned to Louisiana to continue their studies and employment at Louisiana State University, and the couple rented an apartment from Oliver H. Perry (D), a citizen of Louisiana. Mr. and Mrs. Mas (Ps) brought a claim against Mr. Perry (D) in federal court when they discovered that Mr. Perry (D) had been watching the couple through two-way mirrors in their bedroom and bathroom. The trial court awarded $5000 in damages to Mr. Mas (P) and $15,000 to Mrs. Mas (P). On appeal, Mr. Perry (D) claims that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction, contending that Mr. and Mrs. Mas (Ps) failed to prove diversity of citizenship among the parties. Mr. Mas (P) was a citizen of France throughout the proceedings. Mr. Perry (D) apparently believed that Mrs. Mas (P) was a domiciliary of Louisiana, or that she acquired French citizenship upon her...
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- § 1332(a)(1), since she had a different domicile than Mr. Perry (D). Prior to her marriage, Mrs. Mas (P) was a domiciliary of Mississippi, where she had her permanent home. Her domicile did not change when she took up residence in Louisiana, as she was only a student/graduate assistant and did not have an intention to remain in that state. Thus, Mrs. Mas should still be considered a Mississippi domiciliary after the marriage, and there is complete diversity. Affirmed. (2) No. Although generally the domicile of a wife is deemed to be that of her husband, this concept does not extend to situations in which the husband is a foreign citizen who resides in the United States. First, such an extension would work absurd results in the case at hand. If Mrs. Mas (P) was
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Gordon v. Harper 5 results
- Chief Judge Lord Kenyon cites a case, , Kenyon stated that plaintiff’s chosen cause of action for trespass could not lie in such a case scenario but trover would have. Now in , Kenyon writes that he takes back what he said in the earlier case and trover cannot lie either. The obvious question, then, is what remedy would a landlord have if his furniture was taken while his house was being leased? One option may have been to wait before bringing his suit until the lease ran out and the landlord was again rightfully in possession of his house and the furniture that was supposed to be in it. This would probably be difficult to coordinate with a statute of limitations for such an action. The other option would be to avoid leasing a furnished house. If this seems extreme, then you understand why the common law was in desperate need of reform in this century. The judges were capable of determining which causes of action could not lie but offered no help as to which ones could.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Court of Kings Bench, 7 T.R. 9, 101 Eng.Rep. 828 (1796)
- COURT DENIES PLAINTIFF AN ACTION IN TROVER EVEN WHILE ADMITTING THAT HE HAS NO OTHER CAUSE OF ACTION
- Gordon (P) owns a furnished house and leased it to his tenant for a term that has still not expired at the time of trial. While the tenant was in possession of the house, Harper (D), the Sheriff, came to seize the furniture in the house and sold it [sort of like an eighteenth century repo-man]. It seems that Gordon (P) had purchased the furniture from a man who had a court judgement against him and apparently had no right to have sold the furniture in the first place. [We are spared the seedy details, but the furniture may have been stolen.] When Gordon (P) discovered that the furniture in his house was taken away and sold, even though he was not living in it at the time, he brought a suit in trover against Sheriff Harper (D) for the value of the furniture taken.
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Harris v. Avery 5 results
- Harris (D) allegedly called Avery (P) a thief, saying Avery (P) had stolen a horse. [Oooh, that’s got to hurt!] Harris (D) proceeded to take the horse from Avery (P) and keep it for four or five days, and Harris (D) also imprisoned Avery (P) for four or five days in the county jail. Avery (P) sued Harris (D) for false imprisonment and slander in a state court in Kansas. Harris (D) demurred to the complaint, arguing that several causes of action (slander and false imprisonment) were improperly joined. The state district court overruled the demurrer, and Harris (D) appealed.
- (Valentine, J.) Yes. Two or more causes of action that arise from the same transaction may be joined in one complaint. Pursuant to a Kansas statute, a plaintiff may unite several causes of action if they fall within one of several classes, including actions arising out of the same transaction. We find that Avery’s (P) claims for false imprisonment and slander arose out of the same transaction, and thus the claims were properly joined. This represents a departure from common law. At common law, if Harris (D) had arrested Avery (P) without any process—which was in fact the case—then the first cause of action, for false imprisonment, would have to be brought in an action for trespass and the second cause of action, for slander, would have to be brought in an action for trespass on the case. However, our state codes have altered this common law when the two actions arise out of the same transaction. This accomplishes the goal of avoiding multiplicity of suits whenever practicable....
