Black Letter Outline on Antitrust
Author:
Hovenkamp, Herbert
Edition:
6th
Copyright Date:
2016
24 chapters
have results for antitrust
Perspectives 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The antitrust literature is particularly rich. However, most of it is unnecessary for the law student taking his or her first antitrust class. There is no Restatement of the law of antitrust. The standard multi-volume treatise is Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law (22 volumes, 1980–2016). Useful legal texts include:
- This Black Letter assumes no prior knowledge of economics. However, it does provide relatively simple coverage of the economic issues. Not all antitrust teachers emphasize economic theory to the same degree. If your antitrust professor takes a strongly economic approach to antitrust, you will find all parts of this Black Letter to be useful. If your antitrust professor avoids economics, however, you may want to omit Chapter one, as well as the occasional section or subsection that is expressly designated “economic.”
- This Black Letter surveys the coverage of all the federal antitrust laws. It is designed for use in a law school course on federal antitrust law, typically one of three or four semester units.
- This Black Letter has been designed to be a valuable study aid for use with all of the major antitrust casebooks. All those casebooks are structured differently, but you should find it quite easy to track the development of your own antitrust course through the table of contents of this Black Letter.
- The author recommends that when you study for your antitrust examination you follow the course structure laid down by your own professor. Most antitrust courses are analytic; that is, they require you to study and analyze facts and to make policy arguments, rather than to memorize facts about cases. For this reason the author suggest that you use this outline simply to look up the facts or the holding of a particular case. Rather, read an entire section or chapter from beginning to end. That will give you a feel for how the law works in a particular area and what the special problems are. That will also prepare you best for an analytic antitrust exam.
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Appendix B. Practice Exam 21 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Assuming there is no “state action” exemption, the Airporter Bus Company must prove that there has been an antitrust violation and that it has suffered “antitrust injury” as a result. Since the defendant is an agency of a municipality, Airporter cannot obtain treble damages. The 1984 Local Government Antitrust Act limits recovery against municipalities and their agencies to injunctive relief. However, if a violation of the antitrust laws is found, Airporter will be able to obtain an injunction against the Share-a-Cab program.
- Giggle, Inc. takes a major hit in its sales as a result of these actions. It now comes to your law firm to advise it on a course of action and file an antitrust suit if necessary. The partner you work for asks you to write a memorandum discussing a possible antitrust complaint. If you need additional facts in order to make a legal assessment, make sure you state what they are.
- Since Argylcru operates across the nation, and the alleged antitrust violations are multistate, the activities clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the federal antitrust laws under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
- Question Two raises two important issues: 1) whether the activities of the Chicago Taxi Commission qualify for the “state action” exemption from the federal antitrust laws; 2) if the activities do not qualify for the exemption, whether they violate the antitrust laws. Since the entire restraint takes place in the Chicago area, the question conceivably raises an issue concerning the jurisdiction of the antitrust laws under the Commerce Clause. However, the Sherman Act (which is the relevant statute here) applies to all activities “affecting commerce.” Since O’Hare airport is an international airport the taxicab drivers undoubtedly aid in transporting a great many passengers into and out of the state of Illinois. This certainly affects commerce sufficiently to support jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.
- The “state action” exemption from the federal antitrust laws is based on the premise that Congress did not intend for the antitrust laws to be used to interfere too deeply into the official regulatory decisions of the individual states. When an activity qualifies for the “state action” exemption from the antitrust laws, the antitrust laws simply do not apply to that activity. In the
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Chapter XI. Jurisdictional, Public Policy and Regulatory Limitations on the Domain of Antitrust 58 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Many American markets are not subject to free and open price competition, but rather are regulated as to price, output and other aspects of performance. In these regulated markets the antitrust laws generally occupy a somewhat smaller place than they do in unregulated markets.
- The Supreme Court construes exemptions from the antitrust laws narrowly, however, and creates exemptions only when Congressional intent is clear. The Court has noted that “repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust laws and regulatory provisions….”
- It is important to keep in mind that a judicial finding that a municipality does not qualify for the “state action” exemption is only a finding that the municipality may be sued under the antitrust laws. It is a finding that the municipality has violated the antitrust laws. A city or other governmental subdivision is still entitled to litigate the antitrust claim fully on the merits.
- The federal antitrust laws were passed on the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, as well as commerce with foreign nations.
- The import and export of goods to and from the United States is clearly “foreign commerce” within the jurisdictional reach of the antitrust laws. However, the federal antitrust laws have also been held to reach activities abroad that do not involve imports to or exports from the United States, but which have an adverse effect on American foreign commerce.
