The Law of Antitrust, An Integrated Handbook
Authors:
Sullivan, Lawrence A. / Grimes, Warren S. / Sagers, Christopher
Edition:
3rd
Copyright Date:
2016
26 chapters
have results for The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook
Chapter 3. Monopoly, Monopsony and Attempts or Conspiracies to Monopolize 349 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Justifying the refusal to recognize the price squeeze claim, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority that the respondents had failed to identify any “independent competitive harm” from a price squeeze that would not result from a duty to deal violation at the wholesale level or a predatory pricing violation at the retail level. This suggests no significant change in the law, but that impression would be false. The result of is that the reach of Section 2 has been curtailed, perhaps to the point of rendering price squeeze claims lawful. The law governing duty to deal and price predation claims has been honed in the context of a dominant firm that in many cases is not an integrated firm. Limiting the reach of these claims can appropriately foster freedom of action for a non-integrated firm. The situation is altered when the dominant firm ...integrated. A vertically integrated monopolist, for example, will have incentives to suppress downstream competition. In contrast, a non-...
- The analytical process for defining the relevant product and geographic market is discussed in § 2.6b. The process is essentially the same for monopolization cases as it is for merger. Neither the differing substantive law requirements for violation, nor the different thresholds at which power becomes problematical, alters the process of market definition. Our purpose here is to review examples of definitions accepted by courts in monopolization cases. Such a review highlights uncertainties and problems that are inevitable parts of the process. It also demonstrates not that courts or juries gerrymander definitions to reach predetermined outcomes, but that market definition is an aspect of a holistic process—that of deciding whether, after integrating information about demand, supply, buyer alternatives and producer conduct, judicial sanction is warranted.
- It has been argued that a more relaxed standard should be imposed for product integration bundling. The risk of anticompetitive harm is said to be lower because of the sunk costs and high risks facing a producer who errs in integrating two products that the public would prefer to buy separately. Indeed, the stakes are likely to be higher when a seller makes a substantial investment in integrating two formerly separate products. Some of these costs may be sunk or non-recoverable if the strategy is unsuccessful. If there are networking efficiencies associated with the tied product, the stakes (potential benefits and potential losses) may be greater still. A tie-in implemented through product integration may also be more efficient to enforce. The customer has no choice but to purchase the tied product, so the seller need not worry about a buyer who “cheats” on the contractual tie. ...and product integration ties do not determine overall competitive effect. The distinctions... ...the...
- In sum, the selection of the market and the calculation of the defendant’s share poses the questions that must be addressed to determine whether power is exercised: are there few or many firms close to the market’s fringe? What barriers exclude them? What are the characteristics of firms within the market: feisty? compliant? vulnerable? stable? well- or ill-managed? Is the defendant vertically integrated? Are customers and suppliers large or small, concentrated or not? Does the industry perform well or poorly over time? And what has been its structural history?
- Design changes that integrate one product (say, a competitive one) into another product (a monopolized one) present a different and perhaps more manageable issue. When, on the basis of consumer demand and supply-side efficiencies, two distinct products can be identified, each with its own supply and demand curves, integrating those products together and offering them at a single price constitutes a tie. That practice may be perfectly legal. If a grocer offers to sell flour and sugar in a single bundled package, a practice known as mixed bundling, no antitrust violation is involved even though flour and sugar are separate products. Because there is ample competition both for flour and for sugar with or without their bundled sale, the bundling could not harm competition. But if a competitive product is integrated into a monopolized product there is nothing obscure about the effect—it constitutes exclusionary tying. Unless there are demonstrable offsetting efficiency effects not...
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Title Page 5 results
- AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK
- Late Professor of Law, Emeritus Southwestern Law School and Emeritus Professor of LawUniversity of California School of Law, Berkeley
- THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
- Irving D. and Florence Rosenberg Professor of LawSouthwestern Law School
- James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law
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Chapter 15. Antitrust in Global Markets: The Extra Territorial Reach of Unilateral Rules; Comparative Antitrust; and Conflicting National Requirements and Bilateral and Multilateral Efforts to Resolve Them 315 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The EC Treaty establishes the antitrust law applicable in the EU. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, renumbered as Articles 101 and 102 in 2009, are the core competition law provisions. Article 101 forbids anticompetitive agreements while Article 102 addresses abuses of a single firm’s dominant position. These provisions share with the U.S. antitrust law the goal of preventing abuse of market power that undercuts efficiency or innovation or transfers wealth to the power-wielding firm. But another important focus of EC law is integrating the markets of the member states. Competition policy is in service to the basic political goal of the common market: replacing commercial conflict between member states with an integrated, community-wide market. This results in some sensitivity to private arrangements that may inhibit cross-broader transactions or exploit different national demand curves by price discrimination. Such arrangements may be suspect even when they have little...
- This chapter deals with some of the salient issues. It describes relevant areas of current U.S. antitrust law, criticizes it and points to possible paths for development. In § 15.2 the geographic reach of substantive U.S. antitrust, a series of developments and accommodations leading to the “purpose and effects test,” the basic U.S. choice of law rule for antitrust, is examined. In this section the readiness of U.S. policy to protect U.S. markets from agitations that spread from foreign conduct is emphasized and contrasted with the relatively permissive U.S. response to domestic conduct that causes competitive harm abroad. Comity is discussed, both conventional judicial conceptions and diplomatic or positive comity, efforts of U.S. and foreign officials to cooperate and accommodate. Because antitrust systems share a commitment to the goal of rational resource allocation and consumer welfare, room for cooperation is broad. But the scope, form and intensity of commitments to... ...The...
- Despite non-ratification of the Charter, the antitrust code in its Chapter V shaped national law in Germany and its basic principles, refined through German national experience, became the basis for the European Community antitrust embodied in the Treaty of Rome. The Western Allied powers used Chapter V to formulate decartelization requirements in their occupation zones in Germany. From 1947 to 1955 the occupation statute—the text formulated in one international treaty and imposed as law in Germany as a result of the peace treaty—was operative as national law in Western Germany. After 1955 the same text became the law of the Federal Republic of Germany. The provisions of EC antitrust law embodied in Articles 101 and 102 of the EC Treaty can also be traced, if less directly, to the Havana Charter. Of the original six member states, only Germany had a significant antitrust experience, and that was influenced by the Havana Charter. Also, the goal of the EC treaty, integration of the...
