High Court Case Summaries on Property: A Contemporary Approach (Keyed to Sprankling and Coletta, 5th)
Author:
Editorial Staff, Publisher's
Edition:
5th
Copyright Date:
2021
134 chapters
have results for High Court Case Summaries
In re Estate of Oaks 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Stark, P. J.) No. While a gift made in anticipation of a donor’s suicide may not always qualify as a gift causa mortis, the doctrine applies where the undisputed facts show that the suicide was the result of a present mental illness. Under the doctrine of gift causa mortis, a gift made during the life of the donor becomes effective upon the donor’s death if the claimant can establish: (1) the donor had an intention to make a gift effective at death; (2) the donor made the gift “with a view to the donor’s death from present illness or from an external and apprehended peril”; (3) the donor died of that ailment or peril; and (4) there was a delivery of the gifted property. In this case, the circuit court reasoned while the manner of death may be suicide, that suicide may, in some cases, have been caused by a present mental illness—for instance, depression. Accordingly, the court concluded that even in a case in which the donor died by suicide, a party may be able to show that the...
- ...’s death on March 8, 2018. They were never married but lived together for approximately ten years. Oaks had an adult daughter, his only child, Cheri Wardell, who was not Stouff’s offspring and who had been estranged from her father for many years prior to his death. In the morning hours of March 8, 2018, Oaks committed suicide. After his death, Stouff found two handwritten notes, the first of which stated that Stouff had been Oaks’ companion for many years and that he was leaving all his worldly possessions to her. The second note was addressed to Stoff and said “This is all I can go with this—Thank you for being there for me all these years.” Wardell filed a petition for the formal administration of Oaks’ estate on March 23, 2018 and was named the Estate’s personal representative. Stouff filed claims against the Estate, contending that she was entitled to Oaks’s entire estate under the doctrine of gift causa mortis based on the first note left by Oaks. The circuit court...
- Oaks committed suicide and left all his worldly possessions to his romantic partner, Stouff, but the Estate challenged the gift, saying the doctrine of gift causa mortis does not apply in cases where the death is the result of suicide.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal by the Estate from a trial court judgment in favor of the donee on the claim of a gift causa mortis.
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Teller v. McCoy 3 results
- The concurring/dissenting opinion in this case points out the potential for unintended consequences if courts impose a standard of habitability too high for the market to bear.
- The majority opinion is not included in this case excerpt. The court adopted the implied warranty of habitability.
- (Neely, J.) Many people live in quarters which are less than luxurious because they cannot afford to pay more. Either the landlord, the tenant, or the government must pay for increases in housing standards. A landlord who makes substantial renovations must pass on costs to the tenant, who may then be given more luxury than he can afford. By analogy, if a court held that everyone had a natural law right to a Rolls Royce, many damage awards would follow against manufacturers of less elegant automobiles. But the manufacturers would soon go out of business, and very few Rolls Royces would come into the hands of the people whom the court sought to help.
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Neithamer v. Brenneman Property Services, Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Kessler, J.) Yes. A plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination in housing under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) even when the defendant denies knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected-class status if the plaintiff was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Neithamer (P) provided sufficient evidence to show that Brennan (D) rejected his housing application under circumstances which could give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Since homosexuality is not a protected ground under the FHA, Neithamer (P) must show he was discriminated against because of his HIV status, since HIV status is unquestionably a disability covered by the FHA. The court ruled that Neithamer (P) provided enough evidence to make a prima facie case of discrimination, since there were enough “clues” to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Brennan (D) suspected that Neithamer (P) was infected with HIV. To hold otherwise, by dismissing the
- District Court decision on landlord’s (D) motion for summary judgment on prospective tenant’s (P) claims of discrimination.
- Federal courts use a three-step approach to establish discriminatory intent under the FHA: (1) the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his conduct; and (3) if the defendant meets that burden, then the plaintiff must show that the reason is a mere pretext. Neithamer (P) relied on a disparate treatment approach to satisfy all of the elements of the required prima facie showing: he was a member of a class protected by the FHA, he was qualified and applied to rent, he was rejected, and the unit remained open thereafter. In some cases, plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case with statistical evidence which shows that a defendant’s conduct has a disparate impact on a group of people in a protected class.
- PRIMA FACIE CASE: A case in which a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to entitle him or her to a decision by the judge or jury. If no contrary or rebutting evidence is presented, the plaintiff receives a favorable decision.
- A plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination in housing under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) even when the defendant denies knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected-class status if the plaintiff was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
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White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. Part 2 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Vanna White (P) is the hostess of the televised “Wheel of Fortune” game show. A series of advertisements prepared by Samsung (D) that depicted the future included a Vanna White-looking robot on a Wheel of Fortune-type set. White (P) never consented to the ad nor was she paid. White (P) sued Samsung (D) and the advertising agency raising claims under the California Civil Code, the common law right of publicity, and the Lanham Act. The federal district court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor and White (P) appealed. The appellate court held in favor of White (P). The court declined to rehear the case. Circuit Judge Kozinski dissented from the order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing en banc.
- EN BANC: All the judges of the court hearing a case together as a full court. In appellate cases, a litigant can request or the court can move for a consideration of the case by all the judges of a court rather than by a fraction of them. En banc decisions are usually noted at the beginning of the opinion and are often regarded as more influential than decisions rendered by a smaller number of judges.
- The panel voted unanimously to deny the petition for rehearing in this case. However, a suggestion was also made for rehearing en banc. The full court was advised of the
- CASE, FINDING THAT IT DIMINISHES CREATIVITY
- CASE VOCABULARY
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White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Federal appellate court review of a district court decision granting summary judgment to the defendants.
- Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on White’s (P) right of publicity claim?
- (Goodwin, J.) Yes. A common law right of publicity claim is pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness to the defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury. The “name or likeness” element of the claim is given a broad interpretation. Prosser recognized early on that there could be an appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity, as by impersonation, without the use of either her name or likeness, and that this would still be an invasion of her right to privacy. In a case involving Bette Midler, for instance, the court held that even though the defendants had not used Midler’s name or likeness, the defendants, for their own profit in selling their product, appropriated part of Midler’s identity by using a Midler sound-alike. And Johnny Carson stated a viable right of publicity claim against the “Here’s Johnny” portable toilet company because, he...
- Vanna White (P) is the hostess of the televised “Wheel of Fortune” game show. A series of advertisements prepared by Samsung (D) that depicted the future included a Vanna White-looking robot on a Wheel of Fortune-type set. White (P) never consented to the ad nor was she paid. White (P) sued Samsung (D) and the advertising agency raising claims under the California Civil Code, the common law right of publicity, and the Lanham Act. The federal district court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor and White (P) appealed.
- The court emphasized that, viewed separately, the individual aspects of the advertisement in the present case say little. Viewed together, however, they leave little doubt about the celebrity the ad is meant to depict. The court offers an example to illustrate this point. Consider an advertisement that depicts a mechanical robot with male features, an African-American complexion, and a bald head. The robot is wearing black hightop Air Jordans and a red basketball uniform with black trim, baggy shorts, and the number 23 (though not revealing “Bulls” or “Jordan” lettering). The ad depicts the robot dunking a basketball one-handed, stiff-armed, legs extended like open scissors, and tongue hanging out. Now envision that this ad is run on television during professional basketball games. Considered individually, the robot’s physical attributes, its dress, and its stance tell us little. Taken together, they lead to the only conclusion that every sports fan would reach: the ad is about...
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Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Federal appellate court review of the district court decision granting summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.
- Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff’s infringement and dilution claims?
- Mattel (P), maker of the iconic Barbie doll, sued the music companies (collectively, “MCA (D)”) that produced, marketed, and sold the song “Barbie Girl,” recorded by the Danish band Aqua, for trademark infringement and dilution. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Mattel (P) appealed the district court’s ruling that Barbie Girl was a parody of Barbie and that MCA’s (D) use of the term “Barbie” was not likely to confuse consumers as to Mattel’s (P) affiliation with Barbie Girl or dilute the Barbie mark.
- ...believe is sponsored by the trademark owner. A trademark informs people that trademarked products come from the same source. There is no doubt that MCA (D) uses Mattel’s (P) mark in this case. Barbie Girl is the title of a song about Barbie and Ken. The lyrics confirm this. The song does not rely on the Barbie mark to poke fun at another subject, but targets Barbie herself. A title is designed to catch the eye and promote the value of the underlying work. Consumers expect a title to communicate a message, but they do not expect it to identify the producer. If we see a painting entitled “Campbell’s Chicken Noodle Soup,” we are not likely to believe that Campbell’s has branched into the art business. Nor, upon hearing Janis Joplin croon “Oh Lord, won’t you buy me a Mercedes-Benz?” would we suspect that she and the carmaker had entered into a joint venture. A title tells us something about the underlying work, but seldom speaks to its origin. Titles do not violate the Lanham...
- The United States District Court for the Central District of California had earlier determined that the Barbie Girl song was a parody and therefore protected by the First Amendment. The court balanced the First Amendment interests of MCA (D) while considering the traditional likelihood of confusion test. The court concluded that Mattel (P) would not likely succeed in establishing consumer confusion under the traditional test. Also, while the court acknowledged that there may be some incidental confusion because of the parody, the First Amendment interests carried greater weight.
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Marcus Cable Associates, L.P. v. Krohn 3 results
- Texas Supreme Court review of an appellate court decision reversing a grant of summary judgment.
- ...the Hill County Electric Cooperative an easement that allows the cooperative to use their property for the purpose of constructing and maintaining “an electric transmission or distribution line or system.” In 1991, Hill County Electric entered into a “Joint Use Agreement” with a cable-television provider, which later assigned its rights under the agreement to Marcus Cable Associates, L.P. (D). Under the agreement, Marcus Cable (D) obtained permission from Hill County Electric to attach its cable lines to the cooperative’s poles to “furnish television antenna service” to area residents. The cable wires were to be attached only to the extent Hill Country could lawfully do. Seven years later, the Krohns (P) sued Marcus Cable (D), alleging that the company did not have a valid easement and had placed its wires over their property without their knowledge or consent. Marcus Cable (D) asserted a right to use Hill County Electric’s poles under the cooperative’s easement. The trial court...
- The question in this case is whether a cable carrying an electric television signal to various users is “an electric transmission and distribution line or system” as we have come to understand more of what those words entail. If one were to stick just to the words, the answer would clearly be yes. A television cable is a “line”. A television signal is “electric.” Sending the signal is “an electric transmission.” Transmitting it among a number of users is “an electric distribution.” Thus, a television cable is “an electric transmission and distribution line.” I would hold that the easement in the present case can be shared with a cable television provider if the servient estate is not additionally burdened.
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Chapter Ten. Private Land Use Planning 2 results
- Fink (P) brought an action against Miller (D) to enforce a restrictive covenant limiting homeowners to wood shingles, and the trial court granted Miller’s (D) motion for summary judgment.
- Where changed or altered conditions in a neighborhood render the strict adherence to the terms of a restrictive covenant useless to the dominant lots, the court will not enforce such restrictions.
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O’Keeffe v. Snyder 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court from an Appellate Division decision granting summary judgment in favor of a painter who sought the return of paintings by way of an action for replevin
- ...three paintings that she had painted. The parties disagreed with respect to the facts of the case. According to O’Keeffe (P), the paintings were in her possession from the time that she painted them until 1946, when they were stolen from a gallery where they were on display. The paintings were uninsured and the theft was not reported until 1972, when O’Keeffe (P) authorized the reporting of the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. (ADAA), which maintained a registry of stolen paintings. In September 1975, O’Keeffe (P) learned that the paintings were on display in a New York gallery, and on February 11, 1976, she further discovered that Ulrich A. Frank (D) had sold the paintings to Barry Snyder (D) and the Princeton Gallery of Fine Art the prior year for $35,000. The defendants, Snyder (D) and Frank (D), offered a slightly different view of the facts. According to Frank (D), the paintings were in his family’s possession from as early as 1941, a date prior to their...
- court provides the reader with an introduction to one of the more important legal doctrines that arises in cases involving the unauthorized possession of property—the doctrine of adverse possession. Under the doctrine of adverse possession, a person who possesses a piece of property in a certain manner for a specified period of time can acquire good title to the property, thereby taking title away from the true owner. As the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote in the present case, to establish title to property by adverse possession, a person’s possession must be continuous, actual, hostile, visible, and exclusive, and must continue for the duration of a period of time established by the statute of limitations. Continuous possession is possession that is more than sporadic, though not necessarily constant, depending on the circumstances. For example, a person who builds a structure and resides on another person’s property for the entirety of the statutory period has continuous...
- (Pollock, J.) No. In order to avoid a harsh application of the statute of limitations, a cause of action for replevin does not accrue until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts that form the basis of the cause of action. On the limited record before us, we cannot determine who has title to the paintings; that determination will be made at trial. Nonetheless, it may aid the trial court if we resolve questions of law that may become relevant at trial. The critical legal question on appeal is when O’Keeffe’s (P) cause of action accrued, as the statute of limitations provides that an action for replevin of chattels must be commenced within six years after the accrual of the cause of action. A statute of limitations bars a cause of action after the statutory period has ended. To avoid the harsh results that might arise from a mechanical application of the statute, the courts have developed a concept known as...
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Larami Corp v. Amron 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Federal district court consideration of the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.
- ...or (2) is infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. If even one element of a patent’s claim is missing from the accused product, there is no infringement as a matter of law. In this case, only six claims are in dispute. They address the one thing that both products have in common—the use of air pressure created by a hand pump to dispense liquid. Larami (P) describes his product as having a chamber for ejecting a stream of liquid, but there is no chamber for liquid contained within the housing of the Super Soaker. The only element that could be described as a chamber for liquid is an external water reservoir located atop the housing. Liquid is located within the housing only when the trigger causes the liquid to pass from the external water reservoir through the tubing in the housing and out of the nozzle at the front end. Because the absence of even one element of a patent’s claim from the accused product means there can be no finding of literal infringement, the... ...cases...
- The maker of the Totally Rad Soaker sued the Maker of Super Soakers for patent infringement and the defendant moved for partial summary judgment.
- Larami (D) manufactured Super Soaker water guns. Amron (P) claimed that the Super Soakers infringed on the patent for his “Totally Rad Soaker”. Larami (D) moved for partial summary judgment finding noninfringement.
- Was the defendant entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s infringement claim?
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Prah v. Maretti 5 results
- Certified appeal to the state supreme court from summary judgment in an action for injunctive relief and damages.
- ...Second) of Torts defines private nuisance as a non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. The Restatement’s broad definition of “interest in the private use and enjoyment of land” would include access to sunlight. Maretti (D) argues that his right to develop his land is per se superior to Prah’s (P) right to sunlight. He cites the maxim “cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum,” which means that the owner of the land owns up to the sky and down to the center of the earth. However, a landowner’s rights are not unlimited. Even at common law, a landowner could acquire the right to receive sunlight by an express agreement or by the doctrine of “ancient lights.” Under this doctrine, if a landowner had received sunlight for a specified period of time, the landowner acquired a negative prescriptive easement to receive sunlight. American courts are less receptive to protecting sunlight and have rejected the ancient lights doctrine based on...
- Prah (P) owned a house with a solar heating system. Panels on the roof supplied energy for heat and hot water. Maretti (D) bought a lot next to Prah’s (P) and began plans for building a home. When Prah (P) learned of Maretti’s (D) plans, Prah (P) told Maretti (D) that the house would create a shadow on Prah’s (P) solar system and asked him to build the house a few feet over. They failed to reach an agreement. The subdivision architectural committee and the city planning commission approved Maretti’s (D) plans and planned location for his house. Prah (P) sued Maretti (D) for injunctive relief and for damages. The court denied Prah’s (P) motion for a temporary injunction. Maretti (D) filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. Prah (P) then appealed to the court of appeals, which certified the appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
- By applying the nuisance doctrine to the right to access to sunlight, the court takes a middle ground approach between completely denying the right and absolutely protecting it. Under the nuisance doctrine, the issue is reasonableness. Here, Prah (P) will be able to keep his solar panels and his access to sunlight if the factfinder concludes that Maretti’s (D) acts are unreasonable. Prah (P) will not be able to maintain access to the sun if the factfinder concludes that Maretti’s (D) use of his land is reasonable. Under this approach, the issues must be determined on a case-by-case basis, rather than based on an absolute rule.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Riordan v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. 5 results
- Federal district court hearing on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
- (Brack, J.) Yes. Unambiguous insurance contracts must be construed in their usual and ordinary sense, and when the language in the policy is unambiguous, the court will not strain the words to encompass meanings they do not clearly express. The policy in this case insures against a lack of right of access; it does not insure that the property has vehicular or any other type of access. Coverage for a lack of right of access is not triggered where access is merely impractical or difficult as long as the right to access exists. The plaintiffs also complain that they were deprived a right of access because the United States intended to reject any application for a special use authorization for vehicular access to the property, but the plaintiffs never applied for a special use permit. The plaintiffs further claim that the property was unmarketable, but the physical condition of the property does not render the title unmarketable. The plaintiffs had a right of access at all times and...
- Was the title insurance company entitled to summary judgment in its favor on the plaintiffs’ claim based on lack of vehicular access?
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Unambiguous insurance contracts must be construed in their usual and ordinary sense, and when the language in the policy is unambiguous, the court will not strain the words to encompass meanings they do not clearly express.
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Fink v. Miller 4 results
- Fink (P) brought an action against Miller (D) to enforce a restrictive covenant limiting homeowners to wood shingles, and the trial court granted Miller’s (D) motion for summary judgment.
- motion seeking injunctive relief to prevent the installation of fiberglass shingles on Miller’s (D) home. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Miller (D).
- Appeal from an order granting summary judgment to Miller (D).
- (Orme, J.) No. Property owners who have purchased land in a subdivision, subject to a recorded set of restrictive covenants and conditions, may lose the right to enforce such restrictions if the specific covenant they seek to enforce has been abandoned, thereby rendering the covenant unenforceable. The appropriate test to determine abandonment of such a covenant requires proof that existing violations are so great as to lead the mind of the average person to reasonably conclude that the restriction in question has been abandoned. In applying this test, courts consider the number, nature, and severity of the then existing violations, any prior enforcement of the restriction, and whether it is still possible to realize to a substantial degree the benefits intended through the covenant. To maximize the benefits of the essentially objective quality of this test, courts applying it should ...to go further. The undisputed facts in this case show that twenty-three out of eighty-one houses...
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- Defendant appeals from trial court’s grant of summary judgment and permanent injunction.
- This is the first decision that arguably extends the right of intimate association to roommates. Prior cases recognized the right among family members or between people involved in sexual relationships. The plain language of the FHA appears to cover the rental of any portion of a building intended for occupancy as a residence by one or more people, such as an apartment shared by roommates. However, the court in the present case chose a narrow interpretation in order to avoid potential conflict between the FHA’s prohibition on discrimination in housing and the constitutional right of intimate association.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Roommate.com (Roommate) (D), an internet listing service for people seeking roommates, allowed users to select preferences for roommate characteristics, such as sex, sexual orientation, and familial status. The Fair Housing Councils of San Fernando Valley and San Diego (FHCs) (P) sued Roommate (D) in federal court, alleging that the Roommate (D) website’s questions requiring disclosure of sex, sexual orientation, and familial status, and its sorting, steering, and matching of users based on those characteristics, violate the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
- . § 3602(b). A dwelling is thus a living unit designed or intended for occupancy by a family, meaning that it ordinarily has the elements generally associated with a family residence: sleeping spaces, bathroom and kitchen facilities, and common areas, such as living rooms, dens, and hallways. It makes practical sense to interpret “dwelling” as an independent living unit and to stop the FHA at the front door. There is no indication that Congress intended to interfere with personal relationships inside the home when it enacted the FHA. Congress wanted to address the problem of landlords discriminating in the sale and rental of housing, which deprived protected classes of housing opportunities. But a business transaction between a tenant and landlord is quite different from an arrangement between two people sharing the same living space. The Supreme Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into and carry on certain
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Hannah v. Peel 2 results
Obergefell v. Hodges 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Court addressed the dissent’s concern that perhaps the matter of same-sex marriage should be resolved by legislative action. However, the Court noted that there had been countless referenda, legislative debates, grassroots campaigns, studies, papers, books, and other writings, as well as extensive litigation, and the matter remained unresolved. The Court concluded that, were the Court to stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of the availability of specific public benefits to same-sex couples, those couples would continue to be denied many rights and responsibilities intertwined with marriage.