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Appendix C. Glossary 22 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The second federal antitrust law, passed in 1914. § 1 of the Clayton Act defines relevant antitrust terms; § 2, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, prohibits certain instances of differential pricing (called “price discrimination” in the Act); § 3 prohibits certain tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts; § 4 creates a private action for treble damages; § 5 provides for the relationship between public antitrust suits and subsequent private suits and governs several procedural matters; § 6 grants labor a partial exemption from the antitrust laws; § 7 prohibits certain mergers and acquisitions; § 8 prohibits certain interlocking directorates; § 16 provides for injunctive relief from an antitrust violation; § 20 augments the labor exemption.
- Antitrust Injury.
- Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.
- A doctrine under which the courts will defer to a regulatory agency with respect to questions of antitrust violations in the market regulated by the agency. However, the courts will be able to enforce the antitrust laws if they find that the agency’s evaluation of the issue in question was superficial.
- A limited exemption from the antitrust laws for activities that are 1) either compelled or authorized by the state, 2) for which the state has articulated a policy of displacing antitrust with some form of regulation, and 3) which the state actively supervises (or, if municipal conduct is being challenged, which the municipality actively supervises).
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Chapter VII. Refusals to Deal 26 results (showing 5 best matches)
- There is some reason for wondering whether the refusal to deal should really be described as a distinct antitrust offense.
- First, the refusal to deal supplies an injury and a cause of action to a group of plaintiffs who have good knowledge about a market and are highly motivated to bring their cases. Few people are more likely to file an antitrust lawsuit than small businesses who lose their most important product or their right to do business under a certain name as a result of what they perceive to be an antitrust violation.
- In other cases, however, a federal statute may give firms a limited right to engage in self-regulation. For example, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes brokers on the stock exchanges to regulate their own activities to a certain degree. The result of such grants of regulatory authority is that there is relatively less room for the federal antitrust laws. Such problems of the scope of antitrust liability in regulated industries is taken up in Chapter XII. below.
- A) Antitrust Policy and Refusals to Deal
- 2. The Function of the Refusal to Deal in Antitrust Litigation
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Chapter IV. Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers 13 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The antitrust laws may influence a firm’s decision about how to integrate. For example, it has frequently been suggested that aggressive enforcement of the law against vertical mergers has forced firms to integrate by new entry—i.e., by building their own vertically related facilities rather than by acquiring facilities that already exist. This means that if antitrust policy is not designed with efficiency considerations in mind, a firm may be forced to integrate in a relatively costly way (or not integrate at all) in order to avoid antitrust prosecution if it should integrate in the most efficient way.
- The best way to construct an appropriate antitrust policy toward vertical integration is to determine why firms do it. In most cases simple analysis reveals that firms integrate vertically not in order to become monopolists and earn monopoly profits, but rather to reduce their costs. In competitive markets these reduced costs will be passed on to the consumer. This analysis suggests that most instances of vertical integration should be legal under the antitrust laws.
- Whether vertical integration in order to price discriminate should be condemned under the antitrust laws is a difficult question. On the one hand, such price discrimination makes consumers as a group poorer and monopolists wealthier. On the other hand, price discrimination often increases the monopolist’s output and may reduce the deadweight loss caused by monopoly. (See Chapter X.A. below.) As a general rule antitrust law today does not single out price discrimination as a particular reason for condemning vertical integration, except occasionally in the law of tying arrangements. (See Chapter V. below.)
- c. The Applicable Antitrust Laws
- 3. Antitrust Treatment of the Forms of Vertical Integration
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Capsule Summary 75 results (showing 5 best matches)
- As far as the antitrust laws are concerned, a firm is generally free to deal or not to deal as it pleases. A refusal to deal raises antitrust concerns only:
- . Since 1922 baseball has been exempt from the antitrust laws as the result of a Supreme Court decision. The exemption does not apply to other professional or collegiate sports. Most antitrust disputes involving players in professional sports such as the NFL are covered by the labor exemption.
- the antitrust laws. Until 1984 this meant that a municipality could be liable for treble damages. The 1984 Local Government Antitrust Act (LGAA) now limits the remedy to injunctive relief. However, the Act says nothing about when the “state action” exemption will apply to municipalities, or about how to determine whether a municipality has violated the antitrust laws.
- The antitrust injury doctrine applies to all types of antitrust violations. In the
- The existence of economies of scale poses a difficult problem for antitrust policy. High output and low prices are important goals of the antitrust laws. However, in many industries economies of scale are substantial and only very large firms with large market shares will be able to take advantage of all scale economies. As firms obtain larger market shares, however, the danger of monopolization and other anticompetitive activities increases. Antitrust policy faces the very difficult task of permitting firms to grow large enough to take advantage of available economies of scale, but at the same time forcing such firms to perform competitively. This task is complicated enormously by the fact that neither economies of scale nor competitive performance (marginal cost pricing) can easily be quantified.