- The language of the Act critical to coverage of U.S. exports is in subsection 1(b). Antitrust conduct (whether taken by U.S. or foreign firms and whether occurring in the U.S. or elsewhere) is at risk under the Sherman or FTC Acts if it has the required “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” of restraining U.S. exports. Here is an example, one in which the possible violators are all foreign firms acting overseas. Assume that there are several widget manufacturers in Europe, that two of them are integrated to the distribution level and control an overwhelming share of distribution there, that U.S. widget manufacturers export to Europe and rely on these integrated European firms for distribution in Europe, that the U.S. producers are gaining wider market acceptance and that their aggregate share of the European market is increasing while that of European producers is falling, and that the two integrated European firms agree with each other to stop distributing in...
- Next, consider how the FTC-EU dispute about the merger would have been resolved under the six factors specified in the U.S.-EU cooperation agreement (which, presumably, the FTC utilized). The first factor compares the relative significance of conduct within each jurisdiction. This points to EU deference to U.S. enforcement because both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are, after all, U.S. companies and most of their defense and civilian activities are with the U.S. or with U.S. firms. But does this mean that the EC, seeking to enforce, should also defer to U.S. non-enforcement? Or should this first factor integrate the majority’s notion that either of two involved nations may forbid a transaction, so long as the other nation is not compelling it? The second factor listed in the cooperation agreement evaluates purpose of the parties to affect consumers, suppliers or competitors within the enforcing sovereign’s territory. This factor would clearly be permissive of U.S. enforcement if the...
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Chapter 12. Antitrust and Intellectual Property 404 results (showing 5 best matches)
- —Perhaps the most complex element in The Government’s conduct case was the claim that Microsoft persisted through sequential versions of Windows to forestall challenge form Netscape by leveraging its Windows power behind its sales of Explorer. Initially a tying tactic was used. Windows and the Explorer browser were separate products separately sold facing separate demand curves. But Microsoft packaged them for sale to OEMs, thus discouraging OEMs, having acquired and installed Explorer with Windows from adding Netscape’s browser. For the Windows 98 version Microsoft integrated Explorer into the operating system. The Government asserted that, when challenged under Section 2, the latter tactic is no more defensible than the former. Both entail the “forced” sale of a browser, a competitive product, with the monopolized (“tying”) product, the operating system. In the context of this industry, this had the effect not only of stifling browser competition but, by doing so, protecting...
- Nor would raising rivals costs have to be achieved through tying in order to harm competition. Pricing strategies, such as bundling products at a single price, or even product integration strategies, such as linking an operating system with an application system or with a device like a browser, might be designed to achieve similar purposes and effects. If blatant tying is used, the cost-benefit analysis is not likely to be complex. If two products with separate demand functions are involved and power is evident in one, tying can do significant harm and the possibility of benefit may be remote. When indirect leveraging strategies are used, analysis may be complex because bundling and product design strategies may yield efficiencies or other consumer benefits that may offset any resulting harms. For example, integration of a spread-sheet or even a browser into an operating system might yield efficiencies such as fewer lines of code to accomplish the two functions. The marginal cost of
- Any claim that recent case law can be read as supporting a rule or even a strong presumption protecting IP proprietor’s refusals to deal from conventional antitrust inquiry is inconsistent with the dictum, inconsistent with the IP-Antitrust Guidelines, and the assimilation of both antitrust and intellectual property to the service of efficient resource allocation and protecting consumer welfare. An integrated rule of reason analysis taking account of both the ex ante and the ex post allocative effects can aid a court in reaching an appropriate outcome in such cases. Leveraging monopoly power into a distinct and separate market can do substantial ex post harm that should not be lightly justified as needed to encourage the R & D leading to the IP. In exclusive dealing situations the outcomes may be less determinate. If the IP proprietor is controlling the IP through exclusive dealing arrangements in the very market which the IP was produced to service, the ex ante interests in getting
- If a patent has little or no economic value because alternative technology of comparable worth is in the public domain or available at competitive prices, the patentee may not lawfully organize a cartel by inducing competitors to accept its price fixing license. . gains little or no credence when extended beyond a commitment by the licensee to sell the patented product manufactured by the licensee at the price specified by the licensor. The “first sale” doctrine stemming from Adams v. Burke applies: the . case does not protect the licensor if it is fixing prices at which buyers from the licensee may resell patented products. Also, a patent on any component (say, a part) of the licensee’s finished product does not protect a licensor’s attempt to fix the licensee’s pricing of the integrated output. Neither may a patent on a process warrant price fixing by the patentee on the products made with the process by the licensee, although this, perhaps, is doubtful. Under the patent law the...
- It is now clear that the misuse defense will be available against a tying patentee only upon a showing of market power. Nothing in the language of the act alters the antitrust tying rule, however. The violation only if the seller has bundled two separate products and has sufficient power in the market for the tying product to force the tied product on the buyers. Unless that case is overruled it remains law when IP ties are challenged under Sherman. The question is thus raised whether, given Section 271(5), the misuse standard—which for so many years required no competitive effects test at all—now imposes a tougher competitive effects test for tying than does the Sherman Act. One possible answer, probably the wisest one, is to recognize that the statute intended, when passed, to integrate into misuse doctrine the market power standards applied by antitrust courts. The two systems should be kept in accord.
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Chapter 14. Private Enforcement 336 results (showing 5 best matches)
- both of the lower courts had concluded that antitrust injury requirement applied to suits for injunctive relief, but both also agreed that threatened antitrust injury was shown, and that the merger was likely to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The plaintiff Monfort owned and operated three integrated beef packing plants (integrated plants both slaughtered cattle and fabricated the beef for resale). It challenged the acquisition of the third largest by the second largest integrated beef packaging company. The plaintiff alleged that the acquisition violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act by impairing plaintiff’s ability to compete both in buying cattle and in selling fabricated beef in the downstream market because defendant, to gain more market share at the expense of smaller rivals, “would bid up the price it would pay for cattle, and reduce the price at which it sold boxed beef,” a “price-cost-squeeze” that would reduce its own profits, but eventually force smaller... ...the...
- The required “physical and economic nexus” between the alleged violation and plaintiff’s harm was present here because “denying reimbursement to subscribers for the cost of treatment was the very means by which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought to achieve its illegal ends.” The requirement of a relationship between the injury and the concerns Congress had in mind seems to be a restatement of antitrust injury requirement, and the Court seems to have seen it as such, intending perhaps to integrate the antitrust standing and antitrust injury issues. The plaintiff’s denial of health insurance benefits, while not equivalent to a monopoly surcharge, often the target of an antitrust plaintiff’s suit, was an equally legitimate antitrust injury that flowed from “that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”
- As amended in 1966, Rule 23 allows a class action if each of four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met and if the action falls within one of three designated categories in Rule 23(b). The four requirements of Rule 23(a) are: (1) the class be so numerous that joinder is impracticable; (2) there be common questions of law and fact; (3) claims of the class representatives typify those of the class; and (4) representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Of the three categories in Rule 23(b), the two most likely to be relevant in antitrust litigation are (b)(2), designed to protect a class that would benefit from injunctive relief, and (b)(3), which authorizes class actions when “questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate” over other questions and when the class action would be “superior” to other possible ways of adjudicating the controversy. To make its findings under (b)(3), the court is to consider: (A) the interest of members...