- CERTIORARI: To make sure. A writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court ordering the inferior court to produce records so that they may be examined for any irregularities, jurisdictional problems, or errors apparent on the face of the record. Most commonly used to refer to U.S. Supreme Court. The writ acts as a discretionary device for the Court to choose the cases it wishes to hear.
- Supreme Court review of a federal appellate court decision against the plaintiff.
- (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.) The Supreme Court is not a legislature. Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. Today, however, the Court takes the extraordinary step of ordering every State to license and recognize same-sex marriage. There is no serious dispute that, under our precedents, the Constitution protects a right to marry and requires States to apply their marriage laws equally. The majority purports to identify “principles and traditions” in this Court’s due process precedents that support a fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry. In reality, however, the majority’s approach has no basis in principle or tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Vernon Township Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. v. Connor 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In an appropriate case, our courts will invalidate restrictive covenants that have outlived their usefulness, which is what I believe the record demonstrates has occurred in this case.
- Review of a decision of the Superior Court reversing a decision of the trial court granting judgment for Connor (D).
- two bars located within two miles of the restricted tract. The trial court determined that the restrictive covenant prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages was valid and enforceable. The Superior Court reversed the trial court, holding that conditions in the neighborhood had changed, such that the restrictive covenant no longer had significant value to Connor (D) and the other defendants.
- The burden of proving changed seems like it would be a difficult one to meet. Even though a large majority of the homeowners indicated that they had no objection to the removal of the restriction for the Fire Department (P), and even though there were establishments selling alcohol only a short distance away, the court still held that the restriction was not obsolete. The court’s holding allows the property owners for whom the restriction is important to retain the benefit of the restriction, without allowing their neighbors to overturn their bargained-for condition.
- Where changed or altered conditions in a neighborhood render the strict adherence to the terms of a restrictive covenant useless to the dominant lots, the court will not enforce such restrictions.
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Juliana v. United States 3 results
- The plaintiffs in this case were 21 youths, ages 8 to 19. The U.S. Supreme Court has denied two separate petitions by the U.S. government’s (D), but has expressed skepticism about the underlying merits of the suit. The case has been appealed again, and as of March, 2019, is pending before the Ninth Circuit.
- Juliana (P) also raises public trust claims that apply the public trust doctrine to essential natural resources. In natural resources cases, the trust property consists of a set of resources important enough to the people to warrant public trust protection. The public trust doctrine imposes three types of restrictions on governmental authority: The property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by the ...(D) and intervenors argue that the public trust claims fail because the complaint focuses on harm to the atmosphere, which is not a public trust asset. It is not necessary at this stage to determine whether the atmosphere is a public trust asset because Juliana (P) has alleged violations of the public trust doctrine in connection with the territorial sea. Time and again, the Supreme Court has held that the public trust doctrine applies to “lands beneath tidal waters.” A number of Juliana’s (P) injuries relate to the...
- ...for a due process violation. To hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution affords no protection against a government’s knowing decision to poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its citizens drink. When a plaintiff challenges affirmative government action under the due process clause, the threshold inquiry is the applicable level of judicial scrutiny. The default level of scrutiny is rational basis, which requires a reviewing court to uphold the challenged governmental action if it implements a rational means of achieving a legitimate governmental end. When there is an infringement of a “fundamental right,” the proper standard is strict scrutiny. The affirmative actions of the United States (D) would survive rational basis review. The issue therefore is whether plaintiffs have alleged infringement of a fundamental right. Fundamental liberty rights include both rights enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution and rights and liberties which are either (1)...
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Diamond v. Chakrabarty 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Chakrabarty (P) invented a genetically engineered bacterium that was capable of breaking down crude oil and therefore valuable in treating oil spills. He applied for a patent for the process and the bacterium itself, and the latter was rejected and the grounds that bacteria are products of nature. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, and the case went to the Supreme Court.
- We must be careful to not extend patent protection beyond what Congress intended. When there is an absence of legislative direction, the courts should let Congress speak. In this case, however, there is no legislative vacuum. The Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act both evidence a congressional limitation on patentability that excludes bacteria. Moreover, the Patent Act does not include living organisms, whether human-made or not. It is the role of Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the patent laws, especially where, as here, the composition sought to be patented implicates matters of public concern.
- Supreme Court review of a patent court of appeals decision in the patentee’s favor.
- Chakrabarty (P) invented a bacterium that broke down crude oil and could be used to remediate oil spills; he applied for patents for the process and the bacterium, and the latter was initially denied, but the appellate court reversed the denial.
- The dissent’s concern relates to the controversy over and ethical questions raised by genetic engineering. Some people thought that any genetic engineering was “tampering with nature” or “messing with God’s work.” Were it not for that concern, the dissenters may not have looked so hard for justification for their conclusion that the micro-organism in this case was not patentable. Plant patent laws do not adequately address questions of bacteria patents.
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Sundowner, Inc. v. King 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In 1966, Bushnell (P) sold the Sundowner Motel to King (D). Bushnell (P) then built another motel, the Desert Inn, on adjoining property. Later, King (D) brought an action against Bushnell (P) based on alleged misrepresentations by Bushnell (P) in the 1966 sale of the property. In 1968, King (D) erected a large structure between the properties. The structure was 85 feet long, 18 feet high, raised two feet off the ground, and two feet from the Desert Inn property. Bushnell (P) brought an action against King (D) seeking damages and injunctive relief compelling removal of the structure. The district court found that the structure was erected out of spite and in violation of a municipal ordinance. The court ordered the structure reduced to a maximum height of six feet. King (D) appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that the structure was a fence when it was actually a sign, that it had little or no advertising value, that it cut out light and air from the Desert Inn...
- An injunction is an equitable remedy in which the court orders a party to perform or to desist from a particular act. A , the court may order a school to admit a particular student). A , the court may prohibit a school from suspending or expelling a student). An is any injunction issued prior to trial to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff while the court considers whether to grant permanent relief. It is granted for a limited time only. There are two types: (1) a “preliminary injunction,” which is granted after the defendant has received notice and has had an opportunity to participate in a hearing on the issue; and (2) a “temporary restraining order,” which is granted without notice to the defendant in situations where the plaintiff will suffer irreparably if immediate relief is not granted. A , as ordered in this case, is a final disposition in the suit and is indefinite in length of time.
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- THE COURT WILL NOT TOLERATE A “SPITE FENCE” THAT SERVES NO USEFUL PURPOSE
- Did the trial court err in ordering abatement of the defendant’s structure?
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Eldred v. Ashcroft 5 results
- The Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) enlarged the duration of copyright protection by 20 years, to run from the time of a work’s creation until 70 (previously 50) years after the author’s death. As with prior extensions of copyright protection, Congress made the new term applicable to both existing and future copyrights. The petitioners in this case were individuals and businesses that offered products or services built on copyrighted works that had gone into the public domain— , their copyright protection had expired. They argued that application of the new extended term to existing copyrights went beyond Congress’s Constitutional power. The district court and court of appeals rejected the challenge, and the case went to the Supreme Court.
- Supreme Court review of an appellate court ruling affirming the district court’s decision against the petitioners.
- the copyright period, thereby keeping works out of the public domain. The majority is especially deferential to Congress in this case, suggesting that, in its opinion, the CTEA is basically judicially unreviewable.
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- ...and existing copyrights. This practice reflects a judgment best stated by Representative Huntington at the time of the 1831 Act extending the term of copyright protection: “[J]ustice, policy, and equity alike forb[id]” that an “author who had sold his [work] a week ago, be placed in a worse situation than the author who should sell his work the day after the passing of [the] act.” The CTEA is not an impermissible exercise of Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause. As we read the Framers’ instruction, the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause. The petitioners urge that Congress pursued bad policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long terms. The wisdom of Congress’s action is not within our province to second-guess. We are satisfied that the legislation before us remains inside the domain the Constitution assigns to the First Branch, and we affirm the judgment of the court...
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Cole v. Steinlauf 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Although the language of the 1945 deed to the grantee “and his assigns” may create a full fee title, this assessment is not without reasonable doubt such that the purchasers (P) in this case had a right to reject the seller’s (D) deed and recoup their deposits. In common law jurisdictions, like Connecticut, a deed granting title “to grantee and his assigns forever” vests only a life estate in the grantee. Deeds where the term “and his heirs” has been left out can be reformed to convey fee simple title if that was the parties’ clear intention. Since the court did not have the parties to the 1945 deed present, it could not determine those parties’ intentions. Although the seller (D) cited many cases indicating that the title was in fact a fee simple, this is not the issue. The more important question is whether the 1945 deed could cause the purchasers (P) reasonable doubt about the marketability of the title. In essence, to say as the trial court did that the purchasers (P) must...
- (Baldwin, A.J.) Although it was not within the purview of the court in this case, “the true intent” of the parties to convey a fee simple may be shown in equity. Absent an action appropriate to make that determination, the purchasers (P) are justified in rejecting the title offered by seller (D).
- In the past, a deed had to contain the language “to A and his heirs” to create a fee simple. Now, almost every state has statutes and case law indicating that courts will first try to determine whether the grantor intended to convey a fee simple even if the deed does not contain the “magic words.” Even when courts cannot discern an explicit intention, the law favors fee simple estates because they are more certain and permanent. Where the parties’ intentions are not clear from the document they created, other evidence will be necessary to determine their states of mind. If a deed is “to A and his heirs,” however, it clearly conveys a fee simple estate, and courts and parties are spared the rigors of interpreting the intentions of a distant grantor.
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- Plaintiffs-purchasers’ appeal from a trial court ruling that the seller had delivered marketable, fee simple title to property despite a prior deed that conveyed the property to the grantee “and assigns” rather than “and heirs.”
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State v. Shack 5 results
- Property rights are rarely absolute. Instead, they tend to be overshadowed by the courts’ judgment of what the public interest requires. The Supreme Court often allows intrusions on private property that has been historically a “public forum” (
- AMICUS CURIAE: (“Friend of the court.”) In litigation, a non-party who files a supplementary “amicus” brief on behalf of a party, because the non-party (usually a government agency or interest group) has an interest in the case’s outcome and precedent.
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- ...to trespass by the owner . . . is . . . disorderly . . . and shall be punished by a fine [up to] $50].”). Plantation owner Tedesco housed his migrant laborers at a camp on his land. Federal public interest organization workers—attorney Shack (D) and health inspector Tejeras (D)—wanted to enter the camp to interview the laborers and tell them their legal rights. Tedesco refused to let Shack (D) and Tejeras (D) meet privately with the laborers. When Shack (D) and Tejeras (D) insisted, Tedesco called a state trooper and had them charged with trespass. Shack (D) and Tejeras (D) were convicted. On appeal, the convictions were upheld. Shack (D) and Tejeras (D) appealed again, claiming the anti-trespass statute is unconstitutional, because (i) First Amendment case law guarantees the right to pamphleteer in “company towns,” and (ii) applying the state law to hinder federal employees authorized to aid laborers violates the Supremacy Clause. Interested observers—the Federal Government...
- ...visiting migrant farmworkers. The defendants’ constitutional claims are unsupported by clear case law, but trespass statutes should not isolate migrant farmworkers, for public policy reasons. Property rights serve human values, and should not subvert human rights. Migrant farmworkers are socially disadvantaged, being isolated, unorganized, poor, and voteless. Their plight justly requires federal aid to improve their living conditions and skills. If property owners could use property law to isolate farmworkers, the law would undermine the federal government’s worthy mandate. Applying property law requires balancing the rights of landowners and tenants. The relative importance of each one changes over time; historically, America moved from absolute ownership to greater recognition of the public interest. It is pointless to decide whether migrant farmworkers housed in on-site camps are technically “tenants.” Whatever they are, they must not be isolated from visitors by property...
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Gazvoda v. Wright 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Courts may acknowledge contributions made by a party to another party’s business when the two parties are cohabitating. However, courts will generally decrease the value of the contributing party’s interest in the business in these cases, recognizing as the trial court did here that “the presumption of an equal division of assets that would apply in a dissolution of marriage does not apply.” Courts have not determined a formula or standard for determining the value of the contributing party’s share of the assets that accumulate during the cohabitation. Generally, courts will consider the nature of the individual and joint contributions of the parties, the representations made by the parties regarding their ownership of the assets, and whether those representations resulted in the expectation that the parties shared the assets.
- Gazvoda (P) and Wright (D) were cohabitants who began living together in 1988. At that time, Wright (D) was still in high school, and Gazvoda (P) was twenty-eight and earning $9.00 per hour. They lived in a small rental home, and their combined net worth was less than $2,000.00. Gazvoda (P) obtained his electrician’s license and Wright (D) dropped out of high school after Gazvoda (P) asked her to accompany him to job sites in order to learn the electric business so they could start an electrical business of their own. Over the course of four years, the parties worked together every day building up their electric business. During that time Wright (D) neither received nor asked for compensation for her work. In September 1993, Wright (D) gave birth to the parties’ daughter. She stopped most of the work she did for the electrical business and devoted her time to taking care of the child. Shortly after their daughter was born, the parties opened a joint checking account in the name of...
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- Gazvoda (P) claimed that the trial court erred when it found that he was unjustly enriched and that Wright (D) was entitled to a share of the assets they accumulated while they were cohabitating.
- Appeal by the plaintiff from a trial court judgment in favor of the defendant on defendant’s claim of unjust enrichment.
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- In 1884, John Rigney and his wife conveyed by deed certain property to the Tacoma Light and Water Company. Per the deed, the property was to be used to provide a right of way to conduct fresh water to the city. If at any time the city or its successors ceased using the land for that purpose, it would be lawful for Rigney or his heirs (D) to re-enter the property and reclaim possession. In 1905, the property was set aside for park purposes and the Metropolitan Park District (P) succeeded the city as owner, which change in ownership was not formalized by deed until 1951. In 1920, tennis courts were constructed on the property, but they fell into disrepair and were rarely used. Decades later, the Park District (P) initiated this action to quiet title to the parcel. Rigney’s (D) heirs counterclaimed, alleging breach of the condition subsequent. All parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion of the Park District (P) and entered a decree quieting title. The trial
- State supreme court review of a trial court decision in the Park District’s (P) favor.
- automatically upon the happening of the event named, whereas with a condition subsequent the possessory estate does not vest immediately. The grantor must first elect to terminate the granted estate before a possessory estate vests in him. The District (P) argues that it took title to the property by adverse possession, but that argument makes no sense because the District’s (P) interest in the property was not adverse to anyone’s. However, the holder of a right of entry, following a continuing breach of a condition, is not entitled to endlessly sit by refusing to declare a forfeiture and thus control the use of the property indefinitely. The condition in this case was in continuous breach since sometime prior to 1905. We cannot say that the delay in claiming a forfeiture was either reasonable or warranted. The time for an election has long since passed and the condition has expired. The decree quieting title in the District (P) is affirmed.
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- ...of both white pages and yellow pages. The white pages listed each subscriber’s name, town, and phone number; the yellow pages listed the businesses in the community and included revenue-generating display advertising. Feist (D) was a publishing company that published telephone directories covering a broader geographic area. Feist (D) competed directly with Rural (P) for advertisers. Feist (D) was not a phone company, so it did not have direct access to subscribers’ telephone numbers the way Rural (P) did. Feist (P) was able to enter into licensing agreements with the service providers for the other communities covered by its publications, but Rural (P) refused to allow Feist (D) access to its listings. Litigation ensued, and the district court held that Rural’s (D) refusal was based on the unlawful purpose of extending its monopoly in the telephone business. Feist (D) then used Rural’s (P) listings without Rural’s (P) consent. Rural (P) had planted several fake listings...
- Supreme Court review of a federal appellate court decision in the plaintiff’s favor.
- In this unanimous opinion delivered by Justice O’Connor, the Court held that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist (D) were not original to Rural (P) and therefore were not protected. The Court reasoned that Rural’s (P) white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection, because the information they included lacked the requisite originality. Rural (P) had not selected, coordinated, or arranged the uncopyrightable facts in any original way. The Court concluded that, “[b]ecause Rural’s [(P)] white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist’s [(D)] use of the listings cannot constitute infringement.”
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- The New York Court of Appeals heard the issue of just compensation on remand. The Court said the $1 sum was sufficient because cable service usually increases the value of a building, particularly in the eyes of potential renters. With this in mind, it would appear that Loretto (P) brought this suit for nothing. Granted, Teleprompter’s (D) installations did constitute an occupation, but the Court of Appeals recognized it had increased the value of Loretto’s (P) property. The presence of cable television likely made the property more attractive to potential renters in a city where high-rise structures impaired television reception. It was also a taking that the tenants who desired cable service presumably wanted. In addition, Teleprompter (D) could have argued that its cable television service, authorized by the city, equaled a public use. In California, at least, the courts have declared that the promotion of public recreation and education is a legitimate public purpose. The...
- Appeal from summary judgment for the defendant in a class action for damages and injunctive relief
- ...were attached directly to the masonry. This cable served as a “crossover” line, helping provide other buildings on the block with CATV. Loretto (P) purchased the building in 1971. Teleprompter (D) connected a direct, “noncrossover” cable line to the building two years later. Earlier, the state had enacted Executive Law § 828, effective January 1, 1973, which provided that a landlord “may not interfere with the installation of cable facilities upon his property or premises.” The State Commission on Cable Television said that a landlord is only entitled to a one-time $1 fee for installation. Loretto (P) was not aware of the cable until after she bought the building. Loretto (P) brought a class action against Teleprompter (D) on behalf of all owners of real property in the state on which Teleprompter (D) placed its components. She (P) claimed it was a trespass and, insofar as it relied on § 828, a taking without just compensation. The City of New York intervened. The trial court...
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- (Marshall, J.) Yes. A permanent physical occupation of an owner’s property authorized by the government constitutes a taking of property that requires just compensation, regardless of the public interests it may serve. A permanent occupation has long been viewed as arguably the most serious invasion of an owner’s property interests. A classic example of this is found in cases where a person constructs a dam that permanently floods another person’s property. A permanent physical occupation prevents the owner from both possessing the occupied space and excluding the occupier from possession and use of it. This power to exclude is one of the most important elements in an owner’s “bundle of property rights.” The owner is denied any control over the use of the property. Though an owner may still
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- Moore (P) argued that his case was similar to those in which courts have recognized a property interest in one’s own name and likeness, known as the “right of publicity” cases. The court here quickly dispensed with this argument, concluding that body parts, like the spleen at issue here, are not unique to each individual, but rather are common to all humans. Under the law, property is not so much about things but rather about rights over things: the right to use, to possess, to exclude, and to transfer/sell. Thus, in this case, the discussion turns, at least in part, on who has the right to sell or gift the spleen, or excised body parts in general. As demonstrated by the judges’ differing opinions, this is hardly a settled issue.