- This case represents the modern trend allowing for flexibility in joining several claims. Flexible joinder rules, exemplified by Kansas’ statute, encourage judicial efficiency by avoiding a multiplicity of lawsuits. Indeed, it makes sense to try related claims in one action, since the underlying factual issues should only have to be examined one time. Typical state code provisions, such as Kansas’, allowed for joinder of claims when they fell into one of several categories, including the following: contracts, injuries to the person, injuries to character, injuries to property, actions to recover real property, actions to recover chattels, or actions arising out of the same transaction. Notice that these codes do not necessarily liberalize all joinder rules. For example, under the codes, a tort action for injury to property could not be joined with a tort action for injury to the person unless they arose out of the ...common law form of action (e.g., trespass or trespass on the case...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- TRESPASS ON THE CASE: Form of action at common law for damages resulting from wrongful immediate force by a defendant.
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Table of Contents 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
In re Petition of Sheila Roberts Ford 4 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- COMPLAINT: The initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff’s claim, and the demand for relief.
- As the court suggests, a plaintiff may find herself in a situation in which it is clear that a claim exists, but the responsible parties are unknown.
- Rule 27, a party may “perpetuate testimony regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of the United States [by] fil[ing] a verified petition.” Here, the stated purpose for the deposition was not to perpetuate testimony, but to discover it. There is no risk that the deponent’s testimony will be lost or that he will be unavailable for deposition after a suit is commenced.
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Chapter Twelve. Case Management 2 results
- Sanctions are designed to control litigation and preserve the integrity of the judicial process and lie within the sound discretion of the court.
- The petitioner complained that the court lacked the authority to appoint an auditor to determine the amount due for coal sold and to tax the auditor’s fee as costs.
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Alphabetical Table of Cases 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
Flowers v. Flowers 4 results
- This case illustrates some of the problems involved in removing a juror for cause. While a partial juror, who demonstrates bias or prejudice to the litigants or the subject matter of the case, clearly should be dismissed, the determination is not always easy to make. Indeed, Mrs. Schmidt expressed a great reprehension towards anyone who consumed alcoholic beverages. However, she opined that she could still remain an impartial juror. The judge apparently based his decision not to dismiss Mrs. Schmidt on this latter revelation. ...that she was not dismissed initially. Perhaps the judge realized that most potential jurors in this small town would have some prejudice to the facts of this case, and he felt that Mrs. Schmidt’s honest answers revealed qualities suitable for jury service. The judge certainly faced a difficult task, as he could only rely on the voir dire examination and could not read the minds of potential jurors. At any event, however, the judge should have questioned...
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- Billie Charlene Flowers (P) and R.A. Flowers (D) were involved in a child custody dispute. On voir dire examination, the prospective jurors were told that Billie (P) drank alcoholic beverages socially and on occasion had consumed to excess. [Of course, the jurors in this small community already knew these facts!] One of the potential jurors, Mrs. Schmidt, responded on voir dire that she did not approve of any alcoholic beverage consumption. However, when asked the leading question of whether she would hold Billie’s (P) consumption against her at trial, Mrs. Schmidt responded “not especially.” The court overruled Billie’s (P) attorney’s challenge to Mrs. Schmidt for cause. Subsequently, evidence revealed that Mrs. Philpot, a panelist who sat next to Mrs. Schmidt, had heard Mrs. Schmidt make derogatory statements about Billie (P). Nevertheless, at Billie’s (P) motion for mistrial and motion for new trial, the court refused to hear Mrs. Philpot’s testimony. Billie Flowers (P) appealed.
