Presidential Power Stories
Authors:
Schroeder, Christopher H. / Bradley, Curtis A.
Edition:
1st
Copyright Date:
2009
17 chapters
have results for Presidential Power Stories
Introduction: The Story of Presidential Power 53 results (showing 5 best matches)
- tells several different stories. The most remembered of these stories focuses on the broad rhetoric of the decision, extolling the President’s role as “sole organ of the nation in its external relations,” vested by the Constitution with “delicate, plenary and exclusive power” in the field of foreign relations. As such, the opinion has become a frequent reference point for advocates of extensive and exclusive presidential powers in foreign relations.
- The Story of Presidential Power
- Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over Presidential Power Outside the Courts, Chapter 1.
- By focusing on notable occasions of judicial resolution of presidential power questions, then, this book concentrates on the atypical rather than the typical situations in which questions of presidential power arise. In studying presidential power, however, the litigated instances have some distinct advantages as the initial objects of study compared to any comparable number of instances that ended without litigation. Almost all arguments solely between Congress and the President over the President’s powers end inconclusively, without any sense that the rival parties have reached a shared view on the extent of either branch’s powers. By and large, the parties fight until they achieve a modus vivendi enabling them to navigate past the current controversy, retiring to their corners to fight another day.
- Beyond the problem of a lack of agreement between the two parties, it can frequently be difficult even to determine the position of Congress at all, particularly when binding votes are lacking. Has Congress acquiesced in some presidential action, for instance, because it recognizes the legitimate assertion of presidential authority, or because the action has proven in some sense successful in achieving an objective agreeable to Congress, which therefore decides that it will desist in challenging a desired fait accompli? In comparison, judicial decisions, while often rife with ambiguities of their own, at least confront the arguments and counterarguments and result in a decision with a rationale that can be analyzed and dissected. In addition, each judicial decision usually surveys a body of prior disagreements, drawing together the historical background as well as the dispute’s more immediate context to provide a larger perspective on the nature of these disagreements and their...
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Chapter 5: The Story of Myers and its Wayward Successors: Going Postal on the Removal Power 77 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Pompous Postmaster and Presidential Power: The Story of Myers v. United States
- The Pompous Postmaster and Presidential Power: The Story of Myers v. United States
- The Pompous Postmaster and Presidential Power: The Story of Myers v. United States
- The Pompous Postmaster and Presidential Power: The Story of Myers v. United States
- The Pompous Postmaster and Presidential Power: The Story of Myers v. United States
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Presidential Power Stories 14 results (showing 5 best matches)
- PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES
- Introduction: The Story of Presidential Power
- Chapter 1: The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over Presidential Power Outside the Courts
- Chapter 4: The Story of In re Neagle: Sex, Money, Politics, Perjury, Homicide, Federalism, and Executive Power
- Chapter 5: The Story of Myers and its Wayward Successors: Going Postal on the Removal Power
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Chapter 1: The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over Presidential Power Outside the Courts 55 results (showing 5 best matches)
- All of which raises an even larger issue which has special relevance to presidential power disputes in the realm of foreign relations. What is, has been, and should be the role of the courts in resolving disputes concerning the country’s relations with other nations? Did the judiciary play a minimal role because the times were different and the Supreme Court less well-established? Or, as some argue, are foreign relations matters simply less suited for judicial resolution? Precisely because the Justices did not settle it, the nation’s first major foreign affairs story has much to offer on these more fundamental questions as well.
- The second set of “briefs” have proven more enduring. They first of all were argued in public. More importantly, they helped introduce the types of arguments that have framed many of the presidential power controversies, implicating issues ranging far beyond neutrality, that have come later.