- Appeal by the defendants to the state supreme court after the appeals court ruled that a cause of action in conversion was properly pled and could be sustained under the law.
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- ...components were of great value for medical and scientific research. On October 8, 1976, Dr. Golde (D) recommended that Moore’s (P) spleen be removed in order to slow down the progression of his disease. Based upon this recommendation, Moore (P) consented to the procedure. From November 1976 to September 1983, Moore (P) returned to the UCLA-MC several times based upon Golde’s (D) recommendations that the visits were needed for Moore’s (P) health and well-being. During each of these visits, Dr. Golde (D) withdrew samples of blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm. By using these tissue and fluid samples from Moore (P), Dr. Golde (D) was able to develop a cell line for which a patent was issued with Dr. Golde (D) and Quan (D) as inventors and the Regents (D) as assignee. The value of the cell line was estimated to be as high as $3.01 billion by 1990. Through various contractual agreements with the Genetics Institute (D) and Sandoz (D), Dr. Golde (D), Quan (D),...
- To establish a conversion, a plaintiff must show an actual interference with his ownership or right of possession. However, where a plaintiff has neither possession of nor title to property alleged to have been converted, he cannot maintain an action for conversion. This Court is unaware of any reported decisions holding that a person retains sufficient interest in excised cells to support a cause of action for conversion. The laws governing such things as human tissue, fluid, etc. deal with human biological materials as objects sui generis, regulating their disposition to achieve policy goals rather than abandoning them to the general law of property. It is these specialized statutes to which courts ordinarily should and do look for guidance on the disposition of human biological materials. California statutory law drastically limits a patient’s control over excised cells. Health and Safety Code
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Stambovsky v. Ackley 5 results
- The court’s decision rests upon the idea that the policy reasons for the doctrine of caveat emptor are not met in the case of a haunted house. The court finds that the existence of poltergeists is a material issue in the sale. And the court implies that it would be undesirable to require all buyers to bring mediums or psychics to every house they purchase. For this reason, to best provide protection for the buyer and to avoid ridiculous consequences, the court is willing to make a substantial inroad into the limitation of the doctrine of caveat emptor.
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- (Smith, J.) This court should not overturn the doctrine of caveat emptor because of the purported existence of poltergeists.
- Ackley (D) sold her house in the Village of Nyack to Stambovsky (P), a resident of New York City. Stambovsky (P) then discovered that the house was known in the area to be haunted. Ackley (D) had perpetuated that rumor by reporting the presence of ghosts in her local newspaper and to Reader’s Digest, and by including the home in a walking tour of Nyack. She had not told Stambovsky (P) that the house was haunted. Stambovsky (P) sought to rescind the contract, but the trial court dismissed the cause of action because of the doctrine of caveat emptor.
- ...creates a basis for rescission as a matter of equity. Preliminarily, the impact of the house’s ghostly reputation goes to the very essence of the bargain. As Ackley (D) was responsible for circulating the folklore that the house was haunted, it is not for the court to decide whether there are, in fact, poltergeists in the house. Rather, Ackley (D) is estopped to deny the existence of ghosts, and the house is, as a matter of law, haunted. While the real estate broker, as agent for the seller, was under no duty to disclose the existence of poltergeists, equitable considerations suggest that the contract should be rescinded. It is difficult, and unusual, for a prospective buyer to order an inspection for ghosts. Additionally, we do not want to create a precedent that suggests that buyers should inspect for ghosts. Caveat emptor is appropriate where the buyer has equal opportunity to discover information about the house. A traditional means of refuting the doctrine was to show that...
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- When enforcing equitable servitudes, courts are generally disinclined to question the wisdom of agreed-to restrictions. This rule does not apply, however, when the restriction does not comport with public policy. The limitations on the equitable enforcement of restrictive servitudes that are either arbitrary or violate fundamental public policy are specific applications of the general rule that courts will not enforce a restrictive covenant when the harm caused by the restriction is so disproportionate to the benefit produced by its ...conclude, as a matter of law, that the recorded pet restriction of Lakeside Village (D) is not arbitrary, but is rationally related to health, sanitation and noise concerns legitimately held by residents of a high-density condominium project. Nahrstedt’s (P) complaint alleges no facts that could possibly support a finding that the burden of the restriction on the affected property is so disproportionate to its benefit that the restriction is...
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- Review of an order of the Court of Appeal reversing an order sustaining a demurrer.
- Nahrstedt (P) owned three cats. She bought a unit in Lakeside Village (D), a 530-unit condominium complex. The declaration for Lakeside Village (D) filed with the County Recorder, include a restriction against keeping cats, dogs, and other animals in the Lakeside Village (D). Nahrstedt (P) claimed that she did not know of the restriction when she purchased her unit. She brought suit against Lakeside Village, claiming that the restriction was “unreasonable” as applied to her because she kept her cats indoors and because her cats were “noiseless” and “created no nuisance.” The trial court sustained Lakeside Village’s (D) demurrer to Nahrstedt’s (P) complaint. The Court of Appeal agreed with the premise underlying Nahrstedt’s (P) complaint, and concluded that the homeowners association could enforce the restriction only upon proof that Nahrstedt’s (P) cats would be likely to interfere with the right of other homeowners “to the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of their property.”
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PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- While this was not the first case to address the concept of inevitable disclosure in relation to trade secrets, the holding did legitimize the argument and paved the way for many new cases that would go on to make similar arguments. As technology continues to advance, many commenters have recognized that trade secrets are less and less likely to be concrete formulas to which the court can make easy reference. This will ultimately result in inconsistent rulings across states. Many argue that there should be a clear nationwide standard for inevitable disclosure.
- Yes. Inevitable misappropriation may satisfy the “actual or threatened misappropriation” requirement under the trade secrets laws. Under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, a court may enjoin the “actual or threatened misappropriation” of a trade secret. A party seeking an injunction must therefore prove both the existence of a trade secret and the misappropriation. Under the ITSA, a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets. In this case, the court found that PepsiCo (P) had presented evidence that demonstrated inevitable misappropriation for purposes of an injunction under the ITSA. Redmond (D) had extensive and intimate knowledge about PespiCo (P) North American Division’s strategic goals for 1995 in sports drinks and new age drinks. Although Redmond (D) signed an agreement with Quaker (D) not to reveal PepsiCo’s (P) trade secrets, Redmond (D) and...
- Quaker (D) and PepsiCo (P) were competitors in the sports drink and new-age drink markets. Redmond (D) worked for PepsiCo’s (P) North American Division (“PCNA”) for 10 years. During that time, Redmond (D) learned various PepsiCo (P) trade secrets, including PCNA’s Strategic Plan (which contained its plans to compete and other important company strategies) as well as PCNA’s Annual Operating Plan (which specified financial goals, marketing plans, promotional event calendars, growth expectations, and operational changes for the 1995 year). In 1994, Redmond (D) accepted the position as chief operating officer of Quaker’s (D) Gatorade and Snapple divisions. PepsiCo (P) brought suit against Redmond (D) and Quaker (D), under the Illinois Trade Secret Act (ITSA). The district court issued an order enjoining Redmond (D) from assuming his position at Quaker through May, 1995. The court held that PepsiCo (P) had a reasonable likelihood of success on its claim for trade secret misappropriation....
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- A district court temporarily enjoined Redmond (D) from assuming his position at Quaker (D) and permanently enjoined him from using or disclosing trade secrets of his former employer, PepsiCo (P).
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Effel v. Rosberg 5 results
- The court’s determination of the property interest in this case (tenancy at will) does not appear to have been contemplated by the tenant, the landlord, or the previous owners. In fact, the landlord sought to terminate the lease by invoking the tenant’s violation of covenants in the lease, rather than by attempting to terminate without cause. Additionally, the purported “leasehold for life” in this case was part of a larger transaction between the previous owners of the property, whose attorney drafted the lease, and the landlord.
- (Morris, J.) Yes. Under the Texas rule, a lease must be for a certain period of time or it will be considered a tenancy at will. Courts that have applied this rule to leases that state they are for the term of the lessee’s life have concluded that the uncertainty of the date of the lessee’s death rendered the lease terminable at will by either party. In this case, not only was the term of the lease stated to be for the uncertain length of Effel’s (D) life, but her tenancy was also “until such time that she voluntarily vacates the premises.” If a lease can be terminated at the will of the lessee, it may also be terminated at the will of the lessor. Because the lease at issue was terminable at will by either party, the trial court’s first conclusion of law was correct. Affirmed.
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- Appeal by tenant (D) from trial court’s judgment awarding landlord (P) possession of property in a forcible detainer action.
- ...the owners of the property at issue in this case. As part of the settlement, Rosberg (P) purchased the property. The settlement agreement stated that the current resident of the property, Effel (D), “shall continue to occupy the property for the remainder of her natural life, or until such time as she voluntarily chooses to vacate the premises.” The settlement agreement further stated that a lease agreement incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement would be prepared before the closing date of the purchase. Effel (D) was neither a party nor a signatory to the settlement agreement. The previous owners deeded the property to Rosberg (P) with no reservation of a life estate for Effel (D). A lease for Effel (D) was prepared by the previous owners’ attorney. The term of the lease was “for a term equal to the remainder of the Lessee’s [Effel’s (D)] life, or until such time that she voluntarily vacates the premises.” The lease provided that if there was any default in...
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Selle v. Gibb 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The court’s decision in this case turned in large part on the insufficiency of the expert testimony. To bolster the expert’s conclusion that independent creation was not possible, there should have been some testimony of the relative complexity or uniqueness of the two compositions. In addition, the expert was experienced in classical, but not popular, music. The expert’s testimony also failed to address the element of prior common source. Because the plaintiff relied nearly exclusively on his expert to make his case, he failed to meet his burden of proof.
- The plaintiff relies on the testimony of his expert witness that the two pieces were strikingly similar. Striking similarity means that the similarities are of a kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source. In order for striking similarity to establish a reasonable inference of access, the plaintiff must show that the similarity is of a type that will preclude any explanation other than that of copying. The burden of proving striking similarity is on the plaintiff. In this case, the evidence of striking similarity was not compelling, and the plaintiff failed to establish a basis from which the jury could reasonably infer that the Bee Gees (D) had access to his song. The district court’s granting of the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is therefore affirmed.
- Federal appellate court review of the district court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the defendants’ favor.
- ...of copyright infringement of a musical composition, the plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of the copyright in the complainant’s work, (2) originality of the work, (3) copying of the work by the defendant, and (4) a substantial degree of similarity between the two works. The only element at issue in this appeal is proof of copying; the first two elements are essentially conceded, while the fourth, substantial similarity, is closely related to the third element under the plaintiff’s theory of the case. Proof of copying is paramount, because no matter how similar two works are, there is no infringement if there is no copying. In order to prove copying, it is essential to establish access. The plaintiff may be able to establish access if the work was widely disseminated to the public. If there is no direct evidence of access, an inference of access may be established when the similarity is so striking that the possibility of independent creation is, as a practical matter, precluded...
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Slone v. Calhoun 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case is highly distinguishable from , on which the court relies. Unlike in , this case involves abandonment of the contested property and a voluntary termination of the underlying contract.
- case controlled the court’s decision here. In , the court emphasized that there was no practical distinction between land sale contracts and purchase money mortgages, in which the seller conveys legal title to the property but retains a lien on the property to secure payment. In a typical land sale contract, legal title to the property remains in the seller until the buyer has paid the entire contract price or some agreed-upon portion thereof, at which time the seller tenders a deed to the buyer. However, equitable title passes to the buyer when the contract is executed. The seller holds nothing but the bare legal title as security for payment of the purchase price.
- (Taylor, J.) No. A forfeiture provision in an installment land sale contract that provides for the forfeiture of the buyer’s payments upon the buyer’s default is invalid and not enforceable. This is not unlike a mortgage situation, in which a purchaser who defaults has the right to redeem the property by paying the full debt plus interest and expenses. In order to cut off the mortgagor’s right to redeem, the mortgagee must request that the court sell the property at public auction. From the proceeds of the sale, the mortgagee recovers the amount owed on the mortgage, plus expenses, and the mortgagor is entitled to the balance, if any. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Slone (P) forfeited her interest in the property. Not only does Slone (P) have an equitable ownership interest, she also has redemption rights in the property under applicable Kentucky law. The only judicial remedy is a judicial sale of the property. The forfeiture provisions set forth in the...
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- Slone (P) moved out of her mobile home after making payments for years under an installment land sale contract and, in litigation over the matter, the trial court held that she had forfeited all interest in the property, including the payments she already made.
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Reynolds v. Bagwell 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- motive must be shown in all cases need not be determined in this case, the court said, but there must always be acts of an affirmative character. Mere failure to give information is not enough. Silence with or without knowledge is not concealment.
- State supreme court review of a trial court decision in the plaintiff’s favor.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Deception, deceit, or trickery. An act using deceit such as intentional distortion of the truth or misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact to gain an unfair advantage over another in order to secure something of value or deprive another of a right. Fraud is grounds for setting aside a transaction at the option of the party prejudiced by it or for recovery of damages. “Actual fraud” involves a deliberate misrepresentation or concealment. A court may infer “constructive” or “legal fraud” either from the nature of a contract or from the relationship of the parties.
- In March 1938, the plaintiff instituted a replevin action against the defendant for the recovery of a violin, bow, and case, which the plaintiff alleged were stolen from him in 1933. The plaintiff discovered the violin in the defendant’s possession in 1938 and demanded it back, but the defendant refused. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had acquired the violin immediately after it had been stolen and sought to conceal the identity by altering its appearance. The defendant countered that he purchased the property in good faith and for value and that he had it, without alteration, for more than five years. The jury reached a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
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- court accepted the township’s representation that its ordinance was not adopted “with any desire or intent” to exclude minority groups. Courts generally uphold certain growth control ordinances like the one in this case when they are adopted for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. In this case, although Mount Laurel (D) articulated a non-discriminatory rationale for the ordinance, the effect was to exclude minority groups and persons of limited incomes.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey from a ruling that Mount Laurel’s (D) zoning ordinances discriminated against the poor.
- The Township of Mount Laurel (D) was zoned for industrial and residential use. Only 100 acres were for industrial purposes, with the rest of the industrial land being undeveloped. The majority of the remaining area in the township was developed in subdivisions. The zoning ordinance provided four residential zones, all of which permitted only single-family, detached dwellings with one house per lot. Attached townhomes, apartments (except on farms for agricultural purposes), and mobile homes were not allowed anywhere in Mount Laurel (D). The ordinance realistically only allowed homes that exceeded the financial means of people of middle income and below. The trial court found that the Mount Laurel (D) “acted affirmatively to control development and to attract a selective type of growth.” The trial court concluded that the zoning ordinances resulted in economic discrimination against the poor by depriving them of adequate housing and the chance to secure construction of subsidized...
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Hickey v. Green 3 results
- SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Where money damages would be inadequate compensation, a court will compel a breaching party to perform specifically what he has agreed to do. These are considered appropriate remedies for buyers in land transfer cases, where each plot of land is considered “unique.”
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Comment b to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 129 articulates the two policy reasons for awarding specific performance based on reliance. First, such an award is justified based on the extent to which the parties’ actions satisfy the evidentiary goals of the Statute of Frauds. In other words, the purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to provide concrete evidence that an agreement was made. If the parties’ actions, through part performance, demonstrate good evidence of an agreement, courts are more likely to overlook the writing requirement. Second, the buyer’s reliance may display the buyer’s expectations as to what he thought the parties agreed upon. This provides to courts of equity more of a basis for enforcing the agreement than mere testimonial evidence
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Tenhet v. Boswell 4 results
- DECLARATORY JUDGMENT: A statement of the court declaring the rights and duties of the parties in a case or stating an opinion on a question of law without awarding relief. This judgment is binding whereas an advisory opinion is not.
- The court noted that under the traditional English common law rule a lease completely severs a joint tenancy. A variation on this rule is that a lease effects a temporary severance during the term of the lease. Under this variation, if the lessor dies while the lease is in force, the lease operates as a severance to prevent the right of survivorship from taking effect. However, in declining to adopt either of these rules, the court cited California statutes requires that joint tenancies must be expressly declared in the creating instrument. Accordingly, because the creation of a joint tenancy requires express intent, the court
- CASE VOCABULARY
- ..., Johnson’s partial alienation of his interest through the lease is not so inherently inconsistent with joint tenancy as to create a severance, either temporary or permanent. Inasmuch as the estate arises only upon express intent, and in many cases such intent will be the intent of the joint tenants themselves, we decline to find a severance in circumstances which do not clearly and unambiguously establish that either of the joint tenants desired to terminate the estate. Either Tenhet (P) or Johnson might have severed the joint tenancy, with or without the consent of the other, by an act which was clearly indicative of an intent to terminate. Because there are alternative and unambiguous means of altering the nature of that estate, we hold that the lease here in issue did not operate to sever the joint tenancy. A joint tenant may, during his lifetime, grant certain rights in the joint property without severing the tenancy. But when such a joint tenant dies his interest dies with...
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Guy v. Guy 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal by wife (D) from lower court judgment in divorce case.
- The court in Guy followed the majority position that a spouse’s degree is not a marital asset. The minority approach, followed by some courts (most notably New York) is that a professional degree is marital property. The majority rule avoids the problem of assigning a monetary value to the professional degree, such as attempting to estimate future earnings,
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (Waller, J.). Historically, the court divided marital assets based on the composition of the marital estate at the time of separation. The majority’s holding assumes that the wife (D) made less significant contributions to the marriage. The husband (P) should not be entitled to a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of his payments towards the wife’s (D) education.
- ALIMONY: Payments made by a divorced or separated husband to his ex-wife (or vice versa) for her support. The amount is court-ordered. In many states, it is called “spousal maintenance” or “spousal support.”
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In re Clark 1 result
- The court’s decision is not included in the case excerpt. The excerpt is provided to illustrate that many urban landlords concluded that they can maximize profits by ignoring housing codes. They spend little or no money on repair and maintenance. As a result, conditions in rental housing may sometimes be appalling.
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- , Justice Holmes laid down the proposition that government regulation of property that “goes too far” will be deemed a taking. However, this Court’s decisions since
- (Blackmun, J.) Today the Court has created a category of government regulation that eliminates the ad hoc fact-specific inquiry normally undertaken by this Court in regulatory takings cases. The new rule stands on questionable footing. This Court has recognized the ability of government to regulate property without compensation when the prohibition is aimed at preventing harm to the public. The Court has also decided that it will permit a state to regulate all economic value only if the state prohibits uses that would not be permitted under “background principles of nuisance and property law.” There is nothing magical about determinations made centuries ago regarding the harmful effects of certain uses of property. Present day judges and legislatures are just as capable of making these determinations.
- The Court here established a rule whereby states may not regulate land to such a degree that it deprives the property owner of all economically viable use of his land without paying just compensation. A state may avoid paying compensation if the regulation is consistent with common law principles, so that the landowner cannot reasonably have expected any such use. There are few instances in which regulation will deprive land of all economically viable use. Even in this case, it is doubtful that Lucas (P) lost all such use since he was prohibited only from building habitable structures. Lucas lost only one stick in the “bundle of rights,” albeit an important one.
- Appeal to the United States Supreme Court challenging the South Carolina Supreme Court’s reversal of the trial court’s finding that the state had “taken” the plaintiff’s property.
