Chapter 5. Original Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts 126 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Court, however, chose a different path. Speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, the Court rejected the notion that the common law origins of the Bank’s claim necessarily foreclosed the assertion of original jurisdiction. (Today, after (1938), we would regard the cause of action as a creature of state law; at the time, the Court spoke of the matter as one of general law. Both then and now, claims arising under such common law principles do not, in themselves, present federal questions.) Rather, the Court explained that federal jurisdiction would be available, even over state-created (common law) claims, so long as federal law formed an “ingredient” of the original cause. In justifying the availability of jurisdiction over claims involving federal ingredients, Marshall emphasized that Article III sought to ensure that the judicial power of the federal courts would be co-extensive with the legislative power of Congress (co-extensivity implies that federal jurisdiction would...
- Some scholars have proposed a theory of protective jurisdiction to explain and perhaps justify an expansive view of federal jurisdiction. In brief, these scholars contend that Congress may have the power to protect an area of federal interest from the vagaries of state court litigation by providing for federal jurisdiction over litigation that touches an identified area of federal concern. Consider the problem presented by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, which provides for federal jurisdiction over suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements, but fails to specify any substantive federal law to govern the resulting litigation. Questions arose after the statute’s passage as to its constitutionality under Article III; such doubts rested upon the assumption that state law would govern any breach of contract actions. Scholars defended the statute on protective jurisdiction grounds, emphasizing the power of Congress over labor...
- In perhaps its most significant grant of jurisdiction, Article III authorizes the federal courts to hear cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. This federal-question grant of jurisdiction was designed to ensure that the federal judiciary would have power to hear and decide disputes that turned on the meaning federal law. The emphasis on federal law operates in turn to restrict the power of the federal courts to hear claims based upon state law. Only where state law claims include federal ingredients or involve parties that satisfy the requirements of alienage or diversity jurisdiction may the federal courts entertain the suit. Thus, the task of defining the scope and limits of federal-question jurisdiction boils down to a sorting process: courts and litigants must distinguish their state law claims from those that present federal law issues and support federal jurisdiction.
- Having explored the constitutional scope of federal question jurisdiction, we now examine the interpretation of the principal statute that confers federal question jurisdiction on the federal district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Note that federal law authorizes federal question jurisdiction in many other settings. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (conferring original jurisdiction on the district courts in cases arising under an Act of Congress regulating commerce); § 1338 (conferring original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under federal laws relating to patents and copyright); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in cases involving state court interpretation of dispositive issues of federal law).) In general, the federal question statute has been construed more narrowly than has the analogous constitutional provision; not every case that presents a federal question can be brought in a federal district court under the authority...federal
- One can begin by identifying the body of law (state or federal) that creates the claim or cause of action. As a general rule, the great majority of state-created claims will stay in state court just as the great majority of federal claims will be proper subjects of federal question jurisdiction. This rule does not work perfectly as we shall see; some state law claims include federal ingredients that will justify an assertion of federal question jurisdiction. But the simple distinction between claims created by state and federal law does provide an essential starting point for sorting out the scope of federal question jurisdiction.
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Preface 5 results
- This book provides an introduction to the principles of federal jurisdiction, aimed primarily at law students in advanced courses. It seeks to convey two related bodies of knowledge. First, the book offers students an overview of certain canonical features of jurisdictional law. Most courses in federal jurisdiction include discussions of Marbury v. Madison (1803), Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938), the Madisonian Compromise, the abstention doctrines, and the jurisdictional rules of standing, ripeness, and mootness. Knowledge of these rules, which structure (and sometimes frustrate) an individual’s attempt to invoke the power of federal courts, will serve students well on bar exams and in practice. Such knowledge will also enable the student to evaluate the impact of changes in the rules. If Congress or the Supreme Court curtails access to federal trial courts, for example, students should know that the decision may put more pressure on the Court’s appellate docket as the only federal...of
- This book attempts to convey both the canonical doctrines and the argumentative possibilities that together make up the principles of federal jurisdiction. In addition to providing background information on the leading doctrines, the book will set out the principles articulated in the cases and the impact those principles have had on the shape of jurisdictional law. By necessity in a book of relatively compact size, the discussion will focus on the field’s leading cases and will omit many issues of detail that one can readily find in more encyclopedic treatises. Decisions of the Supreme Court provide the foundation for much of the discussion, but the book also draws on the work of scholars to probe judicial pronouncements. For simplicity, I have cited judicial decisions by party names, year of decision, and court, if not the Supreme Court. I have cited scholarly authorities by referring to the author’s last name and the year of publication. More complete citations appear in tables...of
- Second, and more importantly, the book will encourage students to make sophisticated arguments about the evolution of jurisdictional law. Law school students tend to think that the rules of law in their casebooks will remain fixed for the foreseeable future. But dramatic changes in law can occur in a very short time, occasioned by the government’s responses to world events and subtle changes in legal culture. If the Bush Administration’s response to terrorist attacks illustrates the impact of world events, shifting attitudes toward diversity jurisdiction provide a serviceable example of cultural change. A generation ago, many saw diversity jurisdiction as a waste of federal judicial resources, and influential organizations such as the American Law Institute (ALI), the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the Federal Courts Study Committee called for its legislative repeal. See ALI (1969). Today, diversity jurisdiction has enjoyed something of a rebirth. Not only has...