- The first clue is that Hamilton does not start with the argument that has since made him famous. Instead, he starts—and ends—his affirmative case for Washington’s power to declare neutrality by relying on specific grants of power. Hamilton asserts that the Neutrality Proclamation “appears to be connected with [the Executive] department in various capacities.” Yet each of the powers that underpin these roles more plausibly derives from specific grants rather than some residual general reservoir of Executive power. First, declaring neutrality has a connection to the President’s “role as the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign nations.” This authority in turn was widely understood to rest upon the President’s power to appoint and receive ambassadors and other ministers. ...Treaties” in cases outside the jurisdiction of the courts and so require diplomatic action “between Government and Government.” This point likewise hews closely to grants of presidential authority...Power
- Here the Neutrality Controversy did not so much resolve matters as set the framework for ongoing debate. At the congressional end of the spectrum, Madison’s categorical arguments about core legislative powers may not have succeeded then or now, but they did help establish the convention of defending congressional authority based upon specific grants of power. At the presidential end, Hamilton famously introduced the Vesting Clause argument, versions of which have been used by administrations ever since. Yet, as noted, at the time this argument was not only novel, but also prompted a strong reaction from Madison and Jefferson among others. During this period, the far safer basis for executive authority was likewise the Constitution’s specific grants of power.
- Presidential War Power
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Chapter 4: The Story of In re Neagle: Sex, Money, Politics, Perjury, Homicide, Federalism, and Executive Power 44 results (showing 5 best matches)
- ’s fit into the larger picture of presidential power and especially into contemporary debates about it. It suggests that in that case two questions that are usually separate, presidential power to use federal resources and presidential power to invade private rights, come together. Neagle was a deputy Marshal, and so if he was acting in the line of duty in protecting Justice Field, he was allowed to use deadly force. That confluence is unusual, which has implications for ’s meaning with respect to the scope of implicit and inherent presidential power.
- Presidential enthusiasm for federal power, especially in this form, is part of the story of . At argument, the most aggressive position in favor of presidential flexibility was taken by Attorney General William Henry Harrison Miller, who although but a namesake and not a relative of President Harrison’s illustrious grandfather Old Tippecanoe, was a former law partner and close friend of the chief executive. President Harrison himself was a strong advocate of federal power, much more so than the Democrat who bracketed him in the White House, Grover Cleveland. Harrison favored increased military spending and had no sympathy with moonshiners who impeded tax collection, nor with states’ rights arguments that would protect them.
- in its own day was about federalism, or more precisely about the sovereignty of the national government. Yet it is known today for another of its aspects, its approach to the power of the federal executive. Section four seeks to justify ’s appearance in this volume, discussing the connections between federalism and presidential authority. is an example of a recurring configuration, in which the affirmation of federal power is therefore an affirmation of executive power, but not for reasons primarily related to the latter. The case is about presidential action in the absence of express legislation, but the main reason the Court endorsed that power was in order to uphold federal sovereignty relative to state power.
- It is possible in Justice Lamar’s case that the restriction of federal power was not just a side effect, but from his opinion there is no way to tell. Nothing in Justice Miller’s opinion suggests that he cared about presidential power except as a form of national authority.
- Justice Miller’s answer was of course the latter. He read presidential power broadly, but did not do so by reading legislative power more narrowly. His problem, and his solution, were not about separation of powers in that sense, nor about the relative turf of the different branches. Rather, they were about the total authority of the United States, relative to the states, and his expansive view of presidential authority was designed as an expansive view of overall national authority. In keeping with that way of thinking, Miller then reviewed a series of instances in which the executive had acted without explicit congressional authorization to vindicate specifically federal interests. Miller’s reasoning was that each such instance involved obviously desirable executive action, so the lack of specific authority could not have been a problem.
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Chapter 2: The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime 68 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A more nuanced reading might suggest that the decision takes an intermediate position. It surely sees in the President’s constitutional powers independent substance; its presidency is far from simply a tool of Congress. But the presidential powers it acknowledges arise only from the particular circumstance of a proportionate reaction by armed forced to a war begun by an opposing side—a stoppage of the Confederacy’s maritime trade to reciprocate for the Confederacy’s prior invitation to attack Union merchant shipping. It provides little foundation for presidential power to begin war, or to use military force or to take other actions in other circumstances. Thus Justices Douglas and Thomas might both be right—Thomas in thinking that the decision recognized substantive presidential powers in wartime, Douglas in thinking that those powers are limited to particular circumstances.