- (Stevens, J.) The Court has laid down a rule that is wholly arbitrary and unsupported by prior decisions. First, a landowner whose property is diminished in value by 95% may recover nothing, whereas an owner whose property is diminished 100% is sure to receive full compensation. Second, the Court has frozen the state’s common law, stripping the legislature of its traditional power to revise the law. Previous decisions by this Court have rejected this approach to constitutional law. Moreover, experience teaches us that this approach unwisely arrests the development of the common law, which is necessary to adjust to changing social attitudes and concerns. I agree that some legislative redefinitions of property must be compensated, but that is no reason to create an absolute rule.
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James v. Taylor 4 results
- (Pittman, J.) No. Where, from the four corners of an instrument, a court can interpret the intention of the grantor as creating a survivorship estate, the court will deem the estate to be a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. However, in this case, the deed was ambiguous. Arkansas Code § 18–12–603 creates a presumption in favor of tenancy in common, unless the conveyance “expressly declared” otherwise. Even though extrinsic evidence supported Taylor’s (P) contention that the grantor intended to create a joint tenancy, the language of the deed itself was insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption of a tenancy in common. In case of ambiguity, extrinsic evidence of the grantor’s intention cannot prevail over the statute. Reversed and remanded.
- The Arkansas statute in this case is a typical departure from the common law presumption favoring joint tenancy over tenancy in common for conveyances of concurrent estates. In order to resolve ambiguity in the language of the conveyance, the statute, rather than extrinsic evidence guided the court’s interpretation, even though extrinsic evidence may have shown that the grantor intended to create a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in common.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- A mother conveyed property to her three children “jointly and severally, and unto their heirs, assigns and successors forever,” with the mother retaining a life estate. Two of the three grantees died thereafter, after which the grantor died. The remaining grantee, Taylor (P), sought a declaration that the grantor intended to convey the property to grantees as joint tenants, thereby leaving Taylor (P) as the sole owner of the property after the deaths of the other two grantees. The trial court agreed that the conveyance created a joint tenancy, based on extrinsic evidence of the grantor’s intent. The descendants of the grantees, James (D), argued that the conveyance created a tenancy in common.
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Wansley v. First Nat’l Bank of Vicksburg 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- : A retrial or reconsideration of the issues of a case by the same court in which the suit was originally heard (
- : The public sale of personal or real property to the highest bidder. The person who conducts an auction is a licensed individual called an auctioneer, and she operates on behalf of the seller.
- : Cutting off or terminating a right to property. “Foreclosure” describes both the process and the result and is usually done by the person who holds the mortgage. In addition to taking the property away from the mortgagor and ending her rights in it, the property is usually sold publicly to the highest bidder to pay off the mortgage debt.
- Rehearing by the Mississippi Supreme Court to reconsider its decision holding invalid two foreclosure sales and setting aside deficiency judgments obtained by the Bank (D) in the lower court.
- no need to modify or dispatch the old rule that a foreclosure sale may not be set aside unless the sale price is so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court or to amount to fraud. We declare that, if the secured creditor is authorized to foreclose by power of sale, after the debtor’s default and upon compliance with the deed of trust or other instrument, the secured creditor may sell any or all of the real estate that is subject to the security interest in its then condition or after any reasonable rehabilitation or preparation for sale. Every aspect of the sale, including the method, advertising, time, place, and terms, must be commercially reasonable. This is an objective standard. Applied to the case at bar, we find that the Bank (D) bid on the auctioned interest at each sale. Thereafter the Bank (D) credited the Wansleys (P) with the amount it bid on each property, even though at that time the Bank (D) had not realized a penny out of the property. Nothing in the...
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Kelo v. City of New London 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor predicted that the Court’s decision left the door open to governmental taking of any private property capable of improvement and resale under any economic development plan. But that prophecy has not proven true. Rather, since the decision, the most emphasized aspect of the case has been the Court’s deference to legislative decision-making in matters of eminent domain. That emphasis has prompted significant federal and state legislation limiting the right of eminent domain for purely economic development.
- (Kennedy, J.) The Public Use Clause demands that a court strike down a taking intended primarily to benefit a private party with merely incidental public justifications. Here, the Court reviewed the plan and found that it contained a meaningful and justifiable public purpose. When the public benefits are trivial or pretextual, however, and call the plan into question, courts should presume an impermissible purpose and insist on the city’s justification.
- The City of New London (D) proposed a development plan in an effort to revitalize the local economy. The City (D) appointed and authorized the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, to negotiate and purchase the private property necessary to implement the plan. When negotiations with Kelo (P) and eight other property owners broke down, the City of New London (D) initiated condemnation proceedings under its eminent domain powers. The City (D) made no claim that the properties were in poor condition. The petitioner property-owners brought suit in superior court, challenging the City’s (D) actions and claiming that the taking of their property was not for public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. After trial, the superior court held that some of the takings were invalid, while others were permissible. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which held that all of the City’s (D) takings were valid as part of a development plan intended...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Certiorari to review a decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court for the defendant.
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Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In finding a possible public policy violation, the court emphasized the potential loss in value of neighboring property, the designation of the surrounding area as a landmark, and the need for dwelling units in the city. Although the court found these factors relevant, they are not the type that would generally justify direct contravention of a testatrix’s unambiguous intent. The dissent opined that a testatrix’s intent should be given effect in the absence of a clear public injury, and that there was no danger of such an injury in this case.
- (Clemens, J.) The court pretends to know what the testatrix’s motives were. We have no idea what reasons were behind her decision to request, in her will, that her home be razed after her death. And no grounds exist for finding that the razing is contrary to public policy. The public policy. Prejudice to the public interest must clearly appear before a court is warranted in pronouncing a transaction void on public policy grounds. It requires judicial imagination to hold that the mere presence of a second vacant lot violates public policy in this case. As much as our aesthetic sympathies may lie with the neighbors, those sympathies should not interfere with our legal judgment. Johnston had the right during her lifetime to have her house razed, and nothing precludes her executor from doing the same upon her death.
- State appellate court review of a lower court decision in the estate’s favor.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- THE COURT CAN STEP IN TO STOP A DIRECTIVE IN A WILL IF ENFORCING IT WOULD VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY
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- Since the 1950s, Qualitex (P) had sold pads for use on dry cleaning presses that were a special shade of green-gold. In 1989, Jacobson Products (D), a rival, began selling its own press pads of the same color. In 1991, Qualitex (P) registered the special green-gold color of its press pads with the Patent and Trademark Office. Qualitex (P) then brought a trademark infringement claim challenging Jacobson’s (D) use of the green-gold color. Qualitex (P) won in the district court, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Lanham Act does not permit registration of color alone as a trademark. The case went to the Supreme Court.
- Supreme Court review of a Ninth Circuit decision reversing the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
- The Court explained that almost anything that is capable of carrying meaning may be afforded trademark protection. The shape of a Coca-Cola bottle, for instance, is trademarked, as is the three-chime sound used by NBC, and even a scent on sewing thread. The Court asks here, if a shape, sound, and fragrance can act as a symbol, can a color not do the same? The Court answered that question in the affirmative.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- ..., or any combination thereof, and to prevent his or her competitors from using that trademark. We cannot find in the basic objectives of trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark, when that color has attained secondary meaning and therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand. It would seem that color alone could meet the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark. It can act as a symbol that distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their source. In this case, the green-gold color acts as a symbol. Having developed a secondary meaning, it identifies the press pads’ source. Jacobson (D) argues that colors are in limited supply and that if one of many competitors can appropriate a particular color for use as a trademark, the supply of colors will soon be depleted. But hundreds of color pigments are manufactured and thousands of colors can be obtained by mixing. When a color serves as a mark, alternative colors...
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State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley 4 results
- PROCEDURAL BASIS Appeal from summary judgment for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a residential building permit.
- Architectural design regulations, like Ordinances 131 and 281 here, rarely come up for review in appellate courts. When they do, they have usually resulted from disputes in suburban communities. In a few of these cases regulations were invalidated because the promotion of aesthetic values was not considered a proper purpose of zoning. More recent cases, like
- ...regulations and ordinances. The permit application was not approved by the Architectural Board of the City of Ladue. A zoning ordinance was in effect in Ladue to promote a comprehensive plan “designed to promote the health and general welfare of the residents of the City of Ladue.” The Architectural Board, established by Ordinance 131, as amended by Ordinance 281, is composed of three architects. It was created to ensure that new buildings would “conform to certain minimum architectural standards of appearance and conformity with surrounding structures.” Those structures that were “detrimental to the stability of value and the welfare of surrounding property” were not permitted in Ladue under the ordinances. According to another developer, a house built to Stoyanoff’s (P) design would have a substantial adverse effect upon the market values of other residential property in the neighborhood. Stoyanoff (P) filed a motion for summary judgment to compel Berkeley (D) to issue a...
- CASE VOCABULARY
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- The maker of the Totally Rad Soaker sued the Maker of Super Soakers for patent infringement and the defendant moved for partial summary judgment.
- Selle (P) claimed that a song he wrote and copyrighted in 1975 was copied by the Bee Gees (D) two years later, even though his song was not publicly disseminated; Selle (P) sued for copyright infringement and the jury found in his favor, but the district court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
- Chakrabarty (P) invented a bacterium that broke down crude oil and could be used to remediate oil spills; he applied for patents for the process and the bacterium, and the latter was initially denied, but the appellate court reversed the denial.
- A district court temporarily enjoined Redmond (D) from assuming his position at Quaker (D) and permanently enjoined him from using or disclosing trade secrets of his former employer, PepsiCo (P).
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Berg v. Wiley 5 results
- SUMMARY PROCEDURE: An expedited method to evict one in possession.
- (Rogosheske, J.) No. A landlord may not use self-help to regain possession of his land. At common law, a landlord could use self-help if: (1) the landlord is legally entitled to possession, such as when a tenant is a hold-over; and (2) the landlord’s means of entry are peaceable. Wiley (D) contends that he was entitled to possession since Berg (P) breached the lease. However, it is for the courts, not Wiley (D), to determine if a landlord is entitled to possession. Wiley (D) contends that only actual or threatened use of violence should give rise to liability. We are not convinced. Public policy in this state discourages self-help. To discourage self-help, the legislature has created summary proceedings to help the landlord regain possession quickly. To further discourage self-help, the legislature has provided treble damages for forced entry. In consideration of this policy, Wiley’s (D) entry was not peaceable. Given the historical relations between Berg (P) and Wiley (D), the only...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Because Berg (P) had possession of the premises, the law gave her much protection. There are various reasons for protecting possessors on rented land. For instance, as the court mentioned, it discourages the forcible taking of possession (the law always wants to deter violence). Additionally, discouraging self-help by landlords protects families from being left with nowhere to go. Note, however, that protection of possessors comes at the expense of the landlord, who may be legally entitled to possession. As a compromise, some states forbid self-help to evict a residential tenant, but allow self-help for the eviction of a commercial tenant.
- ..., Phillip Berg assigned his lease to Berg (P). Without securing Wiley’s (D) permission, Berg (P) began to remodel the premises to make them suitable for a restaurant. A dispute arose between Berg (P) and Wiley (D) as a result of Berg’s (P) continued remodeling of the restaurant without permission and operation of the restaurant in violation of the health code. Wiley (D) demanded that the health code violations be remedied and that Berg (P) complete the remodeling within two weeks. At the close of two weeks, Berg (P) closed the restaurant, dismissed her employees, and placed a sign on the premises that read, “Closed for Remodeling.” At the time of the restaurant closure, Wiley (D) attempted to change the locks on the doors, but ceased this attempt when Berg (P) arrived. Three days later, without Berg’s (P) knowledge, Wiley (D) changed the locks. Berg (P) contends that she was wrongfully evicted. Wiley (D) raises the defense of abandonment. The trial court ruled Wiley’s (...
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Fulkerson v. Van Buren 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- : An action to recover possession of land claimed by another. To recover, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is in wrongful possession of the property and that the plaintiff has a present legal right to possession of the same. Also called an “action to recover possession of land,” “summary process,” “eviction,” and “forcible entry and detainer.”
- State appellate court review of a trial court decision in the defendants’ favor.
- (Jennings, J.) No. In order to establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must prove that she has been in possession of the property continuously for more than seven years and that her possession was visible, notorious, distinct, exclusive, hostile, and with the intent to hold it against the true owner. The intention to hold adversely must be clear, distinct, and unequivocal. In this case, Reverend Van Buren’s (D) testimony shows that the church congregation was unsure of the precise nature of its interest in the land but recognized that Fulkerson (P) owned the land. Reverend Van Buren (D) asked Fulkerson (P) to give him a quitclaim deed to the property, which Fulkerson (P) refused to do. A possessor of land does not possess adversely if, while in possession, he recognizes the ownership right of the titleholder. The trial court’s finding that the congregation possessed for seven years the requisite intent to possess the land adversely to Fulkerson (P) is against the...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Fulkerson (P) held legal title to a 4.5-acre parcel of land that was 11-sided and irregularly configured. A church building was situated near the highway that abutted the northernmost part of the parcel. In 1985, without obtaining permission from Fulkerson (P), the Progressive Church, Inc. (D) began using the church as its place of worship. Over the next several years, the congregation made many improvements to the building and land. In 1994, Fulkerson (P) sent Reverend Van Buren (D) a letter demanding that the church congregation vacate the premises, but it did not. In 1995, Fulkerson (P) filed a complaint asking that the court eject the congregation. The church filed a counterclaim asserting ownership by adverse possession. The court agreed with the church and Fulkerson (P) appealed.
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Berge v. State of Vermont 4 results
- Appeal from an order granting summary judgment for the State (D).
- .... In 1961, Davis conveyed the Norton Pond Exclusion to McDonald and Bruce Washburn. The 1961 deed again contained no reference to any easement across the property conveyed to Vermont (D). McDonald and Washburn subdivided the Norton Pond Exclusion into eighteen lots. In 1997, Berge (P) purchased two of the lots from a successor in title to McDonald and Washburn. Since then, Berge (P) has regularly accessed the property by car over a gravel road that runs across the property owned by the State (D) to his property. Although Berge (P) owns a fishing boat, he does not use the boat to access the property. The State (D) placed a gate across the access road, depriving Berge (P) of overland access to his property. Berge (P) brought suit, asserting, among other claims, that the 1959 deed had created an easement by necessity for the benefit of his property over the land conveyed to the State (D). The State (D) moved for summary judgment, maintaining that Berge’s (P) ability to access his...
- The trial court concluded that we must apply the navigable waters exception because it was the law in 1959, at the time of the original conveyance in this case. We disagree for two reasons. First, as noted, our case law has long made practical access to a public road
- (Dooley, J.) Yes. An easement by necessity arises when there is a division of commonly owned land that creates a landlocked parcel. The easement is said to remain in effect so long as the necessity exists. The trial court concluded that Berge’s (P) claim was defeated solely by virtue of the fact that he could reach the property by water. The court stated that it could not recognize an easement “merely because water access is not as desirable as the road access that is sought.” Our prior decisions draw a distinction between mere inconvenience and necessity, with a lack of reasonably practical access required to find an easement by necessity. Strict “necessity” is not a requirement. Thus understood, the record here leaves no doubt that without use of the road across State (D) land, Berge (P) would have no reasonably consistent, practical ...may be accessible by water for part of the year, the State (D) made no real claim—and the trial court here made no finding—that this represents...
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National Audubon Society v. Superior Court 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Challenging Allocation) v. (Granted Summary Judgment)
- Decision on a petition for a writ of mandate to review a grant of summary judgment.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- The court makes reference to the “appropriative water rights system” administered in California. Appropriative water rights (also called “appropriation water rights,” or “prior appropriation water rights”), which apply in many Western states, allow a person to make a claim to water and divert it to his or her own use. The right is based on the continued use of the water. The system, which developed during the time of unregulated mining, has been formalized by statute.
- Three aspects of the public trust doctrine require consideration: the purpose of the trust; the scope of the trust; and the powers and duties of the state as trustee. The objective of the public trust was traditionally defined in terms of navigation, commerce and fisheries. Those three traditional uses do not limit the public interest in the trust res. The public uses to which waters are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. Mono Lake is a navigable waterway. It supports a small local industry which harvests brine shrimp, probably qualifying the lake as a “fishery” under the traditional public trust cases. The
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United States v. Monsanto Co. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal from an order granting summary judgment to the United States (P).
- summary judgment, and the trial court granted the government’s (P) summary judgment motion on CERCLA liability.
- ...to owners of waste facilities, regardless of their degree of participation in the subsequent disposal of hazardous waste. The site-owners (D) contend that summary judgment improperly denied them the opportunity to present an affirmative defense based on the complete absence of causation. That defense requires proof that the release or threatened release of hazardous substances and resulting damages were caused solely by a third-party. A second element of the defense requires proof that the defendant took precautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of such a third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from those acts or omissions. Under no view of the evidence could the site-owners (D) satisfy either of these proof requirements. First, the site-owners (D) could not establish the absence of a direct or indirect contractual relationship necessary to maintain the affirmative defense. They entered into a lease agreement with COCC (D) and accepted...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Did the trial court properly hold that the site owners (D) were liable for the costs of clean-up?
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Emanuel v. Hernandez 3 results
- Appeal from an order granting summary judgment.
- (Bowman, J.) No. An implied easement is the product of the intention of the parties to the conveyance. An easement from a prior existing use will be implied when the owner of a tract of two parcels conveys part of the property after having used the land so that one part of the parcel derives from another a benefit that is apparent, continuous, and permanent. The easement is “implied” in that courts attempt to ascribe an intention to parties who themselves did not put any such intention into words at the time of the conveyance. Because the intention of the parties to the conveyance that severs title is the crucial consideration, whether an easement exists depends wholly on the circumstances at the time of the severance of title. If an easement by implication does not arise at the moment of severance, a change in circumstances since the severance, no matter how great, cannot create any such easement.
- ...and had begun constructing a fence on the property line so that plaintiffs could not use the driveway. Emanuel (P) alleged that, before title was separated, the use of the driveway to gain access to the garage was so long continued, open, and obvious as to show that it was intended to be permanent. The use of the driveway is essential to the enjoyment of the property at 920 Pearl, as the driveway is the only way a car can get to the garage. Emanuel (P) introduced affidavits showing that the driveway was in place when he bought the property in 1965, and an affidavit from a prior occupant, showing that the driveway was in place and used since at least 1953. The affidavit also included a 1922 map prepared by the city public works department showing the locations of residences and garages on the properties. The Emanuels (P) asserted they had an “easement by implication” over the Hernandez (D) property. The trial court agreed, and held that the easement was highly beneficial because...
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Keydata Corp. v. United States 4 results
- Decision on both parties’ motions for summary judgment.
- undertaking that the lessor will deliver possession to the lessee. If the lessee cannot take possession because of a holdover tenant, or some other obstructing third person, the landlord is in breach of his obligation and the tenant may terminate the lease. The “English” rule conforms to the commonsense notion of what a lease is. Although the property at issue is located in Massachusetts, which follows the “American” rule, the “English” rule applies to federal leases, since the Government (D) has a strong need for a uniform rule. The Government’s (D) motion for summary judgment is granted.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- A landlord leasing to the federal government may take steps to protect himself from liability under the “English” rule in case of a holdover tenant. For instance, a landlord can expressly limit or disclaim his obligation to deliver possession in the new lease agreement, or require security of a prior tenant in possession that he will not hold over. The landlord may also have a remedy in damages against a holdover tenant.