- A word about my sources, and debts of gratitude. I am a fan of the Hart & Wechsler casebook and have relied on it in framing and thinking through the problems addressed in this book. Thanks to the current authors: Dick Fallon, Jack Goldsmith, John Manning, David Shapiro, and Amanda Tyler. My indebtedness also runs to the authors of the many other fine casebooks in the field; I have often turned to them to challenge my thinking and deepen my understanding. Finally, let me mention my great admiration for Dan Meltzer and the tradition of excellence that his scholarship on the law of federal jurisdiction exemplified.
- Special thanks to Marty Redish and Suzanna Sherry (my casebook co-authors), Akhil Amar, Willy Fletcher, Amanda Frost, Tara Grove, Vicki Jackson, John Jeffries, Henry Monaghan, Judith Resnik, Carlos Vazquez, Steve Vladeck, and Ernie Young (for their many contributions to the field), to Eddie Hartnett and Bob Pushaw (for ongoing collegiality), and to Jane Brock (for expert secretarial help). Thanks most of all to my family for maintaining an attitude of bemused toleration.
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Chapter 10. Congressional Control of State and Federal Jurisdiction 128 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The distinction between appellate jurisdiction as a matter of right and supervisory power in the exercise of discretion helps to explain how the Court’s supremacy could co-exist with broad power in Congress to fashion exceptions and regulations to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The distinction also maps onto important distinctions that Congress drew in the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In section 13 of the Act, Congress referred to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states and then conferred “power” on the Court to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts and writs of mandamus “in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.” This broad grant of mandamus authority applied without qualification to the federal district and circuit courts that Congress had “established” in the Act, and to any courts “appointed”...
- Judge Bork’s approach drew a well-reasoned response from the majority, which upheld the district court’s jurisdiction to reach the claim. The majority cited the presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and the due process principle that constitutional claims must be heard before an independent judicial body. Together, these principles argued in favor of federal judicial oversight as essentially the only judicial review game in town. (State courts generally have no power to review federal administrative action, particular in suits brought against a federal agency or the United States.) The majority rejected the notion that sovereign immunity could trump these principles. After all, Congress could not (consistent with notions of equal protection embedded in the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause) create a benefit scheme that excluded individuals on the basis of race or sex. Nor should it be permitted to avoid judicial review of constitutional challenges to...
- History demonstrates that Congress enjoys broad control over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. When Congress first established the lower federal courts in 1789, it did not confer the full range of federal jurisdiction on them. Many federal question claims were left to originate in the state courts, subject to review in the Supreme Court. Indeed, lower federal courts did not receive a lasting grant of general federal question jurisdiction until 1875. The Court’s decisions confirm the lessons of history. In (1850), the Court considered a challenge to legislation that required the existence of diversity jurisdiction to be based on the citizenship of the initial owners of a promissory note rather than on the citizenship of one to whom the note was later assigned. In the course of upholding this ban on an assignment to create jurisdiction, the Court rejected the idea that the lower federal courts had been given jurisdiction in Article III. Rather, as creatures of statute,...
- If assured access to federal court helps to explain the Court’s willingness to entrust state courts with federal claims, it raises serious questions about the wisdom of a curious line of cases. The federal appellate courts have concluded with virtual unanimity that the state courts enjoy jurisdiction over federal actions to enforce the provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 277. The conclusion seems odd in view of the fact that the statute creates a federal right of action, allowing individuals to sue for damages and injunctive relief (including a stipulated award of at least $500) when any person sends unwanted facsimile messages in violation of the law. Ordinarily, state and federal courts would enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over such claims, and the claims would be subject to removal from state to federal court in the absence of some provision expressly barring removal or otherwise conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the state courts. Despite...
- Many commentators view the Madisonian Compromise and its provision for congressional control over the establishment of the inferior federal courts as giving Congress plenary control over the jurisdiction of those courts. On this “orthodox” view, Congress may establish lower federal courts and provide them with jurisdiction over the matters listed in Article III, section 2, clause 1, or it may refrain from doing so. Moreover, the orthodox view holds that Congress may amend the jurisdictional grants, by withholding jurisdiction from some lower courts and shifting it to others. Finally, orthodoxy holds that Congress may simply disestablish the courts in question, and return to a pre-constitutional world of reliance upon state courts. In 1802, the Jeffersonian Congress repealed a controversial judiciary law that had created federal circuit courts as freestanding courts with their own judges and a general grant of federal-question jurisdiction; in the process, the Jeffersonians turned...