- both stress the plaintiff’s incentive incompatibility in holding that antitrust injury is not established. Although not focusing on incentive incompatibility, too, could be seen as a holding that the plaintiff had incentives incompatible with the antitrust laws. But an antitrust standing analysis cannot focus exclusively on incentive incompatibility. In many instances, plaintiffs may have a variety of incentives, some of them consistent, some of them inconsistent with the purposes of the antitrust laws. For example, a competing firm suing to enjoin an allegedly unlawful merger may fear the greater efficiencies generated by the merged entity. A fear of increased competition from a more efficient rival is an incentive that may be inconsistent with the purposes of antitrust law. Still, it is quite possible that the same merger that generates efficiencies also generates market power. A plaintiff may quite logically fear that the market power will be exercised strategically to punish...
- Private suits challenging anticompetitive conduct have a long tradition. In the English courts, private litigation produced common law principles that were to evolve into contemporary antitrust law. When the Sherman Act was drafted, legislators were attracted to a provision authorizing multiple damages for private parties bringing antitrust claims. The motivation of the framers seems to have been to provide deterrence or punishment for violators as well as compensation for victims. Referring to the trusts, Senator Reagan, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee that drafted the bill, urged the committee to adopt a law “that will punish every man engaged in this business and that will give an adequate remedy in a convenient jurisdiction to every person who is damaged by these associations.” Senator Sherman, who thought that his original proposal for double damages was insufficient, urged that the multiple damages “be commensurate with the difficulty of maintaining a private suit.”The
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Chapter 10. Joint Ventures 250 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Both the decision and its discussion of ancillarity would at least have made sense had the Court simply found the particular venture before it to be a single entity incapable of conspiring, Had the Court simply held that, the case might not have had much impact, since probably the large majority of joint ventures are not so integrated as to constitute de facto merger, and since many do not produce a separate product that they then sell. But instead, the Court seemed to imply a much broader holding—that “core” or “internal” activities would be exempt from Section 1 in all arrangements within some broad class of “joint ventures,” at least so long as they were “integrated.” substantial and alarming change in the law of Section 1. the Seventh Circuit held that the National Football League—an unincorporated association of 32 separate corporations, having no cross-ownership or any legal relationship except the association—was a single entity incapable of violating Section 1. But the whole...
- No doubt such possibilities exist. And no doubt many ventures cause no harm even where every doctor can profit at the expense of the venture. If there is effective competition in the relevant health service market the venture may have little or no market power. Nonetheless, moving from the conventional approach to the ’ approach may diminish protection against competitive harm. Under the conventional approach, joint price setting usually required financial integration. Unrelated collateral restraints gained no protection from a venture, and ancillary restraints were subject first to a less restrictive alternative test and then integrated into a critical evaluation of all harms and benefits under the rule of reason. As the case showed, physician ventures were treated as were other ventures. By contrast, under the 1996 challenge, at least by the enforcement agencies. The danger is that devices designed to police utilization, control costs and assure quality will tend to erode in
- The 1993 and 1994 guidelines provided, if not crystal clarity, an understandable standard closely related to antitrust tradition. If actors competing in the same market integrate sufficiently to share profit and loss, they will be motivated to achieve cost cutting efficiencies. If their market remains effectively competitive after such an integration, there is no reason to challenge their venture. It can, and probably will, yield efficiencies, and ongoing competition should assure that these are passed on to consumers. Physicians combined in a financial risk-sharing venture should be treated the same way. There are many means for sharing risks: capitation; venture acceptance of a percentage of the premium collected by the third party payer; sharing of the fee between the venture and the physician provider; a conditional retention of the fee or a portion of it, subject to profit/loss outcomes, etc. If any such mechanism is effectively used, there is a real integration, reflected in
- Adding further uncertainty, the Court refused to consider whether the venture’s pricing could nevertheless violate the rule of reason, because plaintiffs had pled the case as only a case. The Court therefore did not reach a question the defendants pressed, that Section 1 is entirely inapplicable to some whole class of entities that would be called “joint ventures.” 547 U.S. at 7 n.2. therefore might have stood for two quite different things—that an “integrated” joint venture’s “internal” activities are subject only to rule of reason challenge, or, as suggested in the text, that all conduct by an “integrated” joint venture is fully exempt from Sherman Act § 1.
- The Court described the entity before it as just a “lawful, economically integrated joint venture,” 547 U.S. at 3, and framed the question as whether the rule against price-fixing could apply to “an important and increasingly popular form of business organization, the joint venture,”
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Chapter 9. The Antitrust Law of Mergers and Acquisitions: The Substantive Cause of Action 343 results (showing 5 best matches)
- One result of a vertical merger involving a firm with market power in the primary market is an enhanced ability to foster discrimination harmful to rivals in the secondary market. For example, if a manufacturer-monopolist acquires a critical distributor, it can charge a lower price to the acquired distributor, while selling to other distributors at a monopoly price. Or a manufacturer-oligopolist may acquire a critical supplier in an oligopolistic supply industry, after which the supplier might institute discriminatory pricing favorable to the manufacturer and unfavorable to rival manufacturers that may be unaware of the discrimination. By themselves, these results might produce neither benefits nor detriments to consumers because the consumer price for end products might remain unchanged in the short term. Under this result, there would be no short-term allocative injury to competition. But these mergers could allow the favored firm to muscle rivals out of the market, raise entry...
- Such a merger can also provide the vertically integrated firm access to confidential information of its own product-market rivals. If the large tire manufacturer acquired by the automobile producer is an important supplier of other competing automakers, it will likely learn from them sensitive information about their competitive plans—for example, what their production goals are for various classes of vehicles in the next year. This information could be passed on to the automobile producer with which the tire manufacturer is now integrated.
- If an input supplier and its output-producing consumer each possess market power, each may impose a supracompetitive mark-up so that the ultimate consumer pays a price that exceeds the price of an integrated monopolist. Vertical integration of these successive monopolists could result in a lower end-consumer price. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 211, at 526.
