High Court Case Summaries on Health Law (Keyed to Furrow, Greaney, Johnson, Jost, Schwartz, Clark, Fuse Brown, Gatter, King, and Pendo, 8th)
Author:
Staff, Publisher's Editorial
Edition:
8th
Copyright Date:
2020
129 chapters
have results for high court summaries health
- Dr. Berlin (P) was employed by the Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center (Health Center) (D), a nonprofit corporation duly licensed to operate a hospital, pursuant to a written agreement. Berlin (P) resigned prior to the expiration of his five-year contract, and he began working at a nearby clinic. The Health Center (D) sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit Berlin (P) from practicing at the clinic, based on the restrictive covenant in the employment agreement. Berlin (P) filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and a motion for summary judgment to have the restrictive covenant contained in the employment agreement with the Health Center (D) declared unenforceable. The circuit court granted summary judgment, holding that the Health Center (D), as a nonprofit corporation employing a physician, was practicing medicine in violation of the prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine, and a divided appellate court affirmed. The Health Center (D) appealed.
- (Nickels, J.) Yes. A duly licensed hospital is authorized by legislative authority to practice medicine by means of its staff of licensed physicians and is excepted from the operation of the corporate practice doctrine. The corporate practice doctrine, which prohibits corporations from employing physicians to provide medical services, is not applicable to licensed hospitals in the modern health care industry for public policy reasons. Consequently, the employment agreement between the Health Center (D) and Dr. Berlin (P) was not unenforceable merely because the Health Center (D) was a corporate entity. Reversed.
- Appeal from plaintiff’s summary judgment in declaratory judgment suit.
- Dr. Berlin (P) sought to have a restrictive covenant prohibiting him from competing with Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center (D) declared unenforceable.
- The court in this case found that legislative enactments pertaining to hospitals supported its conclusion that licensed hospitals were excepted from the prohibition. It found that certain statutes clearly authorized, and at times mandated, licensed hospitals to provide medical services despite their corporate stature. If also could find no justification for distinguishing between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in that regard.
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Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Herskovits’s (P) decedent presented himself to Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (D) complaining of coughs and chest pain. Group Health (D) failed to diagnose lung cancer, which was diagnosed by another facility one year later. The decedent’s lung was removed, but he died 20 months later. Herskovits (P) sued Group Health (D) for negligent failure to diagnose. Group Health (D) moved for summary judgment, contending that the decedent suffered from a probability of dying even if it had promptly diagnosed the cancer. At best, the decedent had a 39 percent chance of recovery; the hospital’s (D) alleged negligence reduced it to 25 percent. The trial court granted summary judgment, and Herskovits (P) appealed.
- SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Judgment rendered by a court in response to a motion by one of the parties, claiming that the lack of a question of material fact in respect to an issue warrants disposition of the issue without consideration by the jury.
- (Dore, J.) No. A plaintiff in a wrongful death/malpractice action need not prove that the decedent more likely than not would have survived absent the alleged malpractice. To hold otherwise would have the practical effect of shielding medical providers from liability anytime a decedent did not have a greater than 50 percent chance of living, no matter how egregious its negligence. This is not a proper result. Analytically, the issue boils down to proximate cause, a jury question. Using this case as an example, the question is whether a diminution in chances of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent could be considered a substantial factor in bringing about injury. This, as noted before, is a jury question, and not properly resolvable at the summary judgment level. The trial court was therefore in error in so granting. Reversed.
- Appeal from summary judgment dismissing wrongful death/malpractice action.
- (Representative of decedent) v. (Health care provider)
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Looney v. Moore 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The University of Alabama at Birmingham was the site of a national clinical research trial analyzing the effects of differing oxygen saturation levels on premature infants. The study sought to determine whether, within the accepted standard of care, there was a more precise range of oxygen saturation that would better reduce the risk of exposing an infant to either too much or too little oxygen. The current standard of care allowed for a range of 85 to 95%. For the study, one group of infants was kept at 85 to 89% and the other was kept at an oxygen saturation level between 90 and 95%. The study authors concluded that infants in the high-oxygen range were more likely to be diagnosed with retinopathy, while those in the low range were more likely to die. To enroll in the study, the infants’ guardians had to execute informed consent documents. After the study’s completion, the Department of Health and Human Services questioned whether these informed consent documents had disclosed all...
- The plaintiffs argued in this case that they did not need a physical injury to make a viable informed consent claim, an issue that Alabama law had not directly addressed. The Eleventh Circuit sought help, certifying the question to the Alabama Supreme Court, but the Alabama Supreme Court declined to answer it. The Eleventh Circuit ultimately had to predict how an Alabama court would decide the issue. First, it noted that the Alabama Medical Liability Act required an injury. The Eleventh Circuit also considered Alabama Supreme Court informed consent decisions, which laid out the elements of an informed consent claim but did not explicitly include injury. In reality, however, in each case the plaintiff had in fact suffered a serious injury. The plaintiffs pointed to battery claims, in particular medical battery claims, which in Alabama do not require physical injury, but the Eleventh Circuit distinguished those claims. Battery claims are not based on negligence, but instead on a lack...
- The plaintiffs, through their parents, sued various defendants for harms they allegedly suffered as a result of taking part in a clinical study while being treated for health issues accompanying their premature births.
- A formal request by one court to another court, usually in another jurisdiction, for an opinion on a question of law. These cases typically arise when the court in which litigation is actually pending is required to decide a matter that turns on the law of another state or jurisdiction. If the other jurisdiction’s law is unclear or uncertain, a certified question can be sent to that jurisdiction’s courts to render an opinion on the question of law. The courts to which these questions of law are certified are typically appellate courts or state supreme courts.
- Federal appellate court review of a district court decision dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims.
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White v. Harris 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal by the plaintiffs from a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendant Fletcher Allen Health Care in a wrongful death action alleging medical malpractice by a Fletcher employee.
- ...ongoing mental health problems. On the recommendation of her case manager, she consulted with the defendant’s psychiatrist through a telepsychiatry research study he was conducting. As part of the study, the daughter participated in a 90-minute video-conference session with the psychiatrist, after which she completed a questionnaire about her reaction to using telemedicine. Also after the session, the psychiatrist prepared a report setting forth his recommendations for an initial treatment plan. The research protocol specifically stated that no follow-up services or medication would be directly provided by the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist sent the evaluation to the daughter’s treatment team and then had no further interaction with the parents, the daughter, or any member of the daughter’s treatment team. Nearly a year after the session, the daughter died by suicide. Her parents sued eight defendants, including the psychiatrist’s employer, alleging that the treatment of...
- The court noted that the standard of care was not discussed at the summary judgment hearing, because the focus was on whether a doctor-patient relationship even existed. The standard of care imposes on those with special skills or training a higher obligation to act in light of that skill, training, or knowledge. What is necessary to satisfy the standard depends on the facts of each case. Here, the case had not yet developed to the point where a decision could be made on what a reasonably skillful, careful, and prudent healthcare professional would have done under similar circumstances, or whether any alleged breach of the standard was the proximate cause of harm to the decedent. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further development.
- Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment in the defendant’s favor?
- The plaintiffs’ daughter died by suicide, and the plaintiffs sued a psychiatrist who had been briefly involved in their daughter’s case through a telepsychiatry research study; the plaintiffs argued that summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of the duty owed to their daughter by the psychiatrist.
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Title Page 3 results
IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Intermountain Health Care Inc. (IHC) formed a subsidiary, IHC Health Services (Health Services), as a non-profit corporation. Health Services operated twenty-two hospitals, and during a two-year period, Health Services provided $1.2 billion in unreimbursed medical care to Medicaid patients and another $91 million in unreimbursed care to indigent patients. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) (D) recognized Health Services as having tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). Later, IHC formed three additional subsidiary health care companies: IHC Health Plans (Health Plans) (P), IHC Care, Inc. (Care), and IHC Group, Inc. (Group) (P) to operate as health maintenance organizations (HMOs). The Commissioner (D) subsequently concluded that none of these three subsidiaries was operating exclusively for exempt purposes pursuant to ...in fact, were operating to make a profit. The Commissioner (D) accordingly revoked the subsidiaries’ exempt status. Health Plans (P), Care (P), and...
- 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), an entity must be operated exclusively for charitable purposes, which, as a matter of law, means that it is operated primarily for such purposes. There is a two-part test for this evaluation. First it must be determined if the purpose of the corporation is “charitable,” and second the corporation must operate primarily to serve this purpose. To be “charitable” the corporation must be engaged in activities that convey a benefit to the public. The public benefit is accepted in exchange for lifting the tax burden and is not a benefit the community actually chooses, but rather is one that supplements or advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues. For example, not every activity that promotes health supports charitable tax exemption status, e.g., selling prescription pharmaceuticals certainly promotes health, but pharmacies cannot qualify for charitable exemption on that basis alone. The magnitude of this benefit must give a strong...
- The two-part inquiry used by the court in this case to determine tax-exempt status is a fact-intensive inquiry that must be implemented on a case-by-case basis. The appropriate legal standard for determining whether an organization operates for a “charitable” purpose is a legal question, which the appellate court reviews de novo. Whether an organization in fact
- Intermountain Health Care Health Plans, Inc. (Health Plans) (P) and other subsidiaries (“Care” and “Group”) (P) of Intermountain Health Care Inc. (IHC) contended that they qualified for tax-exempt status under
- Appeal from Tax Court judgment affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue denying tax-exempt status to health care organization’s subsidiaries.
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Bryan v. Koch 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In 1979, New York Mayor Koch appointed a task force to examine ways to reduce costly excess hospital capacity while maintaining access to high quality health services. The task force reported, among other findings, that two hospitals located in Harlem should be closed. A class of low income black and Hispanic residents brought suit, alleging that the city’s proposed plan for the municipal hospital system violated Title VI and should therefore be enjoined. The federal district court found in favor of the city and the plaintiffs appealed.
- Federal appellate court review of a district court decision denying an injunction.
- The plaintiffs here sought to enjoin the closing of the Harlem hospitals. An injunction is an equitable remedy in which the court orders a party to perform or to desist from a particular act. A
- (Newman, J.) Yes. Once plaintiffs challenging governmental action as discriminatory have shown a disproportionate racial impact, the court must examine the justification advanced by the defendant for its actions. The justification given here is the reduction of expenditures and the increase in efficiency within the municipal hospital system, which is a legitimate justification. The plaintiffs do not dispute that, if any of the hospitals are to be closed, Sydenham in Harlem is an appropriate choice. Instead, the plaintiffs propose alternatives to closing the Harlem hospitals, such as mergers and regionalization of services. We do not believe Title VI requires consideration of alternatives beyond an assessment of all the municipal hospitals in order to select one or more for closing. The proposed alternatives are more appropriate for examination by administrative, legislative, and other political processes than by the court. The plaintiffs have shown no likelihood of success in...
- Once plaintiffs challenging governmental action as discriminatory have shown a disproportionate racial impact, the court must examine the justification advanced by the defendant for its actions.
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Esquivel v. Watters 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal of summary judgment in favor of the health care provider.
- Note in the court’s discussion of the issue that courts disagree about whether there is a duty to notify even in the absence of a physician-patient relationship, even though a physician-patient relationship is usually a prerequisite to a malpractice suit against a doctor. But note also that once a physician-patient relationship is established, the higher duty of care is always applied.