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Chapter 1. The Architecture of Article III 34 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Whatever the function of the case-controversy distinction, the definition of specific items on the jurisdictional menu has proven quite durable. Although the Eleventh Amendment curtailed the jurisdiction somewhat to foreclose the assertion of certain claims against the states as states, the menu of federal proceedings has remained unchanged for over two centuries. This durability owes much to the decision to define federal jurisdiction in terms co-extensive with the powers of the federal government. Co-extensivity inheres in the grant of federal-question jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. The federal question grant ensures that the federal courts’ jurisdiction extends to any dispute that implicates supreme federal law. When the content and scope of that law changes over time, jurisdiction follows. The Fourteenth Amendment (and the legislation of the Reconstruction Congress) vastly expanded federal power but did not...
- Section 2 of Article III declares that the judicial power “shall extend” to a series of “cases” and “controversies.” This list of items on the jurisdictional menu defines the scope of federal judicial power, and gives rise to the conception of the federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction. But in defining the outer limits of federal judicial power, Article III section 2 does not clearly specify the minimum amount of work, if any, that Congress must assign to the federal courts. Most observers agree that Article III actually confers original and appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, subject to the possibility (discussed below) of some congressional reallocation. But Article III does not specify the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, leaving Congress to define their jurisdiction under the Madisonian Compromise.
- The Madisonian Compromise informs debates about both Congress’s authority to control the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the degree to which state courts provide an adequate alternative forum. As for the federal courts, most observers see the Madisonian Compromise as giving Congress broad control over the existence and powers of the inferior federal courts. (The evident recognition of congressional discretion as to lower courts also helps to cement the perception that Article III creates and mandates the preservation of the Supreme Court.) For these observers, the greater power to deny all jurisdiction to the lower federal courts also gives Congress the power to create such courts and confer part, but not all, of the jurisdiction specified later in Article III section 2. As for state courts, the Madisonian Compromise implies as a matter of constitutional law that the state courts may serve as appropriate substitutes for lower federal courts. While the Compromise assumes...
- The Compromise may also help to explain the framers’ decision to divide judicial business between the Supreme Court’s original and appellate dockets. As the nation’s only mandatory federal court, the Supreme Court provides a constitutionally assured federal forum for the determination of federal claims. The Compromise assumes that many claims within federal jurisdiction may receive their original determination in the state courts, subject only to appellate review in the Supreme Court. Yet for some kinds of claims, the framers may have viewed appellate review as inadequate to protect federal interests and may have sought to secure their original federal determination. The two categories of litigation that appear on the Court’s original docket—cases affecting ambassadors and public ministers and cases involving the states themselves as parties—may appear there in part due to some distrust of state court original jurisdiction. Ambassador cases, if brought in state court, might violate...
- To a degree some find surprising, the text, history, and structure of Article III continue to play an important role in arguments about the scope of federal jurisdiction and the nature of judicial authority. Justice Felix Frankfurter explained the instinct behind this focus on text, history, and structure some seventy years ago: he characterized the words of Article III as technically framed to establish clear limits on the federal judicial power and contrasted such technical precision with the Constitution’s more generalized references to liberty, property, and due process of law. See (1949) (dissenting opinion). Although many observers share Frankfurter’s view of the comparative specificity of Article III, the sheer number of competing accounts of the federal judicial power would seem to belie any claim of technical precision and clarity. See Brest (1980). Disputes over Congress’s power to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction feature plausible but quite different accounts of...
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Title Page 2 results
Chapter 2. The Nature of the Judicial Power 189 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Among non-originalist theories of interpretation, the principle of institutional settlement often helps to frame the debate over questions of federal jurisdiction. Associated with the Legal Process School of the 1950s, the principle of institutional settlement holds that courts should (as a normative matter) and do (as a descriptive matter) interpret jurisdictional principles so as to assign particular decisions to the branch or department of government best suited to their competent resolution. Crudely put, the principle of institutional settlement operates as a theory of the separation of powers (and federalism), under which the political branches of government (and administrative agencies) bear responsibility for developing many of the rules that govern life in a modern democratic society and the more insulated judicial branch applies the rules in concrete disputes between parties. Essentially court-centered, the principle of institutional settlement seeks to justify a narrow...
- Article III does not answer the question of how Congress can preserve its prerogative over appropriations, even as it enlists the federal courts in the determination of money claims. Article III does contemplate judicial involvement; it provides for the assertion of jurisdiction over claims in which the United States appears as a party. But the Court has not read this language as compelling the assertion of federal jurisdiction or as effecting a waiver of the government’s immunity from suit. In other words, the Constitution seemingly leaves Congress free to decide whether to retain its control over public claims (through the process of legislative petitions), or to cede such control to the federal courts. See Figley & Tidmarsh (2009). Following , Congress cannot invite federal judicial involvement without surrendering some portion of its own control over the payment of claims. Federal judicial involvement requires federal judicial finality and a relatively firm agreement on the part of
- The proposition that federal courts can hear uncontested “cases” under federal law (but not uncontested “controversies” over state law) makes better sense of federal practice than does the suggestion that Article III imposes an across-the-board adverse-party requirement. Thus, the power of the federal FISA court to pass upon the government’s uncontested applications for foreign intelligence surveillance fits comfortably within the tradition of non-contentious jurisdiction over warrant applications; the power of federal bankruptcy courts to entertain uncontested applications to create or approve the administration of an estate similarly qualifies as an exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction, as does the practice of entering consent decrees and default judgments in the absence of party contestation. By the same token, as discussed at greater length in Chapter 9, the case-controversy distinction may explain in part the so-called probate and domestic relations exceptions to Article III.
