Principles of Trademark Law
Authors:
Schechter, Roger E. / Thomas, John R.
Edition:
1st
Copyright Date:
2021
19 chapters
have results for principles of trademark
Chapter 8 Trademark Assignments and Licensing 103 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Where there are ambiguities in the terms of a trademark license, ordinary principles of contract law will control any dispute over those terms. While most trademark licenses will be reduced to writing, there is no requirement that they must be, and an oral license agreement is valid. Where necessary, courts may even imply a trademark license based on the dealings of the parties. After a trademark license is terminated, the licensee must stop using the mark. Continued use of a trademark by an ex-licensee is actionable trademark infringement, a situation which comes up with some regularity when franchisees terminate their agreement but continue to operate out of facilities with signage that bears the franchisor’s trademarks.
- The failure of the licensee to conform to quality control requirements that form part of the license agreement is a breach of that agreement, and it will leave the licensee open to liability under contract law principles. If the licensee continues to sell goods marked with the trademark, but which do not conform to required quality control standards, that will also be considered trademark infringement.
- Applying these principles to concrete fact patterns, a court might hold that a trademark assignment along with the sale of a secret formula to make the trademarked product, was valid even though no physical assets changed hands. In our bakery example above, an assignment of the CHAMPS-ÉLYSÉE trademark would be valid if the seller also transferred the recipes for making the various patisserie, especially if they were the proverbial “secret” recipes.
- There is one form of modern trademark licensing that fits poorly with the traditional requirement of quality control. Many trademark owners license their marks for use on “promotional goods” such as T-shirts, hats or jackets. The underlying mark usually has nothing to do with clothing. Often it will be the trademark of a professional sports team, or perhaps of a college or university. Increasingly, however, it may be the trademark of a company that makes heavy equipment, food or drugs, or computers. For instance, it would not be uncommon to see baseball caps emblazoned with the JOHN DEERE trademark that is ordinarily used for farm machinery, or to see T-shirts with word and logo marks for BEN AND JERRY’S ice cream. As we saw in an earlier chapter, modern cases take the view that unauthorized use of trademarks on such promotional goods is infringing, and thus the manufacturers of such goods need trademark licenses to avoid infringement liability.
- Trademarks are transferable. They can be bought and sold like other business assets. The outright sale of a trademark is known as an “assignment.” There is, however, a catch. The law is clear that a trademark can only be sold “with the accompanying goodwill” of the underlying business and that it is not permissible to assign a trademark “in gross,” which means independently of the associated goodwill.
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Chapter 5 Trademark Infringement, Counterfeiting and False Advertising 387 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Because the Lanham Act is designed to confer nationwide rights in trademarks one might think that the problems of “geographically remote” trademark rights do not arise where one party has obtained a federal trademark registration. A federal trademark registration, after all, is designed to confer nationwide rights. However, there are a number of ways in which the statute has retained key elements of the common law principles discussed thus far. The treatment of remote junior users under the Lanham Act is illustrated in a trilogy of cases, all involving fast food businesses.
- assume that the same principles and policies govern regardless of the exact infringement cause of action being asserted unless the text specifically indicates to the contrary. These principles also will apply whether plaintiff is suing for infringement of a conventional trademark or for infringement of trade dress.
- Obviously, where parody products express messages that fall within the core of the First Amendment, the defendant’s constitutional rights will trump any efforts by the trademark owner to enjoin the activities as infringement. Space limitations do not permit a full exploration of those First Amendment principles here, the full nuances of which would require a separate book-length treatment. Even short of the constitutional line, however, the parody status of a product can affect the likelihood of confusion analysis and alter the outcome of an infringement case. This is because many consumers automatically understand that trademark owners rarely will make fun of themselves or license others to do so. Therefore, if the parody is a good one, consumers will get the joke, not draw any inference of sponsorship, and there will be no infringement.
- Fortunately, there are some baseline principles that guide decisions in this area. As is suggested by the word “likelihood,” the test does not require a trademark infringement plaintiff to show that actual confusion has already occurred in the marketplace. On the other hand, demonstration of only a mere possibility of confusion will not suffice. The formula contemplates the middle ground—the confusion must be “probable.” The Seventh Circuit, in reversing an injunction against alleged trademark infringement based on the trial court’s find of only a “possibility” of confusion, concisely explained why a test predicated on mere possibility would be inappropriate: In other words, there might be some consumers who think that COCA-COLA and PEPSI-COLA are made by the same company because they both have the word “cola” in their trademarks. While that makes confusion a possibility, it would overprotect the first of those two marks to prohibit the second, to protect such a small and naive...