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Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (O’Connor, J.) No. What constitutes public use for purposes of the Takings Clause is determined by the legislature, whose determination will be upheld in all but the most exceptional cases. The starting point for our analysis is whether or not the actions of the state of Hawaii constitute a taking for public use. In
- ALI’L NUI: An island high chief.
- Supreme Court review of a Ninth Circuit decision reversing the district court’s decision finding the Act constitutional.
- What constitutes public use for purposes of the Takings Clause is determined by the legislature, whose determination will be upheld in all but the most exceptional cases.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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- (O’Connor, J.) No. Fair use is a privilege in persons other than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the owner’s consent. The Nation (D) contends that First Amendment values broaden the scope of fair use when the information conveyed relates to matters of high public concern. This theory, however, would expand fair use to effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the work of a public figure. Congress has identified four factors as especially relevant in determining whether a use was fair: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. With regard to factor one, news reporting is one example enumerated in the Copyright Act of activities the courts might regard as fair use, but the fact that the publication in...
- The Court concludes that The Nation’s (D) quotation of 300 words from the unpublished 200,000-word manuscript infringed the publisher’s copyright, even though the quotes related to a historical event of public significance—the resignation and pardon of President Nixon. Protection of the copyright holder’s economic interest is achieved in this case through an exceedingly narrow definition of fair use. I disagree with this constricted reading of the fair use doctrine.
- One of the key factors in this case was the fact that the writings in question had not even been published yet. The Court reasoned that the unpublished nature of a manuscript is a key, although not necessarily determinative, factor weighing against a finding of fair use. Under ordinary circumstances, an author’s right to control the first public release of a previously undisseminated expression outweighs a claim of fair use.
- Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit’s decision reversing the district court ruling in favor of the plaintiff.
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Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters North America, Inc. 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Several factors are relevant to every application of the balancing test: (1) the purpose of the use, (2) the suitability of the use to the location, (3) the extent and amount of the harm, (4) the benefits of the use, (5) the necessity of the amount and manner of the water use, and (6) any other factor that may bear on the reasonableness of the use. In this case, the plaintiffs ...measure of preference as local water users. The defendant’s water withdrawals have a direct effect on the amount of flow in the nearby stream. Even a modest drop in water level would have dramatic consequences for the stream. Established uses for connected waterways in the area have been recreational rather than commercial. Considering these factors, we conclude that the Sanctuary Springs location is not well suited for high-volume water extractions. If the defendant were permitted to pump at the maximum permitted rate, it would effectively appropriate for its own needs about 24% of the base flow of...
- While the balancing test is a case-specific inquiry, three underlying principles govern the process of balancing competing water uses. First, the law seeks to ensure fair participation in the use of water for the greatest number of users. The court should attempt to strike a proper balance between protecting the rights of the complaining party and preserving as many beneficial uses of the common resource as is feasible under the circumstances. Second, the law only protects uses that are reasonable. A plaintiff whose water use has little value or is excessive or harmful is entitled to no protection. And third, the law will not redress every harm, no matter how small, but will only redress unreasonable harms. Accordingly, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate not only that the defendant’s use of the water has interfered with the plaintiff’s own reasonable use, but also that the interference was substantial.
- State appellate court review of a trial court decision in the plaintiffs’ favor.
- (Smolenski, J.) Yes. Under the reasonable use doctrine, a riparian owner may make any and all reasonable uses of water as long as the uses do not unreasonably interfere with other riparian owners’ opportunities for reasonable use. What constitutes a reasonable use must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The reasonable use test balances competing water uses to determine whether one riparian proprietor’s water use, which interferes with another’s use, is unreasonable under the circumstances. As the doctrine has developed, it generally has been held that all uses of water upon the land from which it is extracted are reasonable, even if they more or less deplete the supply to the harm of neighbors, unless the purpose is malicious or the water is simply wasted. But when the question is whether water may be transported off that land for use elsewhere, this is usually found to be unreasonable. Water may be extracted for use elsewhere only up to the point that it begins to injure owners...
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Kienzle v. Myers 3 results
- ...install her sewer through a trench from her home to Van Duyne’s property, where it would share a 207-foot trench with Van Duyne’s connector line to the street. Because of the topography of the area, the pipes were buried at a depth of five and one-half feet. In 1982, Van Duyne’s daughter and son-in-law, Susan S. and David W. Kienzle (P), moved into her River Road property. In 1989, Michael P. and Joan Myers (D) acquired the Bauer property. In 2003, counsel for the Kienzles (P) sent a letter to the Myers (D) advising them that the Kienzles (P) had “decided to terminate the revocable license” by which appellants’ sewer pipe crossed the Kienzle (P) property. The letter directed the Myers (D) to “make other arrangements” within 30 days. In 2004, Kienzle (P) sued the Myers, seeking to quiet title with respect to their “encroachment” across the Kienzles’ (P) property and to enjoin further trespass, as well as damages. Following discovery, the Kienzles (P) were granted partial summary...
- (Singer, J.) Yes. An easement by estoppel may be found when an owner of property misleads or causes another in any way to change the other’s position to his or her prejudice. A servitude is established if the permission is given under such circumstances that the person who gives it should reasonably foresee that the recipient will substantially change position on the basis of that permission, believing that the permission is not revocable. The trial court erroneously found that there was no easement by estoppel in this case, because there was no evidence that Bauer was misled. There is no requirement for an easement by estoppel in the common law that a property owner must mislead or misrepresent. The rule simply states that if an owner misleads or causes another in any way to change his or her position to that party’s prejudice, the owner is estopped from denying the existence of an easement.
- predecessor in interest to change her position. The trial court also refused to find prejudice in that Bauer would have had to pay for the construction of the sewer pipe even had she located it on her own property. Again, we disagree with this analysis. “Prejudice,” in this context, is used as a synonym for “detriment.” Detriment may be shown not only by the expenditures of funds but by the forbearance of some right to which one might otherwise be entitled. While it is true that, in any event, Bauer would have had to spend money to connect to the public sewer, it is also true that but for Van Duyne’s acquiescence to Bauer’s use of her property, Bauer would have linked to the sewer wholly on her own property. Thus, Bauer’s decision to cross Van Duyne’s land constituted a change in position which placed her access to the public sewer out of her control. This decision disadvantaged Bauer. Reversed.
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White v. Brown 5 results
- (Harbison, J.) Lide’s will is not ambiguous. It is clear that she intended to pass only a life estate: “. . . to have my home to live in and not to be sold.” The examples cited by the court are distinguishable because in the first case the testatrix bequeathed all of her real and
- (Brock, J.) Yes. Unless a contrary intention appears by the terms of the will and its context, a will conveys a testator’s entire interest. At common law, there was a presumption that a testator conveyed only a life estate. However, the legislature has enacted a rule of construction that reverses this presumption. Several cases demonstrate the strength of the presumption that a testator conveys his entire interest. In one case, the testatrix left her property to her husband “to be used by him for his support and comfort during his life.” Yet, the will was held to pass a fee simple to the husband. In another, the testator devised real property to his children “for and during their natural lives.” Again, the will was held to pass a fee simple. Therefore, it is clear that if the only language in Lide’s will was that the home was for White (P) to “live in,” a fee simple would pass. However, the language “not to be sold” complicates matters. We must look to the context to determine if...
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- COURTS PRESUME THAT A CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY IN A WILL WAS INTENDED TO CONVEY A FEE SIMPLE ESTATE UNLESS CONTRARY INTENT IS DEMONSTRATED
- White (P), along with her husband and daughter, lived in Jessie Lide’s house for 25 years. When Jessie Lide died, she left a holographic will that read in part: “I wish Evelyn White (P) to have my home to live in and not to be sold. . . . My house is not to be sold.” White (P) contended that the will conveyed a fee simple interest in the house. Brown (D) contended that the will conveyed merely a life estate to White (P). The trial court ruled that the will, on its face, unambiguously conveyed a life estate. Since the trial court found that the will was facially unambiguous, it did not consider extrinsic evidence.
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Shelley v. Kraemer 4 results
- The widespread use of racially restrictive covenants started in the early twentieth century, an era when many African Americans were migrating to cities. Beginning in the 1930s, the Federal Housing Administration actively promoted such covenants in connection with its mortgage insurance program. When this case was argued, these discriminatory covenants were so common that three Supreme Court justices decided to disqualify themselves from hearing the case—presumably to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest.
- (Vinson, C.J.) Yes. Judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants denies equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case does not involve states that were merely abstaining from action and leaving private citizens free to impose discrimination as they please. Rather, cases such as this one involve states making available to individuals the full coercive power of government to deny people of color the enjoyment of property rights. Here, the difference between judicial enforcement and nonenforcement of restrictive covenants is the difference between people like Shelley (D) being denied rights to property that is available to other members of the community and being accorded those rights equally. J
- In, 1945, Shelley (D), a black family, received a warranty deed to a parcel of land covered by the covenant. The trial court found that the Shelley (D) had no actual knowledge of the restrictive agreement at the time of purchase. Kraemer (P) and other owners of property subject to the covenant, brought suit requesting that Shelley (D) be restrained from taking possession of the property and that judgment be entered divesting title out of Shelley (D).The trial court denied Kraemer’s (P) request. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and directed the trial court to grant the relief requested by Kraemer (D). That court held that the agreement was effective and concluded that enforcement of its provisions violated no rights guaranteed to Shelley (D) by the Federal Constitution.
- On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri from an order granting the enforcement of a restrictive covenant based on race or color.
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Wade v. Jobe 4 results
- Modern tenants are in a poor position to bargain effectively for express warranties and covenants requiring landlords to maintain safe and sanitary housing. The court in this case compared modern tenants to consumers of goods, because the tenant frequently has no choice but to rely on the landlord to provide a habitable dwelling. In consumer law, implied warranties are designed to protect ordinary consumers who do not have the knowledge, capacity, or opportunity to ensure that the goods they are buying are in a safe condition.
- (Durham, J.). Yes. Residential leases contain an implied warranty that the leased premises are habitable at the outset of the lease term and will remain so during the course of the tenancy. The court rejected the rule of caveat emptor for residential leases and recognized the common law implied warranty of habitability. Under the traditional rule, a tenant had a duty to inspect the premises to determine their safety and suitability for the purposes for which they were leased before entering a lease. Historically, real property leases were primarily viewed as a conveyance of land. But most modern tenants, unlike agricultural tenants in feudal England, bargain for the use of structures on the land rather than the land itself. Under these conditions, the court noted, it is often more appropriate to apply contract law to residential leases rather than traditional property law. Furthermore, conditions such as housing shortages, standardized leases, and racial and class discrimination...case
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- Appeal by the tenant (D) from the trial court ruling in favor of the landlord (P).
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Pierson v. Post 4 results
- This case was heard by an extraordinary group of judges: Tompkins, a future vice president; Livingston, a future Supreme Court justice; and Kent, one of the nation’s most preeminent jurists at the time. The question before the court concerned the action that must be taken by a hunter in order to acquire property rights in a wild animal, Post (P), who was represented by a future New York mayor, claimed that hot pursuit was enough, but Pierson (D), represented by a future chancellor of New York, asserted that physical possession was required. The majority looked to ancient precedent to support its decision that mere pursuit gave Post (P) no legal rights to the fox, and that the animal became Pierson’s (D) property when he intercepted and killed it.
- (Tompkins, J.) No. Pursuit of a wild beast alone vests no property rights in the huntsman. Here, the fox became the property of Pierson (D), who actually intercepted and killed him. Actual bodily seizure is not always indispensable to acquire a right to or possession of wild beasts; in some cases it may be enough to encompass animals with nets or otherwise intercept them in such a manner as to deprive them of their liberty and render escape impossible. The case under consideration, however, is one of mere pursuit. The judgment below in the plaintiff’s favor is erroneous and must be reversed.
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- Post (P) and his hounds were in pursuit of a fox while hunting. Pierson (D) saw that Post (P) and his dogs were in pursuit of the fox, but he shot the fox himself and carried it away. Post (P) sued, alleging that the fox should have been his. The trial court entered a verdict for Post (P), and the Pierson (D) appealed.
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Detwiler v. Zoning Hearing Board of Lower Salford Township 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Barbieri, J.) No. A landowner’s knowledge of zoning requirements prior to the purchase of property is not sufficient, in and of itself, to bar the grant of a variance. The Municipal Code provides that five requirements must be met before a variance can be granted. The landowner must show that the effect of the zoning ordinance is to burden property with an unnecessary hardship that is unique to the property; that the hardship was not self-inflicted; that granting the variance will not have an adverse impact on the public health, safety, and welfare; and that the variance sought is the minimum variance that will afford relief. The Detwilers (P) argue that any hardship to the Millers from denial of the variance was self-inflicted. Hardship is self-inflicted only when a landowner has paid a high price for property because he assumed that a variance that he anticipated would justify that price. The lot in question has been in the Miller family for some time, so that is not the case...
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- : Use of one’s own judgment in making a responsible decision. Judicial discretion is the making of a determination by reference to legal principles and facts of the case or in the interests of justice; decisions must not be arbitrary or capricious. Official discretion is the power of a public official to use her own judgment in determining the action necessary under the circumstances.
- Appeal by the plaintiffs from an order of the court of common pleas affirming a decision of the Zoning Board in favor of the Millers.
- The Detwilers (P) did not dispute the fact that the unique configuration of the Millers’ lot made the lot unusable as a building lot absent a variance. Instead, they argued that the fact that the lot was unusable as a building lot was not an unnecessary hardship for the Millers. They contended that, since the lot could be and had been used for agricultural purposes, the variance should have been denied. The court disagreed, citing the Municipal Code section providing that a variance may be granted when it is necessary to enable a reasonable use of the property.
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Giannini v. First Nat’l Bank of Des Plaines 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Courts in other jurisdictions have generally concluded that the remedy of specific performance is available to the purchaser of a specific condominium unit. In
- State appellate court review of the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for specific performance.
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- Giannini (P) signed an agreement to purchase a condominium unit and paid $62,330 in earnest money. The building his unit was located in was never formally declared a condominium (instead, it became a rental building due to the poor real estate market at the time), so the terms of the agreement were never fulfilled. Giannini (P) sued First National Bank (D), the record title holder of the complex, as well as others. His complaint requested specific performance and money damages. The court dismissed Giannini’s (P) claim for specific performance because there was no condominium in existence that could be conveyed to Giannini (P), and the court would be obligated to supervise the conversion of the building from rental to condos. Giannini (P) appealed.
- Did the trial court properly dismiss Giannini’s (P) specific performance claim?
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Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- THE “REASONABLE SUSPICION” BAR IS NOT AS HIGH AS THAT FOR “PROBABLE CAUSE”
- (Hawkins, J.) Yes. Activities that destroy the ecology of a wetland are not immune from the Clean Water Act merely because they do not involve the introduction of material brought in from somewhere else. In this case, the Corps alleges that Tsakopoulos (P) has essentially poked a hole in the bottom of protected wetlands. The water that was trapped can now drain out. While it is true, that in so doing, no new material has been “added,” a “pollutant” has certainly been “added.” Prior to the deep ripping, the protective layer of soil was intact, holding the wetland in place. Afterwards, that soil was wrenched up, moved around, and redeposited somewhere else. Tsakopoulos (P) also contends that no case has ever held a plow to be a point source, and that a prohibited discharge must be from a point source. This argument has no merit. The statutory definition of “point source” (“any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance”) is extremely broad, and courts have found that “bulldozers...
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- The driver and passenger of a truck that got pulled over based on an anonymous tip sought to suppress evidence found in the truck, but the court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to pull them over and allowed the evidence; the defendants appealed.
- The crux of this case is that a farmer has plowed deeply to improve his farm property to permit farming of crops that require deep root systems, and are more profitable than grazing or other prior farm use. Although I have no doubt that Congress could have reached and regulated the farming activity challenged, that does not in itself show that Congress so exercised its power. I conclude that the Clean Water Act does not prohibit “deep ripping” in this setting.
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Preseault v. United States 5 results
- THE “REASONABLE SUSPICION” BAR IS NOT AS HIGH AS THAT FOR “PROBABLE CAUSE”
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- Appeal from an order of the Court of Federal Claims dismissing Preseault’s (P) claim for compensation (not set out in excerpt).
- 100 F.3d at 1532. The Preseaults (P) and others had been litigating the issue of the taking of the easement since the initial conversion into a trail. The state courts ruled that the dispute
- In 1899, the Rutland-Canadian Railroad Company acquired rights-of-way over property later acquired by Preseault (P). The State of Vermont (D) later acquired title to the assets of Rutland-Canadian, and leased them to the Vermont Railway, which operated the railroad. Vermont Railway stopped service in 1970; the tracks and other railroad equipment were removed in 1975. In 1985, the State (D) leased the railroad rights-of-way to the City of Burlington pursuant to the Rails-to-Trails Act, for use as a public hiking and biking trail. The trail opened in 1986.In the summer, approximately 200 people per day crossed the Preseault (P) property. Preseault (P) brought an action for compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the action.
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Thomsen v. Greve 5 results
- THE “REASONABLE SUSPICION” BAR IS NOT AS HIGH AS THAT FOR “PROBABLE CAUSE”
- Supreme Court review of a state appellate court decision affirming the decision in the prosecution’s favor.
- After the trial, the court found the smoke to be a nuisance and ordered the Greves (D) to raise the height of the chimney by 3 feet and to burn only “clean dry firewood.” The court also found that the Thomsens (P) failed to prove the actual monetary loss or damage, and thus awarded no damages.
- The court acknowledges the Greves (D) interest in being able to use their property as they please, but finds that it doesn’t outweigh the Thomsen’s (P) interest in being able to use their property as they please: without smoke. A lesser intrusion, or a lesser degree of the same intrusion, might not have been held to be unreasonable. To a certain extent, the unreasonableness of the intrusion depends on the person whose interest is being interfered with. A person who has a respiratory ailment, for example, might be more sensitive to even non-offensive smelling wood smoke than the average person.
- that the Thomsens (P) had a significant smoke odor in their house, and the source of that odor had to be outside. The trial court’s decree will be amended to provide an award of damages to the Thomsens of $4,000. The Greves (D) are also ordered to abate the nuisance of smoke and odor emanating from their home. Affirmed, as amended.
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Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A NUISANCE WILL NOT BE ENJOINED IF THE ECONOMIC COSTS ARE TOO HIGH IN RELATION TO THE DAMAGE CAUSED
- (Bergan, J.) No. If there is a marked disparity in economic consequence between the effect of an injunction and the effect of the nuisance, the court may order the payment of permanent damages instead of an injunction. The rule in New York has been that such a nuisance will be enjoined although marked disparity be shown in economic consequence between the effect of the injunction and the effect of the nuisance. To follow the rule literally in this cases would be to close down Atlantic’s (D) plant at once. This court is fully agreed to avoid that drastic remedy; the difference in view is how best to avoid it. One alternative is to grant the injunction but postpone its effect to a specified future date to give opportunity for technical advances to permit Atlantic (D) to eliminate the nuisance. If the injunction were to be granted unless the nuisance were abated within a short period, there would be no assurance that any significant technical improvement would occur. On the other hand,...
- Atlantic Cement (D) emitted pollution that created a nuisance, but the courts denied an injunction.
- If there is a marked disparity in economic consequence between the effect of an injunction and the effect of the nuisance, the court may order the payment of permanent damages instead of an injunction.
- Should the trial court have issued an injunction against further pollution?
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- THE “REASONABLE SUSPICION” BAR IS NOT AS HIGH AS THAT FOR “PROBABLE CAUSE”
- Supreme Court review of a state appellate court decision affirming the decision in the prosecution’s favor.
