Legislation and Regulation in a Nutshell
Author:
Huefner, Steven
Edition:
1st
Copyright Date:
2017
16 chapters
have results for statutory interpretation
Chapter 8. Theories of Statutory Interpretation 303 70 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This chapter first provides a short historical overview of how courts in earlier eras addressed problems of statutory interpretation. Building on that history, it then summarizes six prominent theories of statutory interpretation that are most relevant today, namely Intentionalism, Purposivism, Plain Meaning Interpretation, Textualism, and Pragmatic and Dynamic Interpretation.
- It also bears noting that, with respect to this small minority of occasions when the meaning of statutory text is contested, no one theory of interpretation is universally accepted. As Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, two prominent scholars of statutory interpretation, famously said almost sixty years ago: “Do not expect anybody’s theory of statutory interpretation . . . to be an accurate statement of what courts actually do with statutes. The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”
- Dynamic Interpretation similarly calls for a practical interpretive approach nimble enough to adapt a statutory text to accommodate new circumstances. Dynamic theory usually still takes the enacted text itself as the starting point, and also draws upon both the purpose(s) behind the statute and the context of its enactment as interpretive tools. But Dynamic Interpretation then adds an additional focus on subsequent changes in social conditions, including how the overall fabric of the law has itself continued to evolve since the time of the measure’s enactment. Harking back to notions of the “equity of the statute,” Dynamic Interpretation then encourages the interpreter to seek a reasonable construction of the statutory text in light of these changes, in a kind of clarification, extension, or even updating of the statute to keep it in tune with the times. Dynamic interpreters are operating much more as cooperative partners with the legislature than as its faithful agents.
- In today’s debates about theories of statutory interpretation, Intentionalism is often overshadowed by Purposivism. Nevertheless, Intentionalism still has plenty of adherents, especially in the state systems. For instance, New York has long followed a set of statutory interpretation guidelines that specifically invite its courts to be Intentionalist interpreters. These guidelines provide that “[t]he primary consideration of the courts” is to “give effect to the intention of the Legislature,” first “from a literal reading of the act itself,” and then “if the meaning is still not clear . . . from such facts [as may] legitimately reveal it.” § 92 (McKinney 2016). Minnesota has a statute providing that “[t]he object of all interpretation . . . is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature,” and to do so using a range of sources “[w]hen the words of a law are not explicit.”
- opinion suggests, American courts in the mid-twentieth century were departing from a strict plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation. In part, this likely reflected the growing influence of ideas that would shortly lead to the mid-century emergence of the “Legal Process” school of jurisprudence. Indeed, Purposivism is often equated with Legal Process interpretation, and while Purposivism had previously flourished on its own, today it certainly owes much of its contemporary theoretical basis to the Legal Process school.
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- In addressing these essential questions about American law today, the second part of the Nutshell builds directly on the first part, illustrating that a sophisticated understanding of the challenges and problems of statutory and regulatory interpretation must be predicated on an equally nuanced understanding of the processes by which the words of the law come into being. The topics in this second part include: the challenge of textual interpretation (Chapter 7); theories of statutory interpretation (Chapter 8); canons of construction and other intrinsic tools of interpretation (Chapter 9); legislative history and other extrinsic tools of interpretation (Chapter 10); agency interpretation of legislative text (Chapter 11); and judicial review of agency interpretations (Chapter 12). An Appendix of Representative Canons of Statutory Interpretation follows.
- Part II then develops in detail the dominant theories, doctrines, and practices of statutory and regulatory interpretation. Statutory and regulatory language can be fraught with ambiguity, despite the drafters’ best efforts. The results lead to questions like these: How is an implementing agency or court to deal with statutory ambiguity? What latitude is appropriate? What interpretive tools or aids can or should guide this process? How might the responses to these questions be different for agencies than for courts? How do, or ought, courts differ in how they approach the interpretation of regulatory text rather than statutory text? And what are the most salient differences between the federal and state systems regarding the interpretation of statutes and regulatory language?
- Reflecting this reality, in recent years an increasing number of U.S. law schools have included in their first-year curriculum a course in Legislation and Regulation, or in Legislation alone. As a result, a rich supply of new course materials on legislative processes, regulatory agencies, and statutory interpretation is now available to students and practitioners, in addition to an explosion of academic research concerning the complexities of modern American lawmaking. Upper level courses that build on these foundations also have expanded into specific areas of regulatory policy, courses in election law and the law of democracy, and clinical and experiential learning opportunities in legislative and regulatory settings.
