Introduction: Nine Employment Law Stories 21 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The stories behind common law cases, of course, give only a glimpse into the patchwork canvas of employment law. Statutes play a pivotal role in the regulation of the workplace, and some of the most compelling developments in work law took place in the backrooms of the legislative arena. Three of our stories are about statutes, and in one, no case is involved at all—only the life and times of a controversial piece of legislation.
- Law Stories
- : Nine Employment Law Stories
- How did we choose the cases we chose? The cases canvass (albeit imperfectly) the major doctrinal areas of employment law, excluding discrimination and collective bargaining (each the subject of their own Stories volume). Although we had some ideas of our own, we followed the selections of our authors, each expert in the area about which they wrote.
- We begin with the stories behind a pair of foundational cases in the development of common law wrongful termination jurisprudence. The California Court of Appeal’s 1981 decision in was among a cluster of early state court decisions that began to raise questions about the virtually irrebuttable presumption that employment is at will, terminable at the pure discretion of the employer. Professor Joseph Grodin, who as an intermediate appeals judge wrote the opinion in , explains the context in which that case arose, how the case came to his court, and how it came to be assigned to his chambers. He discusses his own early interest, while teaching contract law, in the disparate way courts seemed to treat employment contracts as compared to other contracts, refusing to enforce promises of job security absent
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Chapter 9. The Story of the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A Drama in 5 Acts 85 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The story of Montana’s employment law has five phases. In the first, employment termination claims in Montana were governed by Montana Code § 39–2–503, first enacted in 1895 as part of Montana’s adoption of a comprehensive Civil Code modeled on the French Code Napoleon. For almost a hundred years, Montana employment law was built around a codified at-will rule, similar to other states’ common law at-will rule.
- Montana’s adoption of the statutory at-will rule is an important part of the WDEA story, and the story of employment law more generally, for three reasons. First, the history of the at-will provisions in Field’s codes, from his 1862 draft through the Dakota, California, and Montana versions and various drafts proposed in New York, undercuts the oft-repeated claim that the at-will rule was created by treatise writer Horace Wood in his 1877 treatise on master and servant law.
- Montana is distinctive not only for being the first state to replace the at-will rule with a statute but also for being one of six states (California, the Dakotas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Montana) to have codified the at-will rule rather than adopting it through the common law. The story of the WDEA thus has its roots in an earlier statutory story. As a result, the evolution of Montana wrongful discharge law takes the state from statute to statute, with an intervening period of common law dominance. And the tale is one of competition between the courts and the legislature, over which institution will determine the law of employment, raising important general questions about the role of common law courts. In recounting the story of the WDEA we will take a look at the history of the statute as well as at the history of its predecessors. Finally, we will examine the impact of the WDEA on the practice of law in Montana and on discharged employees’ claims, using statistics, to see if
- The employment-at-will rule forms the starting point for indefinite employment contracts in every state, except Montana after the passage of the WDEA. In most states the rule is a common law rule. The Montana Civil Code originated in a draft code prepared for New York by prominent nineteenth century lawyer David Dudley Field. California (in 1872) and Dakota Territory (in 1866) also adopted statutory at-will rules when they adopted versions of the same Civil Code. The story of the Montana at-will rule, a crucial piece of the larger story of the WDEA, thus starts in New York in 1846, where a new state constitution mandated a codification commission.
- Joseph Story et al., Codification of the Common Law, in The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story 698, 734 (William W. Story ed., 1852).