- Many believe that, with the separation of the powers of government into three departments, federal courts have a distinctive role to play in deciding, with final and binding effect, concrete disputes between adverse parties. Such an understanding of the judicial power gives rise to a number of corollaries. Judicial independence necessitates some restrictions on the power of the political branches to review the work of the judiciary (the principle of finality) and on the power of courts to decide political questions (the political question doctrine). It also implies limits on the willingness of the federal courts to offer advice or other non-binding declarations of the law in an abstract or hypothetical setting (the ban on advisory opinions). The focus on adjudication of genuine disputes has also been thought to preclude the federal courts from hearing claims in which one of the parties lacks a concrete interest in the litigation (the principle of standing). Finally, adjudication...
- creates the controversy, grounding the jurisdiction of Article III courts. But controversies encompass only those disputes that depend on the alignment of the parties and often turn on state common law. Perhaps, then, we can see why the framers chose to distinguish (rather than to conflate) cases and controversies. “Cases,” according to the text of Article III, implicate federal law and include law, equity, and admiralty jurisdiction; they arise under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States where the federal courts can sensibly play an administrative or non-contentious role. As to controversies, by contrast, the federal courts were expected to provide a reliably neutral forum for the resolution of disputes over matters of common (not federal) law involving parties who may have had reason to fear the impartiality of the state courts. Neutral dispute resolution, rather than the non-contentious administration of the law, was the whole point of the enterprise in “...
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Chapter 6. The Erie Doctrine(s) and Federal Common Law 117 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Consider disputes that implicate the proprietary interests of the United States. The federal government owns property, enters into contracts, and often brings suit to protect its interests. Jurisdiction presents no difficulties; Article III authorizes the federal courts to hear controversies to which the United States shall be a party and the judicial code has long provided jurisdiction over actions by the United States as a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1345. (Suits against the United States implicate the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the subject of Chapter 7.) One might argue that the availability of party-based jurisdiction may itself imply certain power in the federal courts to fashion federal common law. After all, party-based jurisdiction applies even where state (or other) common law creates the government’s cause of action; it extends federal judicial power beyond those situations in which the government’s action arises under the federal law within the scope of federal question
- problems arise when state courts entertain federal rights of action. Like federal courts, sitting in diversity, state courts may generally apply their own procedural rules in determining such claims. And like federal diversity courts, state courts must respect the rules of decision that define the substantive rights and obligations of the parties. In an case, federal courts look to the substantive law of the states, whereas in a converse- case, state courts must follow federal substantive law. The problem arises with monotonous regularity; state courts may exercise jurisdiction over most federal rights of action (except for the relatively modest number that Congress has exclusively assigned to the federal district courts). State court concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims opens a wide field for clashes between state rules of procedure and federal substantive law.
- Customary international law may define yet another field or enclave of federal common law, though the question has grown quite controversial. Here again, the initial role of the federal courts arose from jurisdictional grants; Article III provides for federal jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over controversies between a citizen of the United States and a foreign nation or a citizen or subject of a foreign nation. Although the ambassador grant has given rise to only a sparse collection of decided cases, federal courts have often asserted jurisdiction over disputes involving foreign nations and foreign nationals. Before , the federal courts were free to develop a judge-made body of law to govern such disputes, and could draw upon customary international law in formulating rules of decision. After , jurisdiction no longer suffices to confer lawmaking authority and scholars now doubt the power of the federal courts to formulate a body
- Once a federal court establishes that it has jurisdiction over a case, it must decide what law to apply. That process, inevitably, requires interpretation and the resolution of conflicts of law. In , for example, the Court faced what it saw as a conflict between an ordinary act of federal legislation and a constitutional provision limiting the Court’s original jurisdiction. In such a case, the higher law prevails. Conflicts may also arise between laws of equal dignity, such as a treaty and a federal statute, or two federal statutes; in such cases, the more recent or specific enactment will control. Finally, conflicts may arise between rules of state and federal law. In general, federal law will control under the Supremacy Clause if the Court finds an unavoidable conflict. But the Court may work to accommodate state and federal law in order to prevent the needless displacement of state rules.