- As we have seen in previous chapters, a merchant who selects the right kind of trade-identifying symbol and appropriates it in the right kind of way is given trademark rights in that symbol. Those rights are essentially a form of legally enforced exclusivity—a limited property right if you prefer —forbidding others to use the trademark in certain ways. It follows that the unauthorized use of another party’s trademark will be actionable as trademark infringement. There is, however, a lot of law hiding behind that word “sometimes.”
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Chapter 7 Fair Use, Other Affirmative Defenses and Remedies 232 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Not surprisingly, therefore, such resale is immune from attack as trademark infringement. This doctrine is conventionally known as the “first sale exhaustion” principle. Under this rule, once a trademark owner sells trademarked goods, the buyer is free to resell those goods to others without having to remove the trademarks. As the Ninth Circuit summarized, “the right of a producer to control distribution of its trademarked product does not extend beyond the first sale of the product. Resale by the first purchaser of the original article under the producer’s trademark is neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition.”
- did not hold that this approach should also govern in trademark cases (for the obvious reason that it was not resolving a trademark dispute), the Lanham Act language quoted above specifically says that injunctions should be granted “according to the principles of equity” and there is no other valid reason to distinguish between the two different types of cases. In recent years the federal appellate courts have applied the rule of in trademark cases without hesitation or extended analysis.
- As a general rule, gray market goods are not “genuine” and their sale constitutes trademark infringement. This follows because in the United States, the mark means “the goods of the U.S. trademark owner” and the gray market goods are, by definition, the goods of some foreign party instead. One of the earliest cases to articulate this principle is the Supreme Court decision in
- Under section 35 of the Lanham Act, a successful trademark infringement plaintiff may recover both its own damages, the infringer’s profits, as well as the costs of the action. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition has comparable provisions, which reflect the governing principles in suits under state law.
- In a similar case, the Second Circuit held that the owner of the HALLS trademark for cough drops could enjoin a wholesaler from selling any cough drops past their freshness expiration date, declaring “[d]istribution of a product that does not meet the trademark holder’s quality control standards may result in the devaluation of the mark by tarnishing its image. If so, the non-conforming product is deemed for Lanham Act purposes not to be the genuine product of the holder, and its distribution constitutes trademark infringement.” However, as the Third Circuit has cautioned, “ ‘quality control’ is not a talisman the mere utterance of which entitles the trademark owner to judgment. . . . Rather, the test is whether the quality control procedures established by the trademark owner are likely to result in differences between the products such that consumer confusion regarding the sponsorship of the products could injure the trademark owner’s goodwill.” ...of this approach is that the...
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Chapter 10 International Aspects of Trademark Protection 108 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Both the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement require member nations to adhere to a principle known as “national treatment.” This requires each member country to treat foreign parties who apply for trademark protection no less favorably than they treat domestic parties. The national treatment concept can be thought of as a principle of nondiscrimination against foreigners. Consequently, any foreign party seeking U.S. trademark protection is entitled to base its claim on the same activities or representations that would suffice for a domestic firm. For instance, a foreign merchant can begin using the mark in U.S. domestic commerce, and by that act, secure common law rights to the trademark under the laws of the relevant U.S. state or states. Similarly, that foreign merchant can also, based on its use of the mark in domestic U.S. commerce, file for Lanham Act registration. Moreover, a foreign merchant is entitled to seek Lanham Act registration based on an “intent to use” filing,...
- This principle is sometimes labeled a rule of “territoriality.” It is embodied in the Paris Convention, which was first promulgated in 1883 and is the premier international treaty governing international trademark rights. The treaty declares, in Article 6(3), that “a mark duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in other countries of the Union, including the country of origin.” Over 170 countries, including the United States, have ratified the Paris Convention, and the U.S. courts have consistently concluded that the United States has therefore accepted the principle of territoriality of trademarks.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit identified two competing principles. One is that the international trademark system is territorial, meaning that priority of trademark rights in the United States is based upon the first domestic use. The other is that when foreign use of a mark achieves a certain level of fame within the United States, the earlier foreign use may obtain priority in keeping with Article 6 of the Paris Convention and Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement. In order to reconcile these two principles, the Ninth Circuit held that to invoke the foreign-mark exception to the territoriality principle, the owner of the foreign mark must demonstrate that the mark possesses secondary meaning in the relevant geographic area where the U.S. firm operates. However, under the Ninth Circuit’s test, secondary meaning by itself did not suffice to invoke the foreign-mark exception. In addition, the owner of the foreign mark has to go further and demonstrate that a substantial percentage of...