- Michelle Esquivel (P) went to South Central Kansas Regional Medical Center (SCKRMC) (D) for a free sonogram, which was only to determine the unborn baby’s sex. An abnormality was discovered, but not disclosed to Esquivel (P) by SCKRMC (D). Esquivel (P) sued SCKRMC (D) when her baby died after birth, and the court granted summary judgment for SCKRMC (D) Esquivel (P) appealed.
- (Patient) v. (Health Care Provider)
- A PATIENT-HEALTH PROVIDER RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT EXIST WHERE A PROVIDER DOES NOT ADVISE OR TREAT PATIENT
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Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Ruby R. Calad (P) and Juan Davila (P) were among four health maintenance organization (HMO) subscribers who sued their HMOs (D) for violating Texas law by denying or delaying their receipt of health benefits. Calad (P), who was a beneficiary of a health plan offered by CIGNA HealthCare of Texas Inc. (CIGNA) (D), had a hysterectomy, and CIGNA (D) authorized coverage for only a one-day hospital stay despite the recommendation of Calad’s (P) doctor that she stay in the hospital longer. After Calad (P) suffered complications that caused her to return to the hospital a few days after her release, she sued CIGNA (D) in a Texas state court under the Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA). CIGNA (D) removed the case to federal court as preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and the federal court dismissed Calad’s (P) claims as preempted by ERISA. Davila (P) was insured through Aetna Health Inc. (D). His doctor prescribed the drug Vioxx for Davila’s (P)...
- Appeal by health maintenance organizations (HMOs) of Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court.
- Immediately after this case was decided, members of Congress concerned with health plans’ treatment of beneficiaries reacted. Rep. John D. Dingell (D-Mich.), ranking member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, announced he and other Democrats would
- Two participants (P) filed state law claims against their health maintenance organizations (HMOs) for failure to administer proper care. The HMOs (D) argued that their claims were preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The U.S. Court of Appeals found in favor of the participants (P), and the HMOs (D) appealed.
- ...Act of 1974 (ERISA)-regulated employee benefit plan, and where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or the plan terms is violated, the suit falls within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides that a civil action may be brought by a plan participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due under the terms of his or her plan, to enforce his or her rights under the plan terms, and to clarify his or her rights to future plan-benefits. The state law claims asserted by Davila (P) and Calad (P) fell within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) because Davila (P) and Calad’s (P) only relationship with or connection to Aetna (D) and CIGNA (D) was through ERISA-governed benefit plans. Several other considerations support the conclusions that ERISA preempts the state law claims. First, the duties imposed on HMOs (D) by the THCLA did not arise independently of ERISA or the plans’ terms. The Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA) imposed on HMOs (D)...health
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- Mauro (P) was employed as an operating room technician at Borgess Medical Center (BMC) (D) when someone called BMC (D) saying that Mauro had full-blown AIDS. Because of the fear of exposure, a new position was offered to Mauro (P), who was HIV positive. Mauro (P) refused the new position, and he was laid off. Mauro (P) then filed suit, alleging discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court found that Mauro’s (P) continued employment as a surgical technician posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others and granted BMC’s (D) motion for summary judgment. Mauro (P) appealed.
- (Gibson, J.) No. A person with an infectious disease who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace is not otherwise qualified to perform the job. The “direct threat” standard applied in the ADA is based on the same standard as “significant risk” applied by the Rehabilitation Act. Courts defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials in determining whether HIV-positive health care workers pose a significant risk or a direct threat in the performance of the essential functions of their jobs. The Center for Disease Control has released a report advising health care institutions to determine which procedures are exposure-prone and recommends that HIV-infected health care workers not perform such functions. Here, Mauro (P) supervisor explained that a surgical technician may be called upon to assist in the performance of a surgical procedure, though this occurs rarely. The district court did not err in determining that...
- Appeal from summary judgment for defendant.
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Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc. 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Idaho adopted, and the federal government approved, a Medicaid plan that included coverage for habilitation services—in-home care for individuals who, but for the provision of such services, would require care in a hospital or nursing home. Medicaid requires Idaho’s plan to provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of and payment for care and services as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of the care and services, and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care. Exceptional Child Center (P) sued two officials (D) in Idaho’s Department of Health and Welfare, claiming that Idaho violated Medicaid law by reimbursing habilitation service providers at rates lower than the law permits. The plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the administrators to increase the rates. The district court entered summary judgment for the providers, holding that Idaho had not set rates in a manner consistent with...
- (Scalia, J.) No. The Supremacy Clause instructs courts to defer to federal law when state and federal law conflict, but it does not create a private right of action. The Medicaid Act implicitly precludes private enforcement of the provision at issue here. In a proper case, relief may be given in a court of equity to prevent an injurious act by a public officer. The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional action by state and federal officers reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action. It is a judge-made remedy, however, and we have never held or even suggested that, in its application to state actors, it rests upon an implied right of action contained in the Supremacy Clause. The power of federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful executive action is subject to express and implied statutory limitations. Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements than can courts of law. The plaintiffs must seek their relief from the...
- majority found that the Medicaid Act implicitly precludes private enforcement of § (30)(A). Thus, the healthcare providers could not invoke the court’s equitable powers to circumvent Congress’s exclusion of private enforcement. The sole remedy that Congress provided in the Medicaid Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to terminate federal funding to all or parts of the state Medicaid program until the state stops violating the federal law. According to the court, this express provision of one method of enforcing a statute suggests that Congress intended to preclude all others.
- (Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare Official) v. (Provider of Habilitation Services)
- Exceptional Child Center (P) sued two officials (D) in Idaho’s Department of Health and Welfare, claiming that Idaho violated Medicaid law by reimbursing habilitation service providers at rates lower than the law permits.
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Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology (D), the defendant clinic, provided Byrne (P) with gynecological and obstetrical care prior to 2005. The defendant also provided Byrne (P) with the HIPAA-required notice of privacy policy and agreed, pursuant to that policy, that it would not disclose Byrne’s (P) health information without her authorization. Byrne (P) began a personal relationship with Mendoza in 2004. She instructed the defendant not to release her medical records to Mendoza. In 2005, Mendoza filed a paternity case against Byrne (P). Pursuant to a subpoena, the defendant clinic provided a copy of Byrne’s (P) medical records to the court. Byrne (P) alleged that she suffered harassment and extortion threats from Mendoza once he viewed her medical records. She sued, alleging that the clinic breached its privacy policy and asserting other negligence claims. The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, which was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court held that...
- The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) is a comprehensive legislative and regulatory scheme to protect the privacy of patients’ health information given advances in information technology. This case considered whether HIPAA, which lacks a private right of action and preempts contrary state law, preempts state law claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against a healthcare provider who allegedly breached the confidentiality of a patient’s medical records in the course of complying with a subpoena. The trial court dismissed the claims, but, on appeal, the court concluded that, to the extent the state’s common law provides a remedy for a healthcare provider’s breach of its duty of confidentiality in the course of complying with a subpoena, HIPAA does not preempt the plaintiff’s state common-law causes of action.
- of state law. A “contrary provision” means that a covered entity would find it impossible to comply with both the state and federal requirements, or the state law stands as an obstacle for the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of HIPAA. State laws exempted from preemption include those that relate to the privacy of individually identifiable health information and are more stringent than HIPAA. In its administrative commentary to the final rule, the agency stated that the fact that a state allows an individual to file a civil action to protect privacy does not conflict with HIPAA penalty provisions. When an agency has interpreted its own rule, courts generally defer to that reading. Although HIPAA provides no private right of action, but rather punishes violators with fines and imprisonment, state causes of action are not preempted solely because they impose liability above that authorized by federal law. We conclude that, if Connecticut’s common law...
- Byrne (P) sued her clinic after it released her health records to a third party pursuant to a subpoena in a paternity suit, despite her instruction not to release them.
- The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
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- Katskee (P) was referred by her gynecologist to another doctor to consult on her family history of breast and ovarian cancer. Although Katskee (P) did not have cancer at the time, the doctor determined that she was in an extremely high-risk category. Katskee (P) filed a claim with Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Nebraska (D) to cover a scheduled hysterectomy and other procedures. Blue Cross (D) declined to pay for the surgery. Katskee’s (P) policy provided coverage for treatments that were “medically necessary” to treat an illness. Katskee (P) proceeded with the surgery and then filed suit against Blue Cross (D) for breach of contract. The court granted summary judgment to Blue Cross (D), and Katskee (P) appealed.
- SUMMARY JUDGMENT: J
- Appeal of summary judgment dismissing action for breach of contract.
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- When Illinois Council of Long Term Care (P), an association of nursing homes, sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services (D) in federal court, the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, holding that only reviews of amount determinations are barred. Shalala (D) appealed.
- (Secretary of Health and Human Services) v. (Nursing homes)
- The district court found that regulations must be first challenged through government agency procedures and not in federal court.
- FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION: The authority of the federal courts to hear and determine in the first instance matters pertaining to the federal Constitution, federal law, or treaties of the United States.
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Doctors Hospital of Augusta v. Alicea 5 results
- State supreme court review of the lower courts’ decisions denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
- Did the court err in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment?
- A unanimous Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and court of appeals in finding that there is no immunity unless a healthcare provider acts in good faith in following the patient’s or the agent’s instructions, unless the provider informs the patient or agent that it cannot follow their decision on moral or medical grounds and cooperates in facilitating a transfer to a healthcare provider who will honor the patient/agent’s directive.
- ...good faith reliance on any direction by the healthcare agent to the same extent as if the provider had interacted directly with the patient, if competent. The Advance Directive Act only immunizes the provider, however, to the extent he or she continues to provide reasonably necessary consultation and care. There is ample evidence that the doctor here was not acting in good faith reliance on any decision Alicea (P) had made, either to comply with it or to refuse or fail to comply with it and then inform Alicea (P) of his unwillingness. Instead, the evidence supports a finding that the doctor made the healthcare decision himself in the exercise of his own medical and personal judgment. Because there is at least a disputed issue of fact as to whether the doctor acted in good faith reliance on a decision made by his patient’s healthcare agent, the doctor cannot, on a motion for summary judgment, claim the immunity that is available to providers who honestly depend on such a decision...
- defendant doctors and hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were immune from liability under the Georgia Advance Directive Act.
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St. David’s Health Care System v. United States 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Federal appellate court review of the district court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
- When a non-profit organization forms a partnership with a for-profit entity, courts should be concerned about the relinquishment of control. St. David’s (P) needed the partnership more than its partner did and may have been willing to acquiesce to many of the partner’s demands. In the process, it may not have been able to give a high priority to its charitable objectives. According to the partnership documents, there may be reason to doubt that St. David’s retained sufficient control. For instance, although St. David’s (P) had a seat on the board of the newly formed partnership, the board of governors is empowered to deal only with major decisions, not the day-to-day operation of the partnership hospitals. Thus, St. David’s (P) could not, via its position on the board, overrule a management decision. The evidence presented by the parties demonstrates that there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding whether St. David’s (P) ceded control to its partner organization. Because...
- Did the district court err in granting St. David’s (P) motion for summary judgment?
- In determining whether there is a dispute as to a material fact on a motion for summary judgment, the court considers all of the evidence in the record but does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Instead, the court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. If, after accepting the facts as presented by the nonmoving party as true, the court determines that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, it will grant summary judgment in favor of that party.