- Scholars point to at least four separate fields or enclaves in which federal common law has arisen. See Hill (1967). These enclaves include cases involving the proprietary interests of the United States, inter-state controversies, cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and cases involving international relations. In each of these areas, Article III and the judicial code have long authorized federal courts to exercise jurisdiction. But neither the Constitution nor the Congress has set forth a detailed code to govern the merits of disputes falling within these enclaves. During the era of , the federal courts had no obligation to justify their exercise of common lawmaking authority; jurisdiction over disputes within these enclaves (as within diversity) carried with it the authority to find, fashion, and apply rules of law. After , jurisdiction alone would no longer suffice to justify an exercise of lawmaking authority, and the Supreme Court was obliged to explain the extent to...
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Chapter 4. The Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction 71 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The analogy to supplemental jurisdiction at the trial court level furnishes the strongest argument against viewing the limited scope of appellate jurisdiction in as constitutionally compelled. Today, original federal trial court jurisdiction would presumably extend to the federal statutory claim in (In contrast to the situation at the time, the federal courts now enjoy jurisdiction over all claims arising under federal law.) If so, then supplemental jurisdiction would extend to a state law claim so related to the federal claim that the two claims together form a single constitutional case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (The test for relatedness focuses on the nature of the claims and the underlying factual basis of the litigation, and differs conceptually from the analysis of whether state law claims should be regarded as “antecedent” or “distinct.” As a practical matter, many supplemental claims today would be regarded as “distinct,” but could still satisfy the test of relatedness for...
- The presence of a statute conferring appellate jurisdiction presents a jurisdictional puzzle. A statute that regulates and perhaps restricts the Court’s docket may appear somewhat at odds with the accepted idea that the Court derives its appellate jurisdiction directly from the Constitution. But unlike its unadorned grant of original jurisdiction, Article III confers appellate jurisdiction “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations, as the Congress shall make.” This Exceptions and Regulations Clause contemplates a congressional role in organizing the Court’s appellate docket, and may confer authority of uncertain scope on Congress to strip the Court of its appellate jurisdiction over specified issues of federal law. (Chapter 10 discusses the jurisdiction-stripping debate.) In most instances, the Court will simply exercise the affirmative grants of statutory jurisdiction and treat any gaps or omissions as implied exceptions. A wide range of exceptions has appeared over the...
- Justice Story responded to the Virginia court of appeals with a powerful restatement of the Court’s constitutional role. In a wide-ranging opinion, Justice Story argued that the text, structure, and history of Article III all supported the conclusion that the Court’s appellate jurisdiction extended to cases originating in the state courts. Justice Story bolstered this argument by emphasizing the need for uniformity of decision, a goal that could only be achieved through the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Story also noted that the historical practice since the Judiciary Act of 1789 had been to allow such appeals and pointedly observed that all the states had acquiesced in the exercise of the jurisdiction up to that time. Finally, Story demonstrated that Virginia was wrong to claim that federal courts could hear all federal claims without exercising a power of appellate review over state tribunals. Actions must be subject to removal from state to federal court to perfect such a...of
- , so the Court proceeded to reach and resolve the federal question. But if we alter the posture of the case on appeal, we can see how such a bar to review might arise. Suppose that Murdock brought his case in state court today and that he won on both the state and federal grounds. If Memphis appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court would as an initial matter seem to have jurisdiction to consider the federal claim but would lack jurisdiction over the distinct issue of state law. But, on further reflection, the Court’s inability to consider the state ground might deprive the Court of jurisdiction even as to the federal claim, so long as the Court viewed the state ground as an adequate and independent ground for upholding the judgment below. After all, the Court’s decision of the federal issue would not affect the ultimate disposition of the case. Even if Memphis were to succeed in overturning the federal statutory trust, the property would still go ...basis of a state law...
- If lack of appellate capacity shapes the Court’s management of the jurisdiction of federal district courts, the same lack of capacity may influence the litigation choices of the parties. Parties may prefer a federal forum for any number of reasons. They may view federal judges as more independent than their state counterparts, or they may view federal courts as more willing to set aside state law to effectuate an unpopular or controversial federal right. (Differing views as to the relative competence and effectiveness of state and federal courts in effectuating federal rights have produced what scholars refer to the “parity” debate; Section 9.5 discusses the debate.) Whatever the reason for preferring a federal court, litigants know that they cannot rely on the Court to review final state court decisions; if the case begins in state court, it will likely end there. Litigants who want a federal judicial determination must bring their claims into federal court at the outset, either by...
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Chapter 9. Judicial Restraint, Abstention, and Coordination 121 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Debate over the legitimacy of these doctrines often features a discussion of the separation of powers and the role of the federal courts in defining their own jurisdiction. In cases to which the abstention doctrines apply, the district courts enjoy a formal grant of statutory jurisdiction over the dispute in question. Application of the doctrine requires the district court to abstain from deciding a case properly before the court, often in deference to a proceeding in state court. The abstention doctrines thus represent a departure from the traditional view that the parties may freely prosecute overlapping or parallel litigation and have a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in appropriate cases. Scholars have questioned the legitimacy of abstention doctrines, arguing that the federal courts should defer to legislative definitions of their jurisdiction and lack power to impose new restrictions on access to the federal courts. See Redish (1991).