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- ..., subject to the powers and limitations set forth in the declaration. The board has numerous powers enumerated in the declaration and has the ultimate responsibility for making decisions regarding policies, finances and administration at Eastman. ECA was responsible for maintain the recreational amenities for the residents of Eastman. Until September 1999, one of the amenities offered was downhill skiing at its own ski area known as Snow Hill. In 1994, the results of the Eastman Long Range Planning Committee’s survey of Eastman residents indicated that Snow Hill ski area was of little importance to the families and the community. In 1998, a survey found that of 695 respondents, 68% had never used Snow Hill. On September 17, 1999, the board voted eight to one to close Snow Hill and sell the chairlift. Schaefer (P) and the other plaintiffs subsequently filed an action in superior court seeking to enjoin ECA (D) from closing Snow Hill and selling the chairlift. Schaefer (P) and the...
- ..., J.) Yes. A declaration should not be so narrowly construed so as to eviscerate the association’s intended role as the governing body of the community. A broad view of the powers delegated to the association is justified by the important role these communities play in maintaining property values and providing municipal-like services. Because an association’s power should be interpreted broadly, the association, through its appropriate governing body, is entitled to exercise all powers of the community that are not reserved to the members. Accordingly, as long as a board’s action does not contravene either an express provision of the declaration or a right reasonably inferable therefrom, it will be found valid, within the scope of the board’s authority. In the present case, the decision to close Snow Hill ski area does not contravene an express provision of the declaration, and it is not a decision reserved to the members. The decision to close the ski area or any other amenity...
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Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- . In that case, an action for libel, the court considered whether there could be a recovery of punitive damages if only nominal compensatory damages were awarded. With the bare assertion that authority and better reason supported its conclusion, the
- State supreme court review of an appellate court decision affirming the trial court’s decision to set aside the punitive damages award.
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- The defendant insisted on delivering a mobile home by plowing a path across the plaintiffs’ land rather than using the town road, which was curvy and covered with snow, even though the plaintiffs insisted that the defendant use the town road and stay off their property; the plaintiffs sued for trespass and were awarded nominal and punitive damages, but the court set aside the punitive damages award.
- Steenberg Homes (D) had a mobile home to deliver. The easiest route of delivery was across farmland owned by the Jacques (P). Despite their adamant protests, Steenberg (D) plowed a path throw the Jacques’ (P) snow-covered field and used that path to deliver the mobile home. The Jacques (P) sued for intentional trespass. Steenberg (D) conceded that it had intentionally trespassed, but argued that no compensatory damages had been proved, and that punitive damages could not be awarded without compensatory damages. The jury awarded the Jacques (P) $1 in nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The court set aside the punitive damages award and the court of appeals affirmed, reluctantly concluding that it could not reinstate the punitive damages award because it was bound by precedent establishing that an award of nominal damages will not sustain a punitive damages award. The Jacques (P) appealed.
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Moore v. City of East Cleveland 4 results
- dissent, Justice Powell disagreed with the majority’s view that freedom of association does not encompass the right to live with whomever one wishes. As he points out in his majority opinion in this case, however, the right to live with one’s family members does fall within the right of freedom of association. Why the difference? In essence, the Court has declared that the right to associate,
- Certification to the U.S. Supreme Court after the state supreme court refused to review the ruling of the appeals court upholding the trial court’s determination that the ordinance was constitutional.
- , requires us to sustain the Ordinance. But one overriding factor sets this case apart from Belle Terre—the ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals. And in sustaining that ordinance, we were careful to note that it promoted “family needs” and “family values.” By contrast, the Ordinance at issue here regulates housing occupancy by slicing deeply into the family itself. On its face it selects certain categories of relatives who may live together and declares that others may not. When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, the usual
- ...of the household; (b) unmarried children of the nominal head, or of his or her spouse so long as the unmarried children have no children of their own living in the household; and (c) a father or mother of the nominal head or of the nominal head’s spouse. Notwithstanding part (b), the Ordinance also allows a “family” to include not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head or of the nominal head’s spouse, and the spouse and dependent children of such dependent child. Inez Moore (Inez)(P) lives with her son, Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons, Dale, Jr. and John Moore, Jr. The two boys are first cousins rather than brothers. John came to live with Inez (P) after his mother’s death. In early 1973, Inez (P) was issued a criminal citation when she refused to remove her grandson John from the home, since the Ordinance prohibited him from living there. Inez (P) claimed in the trial court that the Ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face....
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- (Flaherty, J.) Yes. If the true owner has not ejected the interloper within the time allotted for an action in ejectment and all other elements of adverse possession have been established, hostility will be implied, regardless of the subjective state of mind of the trespasser. Our earlier cases have indicated that “hostility” implies intent to hold title against the record title holder. Many appellate courts have been reluctant to rely on objective evidence of adverse possession without considering the possessor’s mental state of mind. There are, however, sound reasons to avoid entanglement with attempting to discern the mental state of adverse possessors. Justice Holmes pointed out in a letter to William James that the use of objective tests may involve an essentially equitable consideration that a person who has put down roots on land develops an attachment to the land that is worthy of protection. It was Justice Holmes who said that, if an owner abandons his land and the land is...
- State supreme court review of an intermediate appellate court decision affirming the trial court’s decision in the defendant’s favor.
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- states that the “basic question” in adverse possession cases is “whether the true owner had a right of action in ejectment against the wrongful possessor.” Accordingly, the emphasis is on the statute of limitations that bars an action for ejectment.
- ...by putting its lock on the gate and maintaining the lock until about 1978. During that 30-year period, Tioga (P) controlled ingress and egress from Agate Street. The street bordered Tioga’s (P) property and Tioga (P) thought it belonged to the city, but the street was never opened to the public and it was stricken from the city plan in 1966. Agate Street actually belonged to Supermarkets General (D). In September 1978, upon learning about Supermarkets General’s (D) ownership, Tioga (P) filed a complaint against Supermarkets General (D) seeking title to Agate Street by adverse possession. The chancellor found that Tioga (P) had actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession for longer than the 21-year statutory period, but that Tioga (P) had failed to establish that its possession was hostile or adverse to the true owner because Tioga (P) thought the land belonged to the city. The ruling was affirmed on appeal, and Tioga (P) appealed again to the state supreme court...
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Brown v. Lober 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- ...has title to the land, but also that the other titleholder has evicted the grantee. Such eviction can be constructive or actual, but constructive eviction requires more than the mere possibility that the title holder could someday come and claim possession of the land. Such was the case here. While no one disputed that the prior grantor who reserved the 2/3 mineral estate could someday come and claim possession of his 2/3 interest, since it had not yet happened there was nothing preventing Brown (P) from taking possession of the whole estate that he believed was transferred by Bost (D). Notice how this result does not truly resolve the underlying dispute, since it simply leaves the question open until such time as the prior grantor makes a claim to his 2/3 interest. Notice also how this does not help Brown (P), who cannot lease the whole mineral estate since he only owns a 1/3 interest. Had Brown (P) anticipated this, he could have brought in the prior grantor as a defendant,...
- Appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois from the appellate court’s ruling reversing the trial court’s judgment dismissing the claim
- ...which, under Illinois law, contained the following implied covenants: that at the time of making delivery, the grantor was lawfully seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple in and to the premises described and had good right and full power to convey the same, that the estate was free from all incumbrances, that the grantee will have quiet and peaceable possession of such premises, and that the grantor will defend against all others claiming title thereto. The first part of these implied covenants represent the covenant of seisin, also known as the covenant of good right to convey. The second part represents the covenant against incumbrances, and the last part sets forth the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Brown’s (P) complaint essentially claims that the Bosts (D) covenanted that they were the fee simple owners of the estate at the time of the conveyance and breached that covenant by failing to convey the full mineral estate. The trial court interpreted this as a claim for the...
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- Brown (P) purchased 80 acres from William and Faith Bost (D). The property was transferred by a statutory warranty deed containing no exceptions. The deed was dated December 21, 1957. After delivery of the deed, Brown (P) took possession of the land and recorded the deed. On May 8, 1974, Brown (P) granted a coal option to Consolidated Coal Co. in which Brown (P) leased the right to mine the coal underlying the land for $6,000. In 1976, Brown (P) discovered that a prior grantor had reserved 2/3 of the mineral estate, and that Brown (P) only owned a 1/3 interest. After renegotiating the lease with Consolidated Coal Co., in which a reduced payment of $2,000 was agreed upon for the 1/3 interest, Brown brought suit against Lober (D), the executor of the estate of Faith Bost (D), seeking $4,000 in damages. The suit was filed May 25, 1976. The trial court ruled that Brown’s (P) claim for breach of the covenant of seisin was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations. The trial court...
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Smith v. City of Little Rock 5 results
- (Holt, J.) Yes. There is a presumption that the City Zoning Board acts in a fair, just, and reasonable manner when it rezones or refuses to rezone property, and the burden is on the persons attacking the rezoning or refusal to show otherwise. The decision of the chancellor will be affirmed unless it is clearly erroneous. The judiciary has no right or authority to substitute its judgment for that of the legislative branch of government. In zoning matters, the General Assembly has delegated legislative power to the cities in matters relating to zoning property. The role of the courts is simply to determine whether the action of the municipality is arbitrary. Arbitrary means arising from unrestrained exercise of will, caprice, or personal preference, based on random or convenient choice, rather than on reason or nature. In this case, the property at issue is surrounded by a nearby drive-in restaurant, liquor store, drug store, McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and motel, among other...
- was spot zoning and simply says that, in the zoning administrator’s opinion, it was not spot zoning. It is incredible that the zoning administrator made that decision. Spot zoning singles out a small parcel for use in a manner inconsistent with the other predominant land uses in the area. That is exactly what happened in this case. Spot zoning is invalid because it amounts to an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable treatment of a limited area within a particular district. I do not suggest that we substitute our judgment for that of a city in a zoning matter, but that does not mean we should go to the other extreme and meekly accept whatever the city does as right in zoning cases.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- : In some states, a judge in the court of chancery.
- Spot zoning is defined as singling out a parcel of land for a use totally different from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of that property and to the detriment of other owners. Spot zoning is the antithesis of plan zoning. Courts generally consider whether the questionable zoning relates to the compatibility of the surrounding uses. Other factors include the characteristics of the land, the size of the parcel, and any public benefit from the rezoning. The most important consideration, however, may be the extent to which the disputed zoning is consistent with the city’s comprehensive plan.
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Strawn v. Canuso 5 results
- (O’Hern, J.) Yes. Professional sellers of residential real estate have a duty to disclose off-site conditions that materially affect the value or desirability of property. In the case of on-site conditions, courts have imposed affirmative obligations on sellers to disclose information materially affecting the value of property, and there is no logical reason why a certain class of sellers and brokers should not disclose off-site matters as well. The duty is not unlimited. We hold that a builder-developer of residential real estate is not only liable to a purchaser for affirmative and intentional misrepresentation, but also for nondisclosure of off-site physical conditions known to it and unknown and not readily observable by the buyer, if the existence of those conditions is of sufficient materiality to affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment of the property and, therefore, render the property substantially less desirable or valuable to the objectively reasonable buyer.
- ...was a partial ditch where construction of the canal had begun. In the 1920s, the canal was turned into a municipal and industrial chemical dumpsite. In 1953, the Hooker Chemical Company, then the owners and operators of the property, covered the canal with earth and sold it to the city for one dollar. In the late ‘50s, about 100 homes and a school were built at the site. In 1978, Love Canal exploded. The explosion was triggered by a record amount of rainfall. Shortly thereafter, the leaching began. Corroding waste-disposal drums could be seen breaking up through the grounds of backyards. Trees and gardens were turning black and dying. One entire swimming pool had been had been popped up from its foundation, and floated on a small sea of chemicals. Puddles of noxious substances were in the yards and basements, and on the school grounds. The air had a noxious odor. Children returned from playing with burns on their hands and faces. There was a disturbingly high rate of... ...cases...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- State supreme court review of a decision of the appellate division in the plaintiffs’ favor.
- The plaintiffs in this case consisted of more than 150 families seeking damages because the new homes they bought were constructed near a hazardous waste dump site. Toxic wastes from a nearby landfill had seeped into a downstream lake and contaminated the ground water. The residents complained about odors and associated physical symptoms. The EPA recommended that the site be considered for a Superfund cleanup. The plaintiffs alleged that the developers knew about the landfill before they considered the site for residential development, but did not disclose the facts to the plaintiffs. A 1980 EPA report had warned that the proposed housing development on land adjacent to the site had the potential of developing into a future Love Canal if construction were permitted.
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Howard v. Kunto 4 results
- As the court indicates, the facts of this case are quite unusual. In the ordinary adverse possession situation, a landowner seeks to gain ownership over more property than his deed reflects. Often, a landowner will, for instance, erect a fence around his boundary that actually crosses his property line into a neighbor’s land. Over time, that encroachment upon the neighbor’s land grants the landowner ownership of the neighbor’s land within the fence perimeter, assuming all elements of adverse possession have been satisfied.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- On appeal to review a trial court decision for the plaintiff.
- ...that the legal description on his deed did not coincide with his property and that he was in fact the record owner of the Moyers’ property. Likewise, the Moyers were the record owners of the property owned by Kunto (D), who owned the property immediately to the west of the land upon which his house was constructed. After making this discovery, Howard (P) agreed with Moyer to convey record title of his property—that which Moyer previously believed to belong to him—in exchange for Moyer’s interest in the Kunto (D) property. Because neither Moyer nor any of his predecessors in interest had ever asserted ownership of the Kunto (D) property, he agreed to the conveyance. Thereafter, Howard (P) and Yearly filed an action to quiet title. When considering Kunto’s (D) claim that he had acquired title to the property by adverse possession, the trial court concluded that Kunto (D) had not continuously possessed the property because it was used only for summer occupancy, and that he was...
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Popov v. Hayashi 4 results
- The question in this case is whether Popov (P) achieved possession or the right to possession as he attempted to catch and hold onto the ball. Under the premise known as “Gray’s Rule,” urged by Hayashi (D), a person who catches a ball once it enters the stands is its owner. A ball is caught if the person has achieved complete control at the point in time when the momentum of the ball and the person catching the ball cease. A baseball that is dislodged by incidental contact with another fan before momentum has ceased is not possessed. The ...are reasonably calculated to result in unequivocal dominion and control at some point in the near future. We choose to apply Gray’s Rule. Popov (P) has not established that he would have retained control of the ball after all momentum ceased and after any incidental contact with others. He therefore did not achieve full possession. That finding, however, does not resolve the case. Popov (P) was attacked. He should have had the opportunity to try...
- The court also noted that a trespass to chattel claim would not lie. Trespass to chattel occurs when personal property has been damaged or when the defendant has interfered with the plaintiff’s use of the property. Actual dispossession is not an element of the claim. Popov (P) did not claim that Hayashi (D) damaged the ball or interfered with Popov’s (P) use and enjoyment of it. He claimed that Hayashi (D) intentionally took it from him and refused to give it back. If there was a wrong at all, the court explained, it was conversion.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Trial court consideration of the plaintiff’s tort claims.
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Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. 4 results
- ...free alienability of property, including a leasehold. However, alienability may be restricted by contract so as to protect the lessor. Such contracts are construed against the lessor, especially when the act of assigning terminates the lease. The majority rule allows the lessor to arbitrarily withhold consent. Even in the majority states, however, the lessor may waive his right or be estopped from asserting it. More jurisdictions are adopting the rule that a lessor may withhold consent only when he has a commercially reasonable objection to the assignment. We adopt this rule because: (1) public policy favors free alienability; (2) the relationship between lessor and lessee has become more and more impersonal, and the lessor is just as likely to find a high-quality tenant in the assignee as the lessee; (3) the lessor’s interests are protected by the fact that the lessee remains contractually liable to the lessor; and (4) a lease is increasingly viewed as a contract. As a...
- This case continues the development of contract doctrine in the law of property. In this case, the doctrine of good faith is applied. A lessor may withhold his or her consent to an assignment only with good reason. Notice that the contract doctrine of good faith helps achieve one of the goals of property law: it promotes the free alienability of property.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal by proposed assignee Kendall (P) after trial court sustained demurrer to complaint without leave to amend.
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United States v. Causby 5 results
- ...to the periphery of the universe. With modern air travel, that rule can no longer apply. But here, if the flights made Causby’s (P) land completely uninhabitable, there would be a taking. It would not matter that the planes never touched Causby’s (P) land. Causby’s (P) beneficial ownership of the land would be destroyed. It is not like a nuisance case where incidental damages could be recovered. While Causby’s (P) use and enjoyment of his land is not completely destroyed, it is limited and the value is diminished. The fact that the Civil Aeronautics Authority approved the flight path is not relevant. Congress has determined that navigable airspace in the public domain is airspace above the minimum safe flight altitude, not the lower altitude that is needed for taking off and landing. A landowner owns at least as much of the space above his land as he can use for things like buildings, trees, and fences. The fact that he is not actually using that airspace for anything other...
- Causby (P) owned land near an airport. The U.S. (D) leased the airport on a month-to-month basis. Airplanes passed directly over Causby’s (P) land, about 67 feet over his house, blowing the leaves off his trees. As a result of the noise, Causby (P) had to give up his chicken business. Causby (P) and his family suffered from anxiety, fear, and lack of sleep. Causby (P) sued the U.S. (D) for taking his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Claims held that the U.S. (D) had taken an easement over Causby’s (P) property and that the value of the property was $2000. The U.S. (D) filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court granted.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (Black, J.) Air transportation should not be made into a constitutional issue. Courts should only award damages and grant injunctions. Congress is in a better position to develop solutions for new national problems. I would reverse on the ground that there has been no taking in the constitutional sense.
- , the Supreme Court officially abolished the principle of
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Messersmith v. Smith 3 results
- On petition for rehearing, the court found that there may have been a misapprehension concerning the scope of this opinion. The court emphasized that at the time Caroline signed and delivered the deed to Smith (D), she had no title to convey, so Smith (D) obtained no title to convey to Seale (D), who claimed to be an innocent purchaser. The title had already been conveyed to Frederick (P). Seale (D), through operation of the recording statutes, sought to divest Frederick (P) of the true title and establish statutory title in himself. What we have here is a prior unrecorded valid and effective conveyance that is challenged by a subsequent purchaser to whom no title was conveyed and who claims that the recording laws vest title in him by virtue of a deed that was not acknowledged and was therefore not entitled to be placed of record. This situation differs from a case where an attack is made by a subsequent purchaser on a prior recorded deed that actually conveyed title to the grantee...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (Morris, C.J.) No. An instrument that is not properly acknowledged is not entitled to be recorded. The trial court found that the deeds were not executed through fraud or false representation, and there is no reason to disturb that finding. Caroline’s mineral deed to Smith (D), however, was invalid, for she had already conveyed her interest to her nephew (P). Smith’s (D) conveyance to Seale (D) was also invalid. The only way Seale (D) can assert title to any interest in the property is by citing the fact that Frederick’s (P) deed was not recorded until July 1951. This reasoning is insufficient, however, to support Seale’s (D) claim because
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Brush Grocery Kart, Inc. v. Sure Fine Market, Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- State supreme court review of a state appellate court decision affirming the trial court’s decision against the plaintiff.