- St. David’s (P) owned a hospital and other healthcare facilities in Texas. For many years, St. David’s (P) was recognized as a charitable organization entitled to tax-exempt status. In the 1990s, facing economic challenges, St. David’s (P) formed a partnership with a for-profit company that operated 180 hospitals nationwide. In 1998, the IRS audited St. David’s (P) and concluded that, due to its partnership with the for-profit organization, St. David’s (P) no longer qualified as tax-exempt. The IRS ordered St. David’s (P) to pay taxes, which the hospital did under protest and then filed suit, requesting a refund. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted St. David’s (P) motion and ordered the government to refund the taxes paid, plus attorneys’ fees. The government appealed.
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Jacobson v. Massachusetts 5 results
- This case has never been repudiated. The Court suggested that at times there simply is no liberty interest in conduct that may put others at risk. In the early part of the twentieth century, courts were extremely deferential to a state’s power to protect the public health.
- (Harlan, J.) Yes. The scope of the state’s police power includes the authority to enact reasonable regulations to protect public health and safety. The liberty secured by the Constitution to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. The means employed by Cambridge to stamp out smallpox have a real and substantial relation to the protection of the public health and the public safety. Nothing clearly appears that would justify this Court in holding the statute to be unconstitutional.
- STATE’S POLICE POWER INCLUDES THE AUTHORITY TO ENACT REASONABLE REGULATIONS TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY
- The scope of the state’s police power includes the authority to enact reasonable regulations to protect public health and safety.
- Does the scope of the state’s police power include the authority to enact reasonable regulations to protect public health and safety?
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- Linton (P), who suffered from rheumatoid arthritis, was a patient at Green Valley Health Care Center when she received notice from Medicaid that she no longer qualified for the high-level care provided to her and would have to move to another facility that provided intermediate-level care. Green Valley was certified to provide that level of care, indeed in the same bed Linton (P) occupied, but the facility chose to “decertify” the bed, in keeping with its own internal policy, and compel the plaintiff’s transfer to another facility. Carney, an Alzheimer’s patient, suffered a similar fate, and no placement could be found for her. Her condition declined to the point where she required emergency hospitalization. Tennessee law had previously placed a percentage limitation on the number of available Medicaid beds in nursing homes, but it abolished that program in 1985. Federal law allowed for distinct areas in nursing homes providing different levels of care, but the units had to be...health
- joint federal and state program that, together with the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), provides health coverage to over
- Federal district court consideration of a constitutional challenge to agency policy.
- Commissioner implemented a policy that fosters the egregious status of minorities in the Medicaid program. Continued deference to the agency in such circumstances is inappropriate. To cure the effects of this policy, judicial intervention is necessary. The Commissioner is hereby ordered to consult with the federal agency overseeing Medicaid to submit a plan for court approval that will redress the disparate impact on minority Medicaid patients’ access to nursing home care.
- ...on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. As President Kennedy said in 1963, “Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races [colors, and national origins] contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial [color or national origin] discrimination.” If a recipient of federal assistance is found to have discriminated and voluntary compliance cannot be achieved, the federal agency providing the assistance may either initiate fund termination proceedings or refer the matter to the Department of Justice for appropriate legal action. Aggrieved individuals may file administrative complaints with the federal agency that provides funds to a recipient, or the individuals may file suit in federal court. In addition to Title VI itself, most funding agencies have regulations implementing Title VI that prohibit practices that have...
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Federal Trade Commission and State of Illinois v. Advocate Health Care Network, et al. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Hamilton, J.) Yes. For purposes of competition, the relevant geographic market is where the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate. Markets for hospitals have three notable features. First, most patients prefer to go to nearby hospitals, so there are often only a few hospitals in a geographic market. Second, however, patients vary in their hospital preference. They may not be as particular about where they have an appendectomy as they would be about where they have brain surgery; the hospital where their surgeon has admitting privileges may control their choice, despite distance. Third, consumers do not directly pay the full cost of hospital care; their health insurance does. Insured patients are not as concerned about retail prices. We find that the district court made clear factual errors here. Its central error was misunderstanding the hypothetical monopolist test. The court’s analysis fell prey to a version of the silent majority fallacy. In the...
- Advocate Health Care Network (D) and NorthShore University HealthSystem (D) operated hospital networks in Chicago’s northern suburbs. The two entities sought to merge. Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbids asset acquisitions that may lessen competition in any “section of the country”. The Federal Trade Commission (P) and the State of Illinois (P) sued in district court to enjoin the proposed merger while the FTC (P) considered the interpretation of that phrase through its ordinary, but slower, administrative process. The district court found that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits and denied the injunction. Its analysis focused on the plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony. The court found no economic basis for distinguishing between academic medical centers and local hospitals, and no reason to think a competitor had to constrain both to be in the geographic market. The court also criticized the expert’s assumption that patients generally insist on access to...
- This case began with an administrative complaint issued by the FTC (P), in which the FTC (P) alleged that the proposed merger between Advocate Health Care Network (D) and NorthShore University HealthSystem (D) would create the largest hospital system in the North Shore area of Chicago. According to the complaint, the combined entity would have operated a majority of the hospitals in the area and controlled more than 50% of the general acute care inpatient hospital services. The Commission (P) also authorized staff to file for a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo pending the administrative trial. In the federal court proceeding, the district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction but granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a stay pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. On March 7, 2017, the district court granted the injunction and the parties abandoned their merger plans.
- Federal appellate court review of the district court’s denial of the injunction.
- Did the court err in denying the preliminary injunction?
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Marsh v. Arnot Ogden Medical Center 5 results
- Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chemung County Division, granting the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.
- ...possible that the actions of the doctor, who abandoned Marshall when he was in need of emergency treatment, may be found to have been grossly inappropriate. Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find the stated claim legally sufficient to overcome the doctor’s motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim. As for the nurse and the hospital, the inquiry is whether there are facts in controversy. Only if it can be said as a matter of law that punitive damages are unavailable is summary judgment warranted. Here, there are questions as to whether the nurse should have known that the patient was not a diabetic, yet injected the medication without ascertaining Marshall’s identity and confirming that a doctor ordered the medication for this patient. The nurse denied that she was warned by the plaintiff’s family, but the decedent’s daughter alleges that just before the injection she specifically warned the nurse that her father was not a diabetic and did...
- In 2009, Marshall was a patient in a hospital operated by Arnot Ogden Medical Center (AOMC) (D) when a registered nurse employed by AOMC (D) injected him with an insulin-reducing medication that had not been prescribed for him. When the attending physician found out, she directed the nurse to check the patient’s glucose level every two hours and call her at home if it dropped below 120. The nurse called the doctor at 10:15 p.m. when Marshall’s insulin level reached 107. Even after learning this, the doctor ordered that the testing be discontinued until the next morning. At 6:15 a.m., Marshall’s glucose level was 15, and he died shortly thereafter as a result of insulin overdose resulting from the medication error. The decedent’s estate brought a medical malpractice action against the hospital, the doctor, and the nurse, and the defendants moved for partial summary judgment dismissing the punitive damages claim.
- Did the lower court properly dismiss the punitive damages claim?
- , medical records confirmed that the decedent’s medical chart was not updated to reflect the mistaken administration of medicine until four months after the decedent’s death. The court noted that no explanation for the delay had been offered, and no pretrial discovery had taken place, so dismissal of the punitive damages claim was premature. Based on
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Conn v. United States 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Federal district court consideration of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
- (Reeves, J.) Yes. A plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must prove that a specific standard of care governed his physician’s actions. The physician must be at least minimally competent in his practice. Here, Dr. Strong’s report failed to identify a specific standard of care and state that the V.A. doctor’s decisions were not those of a minimally competent physician. Dr. Strong’s personal recommendations do not establish the standard of care with particularity. Conn (P), through Dr. Strong, relies on the American College of Cardiology, American Heart Association guidelines. There is no consensus on whether a set of published clinical practice guidelines can establish a national standard of care in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The only guidance from Mississippi case law, which applies here, suggests that courts are, under some circumstances, open to the idea of permitting expert witnesses to rely on clinical practice guidelines when enunciating a standard of care. Were this
- ...the next day as “asymptomatic.” Conn (P) actually had a 90% blockage in one of his arteries. He returned to Stone County two days later. While at the hospital, Conn (P) suffered a massive heart attack, flatlined, and had to be shocked back to life. Conn (P) sued the U.S. government (D) for medical malpractice. Dr. Strong submitted an expert report in support of Conn’s (P) case. Strong contended that Conn (P) was not treated at the V.A. hospital with what the American College of Cardiology, American Heart Association recommends for an acute myocardial infarction. His professional recommendation, given the symptoms Conn (P) presented with, would have been to proceed with diagnostic coronary angiography. Dr. Strong further opined that the failure of the medical staff at the V.A. to appropriately diagnose and treat Conn (P) following his admission left him with an unacceptably high risk of recurrent symptoms and complications of angina/myocardial infarction and death. He concluded...
- Was the government (D) entitled to summary judgment in its favor?
- fundamental doctrine of civil procedure mandating that federal courts apply state substantive law in diversity-jurisdiction cases and other cases considering state-law causes of action
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- : The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. (KKI) (D). Parents of the children subject to the research study conducted by KKI (D) appealed, contending that KKI (D) owed a duty of care based on the nature of its relationship with the parents (P) and the children participating in the study.
- : The plaintiffs, through their parents, sued various defendants for harms they allegedly suffered as a result of taking part in a clinical study while being treated for health issues accompanying their premature births.
- If an informed consent claim is a type of medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must show the existence of an actual injury; if an informed consent claim is not considered a malpractice claim, then the court must determine precisely what type of claim it is and determine what the state’s law would prescribe as its elements.
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- The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. (KKI) (D). Parents of the children subject to the research study conducted by KKI (D) appealed, contending that KKI (D) owed a duty of care based on the nature of its relationship with the parents (P) and the children participating in the study.
- .... Children were encouraged to reside in households where the possibility of lead dust was known to the researchers to be likely, so that lead dust content of their blood could be compared with the lead dust in the houses at periodic intervals over a two-year period. The continuing presence of children was required in the subject houses in order for the study to be complete. The purpose of the research was to determine how effective varying degrees of lead paint abatement procedures were. The researchers acknowledged that lead paint was particularly hazardous to children, and that lead dust often remained/returned to abated houses over a period of time. The Institutional Review board (IRB) overseeing this research abdicated its responsibility to review the potential safety and health hazard impact of this nontherapeutic study, instead advising the institute to recast the study so as to obscure such dangers. The research study was sponsored jointly by the EPA and the... ...summary...
- Appeal from the grant of summary judgment.
- ...hazardous living situations for nontherapeutic studies such as the one at issue in this case. Additionally, parents, whether improperly enticed by food stamps, money or other items, have no righter to intentionally and unnecessarily place children in potentially hazardous nontherapeutic research settings. IRBS are not designed to be objective, as they are generally internal boards tied as much to the success of a research project as to its ethical implications. This is evident in this case, where the IRB did not ensure the safety of the children subjects but encouraged researchers to misrepresent the research as therapeutic in nature. Special relationships are created between researchers and their human subjects generally. Finally, the government regulations can create duties on the part of researchers toward human subjects out of which special relationships may arise. Special relationships are to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The circuit court erred in granting KKI’...
- The court in
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Burless v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Judgment rendered by a court in response to a motion made by one of the parties, claiming that the lack of a question of material fact in respect to an issue warrants disposition of the issue without consideration by the jury.