- Consequently, the special rule of section 44(e) is the sole exception to the otherwise iron-clad principle requiring trademark use prior to federal trademark registration in the United States. Once such a registration issues, however, it is on the same footing as any other Lanham Act trademark registration. Thus, if the foreign firm does not make use of the mark in the United States within a reasonable time after the registration issues, it is vulnerable to a petition to cancel on grounds of abandonment. Indeed, under section 45 of the Lanham Act there is a presumption of abandonment if the mark has not been used within three years. Moreover, section 8 of the statute requires that five years after the mark has been registered, the registrant must file an affidavit attesting that the mark is in use “in commerce,” a phrase which means domestic U.S. interstate commerce. Thus, even in the absence of a cancellation petition alleging abandonment, the foreign firm must use the mark by the...
- As between these two lines of reasoning, we prefer Judge Bryson’s approach. The Paris Convention touches upon many aspects of both trademark and patent law, and the Federal Circuit’s blanket statement regarding the executory nature of the Paris Convention seems to us more than needed to be decided. For now, however, the absence of a principle seems to be the law of the land, until the Federal Circuit, Supreme Court, or Congress acts to alter this aspect of the
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Chapter 9 Trademarks on the Internet 179 results (showing 5 best matches)
- One treatise writer has observed that “traditional legal principles apply in determining the existence of trademark rights, priority of use, and likelihood of confusion. In other words, there is no Lanham Act exception for the Internet. . . .”
- Obviously not all spam involves trademark issues. The foreign “prince” who will pay you a 10% commission to help him move $22 million out of his native land does not use anyone’s trademarks. Spam can raise trademark issues when the sender (or spammer) uses another party’s trademark or domain name as its own purported email address, because the recipient could then erroneously assume that the trademark owner is the party who sent the message. This is a classic case of false designation of origin, but it falsely designates the origin not of a product, but of a communication. The CAN-SPAM Act contains a provision that forbids the use of false or materially misleading “header information” in commercial email. Courts have also addressed this specific sub-species of spam under more general trademark principles as well.
- The defense, however, seems to us to be a crucial part of the statutory architecture. The reference to “fair use” insulates—or at least should insulate—those who use another’s trademark only in its descriptive sense in their domain names. That language also should insulate those whose domain names are meant to refer to the trademark owner in non-confusing ways, under the nominative fair use principle. Protection for such parties promotes important policies of free competition and free expression.
- As the Second Circuit has explained, “[c]ybersquatting involves the registration as domain names of well-known trademarks by non-trademark holders who then try to sell the names back to the trademark owners.” The Sixth Circuit offered a more expansive definition saying that “ ‘cybersquatting’ occurs when a person other than the trademark holder registers the domain name of a well-known trademark and then attempts to profit from this by either ransoming the domain name back to the trademark holder or by using the domain name to divert business from the trademark holder to the domain name holder.”
- Perhaps the problem that received the greatest attention in the late 1990s and in the early years of the new century has been the use of trademarks as “domain names”—the names by which a given site or page on the World Wide Web is identified. The theoretical questions about those kinds of suits have been resolved, but cases calling for the application of the principles that emerged remain common.
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Chapter 2 Acquiring Trademark Rights 162 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The common law’s exclusive focus on use required the courts to develop several subsidiary principles to define just what “use” of a trademark means. Historically, a mark was only considered “used” if the trademark was actually affixed to the goods or their containers and if those marked goods were then sold to actual customers in bona fide transactions in sufficient volume. The following sections explore the idea of “affixation” and “bona fide use” in greater detail.
- Finally, even non-affixed symbols of trade identity have long been protected under general principles of unfair competition law even if they do not technically qualify as trademarks. For instance, one who exactly copies the inventive and unique name of a sandwich being sold by a store across the street is guilty of generic unfair competition regardless of whether the sandwich name was considered “affixed” so as to rise to the level of a formal trademark. Consequently, as Professor McCarthy has observed in his treatise, “the common law requirement of affixation is of little significance today.”