- The motivation for vertical integration may be neither procompetitive nor anticompetitive. Vertical merger can be a defensive step to secure access to suppliers or customers. For example, a firm that fears that its rivals will acquire key suppliers or customers may decide to integrate vertically to forestall this result, not because it believes such integration will be more efficient or produce anticompetitive gains. Or it might be undertaken because it was thought to be a sound investment of the firm’s resources—perhaps for the same reason that some pure conglomerate mergers are undertaken. A vertical merger may be more attractive to some firms than a purely conglomerate merger because the acquiring firm has some familiarity with the business it is entering. Whatever the motivation, not all vertical acquisitions benefit the firms involved. Indeed, vertical integration can be inefficient. For example, a supplier considering integrating forward into retailing may have difficulty...
- The thesis that vertical integration could allow a monopolist to redistribute but not to increase monopoly profits is also relevant to claims of leveraged monopoly (§ 3.4b1) and upstream power distribution restraints (Chapter 7). Robert Bork was among the most prominent critiques of vertical foreclosure theory. R. B
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Chapter 5. Horizontal Restraints 515 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This last assurance is a change. If doctors agree on fees when not integrated in an ownership-like, risk-bearing sense, existing case law would seem to call for a response. Of course, the statements deal only with healthcare providers. They state no more than agency enforcement intention; they do not operate as a regulation or otherwise directly affect the governing law, for which there could be private or state enforcers with different views about the extent to which the law had evolved. Yet, the statements are significant. If consistently applied, could the agency justify applying the rule of reason in evaluating provider networks in other professions or industries, if they, too, could offer credible efficiency justifications for joint rate setting?
- These recent revisions are more permissive than an earlier version in two respects. First, the policy statements now stress the lack of implication that joint fee-setting arrangements not falling within a safety zone are unlawful. Missing the safety zone means only that an arrangement may be evaluated under the antitrust laws by one of the agencies. If they are evaluated, and the agency has concerns, the network may still persuade the agency with its data and analysis that the arrangement does yield efficiency and does not result in output limitation and price enhancement. Second, availability of rule of reason analysis by the agency is apparently widened. The 1994 version assumed rule of reason treatment outside of the guidelines only when providers either (1) shared substantial financial risk (implicitly, much as do ...a firm or firms forming a joint venture), or (2) offered a new product yielding significant efficiencies (implicitly comparable to those discerned by the... ...The...
- English common law displays no cohesive policy toward restraint of trade. The line of development changed considerably over time. Until perhaps the seventeenth century, the industrial structure in England was energized and integrated by institutions and attitudes markedly different from those which prevailed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Individuals’ roles in productive processes were primarily related, as was much else in their lives, to status. Economic roles were governed in part by custom and in part by the regulations of municipalities and guilds. There was no sense of market hegemony, and little sense of social, economic or geographic mobility or of power or potential to alter existing modes through private arrangements. Adam Smith had not yet offered the broad vision of how individual competitors, by pursuing their own profit, furthered the common good.
- Both of these open questions were addressed thirteen years later in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., a classic opinion which stands in relation to the stands to the rule of reason. Oil refining was a depressed industry during the 1930s. Major refiners were fully integrated to the retail level, with ample production, storage and distribution capacity. But independent refiners were not integrated and had limited storage capacity. When such refiners had more gasoline than they could store, the industry labeled it “distressed gasoline,” because it was offered on the spot market for immediate delivery to retailers and could force spot market prices to fall below full production cost. Spot market prices in turn affected all prices throughout the industry. In order to hold spot prices to a level viewed as consistent with overall levels of supply and demand, the majors entered into a concerted program of bidding for and buying distressed gas, which they were capable of storing and...
- When firms positioned to compete directly pool investment, entrepreneurial effort and other inputs, competition among them is ended. The significance of that for market competition generally will depend on market structure and other available evidence of the purpose and likely effect of their cooperation. If the participants, among them, hold a large market share, combining production could significantly hurt market competition. Even were their shares modest other questions are presented. Might the venture increase entry barriers (for example, by filling the most attractive open market niche)? Might it serve as a medium for wider collusion between the venture participants (and perhaps others) or otherwise dampen the competitive energy of the participants in areas not covered by the venture? Involving, as it does, significant integration, any production joint venture will evoke the rule of reason; many, no doubt, will require full analysis, including careful definition of the market...
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Chapter 7. Distribution Restraints Based on Upstream Power: Foreclosure and Vertical Maximum Price Restraints; Franchising Abuses 606 results (showing 5 best matches)
- There can be substantial remedial problems when a tying seller has integrated two formerly separate products. If a judge finds a tying violation, the court must contemplate whether it will force the tying seller to incur the costs of redesigning the now integrated product. In the European proceedings against Microsoft, the Commission indicated that Microsoft may continue to offer its operating software bundled with certain applications software, but must also offer the operating software in unbundled fashion. The outcome and efficacy of this form of remedy remains controversial.
- Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit,
- There are a number of problems with this analysis, beginning with the impossibility that any seller could know the reservation price for each consumer for each of the more than one hundred channels commonly included in cable television bundles. Going beyond this, the theory is a rejection of a fundamental premise behind competition laws: that competition, not forced bundling, should determine the size and pricing of any bundled offerings. Some specialized bundles (for example, a bundle of sports television channels) may be very attractive to some consumers and could be profitably marketed as a matter of consumer demand. The cable television industry, however, typically does not offer this sort of specialty bundle to consumers. Instead, no matter the distributor, the expanded basic bundle commonly contains upwards of 180 channels, including sports, news, movies, cartoons, music videos, nature, cooking, comedy, current events, religious, sit-com, soap opera, shopping, and ethnic and...of
- , the first of these preconditions appears to have been satisfied. The publisher was subject to interbrand competitive discipline based upon its need to sell advertising (by keeping subscription rates low and circulation high). The need to compete in the advertising market provided substantial competitive discipline in the sale of newspaper subscriptions. The second precondition—that the dealer must be a monopolist whose monopoly power cannot be efficiently mitigated through means other than the use of maximum resale price ceilings—may or may not have been met in . Among the ways in which a dealer’s monopoly power might be disciplined are: (1) creating competing dealerships; and (2) integrating vertically. Newspaper distribution would seem most efficient when distributors are granted exclusive territories—it would be markedly less efficient to have competing distributors running trucks over the same routes at the same hours of the day. That exclusive territories are the most... ...of...