- Of course, the closeness of the decision, the emergency nature of Lincoln’s actions and their prompt ratification by Congress, and the unique circumstances of organized domestic rebellion may somewhat undermine the decision’s support for broad independent presidential power. Moreover, the Court and the government’s counsel emphasized limits on the President: that the President could not initiate war, and that he was acting in conformity with existing acts of Congress and with international law. Perhaps instead the decision is (as Justice Douglas thought) precedent for weak presidential powers, finding them only in the unusual circumstance of an emergency response to attack, pending submission for approval by Congress. And perhaps the circumstance of domestic rebellion makes the precedent even more narrow, for in that case (but not others) the President might rely on the constitutional direction to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” But in fact none of the broader...
- at 684 & n.35, described the decision as recognizing presidential emergency power. On the centrality of to modern analyses of presidential power, see Chapter 7 of this volume.
- A second way to look at the matter is through the lens of separation of powers. The case’s crucial separation of powers issue was itself derivative of international law. Lincoln’s suspension of , for example, did not implicate international law at all. Its legality turned entirely on domestic constitutional and statutory law governing separation of powers. But a blockade had significant adverse effects on foreign neutrals and trade, and the international law of the time limited its deployment to the state of war. Accordingly, the question whether the President had the unilateral right to exercise a war power under the U.S. Constitution was presented. But as the modern blockade rule illustrates, and as might be inferred by reference to the analogue of embargo, one could claim that the power to order the stoppage of trade with another country, even by deployment of naval forces, is not necessarily a “war” power. It was international law that made it a war power, and no one questioned...
- 1789–1888, at 273–75 (1985). Currie argues that James Madison’s statement at the 1787 Constitutional Convention—that the President would have power to “repel sudden attacks”—is near-conclusive support for Grier’s position. , at 318 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (Madison). But that seems to overstate the point, for it is hardly clear from the Convention comment alone that Madison thought the President had power to take offensive actions, or actions against individuals not actively hostile such as allegedly loyal U.S. citizens or foreign neutrals engaged in trade of possible benefit to the enemy, even in response to attacks. For debate over the President’s response power as matter of the Constitution’s original meaning, and early Presidents’ views on the matter, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 45 (2007) (finding no presidential power to act offensively);
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Chapter 7: The Story of the Steel Seizure Case 115 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The story of the case provides important context for modern readers who might perceive a chasm between what the decision stands for and what it says. The decision has tremendous rhetorical and symbolic significance in justifying judicial policing of executive action in a range of contexts. Yet as a matter of doctrine, it is difficult to see why the case occupies this position. The decision leaves open a major question about executive power—whether the President can ever claim a nontextual constitutional power to act in an emergency absent, or even contrary to, congressional action. Even the most enduring opinion of the case, Justice Jackson’s concurrence, can support both narrow and broad judicial constructions of presidential power.
- case’s implications for the judiciary, however, we should not overlook its messages to the political branches, particularly the messages of Justice Jackson’s concurrence. The concurrence is famous for the framework it supplies for courts to evaluate presidential power claims—a framework that turns out to be less robust in theory and more malleable in practice than those who celebrate it might prefer. The concurrence’s most pointed messages about how to preserve the balance of power between Congress and the President, however, are directed to the political branches. The story of the case holds lessons not only for those who decide separation of powers questions, but also for those who generate them.
- Presidential Powers Stories
- facts presented without broadly considering the scope of any inherent or residual power the President might have to act in an emergency. The importance of the case thus stems in part from the weight it lends to claims that it is a court’s duty to combat abuses of power by a coordinate branch of government. It also stems in part from Justice Jackson’s concurrence, which courts and commentators treat as the most authoritative opinion in the case. As a matter of judicial doctrine, the concurrence does less to constrain presidential power claims that we might expect, for it both recognizes the importance of limiting presidential conduct and provides courts with ready avenues for upholding questionable presidential conduct. The opinion, however, is as much a primer on how to avoid courts’ intervention in presidential power disputes as it is a guide for courts to resolve those disputes.