- ...no evidence that the physicians actually worked for the hospital, and WVUH (D) therefore cannot be found liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but it can be held liable under a theory of apparent agency. Under West Virginia law, regardless of any contractual arrangements with independent contractors, a hospital is liable to the injured patient for acts of malpractice committed in its emergency room, so long as the requisite proximate cause and damages are present. That same rule should apply outside of the emergency room setting. The public’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as a full-service provider of health care appears to be at the foundation of the national trend toward adopting a rule of apparent agency to find hospitals liable, under the appropriate circumstances, for the negligence of physicians providing services within its walls. In addition, WVUH (D) did not unequivocally inform Pritt (P) and Burless (P) that the physicians...
- Appeal of order granting summary judgment to hospital.
- Two women brought lawsuits against West Virginia University Hospital, alleging they were injured by negligent treatment received at the hospital. The trial court did not allow the women to present evidence to support their claims that the physicians who treated them appeared to be hospital employees, even though they were actually independent contractors.
- In order to show that a physician is an employee of a hospital, evidence of control must be present, in accordance with the tests for respondeat superior. Courts turn to apparent agency tests where there might be vicarious liability for the negligence of independent contractors.
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Carter v. Hucks-Folliss 4 results
- SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Judgment rendered by a court in response to a motion made by one of the parties, claiming that the lack of a question of material fact in respect to an issue warrants disposition of the issue without consideration by the jury.
- Appeal from summary judgment.
- (Greene, J.) Yes. A hospital owes a duty of care to its patients to ascertain that a physician is qualified to perform surgery before granting that physician the privilege of conducting surgery in that hospital. Failure to comply with the standards of JCAHO is some evidence of negligence because Moore (D) agreed to be bound by its standards. Moore (D) argued that it did, in fact, “consider” that Hucks-Folliss was not Board certified, but the evidence still presents a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. Reversed and remanded.
- In this case, it is the hospital’s failure to comply with the recommendations of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) that provides some evidence of negligence. The court essentially adopts the JCAHO’S standards as the negligence standard. On remand, the prudent attorney for the hospital will challenge that holding, because in fact, many working physicians are not board certified-rightly or wrongly.
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Erickson v. The Bartell Drug Company 4 results
- Federal district court consideration of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
- Bartell (D), Erickson’s (P) employer, made a decision not to cover prescription contraceptives such as birth control pills, Norplant, Depo-Provera, IUDs, and diaphragms, under its Prescription Benefit Plan for non-union employees. The female employees sued, claiming discrimination under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). Both sides moved for summary judgment.
- Bartell (D) argued that opting not to provide coverage for prescription contraceptive devices did not violate Title VII because contraceptives are voluntary and do not treat or prevent an illness or disease, and thus they were not truly a healthcare issue. The evidence showed, however, that the availability and affordability of effective contraceptives is of great importance to the health of women and children. Bartell (D) also argued that it should be permitted to limit the scope of its employee benefit programs in order to control costs, but cost is not a defense to allegations of discrimination under Title VII. Bartell (D) could not penalize female employees in an effort to keep its benefits costs low.
- (Lasnik, J.) Yes. An employer’s exclusion of prescription contraception from an otherwise generally comprehensive prescription plan is inconsistent with the requirements of federal law. According to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions is discrimination on the basis of sex. The Act was not meant to alter the contours of Title VII, but to correct erroneous interpretations. The Supreme Court had previously held in ...arguing that women, as the only sex at risk for pregnancy, were being subjected to unlawful discrimination. The dissent further stated that, in determining whether an employment policy treats the sexes equally, the court must look at the comprehensiveness of the coverage provided to each sex. Not surprisingly, the PDA makes no specific reference to prescription contraceptives. What is important here, however, is that, in enacting the PDA, Congress embraced the aforementioned dissenting justices’...
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- Courts rarely have applied negligence per se for statutory violations in medical malpractice cases against health care institutions. In some jurisdictions, evidence of violation of specific statutes or accreditation standards, supported by expert testimony, may create a permissive inference of violation of the standard of care. This inference allows a plaintiff to get his case to the jury, which may accept or reject the inference of negligence.
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- : Intermountain Health Care Health Plans, Inc. (Health Plans) (P) and other subsidiaries (“Care” and “Group”) (P) of Intermountain Health Care Inc. (IHC) contended that they qualified for tax-exempt status under
- IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
- St. David’s Health Care System v. United States
- 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), a health care corporation must be operated primarily for charitable purposes, which, as a matter of law, means that it is operated primarily for such purposes. (2) Pursuant to the integral-part doctrine, a corporation may not qualify for tax-exempt status as a charitable organization under
- : St. David’s (P) sued in federal court to recover taxes it paid under protest, arguing that it was a charitable hospital and therefore tax-exempt.
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Rush Prudential, Inc. v. Debra C. Moran, et al. 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal from the reversal of state court judgment enforcing a health maintenance organization (HMO) act.
- A STATE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION STATUTE IS PROVIDING THE RIGHT TO AN IME OF DENIALS IS NOT PREEMTED BY ERISA
- A state health maintenance organization (HMO) statute providing a right to independent medical review of certain denials of benefits is not preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
- Is a state health maintenance organization (HMO) statute providing a right to independent medical review of certain denials of benefits preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)?
- (Thomas, J.) Section 502, the civil enforcement provision of ERISA, provides the exclusive procedure for benefit claims governed by ERISA. State laws creating additional remedial schemes are completely preempted by the broad language of section 514(a) providing that ERISA “Shall supersede any and all State Laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan.” The Court today breaks from precedent, and from congressional intent, to allow Moran (P) to exercise an additional state statutory remedy provided by section 4–10 of the Illinois HMO Act allowing her benefit claim to be determined by an arbitration-like procedure. While such an independent HMO benefit review provision sounds appealing, it undermines the ability of the HMO to control health care costs and the ability of employers to provide basic coverage to all its employees.
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Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Under Vermont law, all health plans, including self-insured plans, were required to file reports, including claims data and other information, with the state. The statute dictated what information was required and how it must be transmitted. Liberty Mutual (P) operated a self-insured employee health plan through a third-party administrator. When Vermont subpoenaed claims data from the third-party administrator, Liberty Mutual (P) sued the state, arguing that the ERISA reporting requirements preempted the state statute. The district court ruled in favor of the state, holding that ERISA did not preempt the Vermont statute. The federal appellate court reversed, holding that the state law was preempted by ERISA because the state statute’s requirements were connected to the ERISA requirements.
- All-payor claims databases are considered by some to be a crucial tool in a state’s efforts to improve public health, control costs, aid research, provide transparency, and foster competition among medical providers. Although states still may seek paid claims information from non-ERISA entities that pay for medical care, such as insurance companies, this decision could render the databases less effective. They will not have data concerning the large segment of the population that receives employer-sponsored health insurance. This decision is important, however, because it provides the boundaries of what action is prohibited by ERISA in the states’ quest to reign in health care costs for consumers and determine if there are more effective methods of treatment.
- ERISA’s reporting requirements preempt state law regarding reporting requirements as applied to self-insured employee health plans.
- Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, a federal law that sets minimum standards for most voluntarily established retirement and health plans in private industry to provide protection for participants in these plans.
- (Kennedy, J.) Yes. ERISA’s reporting requirements preempt state law regarding reporting requirements as applied to self-insured employee health plans. The preemption clause of ERISA must be broadly construed. Precedent establishes that ERISA preempts state law when the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the operation of the state law or when the state law interferes with nationally uniform plan administration. ERISA includes recordkeeping, disclosure, and reporting requirements that are integral to the Act, and the Vermont statute interferes with nationally uniform plan administration. Therefore, it is preempted. Affirmed.
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Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of California 4 results
- Generally speaking, courts have bene quite hostile to attempts by health care providers to limit their malpractice liability. General releases are almost never honored; and arbitration provisions have only been partially successful. Whatever liability limitations exist do so by virtue of legislative action.
- Tunkl’s (P) decedent was admitted to the UCLA Medical Center, a nonprofit and largely research-based medical facility, as part of a research project. Prior to admission, he signed a liability waiver. While in the hospital, the decedent was allegedly injured due to physician malpractice. The decedent brought an action for personal injury, into which Tunkl (P) substituted as administratrix following the decedent’s demise. A jury held the release valid a returned a defense verdict. The court of appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court granted review.
- Supreme court review of appeal of denial of damages for malpractice.
- (Tobriner, J.) No. A release waiving malpractice liability of a nonprofit hospital is unenforceable. Under Civil Code § 1668, a contract purporting to exculpate a party from his own negligence will not stand if it involves “the public interest.” A contract will involve such interest if the party seeking exculpations engaged in performing a service of great public importance, which is often a practical necessity for some. A contract for hospital services certainly falls within this definition. Here, however it is argued that the section should not be applied to a nonprofit charitable hospital. However, this court has already abolished charitable immunity; to the extent a charity is negligent, it may be liable. Since the basis for the jury verdict was the unenforceable contract, the matter must be retried. Reversed.
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- The present case was very closely watched in the scientific and health communities. Through his conversion cause of action, Moore (P) had sought to establish a proprietary interest in his tissue. The ramifications of such a claim on research had caused some consternation among researchers. Moore’s (P) conversion cause of action was unsuccessful in the California Supreme Court.
- Moore (P) underwent treatment at UCLA Medical Center for a form of leukemia. His treating physicians, Golde (D) and Quan (D) recognized that his tissue had certain unique properties that warranted research. They suspected that a patentable cell line could be derived therefrom. Pursuant to this, various types of tissue were removed from Moore (P) including his spleen, ostensibly for treatment only but also for research as well. Several years later, a patent was issued to Golde (D) and Quan (D) on a cell line derived solely from Moore’s (P) tissue. Moore (P) brought a lawsuit, alleging various causes of action including conversion and failure to obtain informed consent. The California Supreme Court granted review.
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- Wons (D) refused to consent to a blood transfusion due to her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. At the time she refused, she was competent to make the decision. While unconscious, the Public Health Trust of Dade County (P) obtained a court order allowing the transfusion. When she awoke, Wons (D) appealed the order. The district court held that Wons’s rights of religion and privacy could not be overridden and reversed to order.
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Williams v. U.S. 3 results
- (Niemeyer, J.) No. Neither a physician, nor a private hospital, has a duty to render medical services to every person requesting them. Williams (P) raises four theories in an attempt to establish a duty on the part of health care providers to provide emergency services. Williams (P) argues: (1) NCGS § 131A–8 requires all health care facilities receiving state funding to be operated to serve and benefit the public in a non-discriminatory manner; (3) the Patients’ Bill of Rights,§ 3C.4103, promulgated pursuant to ...held itself out as providing a service, it cannot arbitrarily refuse to provide that service to a member of the public. The problem with Williams’s (P) theories is that none of the alleged “duties” created by statute authorize any mechanism for their enforcement, and the common-law public utility doctrine has no application toward health care providers in private settings. At best the IHCI Act provided for discretionary treatment, which the federal employees declined to...