- Congress can address these coordination difficulties by shifting the litigation into federal court for consolidated treatment under section 1407. Twice, it has done so in the past few years. In 2002, Congress adopted the Multi-party, Multi-forum Trial Jurisdiction Act, which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear mass injury cases arising from a single disaster (such as a plane crash) that claims 75 lives. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369, 1441(e), 1697. In 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act, which authorizes the assertion of federal jurisdiction over any nationwide and many regional class actions, so long as the aggregate value of all the claims exceeds $5,000,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15. Both statutes rely upon minimal diversity as the mechanism for shifting the litigation from state to federal court, and both assume that the pre-trial consolidation procedures of section 1407 will come into play following removal of such actions to federal court...
- In general, our judicial system assumes that the parties may file overlapping and duplicative litigation in the state and federal courts, an assumption well illustrated in (1922). The litigation began when the Burke Company brought suit for breach of contract in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Kline defended and counterclaimed in federal court, and also brought the same contract dispute before an Arkansas state court. After the federal court declared a mistrial, Burke (the federal plaintiff) sought a federal injunction against any further prosecution of the state proceeding. Although the federal court granted the requested injunction to protect Burke’s right to a federal forum, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that the first court to obtain jurisdiction over a “res” that confers jurisdiction may enjoin litigation over the same property elsewhere. But the Court refused to extend the rule of first-court primacy to side of the Court’s line.
- Though not formally a matter of abstention, the doctrine operates as a restriction on the exercise of original jurisdiction by the lower federal courts. Named after the two leading cases,
- A leading defense of the abstention doctrines emphasizes the federal courts’ traditional exercise of discretion in deciding which cases to hear. See Shapiro (1985). This defense identifies a range of jurisdictional doctrines that include an element of judicial discretion: the Court’s original jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction over state claims with federal ingredients, the justiciability doctrines (standing, ripeness, and mootness) and various doctrines of equitable restraint. The judicial department’s ability to protect its role in the constitutional order may depend on maintaining a degree of control over jurisdiction. More subtly, the federal courts may be in a better position institutionally to work out the details of their jurisdictional grants if they can take into account a range of considerations that may vary from case to case. A rigidly rule-based approach to jurisdictional issues could deny the system the benefit of these more fine-...
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Chapter 7. Government Accountability 177 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The text has given rise to a debate in the literature between the so-called diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment and the literal theory. Under the diversity theory, the Amendment operates to narrow the affirmative grants of jurisdiction in Article III and does so only where Article III jurisdiction would have been based on the alignment of the parties. Diversity theorists note that Article III fails to confer party-alignment jurisdiction over claims by individuals other than the two disfavored parties identified in the Eleventh Amendment. They conclude from this that the Amendment set out to deny the federal courts any diversity jurisdiction in litigation against the states. On this theory, the Amendment would deny jurisdiction over general common law claims but would leave Article III jurisdiction unaffected as to suits based on federal question and admiralty jurisdiction. In other words, the diversity theory views the Eleventh Amendment as leaving federal question and...
- Such a temporal compromise apparently informed the drafting of the Eleventh Amendment. The distinction between old claims and new also corresponds to a distinction between claims against the states based on general common law and claims based on federal law. Before the Constitution was ratified, and took effect, the states were not subject to federal restrictions; all of their debts would have been contracted on the basis of the remedial systems in place within the states themselves and no federal court or cause of action would have been available to enforce them. This, in essence, was Justice Iredell’s point. After ratification, by contrast, federal restrictions on the states would take effect and would have been judicially enforceable through the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. The Eleventh Amendment could curtail jurisdiction on the basis of party-alignment and thereby foreclose the imposition of liability for all debts previously incurred, while leaving intact the power
- Many turned to state court. If Congress had the power to fashion rights against the states, and if the Eleventh Amendment foreclosed the enforcement of such rights in federal courts, then perhaps individuals could pursue their claims in state court, relying either on the states’ own waivers of sovereign immunity or on the obligation of the states to make a forum available for the enforcement of federal rights. (As noted in Section 10.2.2, states cannot refuse to hear federal claims if they open their doors to analogous state law claims.) Litigants filing suit in state court could point to a fairly impressive collection of cases in which the Court appeared to assume that state courts were open for the enforcement of federal rights, even where the Eleventh Amendment would bar suit in federal court. See (1991). Under long-standing decisional law, moreover, the Supreme Court exercised appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions, even where the same cases would lie beyond the power
- The debate between diversity theorists and literalists can be viewed as a friendly one. See Amar (1989). Diversity theorists and literalists agree that a citizen of a state such as Illinois can bring a federal question claim against the state of Illinois under Article III. Moreover, they agree that the Eleventh Amendment does not affect federal jurisdiction over such a claim. But consider a federal question suit by an Illinois citizen against the state of Iowa. Literalists would interpret the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to the suit (in view of the parties’ alignment) whereas diversity theorists would not (in view of the presence of a federal question). Since most individuals with claims based upon federal law will be seeking to enforce them against their own state, both theories of the Eleventh Amendment would leave federal question jurisdiction largely unimpaired.