- ...twenty-first century attorneys need to possess not only a thorough understanding of the judicial branch, its operation, and doctrinal output, but also a comprehensive grounding in the lawmaking activities of each of the three branches of government, including the interactions among these branches. These interbranch relationships sometimes may be truly collaborative; at other times they may be merely cooperative; and on yet other occasions they may even be genuinely conflicting or competitive. In this context, as a matter of both law creation and law implementation, opportunities for thoughtful, creative lawyering abound. Clients today may seek legal assistance in advancing a legislative agenda, appearing before an administrative agency, or persuading a court to adopt a favorable construction of a statutory or regulatory provision—all legal tasks that require in-depth knowledge of the legislative and regulatory processes and of the various theories about their proper...
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Chapter 6. Inside the Administrative State: The Authority and Operation of Government Agencies 13 results (showing 5 best matches)
- deference and other deference regimes, as well as of the general problem of judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language, is the subject of Chapter 12, the concluding chapter of Part II’s treatment of the doctrines and tools of statutory interpretation.
- Over the years, the Supreme Court has articulated a variety of context-dependent standards for how to review the validity of an agency’s resolution of a question of statutory meaning.
- Apart from questions of how an agency may use its discretionary authority, a distinct question involves how courts should oversee agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions. Indeed, the issue in
- in excess of statutory [authority], or short of statutory right;
- Agencies may undertake to fulfill their statutory mandates using an array of authority and tools, which often vary from agency to agency. In different contexts, these agency powers may be described using distinctive labels. Accordingly, a brief overview of some nomenclature is in order.
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Chapter 12. Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations 481 87 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The question is a difficult one in part because it takes a basic problem of statutory interpretation and adds a second layer to it. It no longer is a simple question of what a reviewing court thinks the meaning of the statutory text is, but instead it becomes a question of what the reviewing court thinks of the administrative agency’s interpretation. Thus, interpretation becomes a collective process, if not quite a collaborative one. It is also difficult because courts have struggled mightily to develop a consistent approach to this problem, particularly at the federal level.
- Of course, given the flux in the federal jurisprudence of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation, it is even harder to predict where state law on the subject is headed. Perhaps in the field of statutory interpretation, as in other fields, states can serve as laboratories of democracy, refining the complex relationships between the three branches of American government. In any event, it seems safe to assume that as long as federal and state government agencies continue to play the substantial and significant roles that they have increasingly come to play over the past century, issues of the appropriate extent of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation will remain of central importance to American law.
- On occasion, an agency confronts a statutory ambiguity that a court has also already confronted. Is the agency obligated to follow the judicial interpretation when, had the agency been the first interpreter, its interpretation would have been entitled to
- opinion has become the most cited Supreme Court administrative law decision. Although in part this reflects the vast number of administrative interpretations that are the subjects of judicial review, at least two other factors help explain the opinion’s continuing influence. One is its discussion of the comparative institutional advantages that agencies have over courts in certain aspects of statutory interpretation. The other is its articulation of a clear two-step framework for evaluating agency interpretations.
- This Nutshell concludes with a chapter dedicated to one of the most important and difficult questions in the field of statutory interpretation: How should courts oversee or review the way in which administrative agencies interpret statutory text? In part, the question of the scope and relevant standards of judicial review of agency interpretation is important because of just how many laws today are interpreted and applied by the administrative state. But in addition to the widespread impact that the ...legislative branch passes a law, but leaves to executive branch departments and agencies (whether deliberately or inadvertently) many elements of the statute’s administration and enforcement, including ascertaining the statute’s meaning in particular cases. Some of those administrative interpretations eventually come before the judicial branch for review. Reviewing courts then must decide how much to defer to the agency’s determination, whether because of the agency’s general...
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Chapter 11. Agency Interpretation of Legal Text 461 28 results (showing 5 best matches)
- An additional feature of agency interpretation is the flexibility that agencies have to revise how they have interpreted the statutes that they are charged with administering. As discussed in Chapter 7, the principle of typically has extra strength with respect to judicial interpretations of statutory provisions, because courts are even more reluctant to overturn a statutory precedent than they ordinarily might be to overturn a common law decision or doctrine. By contrast, agencies have great freedom to overturn their previous constructions of statutory meaning.