- Berlie White, decedent, presented to Cherokee Indian Hospital (CIH) suffering from respiratory distress. CIH, the nearest hospital Mr. White could reach at the time, was an Indian hospital operated on the Cherokee Reservation by the United States Public Health Service. CIH was operated under the federal Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCI Act), which prohibits treatment of non-Indians, except for discretionary treatment in emergency situations. The federal employees at CIH refused to treat Mr. White and refused to refill his oxygen tank. Mr. White was referred to another hospital ten miles away. Upon arrival at that hospital, Mr. White was in extreme distress, and he died from complications of oxygen deprivation the following day. Williams (P), the adminstratrix of Mr. White’s estate, brought suit under various theories alleging the breach of a duty to provide emergency treatment on a non-discriminatory basis. District court dismissed, and this appeal followed
- .... It should be noted that the procedural posture of this case hinged on the application of the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) in association with the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). The federal government has sovereign immunity from suit even when violating its own Acts unless, as provided in the FTCA, the liability would exist if the government were acting as a private person in accordance with the law on private parties in the locality where the alleged tort occurred. Consequently, since Williams (P) was unable to establish any private duty to provide medical treatment in North Carolina, the United States (D) was immune from suit. Even though there is, for the most part, no affirmative duty to provide health care, once a decision is made to offer services and a physician-patient relationship is formed, then traditional medical malpractice negligence law is applicable. Also consider that had this been a private hospital receiving federal funds then...
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In re T.A.C.P. 3 results
- The parents (P) of the child T.A.C.P. were informed that their child would be born without an upper brain, or anencephalic. The parents (P), hoping to offer some benefit to others in the face of their loss, sought a declaration that the child was “dead”, so that her organs could be donated. The health care providers (D) refused out of fear of liability. The parents (P) then sought a legal ruling on the matter. The question of the definition of death was certified by the appellate court and forwarded to the Supreme Court of Florida.
- (Parents) v. (Health care providers)
- Review of order certified by the appellate court.
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- (Hurwitz, J.) Yes. A prima facie case under the Clayton Act does not require proof that a merger or other acquisition has caused higher prices in the affected market; all that is necessary is that the merger create an appreciable danger of such consequences in the future. The district court’s conclusion that a prima facie case was established is amply supported by the record here. The court found that statements and past actions by the merging parties made it likely that St. Luke’s (D) would raise reimbursement rates in a highly concentrated market. The court’s uncontested finding of high entry barriers eliminates the possibility that the reduced competition caused by the merger will be ameliorated by the new competition from outsiders, and further strengthens the FTC’s (P) case. The burden thus shifted to St. Luke’s (D) to cast doubt on the accuracy of the government’s evidence as predictive of future anticompetitive effects. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits only those...
- A prima facie case under the Clayton Act does not require proof that a merger or other acquisition has caused higher prices in the affected market; all that is necessary is that the merger create an appreciable danger of such consequences in the future.
- Federal circuit court review of a district court decision in the plaintiffs’ favor.
- Saltzer Medical Group (D) was the largest specialty physician group in Nampa, Idaho. After several unsuccessful attempts to form informal affiliations with a large healthcare system, Saltzer (D) sought a formal partnership deal. In 2012, St. Luke’s (D), a not-for-profit healthcare system, acquired Saltzer’s (D) assets and entered into a five-year professional service agreement. St. Alphonsus (P), the operator of the only hospital in Nampa, filed suit, seeking to enjoin the merger, but the district court denied the motion. Later, the FTC (P) and the state of Idaho (P) filed a separate complaint seeking an injunction. The court consolidated the two cases and ultimately found that the merger was prohibited by the Clayton Act and the Idaho Competition Act because of its anticompetitive effects on the Nampa healthcare market. This appeal followed.
- The Clayton Act addresses certain practices that are not specifically prohibited by the Sherman Act, such as mergers like that involved in this case. Section 7 of the Clayton Act bans mergers and acquisitions if the effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. The Clayton Act was amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and now also bans certain discriminatory prices, services, and dealings between merchants. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 further amended the Clayton Act, so that now companies planning large mergers or acquisitions must notify the government of their plans in advance. The Clayton Act authorizes private parties to sue for triple damages if they have been harmed by conduct that violates either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act and to obtain a court order prohibiting the anticompetitive practice in the future.
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Gonzales v. Carhart 4 results
- (Ginsburg, J.) The reconstituted Court’s “alarming” decision disrespected precedent gutted the long-standing health exception requirement and showed an unconcealed “hostility” to abortion rights. The ruling “refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously.” It ignores district court findings that intact D&E is safer for women with certain conditions and generally offers safety advantages over standard D&E, siding instead with a statute that even the majority recognized contains factual errors. The Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.
- that may become a child.” That interest allows the state, “in order to promote respect for life,” to restrict abortion methods that physicians might otherwise choose. The health exception recognized in cannot be interpreted in a way to “set at naught” the government’s interest in fetal life. Here, there is “documented disagreement whether the Act’s prohibition would ever impose significant health risks on women.” When medical uncertainty exists, the Court defers to legislative choice. In addition, the mother’s health exception requirement cannot be interpreted to preclude regulation of abortion methods that further the government’s interest in protecting and respecting fetal life when there is only uncertainty in the medical community about whether a particular abortion method is ever medically necessary. Here, Congress sought to promote respect for life by drawing a bright line between abortion and infanticide. The statute also recognizes “the bond of love the mother has for her...
- After the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in , which struck down the Nebraska law that barred abortions in which the physician delivers a “substantial portion” of the fetus into the woman’s vagina for the purpose of performing a procedure that kills the “unborn child” and lacked a health exception. Congress passed a federal statute,
- Supreme Court review of federal statute banning partial-birth abortions.
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Turner v. Memorial Medical Center 3 results
- The appellate court in this case had reasoned that the plaintiff simply told the Joint Commission that Memorial’s (D) practice was to update patients’ charts before the end of a shift rather than immediately as the Commission recommended, and that such action falls short of the public-policy threshold. The state supreme court agreed. The court noted that the Department of Public Health rules merely require that patient medical records be
- State supreme court review of the appellate court decision upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for wrongful discharge.
- (Freeman, J.) No. To state a valid retaliatory discharge claim, an employee must allege that the employer discharged the employee in retaliation for the employee’s activities and that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. Public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the state collectively. It is found in the state’s constitution, statutes, and, sometimes, judicial decisions. The issue of whether a public policy is undermined by an employee’s discharge is a question of law for the court to decide. Here, the question of whether patient safety (requiring immediate charting) is a clearly mandated public policy, and whether the plaintiff’s discharge violated that policy, are questions for the court. No Illinois law or regulation directly requires immediate bedside charting of patient care. Even if the Joint Commission guidelines had the force of law, the plaintiff’s complaint fails to recite or even refer to a specific Joint Commission...
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Table of Contents 27 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Chapter Twenty-Two. Population Health and Public Health Law
- Chapter Two. Quality Control Regulation: Licensing Health Care Professionals
- Hoover v. The Agency for Health Care Administration
- Chapter Three. Quality Control Regulation of Health Care Institutions
- Sunshine Haven Nursing Operations v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services
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Shorter v. Drury 2 results
- A variety of religious denominations refuse some or all medical treatment. What to do in such situations has long been a thorny issue in health law, especially when minors are involved. It is one thing from a competent adult to refuse treatment; it is another for a parent to deny treatment of a child. These situations have implications going beyond health law, spilling over into constitutional and criminal law.
- Appellate court review of superior court’s award of damages for malpractice/wrongful death.
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United States ex rel. Michael K. Drakeford v. Tuomey 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Tuomey (D) also maintained that the damages and penalties were too high. A defendant found liable under the FCA must pay the government a penalty of between $5,500 and $11,000 per violation plus three times the amount of damages the government sustained. The jury found that Tuomey (D) submitted 21,730 false claims, to which the district court applied the statutory minimum for a total penalty near $120 million. Together with the damages sustained (which were trebled), Tuomey (D) was liable for nearly $240 million. The court found that there was no error in that calculation.
- that prohibits physicians from referring patients for certain designated health services paid for by Medicare to any entity in which they have a financial interest.
- Appeal from a district court decision in the government’s favor.
- Did the district court err in granting the government’s motion for a new trial and later denying Tuomey’s (D) motion for a new trial?
- provisions of the False Claims Act, alleging that, because the part-time employment contracts violated the Stark Law, Tuomey (D) had knowingly submitted false claims for payment to Medicare. The government intervened. A jury found that Tuomey (D) had not violated the FCA, but the district court vacated the verdict and granted a new trial after concluding that it erroneously excluded certain expert testimony. The second jury found that Tuomey (D) knowingly submitted over 20,000 false Medicare claims for reimbursement. The court entered judgment for the government and awarded damages and civil penalties. Tuomey (D) appealed.
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Chapter Four. The Professional-Patient Relationship 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- : Michelle Esquivel (P) went to South Central Kansas Regional Medical Center (SCKRMC) (D) for a free sonogram, which was only to determine the unborn baby’s sex. An abnormality was discovered, but not disclosed to Esquivel (P) by SCKRMC (D). Esquivel (P) sued SCKRMC (D) when her baby died after birth, and the court granted summary judgment for SCKRMC (D) Esquivel (P) appealed.
- : The plaintiffs’ daughter died by suicide, and the plaintiffs sued a psychiatrist who had been briefly involved in their daughter’s case through a telepsychiatry research study; the plaintiffs argued that summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of the duty owed to their daughter by the psychiatrist.
- A patient-health care provider relationship does not exist where the provider does not undertake to advise the patient, or treat the patient, regarding any medical condition, disease, or illness.
- Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc.
- : Doe (P) brought suit against Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc. (D) alleging invasion of privacy and breach of a confidential relationship for negligent disclosure of his positive Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) status.
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Boreali v. Axelrod 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Titone, J.) No. A legislative grant of authority must be construed so that it is no broader than that which the separation of powers doctrine permits. The legislature cannot pass on its lawmaking functions to other bodies. An administrative body oversteps the boundaries of its lawfully delegated authority when it promulgates comprehensive codes to govern tobacco smoking in areas that are open to the public. While the legislature has given the Public Health Council broad authority to promulgate regulations on matters concerning public health, the scope of authority must be deemed limited by the Council’s role as an administrative, rather than a legislative, body. Striking the proper balance among health concerns, cost, and privacy interests is a uniquely legislative function. Following the legislature’s inability to reach an acceptable balance, the Council weighed the concerns of nonsmokers, smokers, affected businesses, and the general public, and, without any legislative guidance,...
- In 1986, the New York Public Health Council published proposed rules, held public hearings, and promulgated a final set of regulations prohibiting smoking in a wide variety of indoor areas that were open to the public, including schools, hospitals, auditoriums, food markets, stores, banks, cabs, and limousines. Restaurants were required to provide nonsmoking areas sufficient to meet customer demand, and employers were required to provide smoke-free work areas and to keep common areas free of smoke. Businesses could prohibit all smoking on the premises if they so chose. Several parties affected by the regulations sued and the trial court set aside the regulations, holding that they exceeded the Council’s statutory authority. An intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the Council appealed again.
- (Parties Affected by Antismoking Regulations) v. (Comm’r of the N.Y. State Dep’t of Health)
- Did the Public Health Council have the authority to promulgate the smoking regulations?
- Supreme Court review of a state appellate court decision affirming the decision setting aside the regulations.
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Howe v. Hull 4 results
- In this case, the examining physician, Dr. Reardon, essentially admitted to Charon that the transfer was related to his HIV status. Dr. Reardon told Charon, “I’m sure you’ve dealt with this before. . .” Howe (P) asked, “What’s that discrimination?” Reardon replied, “You have to understand, this is a small community, and the admitting doctor does not feel comfortable admitting [Charon].” In other cases, it may be much more difficult to prove that discrimination was involved in the medical decision due to the complexity of a patient’s condition. Thus, in cases where a disease process involves multiple body systems the court may find itself in a position of deference to the practitioners providing a defense, even if that provider’s motives are questionable. Also, Titles II and III of the ADA, covering access to professional offices of health care providers and access to government programs, contain an exception when an individual with a disability poses a direct threat to the health or...