- The common law background played a significant role in shaping the tools of federal government accountability in the antebellum years, adding flesh to a fairly skeletal set of jurisdictional provisions. Article III extends federal jurisdiction to cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and thus potentially reaches all claims in which an individual alleges that the government or its officers have violated rights grounded in federal law. Article III also extends jurisdiction to controversies involving the United States as a party, and thus authorizes the federal courts to hear a claim by and against the United States itself (even where the claim rested on the general common law of contract or property and thus failed to present a federal question under the regime of ). Article III thus creates a jurisdictional framework for broad judicial involvement in the determination of claims against the federal government and its officers.
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Appendix. Selected Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 166 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.
- Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
- In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
- The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
- Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the district wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice may transfer the application to the other district court for hearing and determination.
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Chapter 3. The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction 19 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Perhaps because its rationale might considerably expand the Court’s original jurisdiction to embrace any state-party dispute that presents a federal question, the federal question interpretation of has not taken hold. Both Congress and the Court have continued to treat the jurisdiction as party-based, and the Court has disavowed the broader implications of a federal question approach. One can understand this narrowing of the Court’s original jurisdiction as reflecting the same docket worries that later drove the Court to claim a discretionary power to deny parties leave to file original suits. (Consider one example of the myriad federal question cases that might qualify for original jurisdiction.) But with such discretionary control now firmly in place, one can fairly question whether the Court should continue to adhere to an interpretation of its original jurisdiction that seems at odds with its plain meaning and that brings a mostly party-based diet of disputes to its original...
- For the most part, the Supreme Court has construed the grant of original jurisdiction as if its reference to “those [cases] in which a State shall be party” confers jurisdiction over state-party controversies alone. See (1922). As the Court explained, the original jurisdiction “depends solely on the character of the parties, and is confined to the cases in which are those enumerated parties and those only.” But the Court has not always adhered to this party-based interpretation. In (1892), the Court agreed to hear a dispute over the location of the border between Texas and the federal territory that later became Oklahoma. Article III, section 2, however, does not specifically confer jurisdiction over controversies between the United States and a state. In defending its assertion of original jurisdiction, the Court noted that the case both presented a federal question and involved the United States as a party and was a proper subject for federal jurisdiction. The additional presence
- Unlike other federal courts with original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court does not permit the parties to invoke its original jurisdiction as a matter of right. Rather, the plaintiff must petition for leave to file and can docket an original complaint only with the Court’s permission. In a leading case, (1971), the Court acknowledged the traditional understanding of original jurisdiction as available to the parties as a matter of right; it nonetheless found that changes over time made discretion essential. The Court pointed out that as-of-right access might interfere with its role as the final federal appellate court. Additionally, it noted that many of the cases that qualify for original jurisdiction do so on the basis of the alignment of the parties and might turn on questions of state common law. (Chapter 6 explores the doctrine and its requirement that district courts, hearing cases on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, apply the law of the states in which they sit.) The...
- To understand the uncertainty about what sorts of state-party “cases” qualify for original jurisdiction requires a brief refresher on the difference for Article III purposes between cases and controversies. (Article III, section 2 describes the cases and controversies to which the judicial power shall extend. Most everyone agrees that this jurisdictional list or menu defines the outer bounds of federal jurisdiction.) In particular, Article III defines “cases” by reference to the subject matter of the dispute (e.g., “cases arising under this Constitution”) and “controversies” by reference to the alignment of the parties (e.g., “controversies between two or more states”). State-party “cases” might include any case involving a state party that happened to present a claim under federal law; state-party controversies, by contrast, would include any dispute that happened to involve a state and one of the parties specified in Article III. Like diversity proceedings, such controversies...
- A variety of factors appear to shape the Court’s selection of cases for original determination. One important factor has been the availability of an alternative forum. In 28 U.S.C. § 1251, Congress declared the Court’s jurisdiction in controversies between two or more states to be both “original and exclusive.” Exclusivity forecloses other courts from entertaining the claims and puts some pressure on the Court to grant leave to file. (Indeed, one might regard the predominance of state-state litigation on the Court’s docket as an outgrowth of statutory exclusivity, rather than as a reflection of the Court’s perception of the relative importance of such matters.) Congress has defined the remainder of the Court’s original jurisdiction as non-exclusive, which permits lower federal (and state) courts to hear the claims concurrently (assuming they have jurisdiction). In such cases of non-exclusivity, the Court may refuse leave to file after assuring itself that another forum would be...