- canon, described in Chapter 9). Agencies also engage in statutory interpretation mindful of the way in which courts may review their work and the circumstances in which courts will most defer to the agency interpretation, as discussed in Chapter 12.
- As also discussed further in Chapter 12, on occasion an agency may have the ability to re-interpret a statutory provision that a . This power to have an agency interpretation displace a judicial interpretation is a dramatic feature that goes to the heart of agency delegation and judicial review thereof. It allows an agency in certain circumstances to undo a judicial construction of a statute that the agency is charged with administering even when the court itself would be unlikely to alter that construction because of the principle of . Thus, in multiple respects this principle of adhering to past precedents may have a substantially different impact on agency interpretations than it generally has on court interpretations.
- As Chapter 7 noted, many types of actors—from citizens to lawyers to judges to executive branch officials—must confront the task of legal interpretation. Nevertheless, as Chapters 8, 9, and 10 reflect, the primary focus of interpretive theory has been on how judges construe legal text, given the judiciary’s role to declare what the law is. However, every bit as much (actually much more) official interpretation of statutory text occurs at the hands of agency officials, in fulfillment of their rulemaking
- Moreover, the interpreting agencies often will have been active, if behind-the-scenes, partners in the statutory drafting process. As a result, it not only may be appropriate (or even necessary) for agencies to identify and understand the legislature’s underlying purpose, it also may be easier for them to do so than for courts. Thus, with respect to agency interpretations rendered in furtherance of an agency’s delegated authority to implement a statute, the debate between Textualists and Purposivists may have less salience.
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Chapter 9. Canons of Construction and Other Intrinsic Tools of Interpretation 363 28 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Interpretation of legal text generally begins with a reading of the words attuned to their plain meaning. Indeed, the Plain Meaning approach to legal interpretation, discussed in some detail in Chapter 8 as an interpretive theory, is also frequently characterized as a rule or canon of interpretation and included among the list of intrinsic tools of interpretation. For instance, see
- Another substantive canon is that statutory provisions should be construed to avoid giving rise to a serious constitutional question. In other words, if two (or more) interpretations of a measure are possible, but one interpretation might place the constitutionality of the underlying measure genuinely at issue, the interpreter should choose an available interpretation that would not raise the (Brandeis, J., concurring). At one time, the constitutional avoidance canon took a narrower form, providing only that an interpretation that would actually make a measure unconstitutional should be avoided if any other interpretation was fairly possible. But today, the canon is used to avoid even needing to resolve a serious question about a law’s constitutionality.
- In contrast, as Sutherland’s famous statutory interpretation treatise explains, “The better rule is that punctuation is part of an act and courts may consider punctuation to interpret an act but not to create doubt or to distort or defeat legislative intent.” 2A
- Whether one is a Textualist, a Purposivist, or almost any other kind of interpreter, the process of statutory and regulatory interpretation at least begins with a close reading of the words of the measure. As Justice Felix Frankfurter, while a professor at Harvard Law School, famously urged his students, the three critical interpretive steps are: “(1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute.” 527. While Purposivists may thereafter deploy a wide range of interpretive tools to refine their understanding of the meaning of the words, Textualists generally limit their tools of interpretation to rules and principles of intrinsic textual analysis. These intrinsic tools include linguistic and substantive maxims, or “canons of construction,” for decoding the text itself without reference to any external evidence about the meaning of the particular words at issue. Yet a thorough familiarity with these intrinsic tools of interpretation is essential to any interpretive...
- As noted in Chapter 8, however, the plain meaning of a text may not always be the accepted interpretive touchstone, particularly when the result seems at odds with a sensible construction. In addition, the reality is that plenty of statutory provisions lack a plain meaning in some contexts, at least without additional attention to the linguistic structure and
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Chapter 7. The Challenge of Textual Interpretation 265 40 results (showing 5 best matches)
- or incorporating legislative policy into common law, the Legal Process school can offer a set of principles to constrain the amount of willfulness with which courts and agencies might approach issues of statutory and regulatory interpretation generally. As a threshold matter, consider again the question of whether an interpreter
- Having considered the hybrid quality of law as the output of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the critical interpretive and law-elaborating role that courts and agencies play, the remaining chapters of Part II now explore in greater depth the theories, doctrines, and tools of statutory interpretation of greatest potential relevance in addressing the kinds of interpretive problems introduced in this chapter.