- Hearing on a motion for summary judgment.
- ...human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) he ordered that Charon be transferred to the Medical College of Ohio (MCO). Testimony revealed that when MCO was called and asked to accept transfer of Charon, there was no discussion of a diagnosis of TEN. The only discussion concerning Charon’s transfer was his HIV-positive status. Prior to Charon being transferred, the examining physician essentially admitted that the transfer was based upon discrimination. Dr. Hull (D), the physician in charge of admissions that day, had told the examining physician that, “if you get an AIDS patient in the hospital, you will never get him out.” Once Charon arrived at MCO he was diagnosed with a simple allergic reaction and was treated and released from the hospital. Charon’s personal representative, Howe (P), brought a discrimination action against Hull (D), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (FRA). Hull (D) moved for summary judgment...
- the disability, and (4) the program must have received federal funding. There are two distinctions in the requirements for these two provisions. First, the FRA requires that the services or programs that were denied were receiving federal funding. Second, the FRA requires that the discrimination be solely based upon the disability, whereas the ADA does not. Under the facts of this case, a fact-finder could reasonably believe that the diagnosis of TEN, a rare disease process, was pretextual and that the only reason Charon was transferred was because of his HIV status. There is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for both the ADA and FRA claims to survive a motion for summary judgment and as such the motion is denied.
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- In response to a complaint from a Sunshine Nursing Home (D) resident, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) contacted the New Mexico Department of Health to conduct surveys of Sunshine (D). The surveys revealed that Sunshine (D) was not in substantial compliance with Medicare requirements. The Health Department sent Sunshine a letter stating providing formal notice of the imposition of statutory denial of payment for new admissions and stating that it would recommend to the CMS office that Sunshine’s provider agreement be terminated if compliance was not achieved. The Department gave Sunshine (D) an extended period of time to come into compliance. The initial complaints were based primarily on the failure to bathe certain residents. Sunshine (D) submitted a plan of correction. Later surveys focused on the improper use of physical restraints and patient body transfer techniques, as well as safety code violations. The plaintiff maintained that Sunshine remained out of...
- The Court observed that, although it may have approved Sunshine’s (D) plan of correction as an acceptable statement of how the facility would address the agency’s findings, the approval is not tantamount to determining that the plan of correction has been successfully implemented and substantial compliance achieved. A nursing home like Sunshine (D) may
- he standard that a party seeking to prove a fact in court must meet tot legally establish that fact. Different standards apply in different circumstances: in criminal cases, the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt is on the prosecution, which must establish the fact beyond a reasonable doubt; in civil cases, by contrast, the plaintiff has the burden of proving her case by a preponderance of the evidence. A “preponderance of the evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt” are different standards, requiring different levels of proof. The burden of proof consists of two distinct but related concepts: the burden of production and the burden of persuasion.
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School Board of Nassau County v. Arline 5 results
- (Brennan, J.) No. The Rehabilitation Act provides that no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States may, solely by reason of his or her handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. We agree with the court of appeals that a person suffering from a contagious disease such as tuberculosis can be a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act. The question, then, is whether Arline (P) was otherwise qualified for the job of elementary school teacher. An individualized inquiry is required to answer this question. The basic factors to consider are the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), the duration of the risk (how long the carrier is infectious), the severity of the risk (the potential harm to third parties), and the probability that the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm. The court...
- The Court relied here on the criteria applied to determine handicapped status under the Department of Health and Human Services guidelines. Congress had authorized HHS to implement the Rehabilitation Act. HHS made clear that the Act covers illnesses that cause a record of impairment of a patient’s major life activities. Both the contagious effects and the physical effects of a disease can impair a patient’s ability to work. The Rehabilitation Act was intended to cover not only those who
- Supreme Court review of an appellate court decision reversing the decision of the district court in the school board’s (D) favor.
- Arline (P) taught elementary school in Florida until she was discharged after suffering a third relapse of tuberculosis within two years. She was denied administrative relief and sued in federal court. In the district court, a medical expert testified that Arline’s (P) tuberculosis had been in remission for 20 years until a 1977 culture revealed it was again active. Two cultures taken in 1978 revealed the same. The superintendent of schools testified that after Arline’s (P) third relapse in 1978, the school board (D) suspended Arline (P) with pay for the rest of the school year, after which she was discharged because of the continued reoccurrence of tuberculosis. In her trial memorandum, Arline (P) argued that she qualified as a handicapped person and that her discharge violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court held that she was not a handicapped person under the terms of the statute, and that even if a person with a contagious disease could be deemed a... ...court...
- Did the court of appeals err in holding that Arline (P) was a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act and in remanding the case to determine if she was otherwise qualified to teach elementary school?
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- Provena Hospitals (P) is a subsidiary of Provena Health, a corporation created in association with the Catholic church. Provena Hospitals (P) was exempt from federal income tax and various state taxes, and it sought an additional exemption from property taxes. The Director of Revenue (D) determined that it did not qualify and denied the exemption. Provena Hospitals (P) sought review in the circuit court, which allowed the exemption. The Department (D) appealed.
- State supreme court review of the circuit court’s reversal of the Department of Revenue’s (D) determination that Provena (P) was not entitled to tax-exempt status.
- : A greater number. A plurality opinion of an appellate court is that opinion held by the greatest number of judges while not being a majority.
- , a hospital must demonstrate that it provides a community benefit. To qualify for state sales and use, income, and property tax exemptions, most state governments consider whether a hospital provides some form of charitable care. The definition of charity care and community benefit differs from state to state. The community benefit standard includes a variety of considerations but does not generally specify how much a hospital should spend on charity care or community benefit to qualify under either federal or state law. Naturally, hospitals argue that less is required, governments argue for more, and resolution of this difference of opinion often ends up in court.
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- : Two participants (P) filed state law claims against their health maintenance organizations (HMOs) for failure to administer proper care. The HMOs (D) argued that their claims were preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The U.S. Court of Appeals found in favor of the participants (P), and the HMOs (D) appealed.
- A state health maintenance organization (HMO) statute providing a right to independent medical review of certain denials of benefits is not preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
- Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila
- ERISA’s reporting requirements preempt state law regarding reporting requirements as applied to self-insured employee health plans.
- : On remand from federal court, a state court ordered Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. (Rush) (D) to comply with a state statute providing a right to independent medical review for its beneficiary, Debra C. Moran (P). Rush (D) continued to deny Moran’s (P) claim and the court of appeals reversed.
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- The Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care (Maricopa) (D) was an Arizona corporation composed of doctors engaging in private practice. About 70 percent of Maricopa County’s doctors were members. The Pima Foundation (D) was a similar corporation consisting of 400 doctors. Both organizations had adopted a schedule of fees imposing a maximum amount that member doctors could charge. This practice was challenged by Arizona (P) as price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. This district court, declining to apply a per se rule of illegality, denied Arizona’s (P) motion for summary adjudication. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court granted review.
- ..., J.) Yes. An agreement on maximum fees for specific services constitutes a per se antitrust violation. Most actions in restraint of trade are subject to a “rule of reason” requiring extensive inquiry into their purposes and effects. However, some categories of restraint have been deemed so inherently anticompetitive that a per se rule of illegality applies. Horizontal price-fixing is one such category. Here, horizontal price-fixing is what is being affected, so the per se rule would at first glance appear applicable. However, Maricopa (D) and Pima (D) argued that an agreement to fix maximum rather than the minimum prices is not anticompetitive. This is not true. Price ceilings are price floors may have different economic consequences, but price ceilings still have anticompetitive effects, as they may severely intrude upon the ability of competitors to survive in the market. Maricopa (D) and Pima (D) also argued that the health care field should not be included in the per se rule...
- Appeal from denial of summary judgment in action challenging a medical fee schedule.
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Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Roe v. Wade was the seminal Supreme Court decision, later cases enunciate further standards to be applied in abortion cases. In 1992, the Court held, in part, that a law that imposes an undue burden on the woman’s right to choose before viability is unconstitutional. See . In 2000, the Court again considered abortion rights and reaffirmed Casey in holding the Nebraska law at issue unconstitutional because (1) it failed to provide an exception to preserve the health of the mother; and (2) it unduly burdened a woman’s right to choose a late-term abortion, thereby unduly burdening her right to choose abortion itself. See . The dissent in this case questioned whether the Court correctly applied the Casey standard.
- (Abortion Providers) v. (Comm’r of the Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs.)
- Should the substantial burden analysis take into account the extent to which laws that restrict a woman’s access to an abortion serve the government’s interest in promoting health?
- Supreme Court review of an appellate court decision reversing the district court and holding the contested provisions constitutional.
- (Thomas, J.) This case should not have been heard in the Supreme Court. The Court does not allow suits by third parties to vindicate the rights of others. The majority altered the rules of judicial scrutiny and misinterpreted precedent to reach the result it did today. The Court misconstrued the substantial burden test as requiring courts to apply a strict scrutiny standard of review, despite the lack of precedent to support that approach. By adding additional levels of scrutiny, the majority created a new test that provides little guidance to lower courts, because the result is based on whether a right is favored rather than whether it is enumerated in the Constitution.
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King v. Burwell 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The IRS Rule on this subject states, like the Court’s holding, that a taxpayer is eligible for a tax credit if he or she enrolls in an insurance plan through an insurance Exchange, which is defined by the IRS as an Exchange serving the individual market, whether established and operated by a State or by Health and Human Services. The Court noted that an agency’s interpretation of a statute is often subjected to the
- ...with household incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. Persons who met the Act’s income requirements could purchase insurance with the tax credits, which are provided in advance directly to the insurer. ACA also required the creation of an Exchange in each state where people could shop for insurance, usually online. If a state chose not to establish an exchange on its own, the Secretary of Health and Human Services established and operated an Exchange within the state. Although ACA provided that the tax credits were allowed for any applicable taxpayer, the Act also provided that the amount of the credit depended in part on whether the taxpayer had enrolled in an insurance plan through an Exchange established by the state under ACA. Pursuant to an IRS Rule on the subject, the credits were available whether the insurance was provided through a state or the federal Exchange. Virginia taxpayers sued, arguing that the IRS regulation exceeded the agency...
- (Virginia Taxpayer) v. (Secretary of Health and Human Services)
- Virginia taxpayers argued that Virginia’s insurance exchange, which was operated by the federal government, did not entitle them to the advance tax credits available under the Affordable Care Act to purchasers of health insurance through a state-run exchange.
- A taxpayer is eligible for a tax credit if he or she enrolls in an insurance plan through an insurance Exchange, whether established and operated by a state or by the Department of Health and Human Services.
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Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s 3 results
- Avera St. Luke’s (ASL)(D) is part of a regional health care system sponsored by the Sisters of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin Mary of Aberdeen, South Dakota. Since 1901, the Presentation Sisters have provided quality health services to the Aberdeen community. In mid-1996, ASL’s (D) neurosurgeon left Aberdeen. During the process of recruiting his replacement, ASL (D) learned that most neurosurgeon applicants would not be interested in coming to Aberdeen if there was already an orthopedic surgeon practicing in the area. ASL (D) successfully recruited a neurosurgeon in December of 1996. Around this time, ASL (D) learned that OSS (P), a group of Aberdeen orthopedic surgeons, had decided to build a day center that would directly compete with ASL (D). During the first seven months that OSS’s (P) surgery center was open, ASL (D) suffered a 1,000-hour loss of operating room usage. In response, ASL (D) closed ASL’s (D) medical staff with respect to physicians requesting privileges...