- The Presidential proclamation rests upon the aggregate of the Presidential powers derived from the Constitution itself and from statutes enacted by Congress.
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Chapter 9: The Story of United States v. Nixon: The President and the Tapes 69 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Unitary Executive and Presidential Imperialism: Two Facets of Presidential Power
- Nixon’s approach to executive power can be broken into two compartments. The first addressed how much control the president should be able to assert over the actions of his subordinates. Here, Nixon was an exponent of a strong theory of the unitary executive (although scholars had not yet designated it by that name). That theory rests in turn on a strong reading of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, which vests the “executive power … in a President.” How completely the executive power is “vested” in a single individual raises questions of the president’s over his subordinates. These questions are distinct from questions of the scope or extent of presidential power. What can the President do without congressional authorization? What can he do even if Congress has enacted prohibitory statutes? Here, Nixon believed that the Constitution vested the President with substantial powers with which the other branches of government simply could not interfere. When Arthur Schlesinger...
- centered on a clash between the judicial branch’s claims for information and the President’s claim of confidentiality. Its larger story reveals a President asserting a broad theory of strong presidential authority—much stronger than simply the claim that he alone was to decide when his confidential conversations were to be revealed. As has been true throughout our history, the President’s main protagonist in the struggle over presidential power was the Congress, with the political arena—and ultimately the Congress’ rarely invoked impeachment process—the main battlegrounds. The judiciary found itself injected into the political struggle because subordinates of the President were charged with the common crimes of breaking and entering and obstruction of justice. When a federal district court issued a criminal subpoena for tapes of conversations in the Oval Office and the President refused to turn them over to the special prosecutor, the prerequisites were in place for litigation in...
- To Schlesinger, the imperialistic assertion of presidential authority typified by the Nixon Presidency constituted a shift in the balance of constitutional powers, amounting to nothing less than “the appropriation by the Presidency … of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress…. The essence of [Nixon’s New American Revolution] was not, as [Nixon] said [in his 1971 Inaugural Address] power to the people. The essence was power to the presidency.” Presidential imperialism now sometimes travels under the label “presidentialism.”
- The efforts during FDR’s second term to accrete power to the executive branch set a tone of presidential ambitions that continued into all Presidents since FDR have shared his conviction that the President is the leader of the country, distinct from Congress and political party. As elections began to become less party focused and more candidate focused, Presidents developed a sense of primacy with respect to national policymaking that both was stimulated by that shift and contributed to it. Presidential candidates now needed to present themselves as individuals worth electing, and the key attribute that recommends a presidential candidate to the electorate is leadership. Incumbents express leadership by exercising the powers of the office to address the nation’s problems. “[T]he same drive that animates candidate-centered campaigns also motivates Presidents and their staff assistants to expand the formal powers and administrative resources of the presidency. In the process, they...
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Chapter 10: The Story of Dames & Moore: Resolution of an International Crisis by Executive Agreement 55 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Iranian hostage litigation gave Rehnquist an opportunity both to reaffirm the insights of his mentor and to revise and extend them in application to a new context. Jackson had identified three categories of congressional support for presidential action: first, the presence of express or implied statutory authority, which would elevate presidential power to its maximum; second, a “zone of twilight,” where Congress had neither granted nor denied authority; third, express or implied denial of authority, where presidential power would be at its “lowest ebb,” reliant on some overriding constitutional grant alone. He thought that this slight reformulation would be especially apt when considering presidential “responses to international crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to anticipate in any detail.”