- the notion that the interpreter cannot just ignore the statutory law; rather, statutory text must still provide a foundation and a tether for any such cooperative lawmaking. Chapters 8, 9, and 10 also will consider some theoretical and doctrinal perspectives relevant to statutory interpretation on something like a “Cooperative Partner” model.
- Specifically with respect to matters of statutory interpretation, the Legal Realists who followed Holmes similarly argued that courts were making rather than finding the law because a court often could have articulated several equally defensible arguments to support contrasting interpretive results, allowing the court to choose, rather than deduce, a particular outcome. This Realist view explicitly acknowledged the idea of judicial power and discretion. Ever since, the prospect of judicial willfulness has raised important questions of objectivity and subjectivity in law and judicial interpretation.
- Chapters 8 and 9 will explore some theories and doctrines that rely heavily on a variety of such default rules, even though in the statutory interpretation context they may not be binding in the way that they are in the interpretation of wills.
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Outline 23 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A.Early Approaches to Problems of Statutory Interpretation
- A.The Basic Problem of Meaning and Interpretation
- B.The Need for Textual Interpretation inLaw
- 3.Lingering Concerns About Willfulnessin Interpretation: Who Is to Say “Whatthe Law Is”?
- D.Plain Meaning Interpretation: A Textualist Approach
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Index 43 results (showing 5 best matches)
Appendix: Representative Canons of Statutory Interpretation 17 results (showing 5 best matches)
- REPRESENTATIVE CANONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
- respect: Courts should respect an agency’s statutory interpretation based on factors such as the thoroughness of its consideration and the validity of its reasoning.
- The following examples of interpretive canons are only representative, not comprehensive. The list organizes the examples by general categories, drawing from a number of comparable but more extensive lists found in statutory interpretation casebooks and similar resources. These more comprehensive lists include, for instance, the Appendix in
- Presumption that when a legislature does not amend a statute to respond to a court or agency interpretation of the statute, the legislature approves of that interpretation.
- Presumption that when a legislature reenacts a statute, it incorporates the statute’s prior interpretations.
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Chapter 10. Legislative History and Other Extrinsic Tools of Interpretation 405 43 results (showing 5 best matches)
- , in which legislative history may have an important seat at the interpretive table, but is secondary in importance to the statutory text and must be carefully scrutinized for its reliability. On its face, this is a rather unremarkable proposition, even if it represents a position perhaps at odds with some previous approaches to interpretation. Yet even this proposition, under its surface, may raise contested questions of interpretive approach.
- This chapter describes the major categories of extrinsic tools of interpretation. These include: (1) the relationship between the specific text at issue and any relevant
- canon. In some lexicons of statutory interpretation, is treated as an extrinsic interpretive tool for reasoning from one statute to another. These lexicons classify it as an extrinsic tool because the focus is on how a settled meaning in some other statute can help resolve an interpretive problem in an ambiguous statute. It is fair to note, however, that on this basis the Whole Code Rule, typically deemed a corollary of the Whole Act Rule, could in its entirety instead be classified as an extrinsic tool of interpretation.
- If the statutory text seeks to remedy a defect in the existing common law, then understanding the common law background can help in understanding the purpose behind the statute, which in turn can shape the interpretive task. As an example of referring to the common law to supply an understanding of the mischief to which a statute is directed, consider the admiralty case of , the Supreme Court concluded that because Congress had intended “to change the general maritime law so as to improve the lot of seamen,” federal statutory law now preempted what would have been the employer’s common-law deductions. The Court acknowledged the interpretive rule that “[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles” (a version of the ...construed) but observed that this rule did not govern “when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” The Court saw federal maritime legislation as designed...