- When a supplier imposes a tie-in by integrating two formerly separate products, this can raise special problems for the court. Part of this problem is remedial. If a court finds a product integration tie to be unlawful, it is more difficult for the court, and more expensive for the defendant, to redesign its now integrated product. These problems have been encountered in the Microsoft litigation both in the United States and in Europe. As difficult as these remedial problems are, ignoring anticompetitive ties that are implemented through product integration could create a loophole that drives suppliers to effect ties through product integration (instead of through conventional sales restrictions).
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Chapter 11. The Scope of Antitrust 409 results (showing 5 best matches)
- accordingly was the archetypal “statutory” exemption case, and it established that unilateral, conventional union activity for the union’s own interest is exempt from antitrust. A handful of other cases add important doctrinal clarifications. First, while no particular regulatory steps or formal recognition of the workers is required, they must constitute a “bona fide labor group,” meaning in effect that at least some of them must be literally “employees” of some nature. They cannot be independent contractors Moreover, generally speaking, a labor group that takes action with nonlabor groups (like employers or third parties) enjoys no protection under the statutory exemption,the non-statutory exemption. That said, a bona fide labor group may sometimes include within it persons who are nominally nonlabor, so long as their economic interests are sufficiently interrelated with that of the union. As the Supreme Court explained in American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, ...the...
- 260 U.S. 156 (1922). Contemporary recognition of the harm that can flow from powerful firms’ use of price discrimination is addressed in Chapters 3 and 7. As an example, with respect to the Internet, the movement for net neutrality is premised in part on recognition that vertically integrated telecommunications firms use discriminatory terms to thwart innovative and competitive content providers.
- It is thought that some insurance work, including the collection of loss data and reinsurance of certain risks, benefits from collaboration. When the Supreme Court in 1944 first held the business of insurance to be within Congress’s interstate commerce power, Congress responded by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. Section 2 of the Act exempts the “business of insurance” from the antitrust laws so long as it is “regulated by state law,” The statute thereby raises three distinct and sometimes troublesome issues: what constitutes the “business of insurance,” how much state involvement is required for “regulation by state law,” and what conduct constitutes “boycott, coercion or intimidation.” Considerable case law considers each issue. The courts have read two of these requirements fairly strictly—that the conduct must be “the business of insurance” and must not involve “boycott, coercion or intimidation”—but the other of them quite permissively—that it be “regulated by state...
- Union influence, however, grew politically as well as in the marketplace, and Congress eventually reacted. The “labor exemption” we now know began as the product of two statutes. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, states that labor is not an article of commerce and that the antitrust laws should not forbid labor organizations. Section 20 of that Act limits the power of federal courts to enjoin labor disputes and lists certain labor activities that should not be held to violate any law of the United States. The Norris-La Guardia Act, passed in 1932, contains a declaration of policy favoring freedom of employees to organize and further limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to enjoin labor disputes. Because it is so directly related in purpose and effect to Section 20 of the Clayton Act, the two statutes have been construed to exempt from the antitrust laws the practices that Norris-La Guardia protects from injunctions. Read together, the two provisions grant antitrust...
- Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, dissented, first on the ground that secondary activity is comprehensively regulated by labor law, and that, in his view, secondary activity of the kind involved was specifically authorized by Section 8(e). But he also argued that even assuming the majority were right on the more specific statutory issues, the various strands of regulation constituted a sort of “occupation of the field” by the labor statutes to the exclusion of the antitrust laws. The majority assumed almost without discussion that unless a particular practice is affirmatively sanctioned by labor law, it is entitled to no exemption.
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Chapter 1. Antitrust and the Market Mechanism 145 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Economists have examined competition issues at least since Adam Smith, but practices that become the focus of antitrust enforcement have not always been studied thoroughly. In a rapidly changing economy, economic theory is often a step or two behind the wave. For example, as the information-based economy advances, many markets are becoming clusters of interconnected units. The power of computer chips doubles every eighteen months, the value of networks increases exponentially with increases in the number of users, and the need for compatibility of communication devices and input and output devices evokes a need for industrywide standards. If standards are proprietary, they can yield power that can be leveraged, perhaps throughout large segments of interrelated markets. Economists are only beginning to fully understand the resulting “network” effects and competition among platforms, and both the antitrust and intellectual property laws have yet to fully integrate either the new...
- All that said, however, antitrust has been characterized throughout its life by change and controversy. So, after first exploring modern competition law’s universal basis in the protection of markets, this chapter turns to the law’s origins and its evolution over time. It begins with the circumstances that underlay adoption of the Sherman Act in 1890 as the basic U.S. antitrust law. The United States has one of the oldest competition laws and is the first nation to establish credible enforcement institutions. It then considers how the law and its goals have changed. Here, as elsewhere, antitrust has adapted to unique national experiences. It then concludes with a description of the role of economics in contemporary antitrust and an assessment of the contemporary challenges the law still faces.
- One significant change during the past century has been in who establishes antitrust goals and priorities. In 1890, there seemed little doubt that Congress could specify antitrust policy, but Congress accepted that responsibility only in part. In the legislative debates of 1890, it was suggested on more than one occasion that the Sherman Act was merely an effort to codify the English common law governing restraints of trade and monopolies, as that law had been applied in the United States. The courts have, in any event, become important in determining antitrust policy. The broadly worded provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts have invited—indeed required—judicial construction. The Supreme Court has described the Sherman Act as a “charter of freedom,” asserting for itself broad interpretative discretion more often associated with provisions of the Constitution. Indeed, the Sherman Act might have had little relevance to much of the economy were it not for constitutional... ...the...
- As this law now exists, the market mechanism is at its core. That is, the causes of action each serve the sole central goal of preserving healthy markets, by challenging the sort of private power that can constrain them, so that they remain our primary tool of social ordering. Antitrust therefore embodies a fundamental policy commitment, which the Supreme Court has frequently said to have constitution-like status, that healthy markets are the preferred American means for governing private affairs. Of the more than 100 countries and regional organizations around the world that have now adopted competition laws, each has to a considerable extent embraced the market as the optimal allocator of resources and distributor of goods and services. Although they differ widely, these laws share one element in common. Each takes the protection of markets as its goal, and each is designed to respond to distorting or oppressive economic power of the kind that markets normally prevent. When market...
- Antitrust laws by their nature place primary reliance on market forces to discipline economic behavior. If a monopoly or a cartel is created, the antitrust laws may be invoked to restore diffused power, but once that competitive balance is achieved, there should be no need for continuing government oversight. As we might now put it, the “invisible hand” of the market provides the discipline. For Americans who mistrusted both big government and big corporations, the antitrust laws seemed well-suited as a remedy for the abuses of large corporations.