- Executive Agreements and Presidential Power in Foreign Policy
- Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion for the Court that gave Texas a victory by ruling that President Bush’s directive exceeded his powers. Applying Justice Jackson’s tripartite analysis of powers from the Court held that when the Senate ratifies a treaty on the understanding that it is not self-executing, a presidential effort to execute it lies in Jackson’s third category of actions inconsistent with congressional will. The Court’s refusal to approve free-wheeling presidential execution of such treaties implies that in the future, even formal executive agreements may need closer ties to statutory authority than has been the case since
- was an appropriate one for invocation of the acquiescence doctrine. Congressional concern about presidential emergency powers had recently led to the inter-branch settlement that was incorporated in the NEA and IEEPA. Congress, knowing that it is difficult to legislate substantive standards for foreign policy in advance, relied on two process controls that were designed to assure the political accountability of presidential action and to preserve a full opportunity for subsequent congressional control through legislation. These were requirements that the President take personal responsibility for his determinations of necessity by making particular findings, and that Congress be kept fully informed by reporting and consultation. Not long after
- Presidents need a constitutional authority to settle claims against foreign nations, subject to controls enacted by Congress, but not subject to clear statement rules that require prior statutory authority. Consider the painful and convoluted story of the Iranian Hostage Crisis and its eventual resolution. This was a real emergency, not a false one fabricated for public posturing or to bulwark argument in litigation. The traditional power of claims settlement was central to President Carter’s capacity to end the crisis. The Executive Branch possessed no bargaining chip other than the frozen Iranian assets. It could not negotiate effectively unless it could control those assets. Hence, the executive could not let them be diverted to the pockets of private claimants, many of whom had no special relation to the assets.
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Chapter 11: The Story of Morrison v. Olson: The Independent Counsel and Independent Agencies in Watergate’s Wake 73 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The story of ’s contribution to the unitary executive debate is President Reagan’s Department of Justice and its separation-of-powers litigation. During the Reagan administration, the Department of Justice sought to implement a strongly unitary conception of the executive, including challenging the constitutionality of independent agencies. The independent counsel shared the same objectionable feature as independent agencies—insulation from plenary presidential removal. This link between the two framed the way in which the independent counsel statute came to be presented to the Supreme Court, the character of arguments before the Court, and the Court’s opinion.
- Executive branch interpreters, moreover, have taken steps in the direction of construing removal restrictions to allow significant presidential influence, while stopping short of fully disobeying a presidential directive as good cause. For instance, the Office of Legal Counsel’s 1996 separation-of-powers memorandum also opines that together suggest that a “generous reading” of the President’s power to remove an inferior officer “may be essential to the constitutionality” of the removal restrictions even when the officer’s functions are narrow.
- , then, although a technical victory for the Reagan Justice Department, was a partial defeat for its strongly unitary conception of presidential control. The Court had the chance to embrace that vision, but the fact that the statute granted removal power to Congress allowed the Court to side-step the issue, and resolve the case on a more narrow ground. Following
- Court validated, at least in form, Congress’s authority to restrict the President’s removal power, it did so in a curious manner, highlighting the similarities between the independent counsel and the Watergate special prosecutors, who enjoyed no statutory removal protections. The independent counsel, the Court’s analysis suggested, was merely a variant of the removable special prosecutor. Rather than marking a strong affirmation of restrictions on the president’s removal power, the decision (re)ignited the question of how much actual protection from presidential influence good cause restrictions provide.
- The story of is the story of the shifting fate of an idea—that through institutional design, a prosecutor could be placed beyond the influence of politics—and its fallout for the unitary executive debate. In response to Watergate and in particular the Saturday Night Massacre, Congress enacted a statute that contained the critical elements that the Watergate special prosecutor model did not have: a statutory protection from removal for the independent counsel, and appointment by a court. With President Reagan’s inauguration in 1980, the statute’s limitation on the President’s control was caught in a larger constitutional battle over the central ground of the unitary executive debate: Congress’s authority to limit the President’s power to remove executive officers at will. Despite the Reagan Justice Department’s accumulation of precedent to challenge the constitutional foundation of independent agencies, the independent counsel statute’s origins as a Watergate reform provided a...
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Chapter 12: The Story of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Trying Enemy Combatants By Military Commission 54 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Court, and the nation, understood well the broader context: almost five years of controversial counterterrorism measures through which the Bush administration strove when possible to act unilaterally, without seeking congressional authorization, in order to strengthen presidential power relative to the other branches of government. In reporting on the decision, Greenhouse acknowledged this context, remarking that “[t]he ruling marked the most significant setback yet for the administration’s broad expansions of presidential power.”