- ...D) entered into a lease agreement that included an option to purchase the property during the last six months of the lease. Brush (P) could elect to purchase the property at a price equal to the average of the appraisals of an expert chosen by each party. Before the lease expired, Brush (P) notified Sure Fine (D) that it wanted to buy the property. Both parties submitted appraisals, but they were unable to agree on a sale price. Brush (P) then vacated the premises, returned all keys, and advised Sure Fine (D) that it would discontinue the casualty insurance on the property that it had maintained during the lease. Brush (P) filed suit, claiming that Sure Fine (D) failed to negotiate in good faith, and Sure Fine (D) countered with the same argument against Brush (P). As the litigation progressed, a hail storm caused $60,000 in damage to the building. The court found that under the doctrine of equitable conversion, Brush (P) was the equitable owner of the property and bore the risk...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE BUYER OF PROPERTY BORE THE RISK OF LOSS BEFORE THE SALE TOOK PLACE
- Brush Grocery Kart (P) wanted to buy property to be used as a grocery store from Sure Fine Market (D), but the parties could not agree on a price; before the sale took place, the property suffered hail damage, and the court held that the buyer bore the risk of loss.
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Elk Creek Management Co. v. Gilbert 1 result
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Supreme Court review of an order of the Court of Appeals reversing a finding that a regulation was valid.
- Application of the Endangered Species Act tends to get a lot of public attention. Much of that attention centers on debates of economics v. preservation of a species whose importance may not be apparent to the general public. The backdrop to his case, for example, was whether protection of the Spotted Owl justified limiting or curtailing logging operations.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to the Secretary, and when Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, the courts are especially reluctant to substitute its views of wise policy for the Secretary’s.
- to preserve the habitat of endangered animals. The Court’s holding that the hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological use.
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Raub v. General Income Sponsors of Iowa, Inc. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- State appellate court review of a trial court decision against the banks.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Did the trial court properly conclude that the banks’ liens were not effective against the plaintiff’s property?
- ...consideration for it without notice of outstanding equities. A mortgagee is regarded the same as a purchaser for this purpose. The critical question in this case is whether the defendants had notice that their mortgagor’s title had been obtained by fraud. Notice may be found to exist if circumstances are shown that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate the possible existence of outstanding rights hostile to the grantor’s title. If such circumstances do exist and no investigation is made, then a purported bona fide purchaser is charged with all knowledge that an investigation probably would have disclosed. First, we must consider whether Raub’s (P) continued possession of the house imparted notice of her present claim, and second, we must consider whether there were any other circumstances that would have put a reasonably prudent person on notice to investigate the possibility of outstanding equities. We have searched the record and find no evidence to... ...cases...
- , judgments, liens, and taxes; and (3) an inspection of the land itself, to determine by observation any rights that may exist apart from the recording system by virtue of occupancy, use, or otherwise. Only the third item in this list was material here. Under the circumstances of this case, the defendants were not charged with notice of the plaintiff’s claim because of her occupancy of the property.
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Woodrick v. Wood 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- State appellate court review of the trial court’s denial of an injunction.
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- (Blackmon, J.) No. Acts that would technically constitute waste as defined under the common law will not be enjoined if they result in improving rather than injuring the property. Woodrick (P) claims that since the barn has a value of $3,200, its destruction would diminish the value of the property and would therefore constitute waste. However, evidence presented by the Woods (D) indicates that the removal of the barn would actually increase the value of the property. Because the removal of the barn would increase the value of the property in which Woodrick (P) had a remainder interest, it does not constitute waste to the property. The relevant inquiry is always whether the contemplated act of the life tenant would result in diminution of the value of the property. The trial court’s decision to award Woodrick (P) the value of the barn was not a payment to justify waste, but was instead indicative of the trial court’s intent to protect the rights of both parties and reach a fair...
- : An equitable remedy in which the court orders a party to perform or to desist from a particular act.
- , for instance, the court found that a widow who inherited a dower interest in her husband’s undeveloped land could make reasonable use of the land’s timber to pay taxes and other things to her benefit and should not be charged with protecting the property for the mere benefit of the reversioner.
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Gurwit v. Kannatzer 5 results
- State appellate court review of a trial court decision quieting title in the plaintiffs.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- QUIET TITLE: An action in court in which a plaintiff seeks to resolve a real-property ownership dispute with the defendant, who is the adverse claimant to the title.
- ...not, however, have title to a 17-acre portion of the property that Putnam pointed out, and the deed did not include that portion in the description. The Gurwits (P), assuming they had a secure title, took possession of the 17-acre tract along with the land to the west thereof, and for 20 years continued to exercise dominion over it. They posted “no trespassing” and “no hunting” signs on the property, cut firewood, and cleaned up downed trees. Neighbors acknowledged the Gurwits’ (P) ownership of the property. John Gruender (D) witnessed Gurwit (P) cutting trees on the disputed tract and did not object. Then, in 1983, Eugene Gruender (D) told Gurwit (P) that Gurwit (P) did not have record title to the 17-acre tract, which had in fact been included with Gruender’s (D) tax bills. The Gurwits (P) instituted a quiet title action. Both Gruenders (D) were defendants and filed a counterclaim seeking to have title to the 17 acres quieted in them. The court found in favor of the Gurwits (P)...
- possession does not require continuous occupation and use. The evidence amply supported the trial court’s finding that the Gurwits’ (P) possession of the disputed tract was of a character that ripened into title with the passage of the statutory period of ten years.
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Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc. 4 results
- State supreme court review of an intermediate appellate court decision affirming a directed verdict for the defendants on all claims except trespass.
- ...) No. Just as owners of property must accept some limitations on their ownership rights extending above the surface of the property, there are also limitations on property owners’ subsurface rights. Ownership rights in today’s world are not as clear-cut as they were before the advent of airplanes and injection wells. Absolute ownership of both air rights and subsurface rights has no place in the modern world. Here, the plaintiffs did not establish, as a matter of law, an actionable trespass. BP (D) operates the wells pursuant to required permits, and the plaintiffs’ subsurface property rights are contingent upon interference with the reasonable and foreseeable use of their property. The trespass alleged is an indirect one, and due to the type of invasion alleged, physical damage or actual interference with the reasonable and foreseeable used of the property must be demonstrated. The plaintiffs’ trespass claim is a novel one, previously unrecognized by any court. Considering all...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- This court pointed out once again the ancient Latin maxim,
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Benjamin v. Lindner Aviation, Inc. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- State supreme court review of a trial court decision against the plaintiff.
- (Ternus, J.) Yes. Mislaid property is entrusted to the owner of the premises where it is found rather than the finder of the property because it is assumed that the true owner may eventually recall where he has placed his property and return there to reclaim it. There is substantial evidence in this case that the money was mislaid. The bills were carefully tied and wrapped and then concealed in the plane’s wing, accessible only by removing rusty screws and a panel. Money that is intentionally concealed with the intention of reclaiming it is mislaid, not lost. Nor was the money abandoned. It is unlikely someone would voluntarily part with over $18,000 with the intention of terminating his ownership. Moreover, because we have no idea how long the money was hidden in the airplane wing, the trial court was not obligated to decide that it was treasure trove. Because the money was mislaid, it belongs to the owner of the premises where it was found, which is the airplane. It doesn’t matter...
- Benjamin (P) would have been satisfied if the money were deemed treasure trove, because treasure trove belongs to the finder against all the world except the true owner. Because there was little chance of the true owner coming forward, Benjamin (P) likely would have ended up with the cash. Treasure trove often consists of property that was presumably lost or abandoned long ago. In this case, the evidence that the wing screws were rusted and the money smelled musty indicated that the cash could have been there a long time. However, there were no inspection records indicating the last time the plane had been inspected, so there was a possibility the money was not inside the wing for an extended period of time. In any event, mislaid property is entrusted to the owner of the premises where it is found, in part because the true owner will likely retrace his or her steps to retrieve the property, but that seems unlikely in this case.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Benjamin (P) was inspecting a plane when he opened a wing panel and found two packets of money; he sought a declaratory judgment that the money belonged to him, but the trial court awarded it to the bank that had repossessed the plane and Benjamin (P) appealed.
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- Appeal by the plaintiff from a court of special appeals and trial court decision upholding the ruling of the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals against the plaintiff.
- nonconforming use is permissible as long as the nature and character of that use is unchanged and is substantially the same. Our cases have held that merely increasing the frequency of a nonconforming use does not constitute an unlawful expansion; rather it is intensification. Intensification is the more frequent present use of property for the same or a similar use as that for which it had been used less frequently before. Increasing the number of nights on which Triplin (P) presented adult entertainment from two to five, for instance, would fit within the definition of intensification. The judgment of the court of special appeals is reversed.
- ...up to five nights per week. When he purchased the property, the zoning ordinance did not prohibit the use of the property for that purpose. Even so, Triplin (P) reduced the number of nights of adult entertainment to two. In 1994, the city (D) enacted an ordinance providing that any adult entertainment business located in the central business district was considered a nonconforming use. Triplin (P) continued to use the facility as an adult entertainment club. In 2000, a zoning inspector issued a code violation notice that directed Triplin (P) to stop using the premises for adult entertainment. Triplin (P) appealed to the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals. The Board ruled that Triplin (P) was entitled to provide adult entertainment two nights per week. Triplin (P) then sued, challenging the Board’s power to temporally restrict the nonconforming use, because he wanted the ability to offer nude dancing more frequently than two nights per week. He lost before the trial court...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- The court relied in part on the decision in , in which the citizens of Baltimore City sought to enjoin the Department of Recreation and Parks from allowing professional baseball at Baltimore Stadium. The stadium was built before 1931, when the district it was in was rezoned residential, after which the stadium was infrequently used for football games, track meets, and other civic events. In 1944, a fire destroyed the city’s baseball stadium, which resulted in more baseball games being played at Baltimore Stadium. The citizens argued that allowing baseball games constituted an impermissible expansion of the use, but the court disagreed. “We have never held that the more frequent use of a property for a purpose which does not conform to the ordinary restrictions of the neighborhood is an expansion of an infrequent use of the same building for a similar purpose.”
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Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp. 4 results
- Federal appellate court review of a trial court decision in the defendant’s favor.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (Hand, J.) No. To prevent the imitation of a chattel, and to set up a monopoly in the plan of it, gives the creator a power that the Constitution allows only Congress to create. True, it seems as though the plaintiff has suffered a grievance for which there should be a remedy. It seems a lame answer to turn the injured party out of court, but there are larger issues at stake. Whether there should be an amendment of the copyright law is not for us to decide. The order is affirmed.
- Cheney Brothers (P) put out new silk designs each season. Many new patterns were created, but only a few proved to be popular, and even if they did, their popularity lasted just the one season. It would have been impossible to secure design patents on all of the different patterns, and it would have been impossible to know in advance which would sell well and patent only those. Accordingly, despite the fact that Cheney Brothers (P) put a lot of expense and ingenuity into fabricating the various designs, the company was without protection from anyone who chose to copy its patterns. Doris Silk Corp. (D) took advantage of that situation. It copied one of the popular designs and undercut Cheney Brothers’ (P) price. Cheney Brothers (P) sued, asking for protection for its designs only during the season they were sold. The trial court refused to enjoin Doris Silk (D) because Cheney Brothers (P) did not have a copyright.
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Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz 2 results
McAvoy v. Medina 1 result
Vasquez v. Vasquez 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- It was undisputed in this case that Juanita signed the quitclaim deed and gave it to her attorney with specific instructions. According to her attorney, those instructions were to keep
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal from a trial court finding that the property belonged to the appellee.
- Did the trial court properly find that the property belonged to Brigido rather than the beneficiaries under Juanita’s will?
- The person appointed by a testator or testatrix to carry out the directives of his or her will. A woman so appointed is called an executrix. When a person is appointed by the court to administer a decedent’s estate, he/she is called an administrator/administratrix.
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Zaman v. Felton 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Unlike what many people believe, a mortgage is not a loan. It is actually the security document that protects the lender’s rights under the loan. A mortgage gives the bank a right to the subject house or real property that comes into play only if payments are not timely made. Mortgages are usually recorded against the ownership record of a house or other real property, but there are times when all of the legal requirements of a mortgage are not met. For instance, the lender might have forgotten to fill in the legal description blank on the mortgage. Technically speaking, the mortgage is invalid. However, most courts will look at the parties’ intent and decide that an equitable mortgage exists, since calling it a mortgage would be the fair (equitable) decision. As this case shows, equitable mortgages can arise in other situations. For instance, contract for deed transactions can also turn into equitable mortgages.
- (Patterson, J.) No. If a deed or contract, lacking the characteristics of a common law mortgage, is used for the purpose of pledging real property or some interest therein as security for a debt or obligation, with the intention that it will have the effect of a mortgage, equity will give effect to the intention of the parties. Such is an equitable mortgage. In other words, if a transaction resolves itself into a security, whatever may be its form and whatever name the parties may choose to give it, it is, in equity, a mortgage. New Jersey courts have repeatedly found that sale-leaseback arrangements made to avoid foreclosure are equitable mortgages. It is the trial court’s task to discern whether the transaction has been labeled as a land sale in order to mask its actual objective: a mortgage loan secured by a deed to the property at issue. In ...court articulated eight factors to assist trial judges in determining whether a transaction gives rise to an equitable mortgage: (1)...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- THE COURT ADOPTS THE
- Appeal from the appellate division’s decision affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.
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Lohmeyer v. Bower 4 results
- The court points out that there is a different standard for marketable title in the case of ordinances than there is for private covenants. In other words, if a zoning ordinance required houses in a certain area to be of a certain type, a buyer, absent an agreement otherwise, cannot rescind the contract. On the other hand, if there is a private covenant running with
- (Parker, J.) Yes. Marketable title to real estate is title that does not expose the buyer to litigation. The weight of the case law is clear that a buyer may not rescind a contract to purchase land where the encumbrance on the title is the result of a municipal ordinance. A buyer may ordinarily rescind a contract based on the existence of private covenants, but Lohmeyer (P) agreed to accept private covenants. Lohmeyer’s (P) case is premised on the fact that the house on Lot 37 violates these restrictions, thus leaving him open to litigation. The case of
- CASE VOCABULARY
- THE STATE SUPREME COURT DEFINED THE FACTORS THAT MAKE A TITLE UNMARKETABLE
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Johnson v. M’Intosh 2 results
- ...the Indians were given the right to occupancy. However, their right to absolute title was divested and taken by the discoverer. This principle, that title vests in the European nation that discovers the land, was especially recognized by England. As early as 1496, the King of England commissioned an explorer to take title to all land discovered by the explorer, except land previously discovered by Christian people. After the revolution, title to all land passed from Great Britain to the colonies. As mentioned, this title was absolute, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. The colonies affirmed the principle that title traced to a discovery is superior to Indian title. Virginia, for example, declared the “exclusive right of pre-emption from the Indians.” The land that is at the core of the controversy in this case was granted from Virginia to the United States. The United States has also affirmed the principle that title traced to a discovery is superior to Indian title....
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Jee v. Audley 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Judge undisclosed.) Yes. The limitations of a personal estate are void unless they necessarily vest, if at all, within a life or lives in being and 21 years or nine or ten months thereafter. In this case I am called upon to decide whether persons of advanced age can still become parents, and I decline to do so. As it stands, the limitation in this case can extend to after-born daughters. Accordingly, it is not within the rules of law. The Jees might have had children ten years after the testator’s death, and the niece might die without issue fifty years later, in which case it would evidently transgress the rules prescribed. Though the testator might possibly mean to restrain the limitation to the children who were living at the time of death, I cannot construe it in such a restrained sense but must intend it to take in after-born children. The limitation is void, so the bill is dismissed.
- Was the limitation to the Jee daughters (P) void as being too remote, given that it was to take effect on a general failure of issue of the niece but was not confined to the daughters living at the death of the testator, such that it might extend to after-born daughters, in which case it would not be within the limit of a life or lives in being and 21 years afterward?
- CASE VOCABULARY
- The holders of a remainder interest asked the court to secure the interest for their benefit in the event the testator’s niece died without issue and forfeited the bequest.
- English Court of Chancery consideration of a bill filed to secure a remainder interest for the holders of that interest.
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Just v. Marinette County 2 results
- For their violation of the ordinance, the Justs (P) were subject to a forfeiture of $100. In a part of the opinion not included in the excerpt, the court addresses the Justs’ (P) argument that the inclusion of their property in the conservation district reduced the value of the property. The court noted that the claimed depreciation was not based on the value of the land in its existing natural state, but on the value of the land after it was filled in. In effect,
- CASE VOCABULARY
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- ...on the same block, or other properties they also owned. At this time, Penn Central (P) owned several properties in downtown Manhattan. In 1968, in order to increase its income from the Terminal, Penn Central (P) entered into a long-term lease with UGP (P), a British corporation. UGP (P) was to build a 55-story office building above the Terminal, paying an annual rent of $1 million during construction and at least $3 million thereafter. Penn Central (P) and UGP (P) submitted two plans to the Commission: one with a modern office tower over the French-style facade of the Terminal, and one with a completely redesigned Terminal. The Commission sternly rejected both plans, calling the first one “an aesthetic joke.” It also said, however, that construction would be allowed depending on whether a proposed addition “would harmonize in scale, materials, and character” with the Terminal. Penn Central (P) and UGP (P) brought suit in state court, alleging the landmarks law effected... ...court...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (Brennan, J.) No. A law that does not interfere with an owner’s primary expectation concerning the use of the property, and allows the owner to receive a reasonable return on his or her investment, does not effect a taking that demands just compensation. There is no set formula for deciding these cases, and so this Court must look at the particular facts here.
- The concept of “reasonable return on investment” is problematic. While prior to this decision the New York Court of Appeals also relied on this idea, it noted that it was “an elusive concept, incapable of definition.” The reasonableness of the return on the owner’s investment must be based on the value of the property. However, the value of the property is inescapably dependent on the amount of return that is permitted or available. This circular reasoning is what makes the concept of reasonable return on investment a somewhat nebulous one.
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 4 results
- The seeds of four dominant themes in legislative zoning are planted in this opinion. First, there is the idea that a city or municipality is allowed to exclude some uses of property in certain circumstances. Second, the court essentially allows the same government body to control the economic markets, in a way, by designating where areas of trade can be set up. Third, the court places emphasis on local control in zoning measures, particularly when it establishes early in its opinion that Euclid (D) is a separate governing entity. Finally, the court places some emphasis on aesthetic values, and how these can be a valid basis for a zoning ordinance in the appropriate context. This concept can be found in the discussion on separating apartment buildings from other residences.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- ..., the Nickel Plate, to the north. There were residential lots with buildings to the east and west of Ambler Realty’s (P) land. In 1922, the Village Council (D) adopted a comprehensive zoning plan to regulate and restrict the use of land, as well as the size of the lots and the heights of buildings. This ordinance divided the village into six use districts, U-1 to U-6. Each higher-numbered district included the uses of the district below it. Thus, U-1 districts allowed only single-family dwellings, while U-2 districts were extended to include two-family dwellings along with U-1 uses; U-3 districts were extended to include public buildings like churches, schools, and hospitals with U-2 uses, and so on. U-6 districts could be used for sewage plants and junkyards, as well as for all residential and industrial operations below this level. The ordinance also divided the village into three height districts, H-1 to H-3, and four area districts, A-1 to A-4. The zone map attached...
- can serve as a guide. The building of a structure should be considered after the building itself is looked at in connection with the circumstances and its surroundings. No one has doubted the validity of regulations regarding the height of buildings within reasonable limits, the materials used in construction, the exclusion of certain trades from residential areas, etc. The Village (D), though essentially a suburb of Cleveland, is nonetheless a separate political body. As such, it has the power to govern itself as it sees fit within the limits of the Ohio and Federal Constitutions. Here, the serious question is over the exclusion of apartment houses, stores and shops, and other similar establishments from residential areas. The state courts that deny or narrow this power are greatly outnumbered by the state courts that sustain it. Various commissions and experts have advocated the separation of residential, business, and industrial buildings. They have pointed to the ease of...