- The circuit court found that Avera St. Luke’s (D) did not have the right to initiate actions that affected the privileges of medical staff such as Dr. Mahan (P) when they had previously delegated this authority.
- (Gilbertson, J.) No. The medical staff bylaws of a hospital do not trump the Board of Directors’ ability to make administrative decisions. This is not a case concerning issues delegated to the expertise of medical staff concerning appointments and privileges. Rather, it was an administrative decision by ASL’s (D) Board to close ASL’s (D) staff for certain procedures to ensure ASL’s (D) economic survival. Allowing the medical staff to pass on valid business decisions by the Board as to any issue that incidentally affects the medical staff would render the Board ineffectual. Hospitals have a duty of responsibility with regards to hiring competent physicians. To impose this duty and leave hospital boards powerless to make any decisions regarding medical staff as the lower court suggests would lead to illogical results. Reversed.
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United States v. Krizek 1 result
- The decision also dealt with the Government’s (P) contention that doctors were not entitled to bill for a full forty-five to fifty-minute session when they spent that much time on the case but did not actually treat or talk to the patient for that long. The court rejected this argument, holding that doctors may reasonably bill for all the time they actually spend working to treat a patient. The court also noted that amounts paid to doctors under the Medicare and ...poor patients receiving inadequate care. Further, the court pointed out several problems it observed with the government’s procedures controlling reimbursement that could potentially lead to abuse of the system or lead to physicians restricting the clientele of the practice to exclude Medicaid and Medicare recipients. These observations included: (1) no distinction as to the status of the provider so that any person providing a coded services received equal reimbursement—assistant or physician; (2) Medicaid and Medicare...
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Bragdon v. Abbott 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Abbott (P), who was infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), disclosed her infection when she visited Bragdon (D), a dentist. When Bragdon (D) informed Abbott (P) of his policy against filling cavities of HIV-infected patients, he offered to perform the work at a hospital with no added fee for his services, though Abbott (P) would be responsible for the cost of using the hospital’s facilities. Abbott (P) sued under § 302 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), alleging discrimination on the basis of her disability. The district court ruled in favor of Abbott (P), holding that her HIV infection was a disability under the ADA, even though her infection had not yet progressed to the symptomatic stage. The court of appeals agreed that treating Abbott (P) in the dental office would not have posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others. Bragdon (D) appealed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- (Kennedy, J.) Yes. The existence or nonexistence of a significant health or safety risk must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence. No individual is required to participate in or benefit from the services in any place of public accommodation when such individual poses a direct threat or safety of others. Bragdon (D) failed to present any objective medical evidence showing that treating Abbott (P) in a hospital would be safer or more efficient in preventing HIV-transmission than treatment in a well-equipped dental office. This Court is concerned, however, that the court of appeals mistakenly relied on the 1993 CDC Dentistry Guidelines, and the 1991 American Dental Association Policy on HIV. This evidence is not definitive. As of September 1994, the CDC had identified seven dental workers with possible occupational transmission of HIV. It is not clear on this...
- Review of summary judgment for plaintiff in case alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
- EXISTENCE OR NONEXISTENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT HEALTH OR SAFETY RISK MUST BE BASED ON MEDICAL OR OTHER OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE
- The existence or nonexistence of a significant health or safety risk must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence.
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Childs v. Weis 1 result
- Daisy Childs (P), a resident of Dallas County, was seven months pregnant and visiting in Lone Oak, Texas. When she began having labor pains, she went to an emergency room. A nurse telephoned Dr. Weis (D), who suggested Childs (P) call her regular doctor in Garland and see what he wanted her to do. The nurse told Childs (P) she would “have to go” to her doctor in Dallas (which were not the exact words Dr. Weis had stated to the nurse). The baby was born in transit and did not survive. Childs (P) sued Weis (D) for malpractice. The trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, and Childs (P) appealed.
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- Caremark International, Inc. (Caremark) (P) provided alternative site health care services as part of its patient care business. Caremark (P) had taken a number of measures to assure compliance with the antikickback provisions of the Medicare fraud and abuse law. When two federal grand juries indicted Caremark (P) and individuals for violations of the antikickback laws, a derivative suit was filed claiming Caremark directors (D) breached their duty of care by failing adequately to supervise Caremark (P) employees. A proposed settlement was reached to recover the corporation’s losses against the individuals who constitute its board of directors, and the court must decide whether the proposed settlement appears to be fair to the corporation and the absent shareholders.
- The court in this case noted that director liability for a breach of duty to exercise appropriate attention may arise in two distinct contexts. First, such liability may be said to follow from a board decision that results in a loss because that decision was ill-advised or negligent. Second, liability to the corporation for a loss may be said to arise from a failure of the Board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.
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Washington v. Glucksberg 4 results
- Although the Supreme Court decided in
- Glucksberg (P) sued the state of Washington (D), alleging that its prohibition against causing or aiding a suicide offended the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Glucksberg (P) asserted the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment that extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide. The district court agreed and concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on the exercise of that constitutionally protected interest. A panel of the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc, reversed the panel’s decision, and affirmed the district court. The court decided that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- (Breyer, J.) I do not believe that this Court need or now should decide whether a right to die with dignity is fundamental. The laws of New York and of Washington do not prohibit doctors from providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain despite the risk that those drugs themselves will kill.
- : The constitutional mandate requiring the courts to protect and enforce individuals’ rights and liberties consistent with prevailing principles of fairness and justice and prohibiting the federal and state governments from such activities that deprive its citizens of a life, liberty, or property interest.
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In re the Estate of Michael Patrick Smith v. Heckler 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A class action suit was filed on behalf of nursing home patients (P) residing in Colorado against Heckler (D), the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In essence, the suit alleged that Heckler (D) was under a duty to enforce compliance with the federal Medicaid Act by considering the quality of care actually provided to patients (P) rather than by looking only to the facilities offered by such homes. The district court concluded that Heckler (D) was acting consistently with the statute in effecting a “facility-oriented” compliance review and dismissed. An appeal was taken.
- A class of nursing home patients (P) challenged the federal health department (D) practice of enforcing compliance with the Medicaid Act by focusing the homes’ facilities rather than patient care.
- The federal health department must enforce compliance with the Medicaid Act by focusing on patient care.
- Must the federal health department enforce compliance with the Medicaid Act by focusing on patient care?
- (Judge undisclosed.) Yes. The Department of Health and Human Services (D) must enforce compliance with the Medicaid Act by focusing on patient care. Nothing in the Medicaid Act indicates that Congress intended the physical facilities to be the end product of the Act. Rather, the Act repeatedly focuses on the care to be provided. For example, the Act provides that health standards are to be developed and maintained and also provides that states must inform the Secretary of what methods they use to ensure quality care. In light of this, the Secretary must look to patient care actually rendered. The current review system, as implemented by Heckler (D), which looks to facilities only and, therefore only to the potential of care, is insufficient. Reversed and remanded.
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United States v. Anthem, Inc. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In 2015, Anthem (D), which is licensed to operate under the Blue Cross Blue Shield health insurance brand in 14 states, reached an agreement to merge with Cigna, with which Anthem (D) competes in those 14 states. The Department of Justice, 11 states, and the District of Columbia (collectively, the government (P)) filed suit to enjoin the merger on the ground that it was likely to substantially lessen competition in violation of the Clayton Act. The district court granted the injunction, rejecting Anthem’s (D) defense that the merger’s anticompetitive effects would be outweighed by its efficiencies, because the merger would yield a superior Cigna product at Anthem’s (D) lower rates. The district court found that Anthem (D) failed to demonstrate that its plan was achievable, and that the merger would benefit consumers. Anthem (D) appealed.
- (Government) v. (Health Insurer)
- Federal appellate court review of the district court’s decision granting the injunction.
- (Rogers, J.) No. When a merger has an anticompetitive effect, any claimed efficiency alleged to offset that effect must be shown to be merger-specific, meaning that it could not be achieved by either merging company alone. If it can be achieved solo, the merger’s asserted benefits can be achieved without the concomitant loss of a competitor. Anthem (D) claims that it plans to achieve savings through rebranding, renegotiating provider contracts, and exercising Anthem’s (D) affiliate clause. The district court found that practical business realities would undermine the execution of that plan, making achievement of the savings speculative and unverifiable. Rebranding does not create a merger-specific benefit in either the short- or long-term. To the extent that some medical savings would be achieved for Cigna customers due to the combined volume, the district court expressed concern over how ...to Anthem (D), the district court found a potential for provider discontent if the lower...
- Did the district court abuse its discretion in enjoining the merger based on Anthem’s (D) failure to show the kind of extraordinary efficiencies necessary to offset the conceded anticompetitive effect of the merger?
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Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc. 4 results
- This case illustrates the level of duty associated with the tort of breach of a confidential relationship. This duty of care is the equivalent of a fiduciary relationship. The duty as a fiduciary carries a standard higher than that of simple negligence or the reasonable person standards. A fiduciary must exercise the utmost degree of honest, forthrightness, loyalty, and fidelity within the confines of the special relationship to the client. While this case is not utilized for this purpose, it should be noted that the court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial judge to reinstate the jury verdict based upon the trial judge’s error with regard to granting defendant’s motion. The appellate court applied a discovery rule to the statute of limitations finding that the cause of action accrued when the plaintiff is deemed to be in inquiry notice, or “that notice which a plaintiff would have possess after due investigation.” The trial court erred by failing to...
- Doe (P) brought suit against Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc. (D) alleging invasion of privacy and breach of a confidential relationship for negligent disclosure of his positive Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) status.
- .... One of Doe’s (P) coworkers at the State Department, Tijuana Goldring (Goldring), also worked at Washington Hospital Center (WHC), the medical institution where Doe (P) was being treated for HIV. Shortly after a visit to the clinic, Doe (P) learned that his co-workers at the State Department knew of his illness and he found himself being subjected to extreme ridicule because of it. Once Doe (P) realized that Goldring was the source of the rumors concerning his medical condition, he filed suit against Goldring for invasion of privacy, and against Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc. (D), the owner of WHC, for breach of confidential relationship. Goldring was later dismissed from the suit, the jury having found that Goldring’s disclosure was not within the scope of her employment at WHC. The jury, however, ruled in favor of Doe (P) against Medlantic (D) awarding damages of $250,000 on the breach of confidential relationship claim. The trial judge, however, granted a motion for...
- the jury’s verdict. The trial court’s judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict.
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- ...age daughter, Rivera, began seeing a therapist at Arbour Counseling, which was owned by Universal Health Services (UHS) (D). UHS (D) participated in the Medicaid program. The counselors at Arbour were not licensed. Rivera was eventually diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed medication by a “doctor” who was later discovered to be a nurse. Rivera had an adverse reaction to the medication and called Arbour for guidance but was unable to speak with anyone. A few days later, she suffered a seizure and was hospitalized; a few months after that, she suffered a fatal seizure. Her parents filed complaints with several state agencies and eventually sued UHS (D) under both the federal and state False Claims Act. The False Claims Act imposes significant penalties on those who defraud the government. Under a theory of liability referred to as implied false certification, when a defendant (such as UHC (D)) submits a claim (to Medicaid, for instance), it impliedly certifies compliance...
- Supreme Court review of a state appellate court decision reversing the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.