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Chapter 8. Habeas Corpus and Government Accountability 129 results (showing 5 best matches)
- On its face, the DTA contained a fairly sweeping restriction on the habeas authority of the federal courts. In addition, a separate provision proclaimed that the statute was in general to take effect on the statute’s date of enactment. Muddying the waters slightly, one final provision proclaimed that certain aspects of the statute were to apply to claims pending on the date of enactment. Some legislative history supported the argument that at least some members of Congress viewed the exception as preserving jurisdiction over some pending challenges. In a replay of (1868), the government promptly moved to dismiss the action from the Court’s appellate docket on the basis that the statute created a lawful exception to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Court concluded that its appellate jurisdiction remained intact. It explained that ordinary principles would “suffice” to rebut the government’s argument, at least as to pending claims. Thus, the Court did not rule out the use of...
- If it cannot be based on the core function of the writ, circa 1789, or on the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, circa 1868, the right of state prisoners to federal habeas review might be predicated on traditional power of the federal courts to review state criminal convictions (and other state court judgments) on direct review. Under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, individuals convicted of a crime in state court had an absolute right to appellate review of their rejected federal defenses by the Supreme Court. Review as of right gave way to discretionary review in the early years of the twentieth century, after Congress had already been expanded the habeas power of the district courts. To the extent one views federal appellate oversight of state courts as constitutionally compelled (a possibility that Chapter 10 explores), one might argue that the Constitution obliges Congress to empower the federal courts to exercise the necessary jurisdiction. If the Court can no...
- Congress first authorized federal courts to conduct habeas review of state detention in 1867. The law empowered the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions” in all cases of restraint in violation of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. The story of how this provision evolved to encompass state post-conviction review has been told again and again, often with a view towards criticizing or defending the Court’s expansion of the federal habeas (1953). Compare Bator (1963) with Peller (1982). But the federal judicial role in overseeing state criminal proceedings was no new thing in 1953. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the Supreme Court to hear state criminal cases on appeal whenever the state court rejected a defense grounded in the federal Constitution and laws. For much of the nineteenth century, individuals who faced state criminal prosecution were entitled to federal judicial review of rejected
- [A]ll the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.—Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States.
- were interesting questions both of jurisdiction and of retroactivity theory. While rules clearly control applicable law in federal habeas proceedings, this was a state post-conviction proceeding. So long as federal law left the state courts free to administer their own post-conviction system as they saw fit, the state’s refusal to give retroactive effect might be seen as a matter of state law to which the Court’s appellate jurisdiction did not extend. By treating the retroactivity question as governed by the Constitution, the Court sidestepped the jurisdictional problem. The Court also confronted the arguably procedural quality of the rule, which ultimately requires only that the state conduct a parole hearing and reevaluate the continuing validity of sentences like that imposed on Montgomery. The Court viewed the prohibition in as clearly substantive, inasmuch as it interpreted the Constitution as prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a certain class of persons. The...
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Table of Authorities 113 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1211 (2004)—
- John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203 (1997)—
- Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo–Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985)—
- American Law Institute (ALI), Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts (1969), Preface
- Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 Colum. L.Rev. 1515 (1986)—
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Summary of Contents 46 results (showing 5 best matches)
- § 10.4Congressional Control of the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
- § 5.5Statutory Federal Question Jurisdiction: State Law Claims with Federal Ingredients
- § 4.5Appellate Jurisdiction over Questions of Federal andState Law
- Chapter 5. Original Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts
- Chapter 10. Congressional Control of State and Federal Jurisdiction
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Table of Contents 70 results (showing 5 best matches)
- § 10.4Congressional Control of the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
- § 5.5Statutory Federal Question Jurisdiction: State Law Claims with Federal Ingredients
- § 4.5Appellate Jurisdiction over Questions of Federal andState Law
- Chapter 5. Original Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts
- Chapter 10. Congressional Control of State and Federal Jurisdiction
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Index 111 results (showing 5 best matches)
Table of Cases 85 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)—
- Federal Election Com’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998)—
- Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001)—
- McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dept. of Business Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990)—
- Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)—
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Table of Statutes and Rules 5 results
West Academic Publishing’s Law School Advisory Board 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Professor of Law Emeritus, University of San Diego Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan
- Professor of Law, Chancellor and Dean Emeritus, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
- Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles
- Earle K. Shawe Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
- Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley
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Copyright Page 2 results
- The publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other professional advice, and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional.
- Printed in the United States of America
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- Publication Date: December 30th, 2016
- ISBN: 9781634603034
- Subject: Civil Procedure
- Series: Concise Hornbook Series
- Type: Hornbook Treatises
- Description: Designed for students in advanced courses and newly revised, this book explains the leading principles of federal jurisdiction. It covers such landmarks as Marbury v. Madison and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents and the rules that govern original and appellate jurisdiction, justiciability and abstention, federal habeas corpus, and sovereign immunity. It discusses the enemy combatant cases, culminating in Boumediene, and recent Supreme Court decisions on such diverse issues as the legal foundation of the Ex parte Young action, the limits of federal ingredient jurisdiction, the demise of prudential standing, and the jurisdictional nuances of consumer class action litigation. Perhaps most important, the book provides students with a sense of the argumentative possibilities available to lawyers and jurists working within the federal courts’ tradition.