- The case is interesting in part because the statute at issue included an interpretive direction that committee statements “shall be consulted in the interpretation and construction of this act.” In the view of the dissenting justice, both the statute and the committee report supported the view that the manufacturer was relieved of liability as long as it had informed the physician—the learned intermediary—of the potential side effects. But the majority concluded from a variety of evidence, including the committee report, that the statutory specification of what constituted an adequate warning reflected an earlier era when “drugs were then marketed to the physician,” and did not provide a safe harbor against tort liability for drug
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- At first, the simple fact that independent democratic institutions can often be attentive to and even anticipate each other may seem neither surprising nor very interesting. Yet an understanding of these institutional dynamics can be especially important when examining how agencies respond to legislative authorization and direction, as well as in considering just what it is that Congress or a state legislature may have expected that an agency would do in furtherance of a legislative mandate. An appreciation of institutional dynamics also can have a meaningful effect in some judicial evaluations of questions of statutory interpretation.
- A third perspective on the processes of representative government examines the relationships between at least five distinct institutions of American government, at both the federal and state levels, that play important and interdependent roles in the shaping of statutory law and its implementing regulations. These institutions include: (1) & (2) each of a legislature’s two chambers (except in Nebraska, whose state legislature is unicameral); (3) the President or Governor, as head of the executive branch; (4) independent agencies or departments and agencies of the executive branch; and (5) the judicial branch. On occasion, multiple agencies can be involved in the same issue, or institutions at both the state and federal levels may sometimes be involved in a single issue (as, for example, when states had to decide whether to accept federal funds to expand their Medicaid programs under the Affordable Care Act, after the Supreme Court in
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Chapter 5. Inside the Legislature, or How a Bill Becomes a Law 181 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The bulk of this chapter is a synopsis of the legislative process, from bill introduction through presentment to the President or Governor. In addition to providing an abbreviated summary of the classic process through which an idea for legislation becomes a law, the synopsis stresses the most critical steps, which have the potential to offer the greatest insight into matters of statutory interpretation. It also acknowledges that in recent years many major pieces of federal legislation have not followed the classic process. The remaining sections of the chapter then separately identify some important differences between congressional procedures and many state legislative processes; offer some special considerations concerning budget matters; provide a short overview of the structure and function of a typical statute, in terms of its organization and primary components; and address the distinctive features of direct democracy that complement the legislative processes of many states....
- In the first instance, responsibility for ruling on a point of order usually rests with the body’s parliamentarian, an unelected staff member appointed by the legislative leadership whose job is to interpret and apply the internal rules. However, the parliamentarian’s decisions and interpretations are always subject to being overruled (or sustained) by the will of the body.
- overcome them can be valuable for purposes of resolving interpretive issues in statutory text, the focus of Part II below. Likewise, an awareness of the substantial amount of agency participation in the legislative process also can be relevant to the interpretive enterprise.
- In particular, in fourteen states the direct initiative allows a group of petitioners to put the text of a proposed statute before the state’s voters for their approval or disapproval at a regular election, and eighteen states allow voters similarly to initiate a constitutional amendment. The number of petitioners required to put the initiated proposal before the electorate at large varies with each state, as do requirements that petitioners must be geographically representative—requirements that may make initiative processes extremely difficult to accomplish. Meanwhile, in nine states (including two states with a direct initiative process as well) the indirect initiative allows a group of petitioners to compel the state legislature to consider a specific statutory proposal, while providing an opportunity for the voters themselves to consider the same proposal at an upcoming election if the legislature fails to act.
- The legislative referendum allows the legislature to refer a specific statutory proposal to the state’s voters for their consideration, letting their wishes as expressed at the voting booth, rather than the legislature’s vote, determine whether the proposal becomes law. The popular referendum, on the other hand, allows the electorate at large to review a measure already enacted by the state legislature but not yet effective. If the electorate at large disapproves the legislature’s enactment, the measure cannot take effect and is functionally nullified. The popular referendum, like the initiative, requires a specified number of signatories on a referendum petition, often
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- Federal Constitutional and Statutory Constraints
- FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS
- Although federal law provides relatively few constraints on the ability of states to gerrymander their congressional and state legislative districts, in many instances state law does impose some limits on how districts can be drawn, whether as a matter of state constitutional law or state statutory requirement. Additionally, in response to increasing public concern about the partisan manipulation of legislative districts, several states have taken the redistricting process entirely out of the hands of elected politicians or their appointees and developed alternative processes intended to reduce or eliminate partisanship; many other states continue to consider doing so.