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Chapter I. Antitrust Economics: Price Theory and Industrial 18 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The economic models presented in the preceding discussion are somewhat simplistic in comparison with the situation that exists in the real world. It is a good idea to be aware of the most important differences between the models and the markets that can be found in antitrust litigation. Antitrust policy must deal with each of these real world deviations from the basic economic models:
- The existence of economies of scale can create extraordinary dilemmas for antitrust policy. On the one hand, antitrust policy has traditionally expressed a concern with bigness in business. Furthermore, bigness can incline businesses toward anticompetitive behavior. For example, price fixing is much more likely to occur in “concentrated” markets—i.e., markets that contain only a few large firms (see Chapter II.A. below). On the other hand, any attack on bigness or high business concentration can produce higher consumer prices because the antitrust laws will prevent firms from attaining Minimum Optimal Scale.
- If antitrust policy is to be guided by the “consumer welfare principle”—that is, if its overriding goal should be to maximize output and minimize consumer prices—then a certain tolerance of large firms is necessary.
- A) An Overview of Basic Price Theory for Antitrust
- B) Industrial Organization: Economies of Scale and the Dilemma of Antitrust Policy
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Appendix A. Answers to Review Questions 16 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Economies of scale exist when the cost of some input declines as output increases. Economies of scale are relevant to antitrust policy because low consumer prices are an important goal of the antitrust laws. At the same time, in industries subject to substantial economies of scale, only large firms with large market shares will be able to attain all the economies. If antitrust policy is too aggressive against such practices as monopolization and mergers, it will prevent industries from attaining technologically available scale economies, and consumer prices will rise. On the other hand, if antitrust policy is not aggressive enough, firms will engage in inefficient, monopolistic practices, and prices will also rise.
- The Local Government Antitrust Act exempted municipalities from ; however, municipalities can still be found in violation of the antitrust laws and may subjected to an injunction.
- One difficulty is that the physician may not be the victim of “antitrust injury,” as defined in the case. In this case, the physician is complaining that the defendants, her competitors, charged lower prices than she did. A few courts have held that antitrust injury will be presumed in the case of decision seems to make clear that the antitrust injury doctrine applies even to
- I. ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
- Although tacit collusion is anticompetitive, the antitrust laws have yet not been able to deal with it effectively because § 1 of the Sherman Act requires an “agreement.”
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Chapter XII. Enforcement, Procedure and Related Matters 56 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The antitrust laws are enforced by two federally-created enforcement entities, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, as well as by private parties who have been injured by an antitrust violation.
- Currently, however, the circuit courts are divided on the issue whether an employee of an antitrust law has standing to sue his former employer because he was fired for refusing to participate in an antitrust violation.
- (3) the plaintiff was a victim of “antitrust injury,” or of those things that made the alleged illegal act anticompetitive. On antitrust injury, see B.3., infra.
- Not all forms of injury caused by antitrust violations are compensable. The plaintiff must show that it was injured by the anticompetitive consequences of the antitrust violation.
- The yardstick method seeks to measure damages by finding another market similar to the market at issue in the litigation, but in which there was no antitrust violation. For example, in a lost profits case, the court will look for a firm similar to the plaintiff, but which was not victimized by the antitrust violation. The court will then compare the amount earned by this “yardstick” firm with the amount earned by the plaintiff.
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Dedication 1 result
- holds the Ben V. and Dorothy Willie Chair at the University of Iowa College of Law. He received his Ph.D. and J.D. at the University of Texas. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the recipient of the Sherman Award from the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, for his lifelong contributions to antitrust. He has written numerous books and articles, including the 21 Volume Antitrust Law treatise (formerly with the late Phillip E. Areeda and the late Donald F. Turner); and
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Chapter III. Monopolization, Attempt to Monopolize and Predatory 21 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Importantly, patent abuse is an antitrust violation only if reasonably calculated to create a monopoly, and the patent monopoly itself does not generally define a relevant antitrust market. Thus, for example, if someone is accused of acquiring or maintaining a patent monopoly of widgets by fraud, the accusation claims an antitrust violation only if widgets constitute a property defined relevant market. See, for example, Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 3480 (1985). Cf. Rambus, Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456 (D.C.Cir. 2008) (not an antitrust violation for a firm surreptitiously to write patent claims as it was participating in a standard setting procedure and later surprising firms employing the standard with infringement claims; no showing that the standard setting organization required such disclosure or that it would not have adopted the defendant’s technology even if it had known about the patents).