- All four types of symbols can be referred to as “marks,” and in most judicial and administrative opinions, any reference to trademarks is meant to encompass the other three varieties of marks as well. That is true for the discussion that follows in this text as well. The Restatement of Unfair Competition (Third) tracks the Lanham Act by separately defining trademarks, service marks, certification marks, and collective marks but earlier state law opinions rarely used any terminology other than “trademark” regardless of the type of identifying symbol at issue.
- It is no coincidence that goods bearing a particular trademark are often said to be a “brand” of goods. Historians have traced the law of trademarks back to the ancient practice of “branding” cattle, a rather brutal and extreme form of affixation.
- This chapter considers the various requirements necessary to obtain trademark rights under both of these systems. As we shall see, under both systems, the essential requirement is that the merchant must actually the mark in making sales to the public in the United States. The only exception to that overarching principle is one that permits certain foreign firms to secure Lanham Act protection if they first take certain steps in their home countries.
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the Law of Trademarks 1 87 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In broad outline, those legal rules are quite straightforward. Unlike patents and copyrights, trademarks are protected by both state and federal law. State law protection is almost always based on the common law, though quite a few states have trademark statutes that codify common law principles and provide some additional rights. For common law purposes, the first party to adopt a mark and use it in connection with a particular category of goods or services is deemed to be the owner of that mark in its area of trade. No further formalities or governmental applications are required. Once a party has used a mark, it may also apply to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to register the mark federally. ...the registration process even before it has used the desired mark; however, no federal registration will be granted until after such use takes place. Federal registration confers a variety of additional legal protections and privileges, but it is not mandatory,...
- Many thoughtful experts bristle at the characterization of trademark rights as “monopolies,” and the monopoly-based criticism of trademark law abated significantly during most of the latter half of the twentieth century. Recent expansions of trademark protection, however, have once again raised the anxiety of some observers who fear significant anti-competitive consequences from an over-broad conception of trademark law.
- Almost any identifying symbol that can be conjured by the human imagination can be used as a trademark, with some key limitations we will take up in due course. Most trademarks consist of one or more words. Those words may be written in a particular format using special fonts or in a particular color scheme, but usually, a merchant is entitled to claim exclusive protection for the chosen words regardless of the format in which they are written. A trademark can also be a picture, symbol, or logo. Many of the strongest U.S. trademarks are pictorial in nature, and one can imagine a bizarre cocktail party populated by the many anthropomorphic trademarks that have become universally familiar to consumers around the world—the PILLSBURY DOUGHBOY, MR. PEANUT, RONALD McDONALD, TONY THE TIGER, ELSIE THE COW, and Geico’s GECKO—to name just a few. A firm can also claim trademark protection for the overall shape and design of the packaging in which their product is sold, and in some cases for...
- Any person who uses a trademark belonging to another in a way that is likely to confuse the consuming public about the source or sponsorship of its own goods or services will be liable for trademark infringement. In addition, if a trademark is in that small subset of marks that are considered “famous,” the owner of the mark may be able to prevent even non-confusing uses by third parties. Like other forms of intellectual property, trademarks can be licensed, or sold outright to other parties, but certain technical requirements associated with such transactions can be traps for the unwary.
- The law generally grants trademark protection to words and symbols only for a particular category of goods and services, not to the word or symbol in the abstract. Thus, while trademark protection resembles copyright and patent protection because it involves a government grant of exclusivity, the exclusivity is limited. Firms in unrelated lines of commerce can use similar or even identical trademarks without infringing on each other’s rights. That is why we can have entirely unrelated companies offering us DELTA airlines, DELTA faucets, and DELTA dental insurance at the same time. That is also why we can write books and articles referring to the Mississippi River delta, and use the Greek letter delta as part of the name of a fraternity or sorority, without fear of running afoul of trademark law. The owner of the trademark does not control or monopolize the word, phrase, or symbol itself.
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Chapter 3 The Distinctiveness Requirement and Issues of Trademark Validity 208 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Inherently distinctive marks—whether arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive—used to be known as “technical trademarks.” In the first half of the twentieth century, only technical trademarks could be protected via the common law cause of action for trademark infringement. Owners of all other types of trademarks had to resort to the more general, and more difficult to prove, claim for “unfair competition” in order to protect their marks. Moreover, only technical trademarks were eligible for protection under the Federal Trademark Law of 1905—the predecessor of the Lanham Act. This terminology is now no longer used, and the Reporter’s Notes to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition refers to it as “obsolete.”