- Although twenty-one states adopted term limits for their state legislatures, six of these states eventually repealed or invalidated their measures. Five of these six states had adopted legislative term limits by statute, and in two of these five states—Idaho and Utah—the state legislatures subsequently repealed the provisions. In the other three states with statutory term limits—Massachusetts, Washington, and Wyoming—the state high courts invalidated their provisions as an unconstitutional imposition of additional legislator qualifications beyond those specified in their state constitutions (mirroring the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
- Nevertheless, many details concerning how to structure legislative elections remain open for debate, depending in part on the underlying representational goals. This chapter considers a number of the essential legal rules and principles that determine who serves in the legislatures. These include some relatively fixed requirements, such as the eligibility criteria specified in the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions; evolving legal principles and political practices that determine how legislative district boundaries are drawn; and the frequently changing rules and principles of state law (as affected by an overlay of federal constitutional and statutory law) that determine how elections are conducted. The chapter concludes with a consideration of legislative term limits. Many of these topics also are discussed in much greater detail
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Chapter 4. Campaign Financing, Lobbying, and Bribery: The Impact of Money in Politics 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- decision effectively allowed corporations and unions to air electioneering communications freely, notwithstanding the BCRA prohibition, except for ads that were “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal for a vote for or against a specific candidate.”
- case deeply divided the Roberts Court. Initially, it raised another as-applied challenge to the now-substantially narrowed BCRA prohibition on direct corporate funding of electioneering communications. The subject of the case was a 2008 Video-on-Demand documentary named “Hillary: The Movie,” which admittedly was susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote against Hillary Clinton during the 2008 Presidential campaign. But the Court used the case to reconsider the facial validity of the electioneering communications provision. Applying strict scrutiny, the
- respect to the crime of bribery. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Resource Manual (written primarily for the guidance of U.S. Attorneys) explains that it means to act “with a bad or evil purpose,” but this definition also leaves much to interpretation, again depending at least partly on one’s theory of the role of elected representatives. Historically, prosecutors reserved bribery prosecutions for politicians who were receiving personal benefits, not campaign contributions, unless a direct
- decision, which in turn requires some knowledge of the statutory landscape and major court decisions that preceded it, is crucial to understanding the modern campaign finance landscape.
- , upheld the public financing system, the disclosure requirements, and the contribution limits, but struck down the expenditure limits. The result was both a dramatic reconfiguration of FECA’s statutory scheme, and the development of a central canon of First Amendment jurisprudence that
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- . Give-and-take occurring between Congress and the White House in the shadow of this presentment requirement also can sometimes be instructive in understanding statutory meaning.
- appears to grant Congress exclusive federal legislative authority, Congress routinely delegates to federal departments and agencies the authority to promulgate regulations that clarify, extend, or otherwise fine-tune statutory law in areas overseen by the relevant department or agency.
- State practice is consistent: state legislatures are allowed to share lawmaking authority with state agencies and departments for the purpose of filling in the gaps in more broadly stated statutory schemes. For instance, although the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed in the 1945 case of
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- Publication Date: April 5th, 2017
- ISBN: 9781628102109
- Subject: Legislation & Regulation
- Series: Nutshells
- Type: Overviews
-
Description:
While traditional American legal education has focused primarily on the judicial branch of government, legislatures and regulatory agencies are responsible for the vast majority of today's law creation and law implementation, in fields from health insurance regulation, to motor vehicle operation, to environmental protection, to the mechanics of voting, to stimulating the economy, to the criminalization of internet piracy, to the distribution of tax burdens, to name only some.
Because well-equipped attorneys need a comprehensive grounding in legislative and regulatory processes and the relationships among all three branches of government, many law schools now teach some version of a course in Legislation and Regulation in the first year. This Nutshell addresses all the major topics of these courses, including the central question of how courts and agencies should interpret ambiguous statutes.
Part I describes the functioning of modern-day legislatures and administrative agencies, including not only their essential mechanics but also theories of democratic representation. Part II then builds on this foundation to develop the principal theories and doctrines of statutory and regulatory interpretation. It includes detailed discussions of the various "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" interpretive tools, as well as the competing interpretive approaches of Textualism and Purposivism. It also includes a chapter devoted to the Chevron doctrine and the question of how courts should review agency interpretations of statutes.