- (Chapman, J.) Yes. A party who demonstrates bias or prejudice should be dismissed from the jury pool. Texas statute and case law provides that a prospective juror may be disqualified whenever that person has a bias or prejudice towards either party or the subject matter of the litigation. Mrs. Schmidt’s statements indicate bias and prejudice, indicating that she could not have acted with impartiality. Thus, she should have been disqualified as a matter of law. Even if her statements did not clearly show prejudice or bias, the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing Billie’s (P) attorney’s challenge for cause. Mrs. Schmidt’s answer to the leading question should be disregarded, and the remainder of the record shows bias and prejudice on the part of Mrs. Schmidt toward Billie’s (P) alcoholic consumption. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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Ziervogel v. Royal Packing Co. 4 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (McCullen, J.) No. One may not introduce evidence of special damages at trial if these were not specifically pleaded in the complaint. Special damages are those which are not the necessary or inevitable result of the injury which is alleged in the complaint. Ziervogel’s (P) increased blood pressure and hurting shoulder cannot be seen as the necessary result of the injury to her neck, back and spine which were pleaded in the complaint. Consequently, the mention of increased blood pressure and hurt shoulder was an improper introduction of evidence on special damages missing from the complaint. The fact that Royal (D) was not surprised about the injuries because they had an opportunity to know of them through other means does not relieve Ziervogel (P) of her responsibility to bear the initial burden of pleading. Thus, it was error for the trial court to admit evidence of the special damages. Judgment is overruled.
- ...his truck. Ziervogel (P) decided to sue Royal (D) in tort and, in her petition for damages, claimed that she was injured in her neck, back, spine and nervous system as well as “otherwise.” During trial, however, Ziervogel’s (P) counsel noted during his opening statement and through later admitted evidence the additional injuries of increased blood pressure and hurt shoulder. Royal (D) had notice of these injuries through Ziervogel’s (P) statement to her insurer’s Claim Agent as well as through her deposition. Nonetheless, Royal (D) moved for a mistrial on the ground that neither the injuries themselves nor the fact that they were a result of the collision was specified in Ziervogel’s (P) petition and, therefore, were inadmissible evidence at trial. Royal (D) argued that it is unjust to allow Ziervogel (P) to present evidence of injuries of which Royal (D) did not have lawful notice and for which they did not prepare a defense. The trial court entered judgment for...
- While it may not be surprising that accident victims can experience the effects of their trauma at different times, and with particularly eviscerating pain right before a lawsuit over the injuries, the decision of the court to exclude them makes a lot of sense. Even in the more lenient jurisdictions which favor notice pleading, it is understandable that a plaintiff should
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- The Ryders (P), an allegedly married couple, were roused from their room and verbally insulted by the staff of the Jefferson Hotel (D). The Ryders (P) brought separate tort claims in one action in a South Carolina court.
- Bank of California Nat. Ass’n v. Superior Court
- Mandatory joinder requires courts to join all necessary and indispensable parties to an action.
- In an action arising out of a traffic collision, Provident Tradesmens Bank (P), the administrator of a decedent’s estate, sued Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Company (D), the insurer of the automobile. The Appellate Court dismissed the action for failure to join the insured party.
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Chapter Two. Jurisdiction over the Parties or Their Property 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Neff (P) sought to recover possession of land which had been seized and sold to pay off a default judgment against him, claiming that the judgment was invalid, as the court involved had not had personal jurisdiction over him.
- Every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory; therefore, the courts of that state may enter a binding judgment against a non-resident only if he is personally served with process while within the state, or, if he has property within the state, if that property is attached before litigation begins.
- Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
- Victim of motorcycle accident brought suit in California court against Taiwanese tire-tube maker, who cross-claimed against Japanese manufacturer of the tire tube valve assembly.
- The sons of Brown (P) and Helms (P) were killed in a bus accident, allegedly because of tires manufactured by a foreign subsidiary of Goodyear (D), and the subsidiaries (D) claimed that the state court did not have jurisdiction.
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- Publication Date: April 29th, 2019
- ISBN: 9781642425062
- Subject: Civil Procedure
- Series: High Court Case Summaries
- Type: Case Briefs
- Description: This title contains briefs for each major case in Friedenthal’s casebook on Civil Procedure. The briefs will help readers identify, understand, and absorb the core knowledge points from each case. They are followed by legal analysis, providing contextual background about each case, and connecting the case to the broader concepts developed throughout the book. This title also supplies case vocabulary, with definitions of new or unusual legal words found throughout the cases.