- While a firm might want to adopt and use a particular symbol to identify its goods or services, the proposed mark might not be eligible for trademark protection. The law does not recognize every possible symbol as a valid trademark. Some proposed marks may mislead the public through inaccurate representations. Others may already be viewed by the public as representing a competing merchant. Still others may violate some extrinsic social policy, such as the desire to respect the national symbols of foreign nations, or the principle of giving individuals control over their own names and images. Finally, granting an enterprise exclusive rights to some potential symbols may interfere with the rights of competing merchants to describe their goods freely and communicate with the public.
- In thinking about trademark validity, it is useful to bear in mind that the issue can come up in at least two contexts. First, when a firm seeks federal protection by applying for a Lanham Act registration, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) will make an administrative determination of validity. If the mark is found unsuitable, registration will be refused. Second, if one firm accuses another of trademark infringement, the defendant will often argue that the plaintiff’s mark is invalid. This argument can be raised whether the mark is federally registered, or whether it is allegedly protected under state common law. In either case, if the defendant can persuade a court that the term in question is not a valid mark, the plaintiff will be denied relief. Thus, the rules governing trademark validity pervade a large number of trademark disputes.
- Another similar scenario has involved a firm’s claim of trademark rights in a generic word with adding a word like “company” or the abbreviation “inc.” appended to it. This is not enough to turn the term into a protectable trademark. Just as “bread” is categorized as generic so that all makers of that product may freely put the word on their wrappers, the law keeps the phrase “The Bread Company” in the public domain for the same reason. This particular principle is quite venerable, dating back at least as far as the late nineteenth century.
- While most issues of trademark validity revolve around the distinctiveness problems considered in this and the previous sections, there are several other types of problems that may prevent a given symbol from being accorded trademark status. Even if a mark is highly distinctive, it may already have been appropriated by another merchant, it may tend to confuse the public, or it may contravene some external policy outside of trademark law. We consider those issues in the few sections that follow.
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Chapter 6 Trademark Dilution 232 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In 1927 an influential law review article, written by an academically accomplished, prominent New York lawyer named Frank Schechter, suggested that the main purpose of trademark law ought not to be the prevention of consumer confusion, but rather the preservation of the uniqueness of merchants’ trademarks. He expressed the concern that even non-confusing uses of a firm’s trademark might cause “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark.” Effectively Schechter was arguing that strong trademarks were entitled to a property-like protection that should prevent any other party from using the mark, even if the junior user used the mark on non-competing and utterly unrelated goods. While he did not use the term, his idea became the stimulus for a new cause of action to protect trademarks known as “dilution.” As the name suggests, the doctrine is designed to provide relief when the acts of an unauthorized third party water down, erode,...
- Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 25
- If the anti-dilution statute were construed as permitting a trademark owner to enjoin the use of his mark in a noncommercial context found to be negative or offensive, then a corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct. The legitimate aim of the anti-dilution statute is to prohibit the unauthorized use of another’s trademark in order to market incompatible products or services. The Constitution does not, however, permit the range of the anti-dilution statute to encompass the unauthorized use of a trademark in a noncommercial setting such as an editorial or artistic context.
- When Congress undertook a major revision of the Lanham Act in 1988, the Trademark Review Commission recommended that the time was ripe to adopt a federal dilution law. Although the Senate agreed, the dilution component of the bill failed to secure passage in the House of Representatives and consequently, when the President signed the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, it did not include any dilution provisions. Nonetheless, the International Trademark Association continued to push for a federal dilution law, and in 1995, Congress finally passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (or FTDA), codified as new section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.
- As a general matter, a trademark is sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by a nonconfusing use if the mark retains its source significance when encountered outside the context of the goods or services with which it is used by the trademark owner. For example, the trademark KODAK evokes an association with the cameras sold under that mark whether the word is displayed with the cameras or used in the abstract. On the other hand, the designation ALPHA could become sufficiently distinctive to be protected as a trademark for cameras, but a use of the term by itself might still evoke a variety of different associations, including nothing more than the first letter of the Greek alphabet. A mark that evokes an association with a specific source only when used in connection with the particular goods or services that it identifies is not ordinarily sufficiently distinctive to be protected against dilution.