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Sommer v. Kridel 2 results
Chapter Thirteen. Eminent Domain 1 result
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 4 results
- ...This was one of the first Bill of Rights guarantees that was absorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. But the case at hand does not involve an obvious taking of property. Neither party lost title to or possession of their property. Rather, the government regulation substantially diminished the Coal Company’s (D) interest in the land beneath Mahon’s (P) house. In so doing, the regulation infringed upon the private contract between Pennsylvania Coal (D) and Mahon (P). Such regulation can constitute an unconstitutional taking if the Coal Company (D) is not given just compensation for its loss. The question is, when does the regulation rise to the level of a taking. The majority’s opinion concludes that the Act makes it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal, and it concludes that this has the same constitutional effect as taking away the company’s property rights. Thus, at its core, the takings analysis boils down to a judgment call—does the regulation...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Review of state court decision upholding validity of statute that restricted coal mining.
- Mahon (P) claimed title to property under a deed executed by the Pennsylvania Coal Co. (D) in 1878. The deed conveyed only the surface, and it reserved to Pennsylvania Coal (D) the right to remove all coal under the surface. The grantee of the deed took the premises with the risk of subsidence of his property, and he waived all claims for damages. Mahon (P) contended that whatever rights Pennsylvania Coal (D) had to subsurface mining were taken away by the state’s Kohler Act. This 1921 law forbade the mining of coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of any structure used for human habitation. Pennsylvania Coal (D) contended that the law amounts to a taking of property, and that it is entitled to just compensation. A Pennsylvania state court upheld the Act, and the United States Supreme Court granted review.
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Gambrell v. Nivens 3 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appellate court review of an order granting injunctive relief to Gambrell (P).
- ...1992, they sold the subject lot to Foshee. In the deed to Foshee, Gambrell (P) left blank the space reserved for reciting encumbrances on the property. Instead, an untitled, undated, and unsigned page listing the restrictions was attached to the deed and recorded along with the deed. The deed made no mention of the attachment, nor did the text of the attachment refer to the deed. The attachment stated that the covenants were to run with the land, and also states that the lot could be used only for residential purposes. Foshee conveyed his lot to Nivens (D) by warranty deed in May of 1996. The real estate agent for Nivens (D) provided them a copy of the covenants prior to the purchase. Nivens (D) started to build a large wedding chapel and facility when Gambrell (P) filed suit on February 18, 1998, to enforce the purported restrictions and enjoin Nivens (D) from completing the chapel’s construction and using it for commercial purposes. The trial court concluded that Gambrell (P...
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Esteves v. Esteves 3 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal by one cotenant (D) from trial court ruling in favor of remaining two cotenants (P).
- Did the trial court err in ruling that upon sale of the house at issue, the cotenant son (D) had to share pro-rata the costs of maintaining the house his cotenant parents (P) occupied without any offset for the value of the cotenant parents’ (P) occupancy of the house?
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Chapter Three. Owning Personal Property 2 results
- Oaks committed suicide and left all his worldly possessions to his romantic partner, Stouff, but the Estate challenged the gift, saying the doctrine of gift causa mortis does not apply in cases where the death is the result of suicide.
- Benjamin (P) was inspecting a plane when he opened a wing panel and found two packets of money; he sought a declaratory judgment that the money belonged to him, but the trial court awarded it to the bank that had repossessed the plane and Benjamin (P) appealed.
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Alphabetical Table of Cases 2 results
JMB Properties Urban Co. v. Paolucci 4 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal from trial court ruling that the landlord (P) constructively evicted the tenant (D).
- As a general rule, a tenant cannot assert constructive eviction due to the acts of third parties. But many courts and the Restatement (Restatement (Second) of Property: Landlord and Tenant § 6.1) recognize an exception to this principle if the landlord has a legal right to control the third-party conduct.
- ...unreasonable length of time after an allegedly untenantable condition arises waives a constructive eviction claim against the landlord. A constructive eviction results from a landlord’s failure to keep the premises in a tenantable condition. Untenantability exists when the interference with occupancy is of such a nature that the property cannot be used for the purpose for which it was rented. Constructive eviction cannot exist where the tenant does not surrender the property. Following a constructive eviction, the tenant is not required to vacate the premises immediately, but is entitled to a reasonable time to do so. The tenant bears the burden of proving that he did abandon the premises within a reasonable time after the untenantable condition occurred. If the tenant fails to vacate within a reasonable time, the tenant is considered to have waived the landlord’s breach of covenant. In this case, we find that Paolucci (D) waived any claim of constructive eviction by remaining on...
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Rosengrant v. Rosengrant 4 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- This case underscores the importance of complying with the strict requirements of delivery. Harold and Mildred clearly intended for Jay (D) to take the property upon their deaths. Even though they attempted to legally deliver the deed, they failed to comply with the requirements. Harold and Mildred could have handled the situation in at least two other ways in order to accomplish their goals. First, they could have simply created a will that transferred the property upon their deaths to Jay (D). The will would have had to comply with the Statute of Wills (
- ...and Mildred to the bank, where the couple signed the deed and handed it to Jay “to make this legal.” They then instructed Jay (D) to return the deed to the banker, who put it in an envelope labeled “J.W. Rosengrant or Harold H. Rosengrant” in a safe deposit box. Harold and Mildred told Jay (D) that he could record the deed when they died. After Mildred died, Jay (D) consulted an attorney concerning the legality of the transaction. The attorney said the delivery should be sufficient but told Harold he could draw up a will. After Harold died (presumably without a will), Jay (D) obtained the deed from the bank and recorded it. Another Rosengrant (P) relative challenged the transfer, filing a petition to cancel and set aside the deed. Rosengrant (P) argued that the deed was void because it was never legally delivered and that the deed was really a testamentary instrument that was void for failure to comply with the Statute of Wills. The trial court agreed and found the deed...
- (Boydston, J.) No. Where a grantor delivers a deed but retains a right of retrieval and states that the deed is operative only after the grantor’s death, the delivery is not legally sufficient. Harold and Mildred intended to comply with the legal aspects of delivery by handing the deed to Jay (D). However, after the “transfer” Harold continued to live on, farm, and pay taxes on the land. The words written on the envelope create an inescapable conclusion that the deed was retrievable by Harold any time before his death. There was an agreement that the deed was to take effect only upon the death of Harold and Mildred. Thus, the “transfer” to Jay (D) was only a pro forma attempt to comply with the legal aspects of delivery. The grantor clearly intended to exercise control over the land and had the power to revoke the transfer at any time. We agree with the trial court that the deed was not properly delivered. Affirmed.
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- CASE VOCABULARY
- THE COURT DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN LANGUAGE THAT CREATES A FEE SIMPLE DETERMINABLE AND FEE SIMPLE ON CONDITION SUBSEQUENT
- : An action in court in which the plaintiff seeks to resolve a real-property ownership dispute with the defendant, who is the adverse claimant to the title.
- The case illustrates how significantly different legal outcomes can turn on the wording of a deed. If a deed is construed to create a fee simple determinable, the title automatically reverts to the grantor or his successor in interest if the condition subsequent is broken. If a deed is construed to create a fee simple on condition subsequent, the title reverts to the grantor or his successor only if he retakes the land. If he fails to retake the land, the grantee may acquire fee simple absolute by adverse possession or abandonment.
- ...or a fee simple determinable was created, we need to examine the words in the deed. Words such as “so long as the land is used for school purposes” or “while it was used for school purposes” or “until the land ceased to be used for school purposes” create a fee simple determinable. Words such as “on the condition that the land be used for school purposes” or “provided that the land be used for school purposes” create a fee simple subject to condition subsequent. Upon examination of the language in the deed, it appears that the Huttons conveyed a fee simple determinable. The phrase “for school purpose only” suggests that the Huttons wanted to give the land only as long as it was needed and no longer. The second phrase, “otherwise to revert to grantors,” seems to trigger an automatic return of the property to the Huttons. Thus, the grant indicates a fee simple determinable. There are many cases where similar language was held to create a fee simple determinable. For example, “when...
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Luthi v. Evans 4 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (Prager, J.) No. A Mother Hubbard clause is upheld as between the parties to the instrument that contains it, but is insufficient to give constructive notice to subsequent purchasers without actual notice of it. This court agrees with both parties that the 1971 assignment constituted a valid transfer of Owens’ interest in the Kufahl lease to Tours, but only as between the two parties to that assignment. Likewise, a single instrument can convey separate tracts by specific description, and by general description that can be made specific.
- From a reading of the relevant statutory provisions taken together, the court concluded that the legislature intended that, in order to impart constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, recorded instruments of conveyance should describe the land conveyed with sufficient specificity so that the specific land conveyed can be identified. Kan. Stat. § 58–2203 and § 58–2204 require that a deed
- ...Coffey County. Although it was not specifically described in the assignment, the Kufahl lease nonetheless fit the description in the Tours assignment. On January 30, 1975, Owens executed and delivered a second assignment of her interest in the Kufahl lease to J.R. Burris (P). Before this assignment took place, Burris (P) personally checked the records in the office of the register of deeds. After the assignment, he (P) obtained an abstract of title to the same property. Neither his inspection nor the abstract revealed the prior assignment to Tours. Tours contends that the 1971 assignment effectively conveyed Owens’ interest in the Kufahl lease to Tours, and that its recordation with the county gave constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers, including Burris. Burris, however, asserts that the language of the assignment provided an inadequate description of the interests conveyed. Burris prevailed in district court. On appeal, the general description in the 1971...
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- CASE VOCABULARY
- ...not within the chain of title because neither the grantor nor the grantee is known to the searcher of title in official records. Here, the term “wild deed” refers to the deed from Duryea and Wilson to the Board (P). There are three other similar, generic problems of title recordation. One occurs when title is recorded too late, as when a grantee in one deed fails to record it until after the grantor’s deed to a second grantee is recorded. Another problem results when a grantee records a deed before the grantor actually obtains title to the property in question. Still another problem arises when the owner of two or more parcels includes, in a deed to one parcel, language that encumbers title to any other commonly owned parcel. In all four of these chain of title problems, the courts have favored title searchers by treating the given conveyances as if they were unrecorded and as providing no constructive notice. Almost invariably, the grantee is spared the burden of discovering...
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- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appellate court review of a judgment in favor of Deep Water Brewing (P).
- The court notes that the “intention” requirement generally is met by a finding that the covenant touched and concerned the property. Is it conceivable that parties to such an agreement could not have intended that the covenant runs with the land? Such an intention probably would need to be made explicit in the instrument creating the agreement.
- ...interfering with the lake view from the restaurant. Kenagy (P) purchased the restaurant from Ahlquist in 1998, and leased the building to his business, Deep Water Brewing, LLC (P). Deep Water (P) operated the restaurant as a brew pub. In 2000, Johnson (D) recorded an addendum to the restrictive covenants, which allowed maximum building heights of up to 26 feet. Deep Water (P) sued Johnson (D), Key Development (D), Fairway Resources Ltd. (D), and others seeking injunctive relief to prevent any interference with the restaurant and lounge views. The complaint was later amended to add claims for damages. By the time the trial began in 2006, several two-story houses had been built in the subdivision. Those houses violated the original 16-foot building limit and interfered with the view of the lake from the restaurant lounge. The trial court awarded the Kenagys (P) $245,000 in damages against Johnson (D) and Key Development (D). On appeal, Johnson (D) and the other defendants asserted...
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Ark Land Co. v. Harper 4 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal from lower court order directing partition and sale of property.
- Did the lower court err in ruling that the property could not be conveniently partitioned in kind, thus warranting a partition by sale?
- PARTITION: 1. A judicial or voluntary separation of land held by joint tenants, coparceners, or tenants-in-common so that the parties may hold their estates severally and not in union with others. When partition in not an available option, the court may order a sale of the property and distribute the income proportionate to the interest held in the property. 2. Any division of real or personal property between co-owners which leads to each owner individually possessing his interests.
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Sawada v. Endo 2 results
Chapter Seven. Leasing Real Property 2 results
- A plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination in housing under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) even when the defendant denies knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected-class status if the plaintiff was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
- In determining whether an assignment or a sub-leasing has occurred, the court looks to the intentions of the parties.
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State v. Shaw 4 results
- (Davis, J.) No. When someone has confined ferae naturae creatures within his own private enclosure and maintains reasonable precautions to prevent escape, a felonious taking of them from the enclosure will be larceny. In such cases, the law does not require absolute security against the possibility of escape. In this case, the fish that were taken had not escaped, and it does not appear that they would have. They were safely secured so that the owners of the nets could have taken them out of the water at will. The possession of the net owners was so complete and certain that the defendants went to the nets and raised them with absolute assurance they could get the fish that were in them. The taking of the fish was larceny. Reversed.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Exceptions to the Court of Common Pleas, Lake County.
- Did the trial court apply the correct rule of law regarding larceny of fish?
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Armory v. Delamirie 2 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Analysis: The rule announced in this case is called the prior possessor rule. It achieves multiple social goals: (1) it protects an owner who cannot prove that he is the true owner. (2) it protects individuals who entrust goods to others; (3) it protects the expectations of prior possessors, who expect to prevail; and (4) it promotes peaceable possession. If prior possessors did not prevail, individuals might begin to steal property, hoping that the law would protect them. Entrusting goods to others promotes social welfare. For example, an individual may entrust his clothes to the laundry without worrying that he may not get them back. Since he is the prior possessor, he will prevail over the laundry.
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Table of Contents 2 results
Gruen v. Gruen 3 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- One of the principle goals of property law is to promote the alienability of property. This goal is of such importance that the court in
- ...title. If the intention is to make a transfer of title only after death, the gift is invalid unless made by a will. Mrs. Gruen (D) errs in maintaining that her husband intended to make a transfer of title only at his death. On the contrary, he intended to make a present transfer of a future interest. Title to this future interest, which is a remainder, vested at the time of the gift. It is irrelevant that possession is not taken until sometime in the future. As to Mrs. Gruen’s (D) contention that the gift was invalid because possession was not delivered, we note that the rule that possession must be delivered to consummate a gift is flexible. The better statement of the rule provides that the delivery that is required is that delivery that is best under the circumstances. In this case, since Gruen (P) had only a remainder, it was impossible to deliver such an interest until his father had died. Moreover, it would be silly to have the elder Gruen deliver possession merely to...
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- CASE VOCABULARY
- POINT OF ERROR: An alleged mistake by the trial court that is asserted as grounds for an appeal.
- Traditionally, the common law recognized that each lease included an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment—a promise by the landlord that he would not wrongfully interfere with the tenant’s possession. However, the promises in a lease were originally seen as independent covenants, so the landlord’s breach of this covenant did not excuse the tenant’s continued performance. The only exception to this rule was actual, physical eviction by the landlord, which would entitle the tenant to end the lease. Over time, courts recognized the principle of “constructive” eviction, defined as conduct which so substantially interfered with the tenant’s possession that it was the functional equivalent of actual eviction.
- ...he showed that: (1) Fidelity (P) intended that he no longer enjoy the premises, which intent the trier of fact could infer from the circumstances; (2) Fidelity (P), or those acting for Fidelity (P) or with its permission, committed a material act or omission which substantially interfered with use and enjoyment of the premises for their leased purpose; (3) Fidelity’s (P) act or omission permanently deprived Kaminsky (D) of the use and enjoyment of the premises; and (4) Kaminsky (D) abandoned the premises within a reasonable period of time after the act or omission. Although a tenant cannot complain that the landlord constructively evicted him and breached a covenant of quiet enjoyment when the eviction results from the actions of third parties acting without the landlord’s authority or permission, in this case Fidelity (P) expressly promised in the lease to provide security on Saturdays. Both action and lack of action can constitute “conduct” by the landlord which amounts to...
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Ernst v. Conditt 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- CASE VOCABULARY
- IN DETERMINING WHETHER AN ASSIGNMENT OR A SUB-LEASE HAS OCCURRED, THE COURT WILL LOOK TO THE INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
- In determining whether an assignment or a sub-leasing has occurred, the court looks to the intentions of the parties.
- In determining whether an assignment or a sub-leasing has occurred, must the court look to the intentions of the parties?
- This case illustrates the interplay between contract and property law. The lease between the lessor and lessee creates duties for both parties. Many of these duties have derived from contract law. On the other hand, a lease is an interest in property, and as such it may be conveyed. However, when it is conveyed, often the rights and duties follow it, as when a lessee assigns a lease. This binds the original lessor into a landlord-tenant relationship with the lessee. The terms of this lease are the same terms as those between the original lessor and lessee. The landlord did consent to the new tenant. Many landlords reserve the right to refuse an assignment.
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Chapter One. The Concept of Property 2 results
- The defendant insisted on delivering a mobile home by plowing a path across the plaintiffs’ land rather than using the town road, which was curvy and covered with snow, even though the plaintiffs insisted that the defendant use the town road and stay off their property; the plaintiffs sued for trespass and were awarded nominal and punitive damages, but the court set aside the punitive damages award.
- Neighbors of a deceased woman sought the court’s help in preventing the demolition of the decedent’s home, despite a provision in the decedent’s will asking that the home be razed and the empty lot sold.
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Chapter Eleven. Land Use Regulation 2 results
- Atlantic Cement (D) emitted pollution that created a nuisance, but the courts denied an injunction.
- If there is a marked disparity in economic consequence between the effect of an injunction and the effect of the nuisance, the court may order the payment of permanent damages instead of an injunction.
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- National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
- The driver and passenger of a truck that got pulled over based on an anonymous tip sought to suppress evidence found in the truck, but the court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to pull them over and allowed the evidence; the defendants appealed.
- Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to the Secretary, and when Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, the courts are especially reluctant to substitute its views of wise policy for the Secretary’s.
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Chapter Eight. Selling Real Property 2 results
- Brush Grocery Kart (P) wanted to buy property to be used as a grocery store from Sure Fine Market (D), but the parties could not agree on a price; before the sale took place, the property suffered hail damage, and the court held that the buyer bore the risk of loss.
- Unambiguous insurance contracts must be construed in their usual and ordinary sense, and when the language in the policy is unambiguous, the court will not strain the words to encompass meanings they do not clearly express.
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Chapter Two. Owning Real Property 1 result
O’Dell v. Stegall 2 results
- Appeal from the trial court’s entry of judgment on a jury’s verdict, and refusal to set aside the judgment.
- In this case, O’Dell (P) failed to show that his use of the gravel lane was adverse. In part, this is because he wholly failed to show that the Stegalls (D) owned the land upon which the gravel lane rests. Furthermore, O’Dell (P) failed to show that the prior use of the gravel lane was in any way wrongful toward, or without the express or implied permission of, the owner. Nothing in the record suggests that the use of the gravel lane was anything more than a neighborly accommodation by the owner of the gravel lane. In sum, we conclude that O’Dell (P) failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a prescriptive easement was created. Reversed and remanded.
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- Publication Date: August 4th, 2021
- ISBN: 9781647086428
- Subject: Property
- Series: High Court Case Summaries
- Type: Case Briefs
- Description: This title contains briefs for each major case in Sprankling and Coletta’s casebook on Property. These briefs will help you identify, understand, and absorb the core knowledge points from each case. They are followed by legal analysis, providing contextual background about each case, and connecting the case to the broader concepts developed throughout the casebook. This title also supplies case vocabulary, with definitions of new or unusual legal words found throughout the cases.