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Employment Law Stories 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Chapter 7. The Story of NLRB v. Washington Aluminum: Labor Law as Employment Law
- EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES
- Introduction: Nine Employment Law Stories
- Chapter 1. The Story of Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc.: “Implied in Fact” Promises in Employment Contracts
- Chapter 8. The Story of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: The Emergence of Employment Arbitration
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Chapter 7. The Story of NLRB v. Washington Aluminum: Labor Law as Employment Law 59 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Story of
- Had the NLRA worked as its New Deal proponents hoped, and promoted the stable and widespread unionization of the economy, “employment law” as we have come to know it would look very different today. Much of it arguably would not exist, for employees would have had recourse through collective bargaining and grievance procedures against many of the abuses of employer power that a great deal of employment law aims to curb. Employees would also have had something that the entire sprawling hodgepodge of employment law does not purport to give them: a collective role in the governance of the workplace and in determining their own terms and conditions of employment. But
- If you put this question to reasonably sophisticated observers of the law—say, upperclass law students—the overwhelming majority will say no. Or so I have found when I have polled students on a variety of discharge scenarios before they begin a course in employment law. Most of those students, while generally aware of the American regime of employment at will, already realize that there are exceptions to at-will employment—exceptions for status-based discrimination and for whistleblower retaliation, for example; they correctly identify many discharges that are unlawful on those grounds either nationwide or in many states. (And, unlike the less sophisticated laypersons surveyed by Professor Pauline Kim in her eye-opening studies, most of my students correctly identify many discharges that are lawful even though they appear unjustified.) ...of the job by walking out on the employer. My more informal inquiries suggest that most lawyers who do not specialize in labor and employment...
- So there is a rather simple explanation for the relative invisibility of the NLRA on the employment law landscape. But that explanation seems to beg another question: Why is this wrongful discharge law virtually alone, and at odds with much of the growing body of wrongful discharge laws and doctrines, in the limited nature of the remedial and procedural arsenal backing it up?
- We might simply conclude that employers and employees do not know much about the law generally. But contrast this state of unconsciousness about the NLRA’s protections with popular knowledge of antidiscrimination law. Employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex, for example, has hardly been obliterated. But it is almost universally and vociferously repudiated by employers, and it is the announced target of employer-created equal employment offices, antiharassment policies, grievance procedures, and other EEO compliance machinery. Antidiscrimination law has produced a rash of other more and less salutary “liability avoidance” measures, ranging from training of supervisors to avoid racially or sexually-charged language, to “sanitizing” of personnel files to remove such language after the fact.
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Contributors 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- is H. Ross and Helen Workman Professor of Law and Professor of Business at the University of Illinois College of Law and a Research Fellow of the NYU Center for Labor and Employment Law. He received his A.B. from Princeton, his J.D. and M.Pub.Aff. from the University of Texas at Austin and his Ph.D. (in economics) from M.I.T. He has written extensively on both employment at will and Montana’s legal history and is a co-author of
- is Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, director of its Center for Labor and Employment and co-director of its Opperman Institute of Judicial Administration. He has published several books including casebooks in labor law and employment discrimination and employment law; edited conference volumes on sexual harassment, employment ADR processes, and cross-global human resources; and authored over 100 articles in professional and academic journals. He received his A.B. from Columbia College, his M.S. (Industrial Relations) from Cornell University and his J.D. from Columbia Law School, where he was editor-in-chief of the Columbia Law Review. After clerking for the late Harold Leventhal of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, practicing for a year with a union-side law firm, and then clerking for the late Lewis F. Powell, Jr. of the U.S. Supreme Court, Estreicher joined the NYU faculty in 1978. He is the former Secretary of the Labor and
- is Professor of Law at Duke University School of Law, where she teaches and writes in the area of labor and employment law, civil procedure, and intellectual property. Professor Fisk is the coauthor of
- is the Allan R. Tessler Dean of the Cornell Law School. After earning an M.A. (in labor economics and industrial organization) a J.D. ( ) and a Ph.D. (in economics) from the University of Michigan, he clerked for the Hon. J. Dickson Phillips of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor before joining the Cornell faculty in 1983. He is reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Employment Law project. He is the co-author of
- is Professor of Law at Washington University School of Law in St. Louis. Prior to joining the faculty in 1994, she was a staff attorney at the Employment Law Center/Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, where she litigated cases involving race, sex and disability discrimination, racial and sexual harassment, and unlawful working conditions. She is a graduate of Harvard Law School and Harvard College and served as a clerk to the Honorable Cecil F. Poole on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Professor Kim is the co-author of
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Chapter 1. The Story of Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc.: “Implied in Fact” Promises in Employment Contracts 27 results (showing 5 best matches)
- When I was appointed to District One, Division One of the California Court of Appeal in 1979, virtually all of my career had been devoted to the practice, study and teaching of labor law. And that meant labor law in the traditional sense, the legal relationship between employers and unions and between unions and their members. For a union-side labor lawyer, what has come to be called employment law barely existed, except as unions might be involved on one side or the other in discrimination cases under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. There were federal wage and hour laws, to be sure, and state laws which regulated some aspects of the employment relationship, but this legislation seldom had significance for union-represented workers, since their collective bargaining agreements were almost always more worker-protective than the statutes.