- In Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Communic., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009), however, the Supreme Court categorically rejected price squeeze claims in circumstances where either (1) the antitrust laws did not impose a duty to deal on the defendant; or (2) the price that the defendant charged to the rival was not predatory, or below cost. While the Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule it noted that subsequent “developments in economic theory and antitrust jurisprudence” had rendered its analysis less relevant than its more recent decisions in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 113 S.Ct. 2578 (1993) (no predatory pricing liability unless prices are below cost); and Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 404, 124 S.Ct. 872, 877 (2004) (no general duty to deal under the antitrust laws).
- 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094, 118 S.Ct. 1560 (1998). However, that decision is in apparent conflict with a provision of the Patent Act declaring that no patentee can be guilty of patent “misuse” because it sought to enforce those rights or refused to license. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d). Patent “misuse” is most often defined by antitrust principles, and something that is expressly permitted by the Patent Act is not an antitrust violation. Other courts have not followed the Ninth Circuit’s ..., in ISO Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322, 1325–1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143, 121 S.Ct. 1077 (2001), which involved facts similar to Kodak except that the defendant was Xerox, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and concluded that a patentee does not have a duty to license its product under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Likewise, in Princo Corp. v. International Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit held that an...
- The distinction is important because of the remedy structure in the antitrust laws. Most business torts yield the plaintiff single damages. An antitrust violation, however, yields treble damages plus attorneys’ fees.
- Low prices and high output are among the most important goals of the antitrust laws. In a predatory pricing case, however, a court must deal with the plaintiff’s allegation that a price violates the antitrust laws because it is too low.
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Chapter IX. Conglomerate and Potential Competition Mergers 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Strictly speaking, a “conglomerate” is a company that has diversified into a number of product areas. A pure conglomerate merger is a merger of two companies that produce completely unrelated products. The antitrust laws have not often been concerned with pure conglomerate mergers.
- A) Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerate Merger
- 4. Efficiency and Antitrust Policy Toward Conglomerate Mergers
- A) Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerate Merger
- Assuming that such inefficiencies exist, should the antitrust laws be used to condemn conglomerate mergers for these reasons? Probably not, for several reasons:
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Table of Cases 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
Title Page 1 result
- Price discrimination has appeared in this discussion of the antitrust laws several times—for example, in the treatment of attempt to monopolize, vertical integration, and tying arrangements. Here a more formal and comprehensive analysis of price discrimination is presented.
- Successful plaintiffs in Secondary-Line Robinson-Patman Case frequently collected “automatic damages” equal to the amount of the price difference that the plaintiff had to pay, multiplied by the number of units the plaintiff purchased, and then trebled, as most antitrust damages are.
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Chapter VIII. Horizontal Mergers 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- For antitrust purposes, a merger occurs whenever two firms that had been separate come under common ownership or control. Mergers may come about in a number of ways:
- At one time or another courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies have considered three different positions concerning the relationship between efficiencies and merger enforcement policy:
- The Guidelines also acknowledge an “exiting assets” defense, which might permit a firm to acquire the unprofitable productive assets of another firm upon a showing that the assets would have been liquidated had the acquisition not occurred. This defense appears to have no precedent in either the legislative history of the antitrust laws or in the case law.
- The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 established premerger notification requirements, including a prescribed “waiting period,” for larger mergers. The purpose of the statute is to permit the FTC and DOJ to analyze a large merger’s impact on competition before it occurs. The statute applies when:
- However, over the years antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts have developed a broad consensus that markets in which the CR4 exceeded 75 or 80 were conducive to collusion and
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Index 15 results (showing 5 best matches)
Chapter V. Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The best way to determine the economic, or competitive, consequences of any practice is to analyze why firms engage in it. A firm generally employs a particular practice only if it predicts that the practice will be profitable. Profits can result from both increased efficiency and from increased market power. As a general rule, if a practice is profitable because it increases a firm’s efficiency, the antitrust laws should not be concerned with it. However, if a practice is profitable because it increases a firm’s market power, it presents an antitrust concern. Unfortunately, the courts have not done a particularly good job of analyzing why firms engage in the various types of tying arrangements.
- In general, the competitive effects and the impact on consumers of price discrimination tying arrangements are ambiguous. However, there is some reason for thinking that price discrimination ties are efficient and should not be condemned under the antitrust laws.
- Because exclusive dealing can be efficient it receives rule of reason treatment under the antitrust laws, and much of it is legal.