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Foreword to the Third Edition 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- An active and activist Supreme Court has taken a large number of antitrust cases and, through them, worked many changes. The Court capped a three decade-long exercise in loosened vertical restraints rules, finally ending the century-old rule against vertical price fixing and rendering all non-tying vertical restraints subject to full rule of reason (and loosening its tying rules a bit as well). It effectively ended the cause of action against “price-squeezes” by vertically integrated monopolists, a venerable interpretation initially recognized by Learned Hand, applied by lower courts for sixty years, and adopted in the competition law of the European Union. It announced reverence for a monopolist’s freedom of action, even when that course invites strategic conduct potentially harmful to new entrants, small business, innovation, and consumers. And it set up what some foresee as a potent new exemption for federally regulated actors, at least within the financial sector. Perhaps even...
- The passage of years and the variety and gravity of change called for significant revision. Entirely rewritten chapters now cover merger law and the Hart-Scott-Rodino process, the law of joint ventures, and the scope of antitrust. Other chapters have been substantially revised as well, including horizontal restraints and the law of distribution. In all, nearly half the book is new or significantly revised.
- This edition welcomes a new co-author. We could no longer benefit from the advice and counsel of Lawrence Sullivan, yet his hand remains indelibly present. The original Sullivan treatise, published in 1977, sought to set forth the law, with honest description of varied positions where they exist. Building upon that platform, Sullivan treatises did not hesitate to follow up with analysis and criticism. This edition follows that tradition.
- The ten years since the last edition have seen potentially momentous changes in federal antitrust law. Their consequences are only beginning to be understood.
- The news was not unequivocally dark for enforcement. Breaking a streak of nearly twenty years of plaintiff losses, the Court in two decisions resoundingly reaffirmed the broad of antitrust in cases involving antitrust immunities and in another unanimous decision tightened its rule for “single entity” treatment under Sherman Act Section 1. And in its first ruling for a plaintiff going to the actual merits in more than twenty years, the Court in 2013 adopted a pro-competitive (albeit perhaps difficult-to-enforce) rule to resolve the long running drama of “pay-for-delay” pharmaceutical settlements.
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Chapter 2. Market Power as a Basis for Antitrust Enforcement: Effects and Measurement 269 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Another problem that arises in connection with the product market definition is the status of any captive production of a vertically integrated firm. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, Alcoa produced a large amount of virgin aluminum for its own internal use in fabricating other aluminum products. Because this aluminum ingot was not sold to outsiders, it arguably was not part of the market. Judge Hand, however, decided that such captive production was part of the ingot market apparently because Alcoa’s captive production, which could be quickly switched to other uses, represented part of the downstream demand.
- These concerns are overstated. Antitrust case law, although based upon statute, still follows the rules of a common law jurisprudence. Despite the general language of key provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts that leaves the courts a large measure of control over interpretation, the jurisprudence is one of incremental evolution, not revolution. Stare decisis and judicial deference to the constitutional prerogatives of the legislature limit change. Furthermore, even when incremental change occurs, it is not necessarily in an activist direction, as the line of cases beginning in 1977 with No doubt it is possible—conceivably even likely—that the inelastic demand definition will provide a platform for those who would extend antitrust law into new areas. But demand elasticity is not a platform from which ambitious extensions could be launched. Its use imposes the rigorous discipline of microeconomics, the very discipline that has narrowed the range of antitrust in recent years....
- The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts
- Smaller countries may more frequently confront the problem of MES. Because of a small population base, some countries may be able to accommodate only a single firm in the domestic industry that is sufficiently large to achieve scale economies. In the United States, there is empirical evidence that most industries can accommodate a significant number of firms that have MES. The concerns that led Stigler to adopt a narrower definition of entry barriers may, in any event, be weighed in applying antitrust laws. The presence of market power is not, in and of itself, an occasion for invoking antitrust remedies. If a proposed merger would allow two firms to achieve market power, but they establish that the merger is required in order to achieve MES, decision-makers have some discretion under the law to decide whether or not this merger should be permitted. See the discussion in Chapter 9.
- 466 U.S. 2, 14–15 (1984). See also id. at 13 n. 19, at 35 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (“purpose of tying law” is “to identify and control those tie-ins that have demonstrable exclusionary impact in the tied product market, or that abet the harmful exercise of market power that the seller possesses in the tying product market”).
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Chapter 6. Downstream Power Distribution Restraints 309 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Downstream power restraints can be a potent tool for inducing promotional efforts by downstream marketers. They can be used to promote the sale of quality goods and services at competitive prices, or for selling shoddy or overpriced merchandise. The promotional gains can be achieved either by conveying valuable information to consumers, or by exploiting consumer information gaps. The gains may be achieved at the expense of arbitrage, anticollusion, and other beneficial effects of market-stimulated intrabrand competition. For some downstream power restraints, however, the loss of intrabrand competition may be minimal, the risk of exploitation small, and the promotional gain based on valuable information or service substantial. There is no consensus among commentators concerning the analysis needed to enable a court applying that rule of reason to distinguish competitively harmful from beneficial or benign restraints. Over time, a structured rule of reason should evolve to achieve a...
- Economic arguments concerning distribution restraints can be roughly divided into four categories. Theorists sympathetic to distribution restraints stress that (i) they create valuable incentives for promotion and (ii) are an important tool for reducing transaction costs. Theorists less sympathetic counter that distribution restraints (iii) tend to facilitate collusive or cartel behavior and (iv) undercut the allocative and dynamic benefits of downstream intrabrand competition. Each of these four points of view has some legitimacy. These cross currents of economic analysis, along with the non-economic arguments, are described below. These concerns are integrated in § 6.3, which describes an emerging view of distribution restraints. The challenge is to obtain a cohesive and empirically valid understanding of distribution restraints that provides a sound platform for antitrust decisions and counseling.
- The third screening test is
- Even during this period when state and federal law seemed relatively favorable to vertical minimum price fixing, the course for suppliers that imposed minimum resale prices could be difficult. Legal problems still remained in those states that had not adopted fair trade laws or that would not allow enforcement against a dealer that had not agreed to be bound by the resale price limit. The incentive for a dealer to cheat on price limits can be substantial and this made monitoring and enforcement expensive for widely distributed brands. By the 1950s, the tide had turned against fair trade laws and minimum resale prices. In 1951, the Supreme Court refused to extend Miller-Tydings immunity to an enforcement of a retail price limit against a nonsigning dealer. Congress responded in 1952 with the McGuire Act, granting antitrust immunity to such state fair trade laws. Even this legislative success did not stem the tide of challenges to such laws. Some state courts construed enforcement...