- As a consequence, I had scarcely any exposure to what little law existed pertaining to job security, or to what we would now call “wrongful termination” law. Union-represented workers were typically covered by agreements that required just cause for discipline, subject to determination by an arbitrator. I recall reading, however, the excellent book by Philip Selznick and Philippe Nonet, two sociologists of the law at U.C. Berkeley, “Law, Society, and Industrial Justice”. The authors traced the development of the law of the employment relationship: from a preindustrial view that the relationship was one of status in which it was understood, on the basis of custom and policy, that employers had certain obligations toward their employees, including some guarantee of view that the employment relationship is contractual in nature and terminable at will.
- See’s brief also argued that since Pugh was free to resign his employment at any time, there was no “mutuality of obligation”, and that any promise See’s might have made to Pugh was not binding for that reason as well. But I recalled even from my law school days that the notion of “mutuality” as a condition to the enforcement of contracts had long since become archaic in contract law generally, and there seemed to be no persuasive reason to resurrect it for employment contracts.
- I found the doctrine puzzling, and discussed it with my class. The exchange of correspondence was arguably ambiguous, and perhaps did not support Ferreyra’s interpretation of the nature of Gallo’s commitment, but that was not the basis for the trial court’s ruling or the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal was certainly correct that under then-prevailing authority “independent” consideration seemed to be required in order to support a promise of “permanent” employment, but why? Was it because the courts did not believe that an employer would make such a promise unless the employer received something more than the employee’s labor? Or because the courts did not trust juries to evaluate the evidence in such a case? Whatever the reason, the requirement was certainly contrary to generally applicable contract law principles. It constituted, in effect, a special rule applicable to the employment relationship, and one which operated to the detriment of employment security....
- wrongful termination in violation of express and implied promises of continued employment, and in violation of public policy. Plaintiff also named as a defendant Bakers’ Local No. 125, a labor union which represented See’s workers, it being part of Pugh’s theory that the union had conspired to have him terminated. Pugh was represented by a San Francisco sole practitioner, Joseph P. Stretch, and See’s by Donald F. Farbstein of the San Mateo firm Farbstein, Brown & Pillsbury. Farbstein was an insurance defense lawyer, with no background in employment. The union was represented by Phillip J. Smith of the Oakland firm Smith, Clancy, Wright & Laws.
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Chapter 8. The Story of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: The Emergence of Employment Arbitration 54 results (showing 5 best matches)
- that employees could enter into binding predispute arbitration agreements encompassing claims they have against employers under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and by extension other federal and state employment laws. Although the ADEA and other federal statutes, viewed on their own terms, contemplate actions in court, the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA), as interpreted by the Court, requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements covering statutory as well as common law claims. The ruling did not come out of the blue. It had been prefigured by a series of decisions broadening the reach of the FAA, including the Court’s 1987 involved a state law claim, the plaintiff community might still have harbored the hope that the Court would rule differently when confronted with a claim arising under one of the hallmark federal anti-discrimination laws.
- A third open question concerns the role of generally applicable state law in voiding agreements for unconscionability or duress. It is clear from decisions like that state laws that subject arbitration agreements to special requirements are preempted by the FAA. Under § 2 of the FAA, arbitration agreements must stand on the same footing as other agreements. However, they do not enjoy any different status than other agreements; they are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Some courts, like the California Supreme Court, have seized upon this language to develop an active unconscionability jurisprudence to curb perceived employer overreaching in employment arbitration agreements.