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Chapter 4 Protection for Trade Dress and Other Unconventional Trademarks 169 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Court found that there was no legal obstacle to the use of color alone as a trademark, provided that the color had achieved secondary meaning and was not functional. The Court could not “find in the basic objectives of trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark . . .” and observed that “[i]t is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word or sign—that permits it to” function as a mark.
- Because the Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol or ” that can identify and distinguish goods, ingenious merchants have occasionally sought protection for exotic types of trademark formats. Provided that these items do in fact serve as source designators, that they are distinctive, and that they are non-functional, there is no obstacle to protection.
- So where do we stand in the wake of forty years of trademark law scattered with references to aesthetic functionality? After , the test for functionality proceeds in two steps. In the first step, courts inquire whether the alleged “significant non-trademark function” satisfies the definition of functionality—“essential to the use or purpose of the article [or] affects [its] cost or quality.” If this is the case, the inquiry is over—the feature is functional and not protected. In the case of a claim of aesthetic functionality, an alternative test inquires whether protection of the feature as a trademark would impose a significant non-reputation-related competitive disadvantage.
- Color is a central attribute of many trademarks. One need only think of the red and white of the COCA-COLA logo, or the brown and gold combination associated with UPS delivery trucks, to appreciate this fact. Nonetheless, courts were initially skeptical about whether a single overall color could, by itself and independent of any design or color scheme, function as a trademark. Those with an affinity for Latin refer to this issue as one involving the protectability of color “simpliciter.”
- Scent or fragrance can also function as a trademark, but here the situation is a bit trickier, since some products are sold primarily, or at least partially, for their scent—such as perfume or soap. On the other hand, many products normally have no particular fragrance at all—such as pens or eyeglasses. The case for trademark protection of a fragrance is strongest with products in the latter category. Imparting the smell of bubble gum to a pen would certainly be highly distinctive, and entirely non-functional since it is hard to see how other pen makers would suffer if they were legally barred from copying that smell. The leading case on federal registration for fragrance as a trademark is a case of this sort. In the USPTO allowed the applicant to register “a high impact, fresh, floral fragrance reminiscent of Plumeria blossoms” for “sewing thread and embroidery yarn.” In granting the registration in , the TTAB distinguished the case of perfumes and other scented household products.
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Summary of Contents 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
Table of Contents 50 results (showing 5 best matches)
- § 1.1Brief Overview of the Trademark Law
- § 1.2.4The Federal Trademark Laws of 1870, 1881, and 1905
- § 1.3The Function of Trademarks and Rationales for Protection
- § 2.1Obtaining Trademark Rights at Common Law Through Priority of Use
- The Distinctiveness Requirement and Issues of Trademark Validity
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Index 73 results (showing 5 best matches)
Table of Cases 52 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Booking.com B.V. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 81
- American Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians and Surgeons v. American Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 212
- Cascades of Levitt Homes, Inc. v. Cascades of Sabatello Dev. Corp., 24
- Rockland Exposition, Inc. v. Alliance of Auto. Serv. Prov. of N.J., 75
- Table of Cases
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Dedication 1 result
West Academic Publishing’s Emeritus Advisory Board 14 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Professor of Law Emeritus, University of San Diego Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan
- Dean and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Chair of Public Interest Law University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law
- Professor of Law, Chancellor and Dean Emeritus University of California, Hastings College of the Law
- Professor of Law Emeritus, Pepperdine University Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles
- Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus University of California, Berkeley
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Copyright Page 2 results
- The publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other professional advice, and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional.
- Printed in the United States of America
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- Publication Date: December 7th, 2020
- ISBN: 9780314147523
- Subject: Intellectual Property
- Series: Concise Hornbook Series
- Type: Hornbook Treatises
- Description: This new volume hits the sweet spot of thorough and thoughtful coverage of trademark law without bogging readers down in minutiae and a blizzard of footnotes. Professors Schechter and Thomas, authors of multiple texts on IP law, have enlivened this volume with crisp prose, clever examples, and touches of humor. Materials on licensing and assignments, online trademark issues, and international topics augment the traditional discussion of trademark acquisition, validity, infringement, and dilution. The book would work well for end-of-semester review or as a supplementary text with, or substitute for, the usual casebook and will serve as a useful reference work for practitioners long after the course is over.