- An alternative or supplement to the Chicago theory that deserves separate mention is the transaction cost approach popularized in the writings of Williamson. Transaction cost analysis has evolved from the theory of the firm, which seeks to explain organizational choices by examining the relative efficiencies of organizational forms. Under this view, vertical integration, franchising or distribution restraints are organizational options, each to be chosen when it maximizes efficiency benefits for the firm. Thus, for Williamson, a key to understanding vertical restraints is their potential for saving transaction costs. A firm that wants to market its products effectively may need to promote downstream marketing, a step that could require some downstream control over distributors and retailers. Forward vertical integration—the purchasing of downstream distributors and retailers—is one method of achieving this benefit. Still, compared to distribution restraints, a vertically integrated...
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Chapter 13. Government Enforcement 140 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A unique feature of antitrust enforcement in the United States is the multiplicity of potential enforcers: there are three types: (1) federal agencies, (2) state and local agencies, and (3) private parties. Two federal agencies, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, have overlapping jurisdiction to enforce most provisions of federal antitrust law. State and local governments, as well as private parties, may also bring suit to enforce the federal antitrust laws. Each of these parties, except the federal agencies, may also enforce various provisions of state antitrust laws.
- Use of state antitrust enforcement can raise constitutional issues. Congress has the authority to preempt state antitrust laws. But, as the Supreme Court has indicated, absent an express indication of Congress’ intent to preempt, the Court will be reluctant to find preemption in an area such as monopolization and unfair business practices long subject to “state common law and statutory remedies.” State antitrust law may also be voided if it unduly discriminates against, regulates, or burdens interstate commerce. The broadest argument in support of a preemption or Commerce Clause challenge to a state law antitrust claim is that the federal antitrust laws have occupied the field. This general claim seems unlikely to succeed, but does not preclude a more specific claim based on a conflict between federal and state antitrust law. Efforts to have a state antitrust action to provide restitution for the state and the state’s consumers removed to federal court (pursuant to federal... ...the...
- A state or local agency bringing an antitrust claim often has a choice, much as does a private party, whether to bring that claim under federal or state law. If state attorneys general are bringing a coordinated, multi-state action, they are likely to choose federal law so that uniform rules of law will prevail in determining the lawfulness of the conduct. Of course, pendent state claims may be joined to a federal claim and tried together in a federal court. Although state antitrust laws often are patterned after, and usually are interpreted in the same manner as, federal laws there Where such substantive differences make it easier for the state or local agency to prevail, or where it is to their advantage to bring the action in a state court, the claim may be made under state law.
- The substantive provisions of state antitrust law are beyond the scope of this work. In many cases, however, state antitrust law is patterned after federal law discussed in this treatise.
- The Commission may issue an administrative complaint to challenge violations of the FTC or Clayton Acts. In this complaint proceeding, the only remedy is a cease and desist order in the nature of an injunction; the Commission may not seek damages, nor may it pursue any form of criminal sanction. The complaint is issued by vote of the Commission. After it issues the complaint, the Commission withdraws, allowing the matter to be prosecuted by complaint counsel (the staff of the Bureau of Competition) before an administrative law judge (ALJ). After the ALJ has issued a final decision, either complaint counsel or the respondent (the party named in the complaint) may appeal the decision to the Commission, which then sits as an appellate tribunal. The FTC’s decision is final as to the complaint counsel, but the respondent may file a petition to review the FTC’s decision in any court of appeal.
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Chapter 8. The Antitrust Law of Mergers and Acquisitions: Background and Enforcement Institutions 278 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This law of merger enforcement is unusual in some respects, above all in its prophylactic and forward-looking nature. Unlike most antitrust, merger law usually does not challenge the exercise of market power, but rather its creation. Accordingly, unlike most antitrust, it really has little concern for past conduct, and is largely a prediction of conduct that has not yet occurred. Second, almost uniquely within antitrust, merger law is concerned with phenomena that may be anticompetitive, but that are not otherwise illegal: oligopoly and unilateral pricing power. At least since the Celler-Kefauver amendments of 1950, a key concern has been preventing levels of concentration that would support tacit, oligopoly price coordination, and more recently—especially since the 1992 —the law has also focused on increases in unilateral pricing power. Neither could be independently challenged under other antitrust, and so merger law holds a special place in overall competition policy. And finally,
- As it now stands, the antitrust law of mergers and acquisitions is directed at market power. The basic merger law cause of action, set out in Clayton Act Section 7, prohibits deals that “may … substantially … lessen competition, or … tend to create a monopoly.” It now serves that end through a distinctively structural cause of action, first articulated in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, an approach that in principle is meant to work prophylactically. It creates a presumption of harm merely from evidence of the structure of the market, with no need for the anticompetitive conduct evidence required in Sherman Act enforcement. This structural, no-fault basis gives merger law perhaps its key importance in a system of competition policy. Indeed it is virtually the only rule ever to have existed in American law that could be called a no-fault monopoly rule, and lack of any such provision is what made the Sherman Act largely a failure as a merger law.
- When one or more of the participating firms has publicly traded stock, securities laws may require advance disclosure of the event. Even for closely held firms, state corporation law may require stockholder votes for fundamental structural changes. Mergers are also often accompanied by substantial publicity.
- While American policymakers briefly considered some general, affirmative deconcentration law, during the 1970s, see generally Kovacic,
- Finally, while this basic law finds expression as a cause of action—it is given effect by the bringing of civil lawsuits, almost always under Clayton Act section 7 —in actual practice it is now applied primarily in the pre-litigation regulatory process of the HSR Act. HSR now comprises a large body of law, consisting of a complex of statutory language, implementing regulations, However, it does not in itself create any new substantive law. It merely sets up a procedural framework within which the agencies are given time to determine whether or not to challenge a proposed merger before it goes into effect. The ultimate substantive question on HSR review always remains whether the proposed deal would be illegal under section 7. The importance of the HSR process, however, cannot be overstated. Most large mergers must now be reviewed before they can be consummated, and the agencies hold sufficiently powerful tools of discovery and delay that if they object to a deal, and it cannot be...
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Chapter 4. Price Predation 131 results (showing 5 best matches)
- One of the strengths of the common law approach to interpretation of the Sherman Act has been the flexibility it has left the Supreme Court in adjusting to new economic learning. In an area of theoretical turmoil such as predatory pricing, some differences of view and occasional missteps are inevitable in determining whether a theory of price predation is a credible one. But the common law wisdom derived from past precedents as well as the considerable body of theoretical literature should guide a court in determining which theories are acceptable. may be criticized for its insensitivity to post-Chicago theories of predation, but some of that insensitivity may be traced to the absence of a forceful presentation of these theories to the Supreme Court.