- Any controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered representative by and with such member or member organization shall be settled by arbitration, at the instance of any such party, in accordance with the arbitration procedure prescribed elsewhere in these rules.
- (over Judge Edward Becker’s strong dissent), the Supreme Court granted Gilmer’s petition for writ of certiorari on October 1, 1990. The grant was expressly limited to the first question in the petition: “Are claims brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act … subject to compulsory arbitration?” e briefs: The organizations supporting Gilmer were the AFL–CIO, the American Associations of Retired Persons, and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; those supporting Interstate were the Center for Public Resources, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Equal Employment Advisory Council, and the Securities Industry Association.
- dashed those hopes. However, the Court did not decide the meaning of the exclusion in § 1 of the FAA for “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers engaged in , the issue had not been raised below, identified among the questions presented, or even briefed by Gilmer’s counsel. Justice White, writing for a 7–2 majority, was able to say that the § 1 exclusionary clause did not apply because Gilmer’s arbitration agreement was part of a registration process with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), rather than a contract of employment directly entered into with his former employer. Ten years later, in , reading the exclusion to “exempt from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers.” ushered in a new era of arbitration of employment disputes.
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- The Story of
- By and large, employment law accommodated this development. Firms may negotiate a wide range of employment contracts. The law imposes very few implied obligations to supplement those actually negotiated. For example, state courts retreated from earlier suggestions that an executive who had been around for a long time thereby acquired implied contractual rights to job security.
- Still, it is hard to figure out the compelling defense narrative. Sheehan and Lyerla had little expertise in trade secrets litigation—to be fair, not many lawyers did in 1994, including PepsiCo’s. Sheehan and Lyerla approached the case as employment litigation. For example, there was some attempt by Lyerla to portray Redmond as a kind of small fish who was being pushed around. emerge from these disparate defense efforts was a coherent story of why trade secrets were not a concern.
- One lawyer involved in the case thought that the defense was poorly served by this expanded team. At the hearing there were evident signs of lack of coordination on a common story, particularly on the trade secrets issue which by now dominated the proceedings. In truth it would have been hard to recover from the fatal puncturing of the initial defense story, that Redmond was being hired merely to implement an existing plan.
- Redmond, as his lawyer told the story a few years later,
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- Although inventions are a subject of considerable popular interest, the law governing employee inventors is somewhat technical and often falls through the disciplinary gap between employment law and intellectual property law. Employment lawyers often regard invention assignment agreements as being part of the arcane specialty of patent law, and patent or intellectual property lawyers tend to think of the issue as being simply a particular application of the law of employment contracts. As a consequence, the law governing invention assignments is a topic that intellectual property and employment lawyers tend vaguely to gesture at, uniformly acknowledging its importance yet still essentially ignoring it because they assume it falls into someone else’s bailiwick. The fate of the
- Ciavatta’s lament about the failures of law to do justice in his case, or in his life, identifies one of the most significant failings in our system of civil litigation, at least in the field of employment. Litigation is often ruinously expensive for the small business and the individual litigant. Remedies, when they come at all, often come too late. The problem is not unique to employment litigation. Stories of creative inventors whose lives were ruined and fortunes squandered in patent litigation are as old as Eli Whitney, who is said to have spent most of the money he made from his patents on the cotton gin prosecuting dozens of patent infringement cases that brought him no relief from his fear that others were pirating his ideas. The dogged determination of these inventors to claim
- The law of employee inventors developed on a parallel track with two other bodies of law governing rights to economically valuable workplace knowledge: the law of trade secrets and the law of restrictive covenants. As explained in chapter six of this book, courts will prevent an employee from using economically valuable knowledge in subsequent or competitive employment when the knowledge qualifies as a trade secret. In addition, an employer may enter into a “restrictive covenant” or “noncompete agreement” with an employee to prevent the employee from engaging in competitive employment. In both the trade secret and the restrictive covenant areas, courts recognize that excessively broad protection for the employer’s desire to prevent former employees from using knowledge gained at work can stifle competition, prevent the employee from finding employment, and retard the economic development and innovation that comes from the diffusion of talent and knowledge throughout the economy. On...