- A Supreme Court Conversation: The Most Important Decision on Presidential Power. Ever
- Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling, Hamdan’s principal lawyers extolled the historic nature of the case and what its very existence revealed about the U.S. system and its safeguards against presidential abuses of power. Neal Katyal, who argued the case before the Court, “recalled thinking ‘how astonishing it was that “a little guy from Yemen” could be heard against “the biggest guys in America—the president and the secretary of defense.” ’” The day before the Court heard argument, Navy Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift, put it this way: “The question tomorrow is not: Did Mr. Hamdan do it? It is: Who are we? What kind of people are we? … [O]nly in this country can a military officer take a disagreement with presidential power to court as a way of settling. Everywhere else they call that a coup.”
- A Supreme Court Conversation: Still “the Most Important Decision on Presidential Power Ever”
- A Supreme Court Conversation: The Most Important Decision on Presidential Power. Ever
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Chapter 8: The Story of United States v. United States District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power 45 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The use of electronic surveillance techniques by appropriate federal officers for the overhearing or recording of wire or oral communications to protect the nation from attack by or other hostile acts of a foreign power or to protect military or other national security information against foreign intelligence activities should be permitted subject to appropriate Presidential and Congressional standards and supervision.
- The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amendment
- Events relating to Plamondon in particular became the focal point of the surveillance component of the case. His story is part of the story.
- Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information
- Lost from the Ottawa: The Story of the Journey Back
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Chapter 3: The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy Combatants, and Congressional Authorization 21 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Military Tribunals and Presidential Power
- Military Tribunals and Presidential Power
- decision illustrates a fundamental tension in the law governing presidential power that is still with us in the war in terrorism. In light of
- On the other hand, the concurrence’s argument that Congress could authorize the commission might suggest that it thought such authorization was necessary. This distinction between presidential action that violates congressional restrictions and presidential action that lacks congressional authorization is of central importance, as Justice Jackson would point out many years later in his concurrence in the
- was decided and consider its implications for presidential power. These implications, as I will explain, are highly uncertain and probably quite limited, at least at the level of legal doctrine. Part of the uncertainty stems from the decision’s unacknowledged inconsistency with widespread military practices during and immediately after the Civil War, including most notably the use of military commissions to try thousands of individuals not formally associated with the Confederate army. Many of these military commission cases involved acts of organized
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Chapter 6: The Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation 67 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power:
- These stories sometimes overlap only slightly: for example, the actual decision of the Court says almost nothing about the distribution of power over international relations. Furthermore, not all of the stories are, it appears, of equal interest. Almost no one in the early Twenty-first Century is concerned with the case because of its connection to the Chaco War (in the United States at any rate), or (with the exception of historians of FDR’s administration) even what it says about the politics of foreign affairs in the Thirties. As a result, the issues lawyers and scholars now concern themselves with in discussing seldom include either the horrors of the war or the interplay between Congress and the president in fashioning American policy toward the world beyond the Republic’s borders. The stories of . That suggests the possibility that there is yet another story to be found in ...power of the Court to determine constitutional meaning on the duty of the judicial branch to decide...
- Sutherland, finally, said surprisingly little about the constitutional powers of the president. He did affirm (in a rather low key manner) the president’s exclusive role in negotiations with foreign powers, although he implied that the Senate’s exclusion, at least where a treaty is being negotiated, is as much a matter of lacking the means as of lacking the legitimate authority to participate directly. In fact he put greater emphasis on the significance of the Senate’s constitutional power to give the president advice on treaties which, he insisted, could not properly be reduced to that of an up or down vote on the final product of negotiations. Finally, by the standards of early twenty-first century debates, Sutherland stated a distinctly pro-Congress view of the line between legislative and executive power with respect to involving the United States in armed conflict. ...an encomium to unilateral presidential authority. “The office of President has grown in potency and... ...powers...