- Current law governing predatory pricing is inconsistent with the fundamental goal of the Sherman Act: protecting competition. In pursuit of an agenda to give maximum pricing discretion to powerful firms, the law ends up granting carte blanche to these firms to establish and maintain oligopolistic pricing patterns through strategically targeted predatory pricing. That such pricing is a widespread feature of twenty-first century US commerce does not make it consistent with the competition based system that the Sherman Act sought to maintain.
- the Supreme Court indicated that price predation claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act are “of the same general character.” In language that is dicta insofar as it relates to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Court indicated that the same screening tests—a showing of pricing below some measure of cost and a reasonable likelihood of recouping losses (or a dangerous probability of recouping losses under Section 2 of the Sherman Act)—would apply in claims under either statute. These same two tests would also appear to apply when the plaintiff invokes Section 1 of the Sherman Act to attack a conspiracy to engage in price predation. This convergence of the law governing price predation may bring desirable simplification and lessen the likelihood of inconsistent results depending on which statute is invoked. For reasons addressed in § 4.1c, however, the screening tests chosen by the Court will permit a great deal of predatory
- The market power screen will not address the concern that price predation litigation may unduly restrain the pricing freedom of a market player possessing monopoly or oligopoly power. Although theorists who have stressed this concern often understate the competitive threat from price predation, the concern that price predation law may deter legitimate procompetitive pricing initiatives is legitimate and ought to be addressed. A substantial answer to these concerns lies in requiring a plaintiff, in addition to establishing market power, to offer a credible economic theory of predation and to show facts supporting its application. Such a test is consistent with the Court’s summary judgment teachings in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. These decisions allow the courts to grant summary judgment (or judgment as a matter of law) when economic learning suggests no credible economic theory supports the plaintiff’s claim, but also make clear that the plaintiff should...
- Whatever their expectations, the Areeda and Turner below-cost pricing screen has proven expensive and difficult to apply. The test creates a great deal of tangential litigation about a matter (whether the defendant’s prices are below some measure of cost) that is not determinative of whether predation has occurred. If the test is applied mechanically, many competitively injurious price predations will be beyond the reach of the law. If it is to be retained at all, the screen should be triggered by pricing above average total cost, a measure modestly easier to make and one that would reduce the risk of insulated strategically targeted predatory conduct against a smaller rival. A better result, however, would use this pricing test as a burden shifting mechanism. If the defendant could show pricing was above average total cost, the burden would be on the plaintiff to show anticompetitive predation.
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Foreword to the First Edition 4 results
- We think of antitrust as law, not free form policy. Antitrust, at any stage, is shaped by the interplay of the legal rules previously laid down (however broad or general these may be) with current political, economic and theoretical forces. Our effort has been to describe this process and to distill from it what we view as antitrust law today. Because antitrust law is constantly evolving, we have sought to describe the law’s central principles in their developmental contexts. While we have often disclosed our own (usually consistent) views on significant policy issues, we have tried fairly to summarize alternative positions and contentions. Because we are convinced that each of antitrust’s developmental stages is related to an existing or emerging consensus about the needs and opportunities of the economy, we view current policy debates less as efforts to stake out solid, normative base lines than as parts of the ongoing developmental process.
- Our debts are many. Few can be specifically recognized, none adequately. We are especially grateful to Southwestern University School of Law for encouragement and support in the form of released time, summer stipends and funding for research assistants. We must also stress our gratitude to Ms. Antoinette Shilkevich, librarian of the law firm of Blecher and Collins in Los Angeles, who took time from busy professional involvements to proof read and correct the book.
- The Hornbook on the Law of Antitrust by one of the authors was published by West in 1977 to meet the needs of students and practitioners for adequate treatment of major antitrust areas. Although the purposes of this volume are essentially the same and its title similar, this is not a revision of that work but a new book that is responsive to changes in the economy (e.g., increasing dynamism and globalization), in economic theory (e.g., analysis of network efficiencies), in prevailing attitudes about how theory should be applied (e.g., post-Chicago analysis), in related policy areas (e.g., deregulation) and, reflexively, in antitrust itself. The book addresses new areas, treats a number of areas more fully, and thoroughly reassesses core concepts like monopolization and horizontal and vertical restraints.
- Foreword to the First Edition
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Advisory Board 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Professor of Law, Chancellor and Dean Emeritus, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
- Distinguished University Professor, Frank R. Strong Chair in LawMichael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University
- Professor of Law Emeritus, University of San Diego Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan
- Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles
- Earle K. Shawe Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
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Table of Contents 240 results (showing 5 best matches)
- CHAPTER 9. THE ANTITRUST LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: THE SUBSTANTIVE CAUSE OF ACTION
- 7.8a. The Evolution of the Law Governing Vertical Maximum Price Fixing
- § 1.3. The Evolution of United States Antitrust Laws
- 3.1a. Summary of the Law
- § 3.2. Historical Overview of the Law Governing Monopolization
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Summary of Contents 48 results (showing 5 best matches)
- CHAPTER 9. THE ANTITRUST LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: THE SUBSTANTIVE CAUSE OF ACTION
- § 1.3. The Evolution of United States Antitrust Laws
- § 3.2. Historical Overview of the Law Governing Monopolization
- § 6.4. Evolution of the Law
- CHAPTER 8. THE ANTITRUST LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: BACKGROUND AND ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS
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Table of Cases 111 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Massachusetts School of Law v. American Bar Ass’n……………658
- Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP……………9, 23, 54, 83, 179, 551, 619, 722, 725, 874
- Law v. NCAA……………75, 191, 591
- Dedication and Everlasting Love to Animals v. Humane Society of the United States, Inc……………618
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc., United States v……………263
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Copyright Page 4 results
- The publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other professional advice, and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional.
- Printed in the United States of America
- is a trademark registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
- West, West Academic Publishing, and West Academic are trademarks of West Publishing Corporation, used under license.
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Index 46 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Publication Date: October 31st, 2015
- ISBN: 9780314290786
- Subject: Antitrust Law
- Series: Hornbooks
- Type: Hornbook Treatises
- Description: This updated edition of a venerable antitrust law treatise will meet the needs of lawyers, judges, scholars, and students. As in prior editions, it provides a clear statement of the law, visits unresolved issues and areas of controversy, and provides a candid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the various positions. The new edition also contains a more user-friendly index.