- The author wishes to thank Amin Aminfar, Duke Law class of 2007, for exceptional research and editorial assistance in the preparation of this chapter and Armand Ciavatta for sharing the story of his invention and his case.
- Over the course of the twentieth century, the law of employee inventors stabilized into three doctrinal categories. First, the default rule was that employees not hired specifically to invent owned the patents to all their inventions, regardless of when or where the employee conceived or developed the invention. Second, if the employee used work time or the employer’s facilities to develop the invention, the law gave the employer a shop right to the invention, but the employee could still license or sell the patent to others or manufacture or market the invention herself. Third, firms and employees could contract around the default rules of employee ownership and shop right in two ways. First, an employer who hired an employee specifically on the understanding that the employee’s job was to invent would be entitled to all patents produced in the scope of the employment contract. In this sense, the employment contract of a hiring to invent was deemed to overcome the default rule....
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Chapter 2. The Story of Woolley v. Hoffmann–La Roche: Finding a Way to Enforce Employee Handbook Promises 67 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At–Will
- decision reach back to the oft-told story of the American adoption of the employment-at-will rule during the late 1800s. Both the plaintiff and the New Jersey Supreme Court embraced the canonical account that credits Horace Gay Wood with inventing the rule and using his 1877 treatise on the law of master and servant to popularize it among the somewhat credulous judges of the time. On this view, courts endorsed Wood’s rule because it favored employers’ interests. Judges sought to encourage industrial activity and enforced the at-will presumption with a vengeance in order to ensure that employers would have more flexibility in labor relations than either the English rate-of-pay rule or reasonable notice requirements would have afforded. More recently, some scholars have questioned this traditional narrative. They have sought to defend Wood against the charge that the rule had no support in contemporary case law, ...bear in mind, however, that the court’s story of inevitable...
- to replace the “grudging” and reluctant approach of earlier case law with the more modern concept of protecting employees’ “reasonable expectations”—a transition that produced our contemporary understanding of employment contract law. Plaintiff’s counsel often struggled to express this theme clearly. Whatever their failings, however, Woolley’s attorneys earned their fee by relentlessly focusing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s attention on . Extensive quotations from both cases found their way directly from plaintiff’s briefs into the court’s opinion. Although those briefs were sometimes inartfully written, Woolley’s counsel cleverly encouraged the sort of jurisdictional cross-pollination that we so often see in this and other areas of employment law.
- Despite these historical cavils, no one can seriously doubt that, during the heyday of the employment-at-will doctrine, courts routinely ignored or discounted evidence of employer statements that employees reasonably might have understood to guarantee job security. New Jersey case law conformed closely to this pattern. In for example, the plaintiff was injured at work and agreed not to sue his employer in exchange for a written promise of lifetime employment. A New Jersey appellate court held that the writing was “no more than a friendly assurance of employment and … not sufficiently definite to make an enforceable contract.” In ...alleged agreement failed to specify a salary term or indicate how the parties intended to handle different types of disability and “other possible future contingencies.” In these cases, courts consistently imposed special requirements for enforcing employer promises of job security and exhibited the broad hostility to such claims that pervaded employment...
- Sometime after his formal termination in July 1978, Woolley contacted Haynes & Donnelly, a Detroit law firm that had developed a national reputation for plaintiff-side employment litigation. . However, the involvement of a Michigan law firm and Wahl’s prescient hunch about New Jersey’s willingness to embrace these arguments show that the jurisdictional cross-pollination in this area of employment law goes much deeper than is apparent from the text of the court’s opinion alone.