- Is such price discrimination by means of a variable proportion tying arrangement bad? That question is difficult to answer. Unquestionably, the monopolist who uses such an arrangement can enlarge its profits; however, there is no policy in the antitrust laws opposed to high profits
- In Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006), the Supreme Court overruled the cases recognizing the market power presumption. It noted that in 1988 Congress had amended the Patent Act to provide that market power must be separately proven when patent tying is challenged as patent “misuse” or an improper extension of the patent, and it would make no sense to apply a different rule for antitrust. See also Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co.,
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Summary of Contents 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Chapter I. Antitrust Economics: Price Theory and Industrial Organization
- A) An Overview of Basic Price Theory for Antitrust
- B) Industrial Organization: Economies of Scale and the Dilemma of Antitrust Policy
- B) Vertical Integration, Efficiency and Antitrust Policy
- A) Antitrust Policy and Refusals to Deal
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Chapter VI. Resale Price Maintenance and Vertical Nonprice Restraints 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- 4. Controversy over Antitrust Policy Toward Vertical Restrictions
- 4. Controversy over Antitrust Policy Toward Vertical Restrictions
- The best way to determine when vertical restrictions are anticompetitive and ought to be condemned under the antitrust laws is to figure out why suppliers use them. As a basic premise, a supplier will use such restrictions only if they are profitable—that is, if the supplier can earn more with the restrictions than without them. Restrictions could be profitable for one of two reasons:
- An antitrust policy that attempts to maximize the welfare of consumers would try to approve restrictions that had the first effect, and condemn those that had the second effect.
- State antitrust law may differ from federal law, however, and a few states have adhered to the old
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Chapter II. Cartels, Tacit Collusion, Joint Ventures and Other Combinations of Competitors 17 results (showing 5 best matches)
- 3. The Agreement Requirement and the Antitrust Laws
- 3. The Agreement Requirement and the Antitrust Laws
- it has proven very difficult for plaintiffs to prove collusion in cases where there is no explicit evidence of price fixing. See, e.g., Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2009) (parallel commission cuts to travel agents by airlines were independently rational act in fact of rising internet market that bypassed independent travel agents); Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, R.J., 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir.2003) (parallel pricing consistent with independent conduct). However, if there is some evidence of express collusion, then the court will ordinarily let the conduct go to the jury. This type of evidence is sometimes referred to as “plus factors,” which must be evidence in addition to mere evidence of parallel pricing. See Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004). The courts sometimes say that ...that the conspiracy is rational. See, e.g., High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002). A very few...
- Increasingly, however, courts hold that even if the above factors are present no agreement can be found unless there is evidence that the firms were communicating about something pertaining to price or output. Otherwise there must be evidence that makes independent conduct implausible. For example, in In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010), the Seventh Circuit held that rather than simultaneous, allowing each firm to observe other’s price changes first. The court then dismissed the complaint. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 782 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2015).
- Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act condemns “unfair methods of competition.” The statute may be enforced only by the Federal Trade Commission, and the remedy most frequently used by the FTC is an injunction, called a “cease and desist” order, instructing the defendant to stop engaging in a certain practice. Courts have held that “unfair methods of competition” include any antitrust violation, but they may also include some conduct that would not be an antitrust violation.
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Table of Contents 21 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Chapter I. Antitrust Economics: Price Theory and Industrial Organization
- A) An Overview of Basic Price Theory for Antitrust
- B) Industrial Organization: Economies of Scale and the Dilemma of Antitrust Policy
- 3. The Dilemma of Antitrust Policy: Coping with Bigness
- 3. The Agreement Requirement and the Antitrust Laws
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Half Title 1 result
- Publication Date: December 11th, 2015
- ISBN: 9780314290991
- Subject: Antitrust Law
- Series: Black Letter Outlines
- Type: Outlines
- Description: Black Letter Outlines are designed to help a law student recognize and understand the basic principles and issues of law covered in a law school course. Black Letter Outlines can be used both as a study aid when preparing for classes and a review of the subject matter when studying for an examination. This outline covers: Antitrust Economics - Price Theory and Industrial Organization; Cartels, Tacit Collusion, Joint Ventures and Other Combinations of Competitors; Monopolization, Attempt to Monopolize and Predatory Pricing; Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers; Tie-ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract; Resale Price Maintenance and Vertical Nonprice Restraints; Refusals to Deal; Horizontal Mergers; Conglomerate and Potential Competition Mergers; Price Discrimination and Differential Pricing Under the Robinson-Patman Act; Jurisdictional, Public Policy and Regulatory Limitations on the Domain of Antitrust; and Enforcement, Procedure and Related Matters.