- At first FDR seems to have agreed with his cousin on all of this. He played a role in drafting the constitution the United States imposed on Haiti after President Wilson ordered the occupation of the island country in 1915, and as late as 1922 he defended the American protectorate over Haiti as an appropriate exercise of American power. By 1928, however, FDR had repudiated the Roosevelt/Wilson view of inter-American relations. “The time has come when we must accept … a newer and better standard in international relations…. Single-handed intervention by us in the affairs of other nations must end.” His views on Wilson’s great project, the League of Nations, underwent a similar evolution. As the Democratic vice presidential candidate in 1920, Roosevelt campaigned vigorously for American membership in the League, but as it became clear that American public opinion was irrevocably opposed to entry into the League, FDR gradually distanced himself from it, and after entering the race for...
- Many well-known Supreme Court decisions have in fact not just one story but several. There is nothing mysterious about this. Consider perhaps the earliest example. William Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus because he and his fellow plaintiffs genuinely wanted official recognition of their appointment as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. however, is far more than that mildly-interesting bit of legal history. The story of Marbury’s action is a small part of the broader history of the development of American political institutions after the election of 1800 resulted in the first transfer of national political power from Marbury’s defeated Federalists to James Madison’s triumphant Republicans. And for modern American lawyers, the decision is the symbol and canonical statement of the practice of judicial review. This last story sits rather loosely to the others:
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Notes on Contributors 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- is the Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy Studies at Duke University. He has written extensively on issues relating to international law, U.S. foreign relations law, and presidential power. His publications include
- is a Professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington, where she teaches and writes about issues of constitutional law. Her recent publications on issues of presidential power include
- is Charles S. Murphy Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy Studies, Director of the Public Law Program at Duke University. He served as deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, and in 1996–97 was the acting assistant attorney general in charge of that office. In that capacity he advised the attorney general and the President on issues of presidential authority. In 1992–93, he was chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee. He has written on a variety of questions of presidential authority, including executive privilege, the use of military commissions and national security surveillance authority. Schroeder also writes on environmental law and policy, including coediting Environmental Regulation: Law, Science and Policy (with Percival, Miller and Leape), currently in its 6th edition. He received his B.A. degree from Princeton University in 1968, a M. Div. from Yale University in 1971, and his J.D. degree from...
- is Professor of Law and Notre Dame Presidential Fellow at the Notre Dame Law School, where she teaches and researches in the areas of constitutional law, administrative law, cyberlaw, electronic surveillance law, and copyright law. She earned her A.B. summa cum laude from Harvard University and her J.D. from Yale Law School, where she served as editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal, executive editor of the Yale Journal of International Law, and student director of the Immigration Legal Services clinic. After graduating from law school, she clerked for Judge José A. Cabranes of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor of the Supreme Court of the United States. Before joining the Notre Dame faculty in 2000, Professor Bellia worked for three years as an attorney-advisor in the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice.
- is the Thomson Professor of Law at the University of Colorado School of Law, where he was dean from 1996–2003. He received his B.A. in American history and literature from Williams College, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He received his J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. He has been on the law faculties of Arizona State University, the University of Texas (as the John S. Redditt Professor of Law), and the George Washington University School of Law (as the Donald Rothschild Research Professor of Law). From 1979 to 1981, he served in the Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice. He has testified before Congress on numerous occasions. Professor Bruff has authored two casebooks on the administrative process and separation of powers, a monograph on the latter, and numerous articles. He resides in Boulder with his wife Sherry and daughter Annie.
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- Publication Date: October 3rd, 2008
- ISBN: 9781599413730
- Subject: Constitutional Law
- Series: Law Stories
- Type: Overviews
- Description: Schroeder and Bradley's Presidential Power Stories tells the story of a dozen notable presidential power disputes in our nation’s history. Ranging from the Neutrality Controversy of 1793 to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, the chapters present a diversity of presidential powers issues as well as a dispute's historical and legal background. Each chapter examines: A dispute’s historical and legal background Broader conceptual issues about the role of the president in our constitutional democracy