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Chapter 3. The Story of Johnston v. Del Mar: Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 45 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Display 3 shows the cumulative effects on employment (as a proportion of the state’s population) when a state first recognizes the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The display comes from a recent study by MIT economist David Autor with Yale law professor John Donohue and the present author. It plots the employment-to-population ratios (separately for men and women) in states that adopted the public-policy tort relative to states that did not adopt the tort from the 48 months prior to adoption to the 96 months following adoption. Points above the x-axis would indicate in increase in employment for adopting states, while points below the x-axis indicate a decline in employment for adopting states. As Display 3 reveals, there is no clear pattern either above or below the line. Even after adding other controls, the authors find the public-policy doctrine is associated with a small (0.1 to 0.2 percent) reduction in employment, but the effect is never...
- case in 1987, the tort of wrongful discharge was becoming well recognized in American common law, although the contours varied considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Just three decades earlier, the tort did not exist. The creation of this tort is a story in itself.
- The Court of Appeals expressly warned that it was not considering a broad whistleblower exception to employment at will. Rather, it limited its ruling to employees who inquired about their own potential criminal liability. We will return to the halting common-law protection of whistleblowers later in this chapter.
- Texas Employment Law Council’s Brief as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner Del Mar Distributing Co., Inc. at 3.
- Brief for Texas Employment Law Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at pp. 13–14, n. 4, Del Mar Distributing Co. v. Johnston, No. C–9282 (Jan. 25, 1990).
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Chapter 4. The Story of Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.: The Struggle to Protect Employee Privacy 44 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Beliefs about the nature of the employment relationship greatly influence views about the appropriate scope of the public policy exception—and whether it should apply in situations like Barbara Luck’s. For those who see employment primarily as a locus of exchange—labor for wages—the relationship between employer and employee is fundamentally a matter of contract. can be answered by looking to their agreement. If an employee has consented to undergo urinalysis drug testing—or vehicle searches or video surveillance—as a condition of employment, she cannot later complain about these practices. If the employee refuses to consent, no agreement is reached and the at-will employment simply terminates. On this view, the law should not step in to interfere with the parties’ agreement absent some fraud or coercion. And the public policy exception should be narrowly cabined to reach only those situations in which the employer’s decision to discharge has some negative effect on third parties—an...
- while they were staff attorneys at the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and the Employment Law Center of the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, respectively. I am grateful to all of these individuals for taking the time to speak with me about the case. In the interests of full disclosure, I report that I was employed as a staff attorney at the Employment Law Center of the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco in the past, but did not participate in the
- is one such case. Brought in the mid–1980s, it was one of the earliest cases to litigate the issue of workplace drug testing, and therefore, was important in developing the law regarding drug testing—and the law of employee privacy more generally. It is not a “landmark case” in the traditional sense—it was not decided by the United States Supreme Court; nor did it establish binding national precedent. The Supreme Court’s decisions in , are employed by private entities and the Fourth Amendment has no direct application. These employees must look for protection to state laws and in the mid–1980s it was quite unclear to what extent the existing patchwork of state constitutional, statutory and common law doctrines might protect employee privacy. is the story of how one court in California, confronted with an employee challenge to workplace drug testing, attempted to build a framework for analyzing employee privacy claims.
- The same lawyers who had tried the case for the employer—Robert Bogason of SP and Wayne Bolio of the law firm McLaughlin & Irvin—represented it on appeal. Luck’s attorneys, who primarily focused on trial work, brought in Ellen Lake, an appellate lawyer, to handle the appeal. A central challenge facing both sides was how to frame the debate over privacy rights and drug testing in the employment context.
- Privacy in Employment Law
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- This publication was created to provide you with accurate and authoritative information concerning the subject matter covered; however, this publication was not necessarily prepared by persons licensed to practice law in a particular jurisdiction. The publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other professional advice and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional.
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- Publication Date: January 17th, 2007
- ISBN: 9781599411187
- Subject: Employment Law
- Series: Law Stories
- Type: Overviews
- Description: Employment law is emerging as an important practice area. This title provides behind-the-scenes descriptions of the landmark cases; the litigants, the lawyers, the strategy; that helped shape this growing field. This account of emerging law is designed to help the student understand that, well before appellate judges are involved, the basic narrative and the doctrinal and policy potential of the case have been set by the decisions of litigants and their representatives. Several chapters are also devoted to the story behind some of the principal statutes in the area.