- The Court explained that materiality, in this context, means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property. This materiality requirement descends from common law antecedents. Materiality looks to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation. It is a demanding standard. When evaluating materiality under the False Claims Act, the ability to expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive. A claim may be sufficient when no specific provision exists, and, conversely, failure to comply with some specific provisions may not give rise to liability.
- ...valid basis for a claim under the False Claims Act, and the conditions of payment that the defendant allegedly failed to satisfy need not be explicitly stated. When the defendant, such as Arbour here, submits a claim for payment that makes specific representations about the goods or services provided, but knowingly fails to disclose noncompliance with statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements, liability may attach if the omissions made those representations misleading. Liability does not depend on whether the requirements are expressly designated as conditions of payment. The determining factor is whether the misrepresentation about compliance was material, applying the common law meaning of that term. Because the materiality standard and the requirement that noncompliance be “knowing” are strict in terms of imposing liability, the requirements of payment need not be expressly stated. The judgment below is vacated and the case remanded so that the courts may apply the...
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In re Guess 4 results
- (Mitchell, J.) Yes. The medical board has the power to revoke a license issued to any person who has been found by the board to have engaged in unprofessional conduct, including a departure from the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice, irrespective of whether a patient is injured thereby. The court of appeals concluded that in order to be a valid exercise of the board’s police power, the law must be construed to punish the action of a physician only when the action in question poses a danger of harm to the patient or the public. We disagree. When a statute is challenged as being beyond the scope of the police power granted to the board, the statute will be upheld unless it has no rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose. The provision of the statute in question here is reasonably related to the public health. The legislature reasonably believed that a general risk of endangering the public is inherent in any practices that fail to conform to the...
- State supreme court review of a state appellate court decision affirming the superior court’s decision reversing the license revocation.
- Dr. Guess (D), a family physician, regularly administered homeopathic treatments. The licensing board charged Dr. Guess (D) with unprofessional conduct based on his practice of homeopathy. At the revocation hearing, several physicians testified that homeopathy was not an accepted practice in North Carolina. The board revoked Dr. Guess’s (D) license but stayed the revocation as long as he refrained from practicing homeopathic medicine. Dr. Guess (D) appealed, and the superior court reversed and vacated the board’s decision, concluding that the decision was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. The court of appeals disagreed with the superior court’s conclusion that the findings, conclusions, and decision were not supported by competent evidence, but it affirmed the superior court’s order reversing the board’s decision because the board never found that any departures from prevailing medical practices endangered or harmed the...
- : The stopping of legal proceedings for a temporary period by court or administrative order.
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Sokol v. Akron General Medical Center 2 results
- Sokol (P) was a cardiac surgeon at Akron General Hospital (Akron General)(D). When informed that Sokol’s (P) patients had an excessively high mortality rate, Akron General (D) gave him notice that his privileges were being curtailed. The Hearing Committee recommended that Sokol’s (P) privileges be restored. The Medical Council rejected this recommendation and reaffirmed its original decision. Sokol (P) then asked the district court for injunctive relief. The magistrate judge found that the Medical Council’s decision to take action against Sokol (P) based on his mortality rate was arbitrary. On appeal, Sokol (P) alleged that the adverse decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
- This case is an example of new outcome measures being used in hospitals. It is somewhat controversial for hospitals to use mortality rates and to reveal them to the public. The court just examined the fairness of the procedures used by the hospital.
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Baber v. Hospital Corporation of America 2 results
- Appeal from summary judgment in an action based on violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).
- Baber’s (P) sister sought treatment at Raleigh General Hospital’s (RGH) (D) emergency room for agitation caused by her mental illness. Even after medication was administered, she remained agitated. While pacing around the emergency department, she convulsed and fell, striking her head on a table. Ms. Baber became calmer and drowsy after the resulting wound sutured but still experienced some agitation and was disorientation. Concluding that her behavior was due to her chronic mental illness, the treating physician transferred her to a hospital with a psychiatric ward, where she had another seizure. A CT scan revealed a fractured skull. Ms. Baber was transferred back to RGH (D), became comatose, and died. Baber (P) brought this suit, alleging several violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) due to RGH’s (D) failure to provide an appropriate medical screening for his sister. The district court granted summary judgment for RGH (D). Baber (P) appealed.
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Ostrowski v. Azzara 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- PATIENT’S HEALTH HABITS BEING A PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF POSTTREATMENT COMPLICATIONS IS NOT A BASIS FOR DENYING DAMAGES FOR MALPRACTICE
- A jury found that Ostrowski’s (P) health habits had been the principal cause of her medical complications following treatment by Azzara (D) and, consequently, denied her damages in a malpractice action.
- That a patient’s health habits are the principal cause of posttreatment complications is not a basis for denying damages for malpractice.
- Is the fact that a patient’s health habits are the primary cause of posttreatment complications a basis for denying damages for malpractice?
- ...No. That a patient’s health habits are the principal cause of posttreatment complications is not a basis for denying damages for malpractice. Resolution of this issue involves a subtle interplay between the concepts of avoidable consequences, comparative negligence, particularly susceptible victims, aggravation of preexisting conditions, and proximate cause. Avoidable consequences concern the plaintiff’s carelessness after the defendant’s legal wrong. Comparative negligence is a threshold matter. If the plaintiff is more responsible than the defendant for injury, then recovery is barred. “Particularly susceptible victim” is merely a restatement of the maxim that a defendant takes a plaintiff as he finds him. Aggravation of preexisting condition is a mitigation of the previous doctrine. A defendant who aggravates a preexisting condition will be responsible only to the extent of the aggravation, not the prior condition itself. Proximate cause serves as a foundation to the...
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Wickline v. State 5 results
- (Patient) v. (Health care provider)
- LIABILITY WILL NOT ATTACH TO THE PAYOR FOR A NEGLIGENT DISCHARGE SINCE HEALTH CARE PAYOR IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR DISCHARGE DETERMINATIONS
- Since a patient’s health care payor is not responsible for discharge determinations, liability will not attach to the payor for a negligent discharge.
- Does a patient’s health care payor bear the primary responsibility for allowing a patient to be discharged from a hospital, thus incurring liability for a negligent discharge?
- (Rowen, J.) No. Since a patient’s health care payor is not responsible for discharge determinations, liability will not attach to the payor for a negligent discharge. A patient’s physician is in a far better position to determine medically necessary procedures than is Medi-Cal (D). When an appeal route exists and is not used, then the physician cannot shift responsibility to the payor. In this case, Dr. Polonsky admitted that it was his primary responsibility to care for Wickline (P). He felt that four more days of hospitalization were needed, but he did not challenge the initial Medi-Cal (D) finding. Medi-Cal (D) based its decision on a limited set of facts that Dr. Polonsky could have questioned. Medi-Cal (D) is not liable for Wickline’s (P) injuries. Reversed.
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Chapter Fifteen. Fraud and Abuse 1 result
- Linton v. Commissioner of Health and Environment
- The existence or nonexistence of a significant health or safety risk must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence.
- Once plaintiffs challenging governmental action as discriminatory have shown a disproportionate racial impact, the court must examine the justification advanced by the defendant for its actions.
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- : A class of nursing home patients (P) challenged the federal health department (D) practice of enforcing compliance with the Medicaid Act by focusing the homes’ facilities rather than patient care.
- The federal health department must enforce compliance with the Medicaid Act by focusing on patient care.
- Sunshine Haven Nursing Operations v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services
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- Pittsburgh’s second-largest hospital system (West Penn) (P) sued Pittsburgh’s dominant hospital system (the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, or UPMC) (D) and health insurer (Highmark) (D) under the Sherman Act and state law, asserting that the defendants violated the laws by forming a conspiracy to protect one another from competition. Prior to this time, Highmark (D) had been friendly toward West Penn (P) and had even funded a merger between West Penn (P) and several financially distressed providers in order to preserve competition in the market. According to the plaintiff, pursuant to the conspiracy, UPMC (D) used its power in the provider market to insulate the insurer from competition, and in exchange the insurer used its power in the insurance market to strengthen UPMC (D) and weaken the plaintiff. The plaintiff also argued that UPMC (D) attempted to monopolize the Pittsburgh market for specialized hospital services. The district court dismissed the Sherman Act claims...
- ...has a specific intent to monopolize; and (2) that the defendant has engaged in anticompetitive conduct that, taken as a whole, creates (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power. A firm engages in anticompetitive conduct when it attempts to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency. Here, UPMC (D) hired employees away from West Penn (P) by paying them bloated salaries, and it made false statements about West Penn’s (P) financial health, which discouraged investors and caused West Penn (P) to pay inflated financing costs on its debt. These allegations plausibly suggest that UPMC (D) engaged in anticompetitive conduct by attempting to drive West Penn (P) out of the market. An antitrust plaintiff must do more, however, than show that it would have been better off absent the violation. The plaintiff must establish that it suffered an antitrust injury, which is an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that... ...health...
- The court held here that allegations of depressed reimbursement rates paid by Highmark (D) to West Penn (P) pursuant to a conspiracy with the area’s dominant hospital system were sufficient to state an antitrust claim. The court also held that West Penn (P) sufficiently alleged anticompetitive conduct for purposes of an attempted monopoly case by describing a variety of acts by UPMC (D), taken as a whole. This decision reflects the court’s dim view of sweetheart deals between two major players in the healthcare industry that are more often at odds—an insurer and a hospital system. In this case, pursuant to the alleged conspiracy the insurer refused to refinance an earlier loan made to West Penn (P), UPMC (D) refused to enter into provider agreements with the insurer’s rivals, and the insurer paid “supra-competitive” reimbursement rates to its conspiracy partner while artificially depressing rates to West Penn (P). The opinion also details the unilateral acts of the dominant hospital...
- Appeal by the plaintiff from the district court’s dismissal of its Sherman Act claims.
- Did the district court err in dismissing the plaintiff’s claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act?
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- Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
- Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons
- Bouvia v. Superior Court
- : A hospital patient faced imminent death from blood loss but refused to consent to a transfusion based on her religious beliefs; the hospital sought a court order compelling the life-saving treatment.
- It is the duty of a court of general jurisdiction to assume the responsibility of guardianship for someone unable to make medical decisions for herself, to the extent of authorizing life-saving treatment.
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National Federation of Independent Business et al., Petitioners v. Sebelius 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Business Group) v. (Secretary of Health and Human Services)
- The National Federation of Independent Business (P) brought suit against Sebelius (D), claiming that the mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requiring individuals to purchase health insurance violated Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
- for health care. The mandate merely regulates how individuals pay for that active participation, they say. The phrase “active in the market for health care” has no constitutional significance. An individual who bought a car two years ago and who may buy another in the future is not “active in the car market.” The phrase “active in the market” cannot obscure the fact that most people regulated by the mandate are not currently engaged in any commercial activity that involves health care. That fact is fatal to the Government’s (D) effort to regulate the uninsured as a class.
- Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010. The law contained a requirement that most Americans must maintain health insurance coverage that meets certain minimum requirements (the “individual mandate”). Individuals who did not purchase coverage, or who were not covered by insurance provided by an employer, eventually would be required to make a “shared responsibility payment” to the Federal Government. The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) (P), along with other plaintiffs, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the Act. The NFIB (P) claimed that the individual mandate exceeded Congressional powers under the Commerce Clause.
- Appeal from an order of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals holding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act unconstitutional in part.
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- An administrative complaint was filed against Dr. Hoover (P) by the Agency for Health Care Administration (D) claiming she was excessively prescribing controlled substances. Dr. Hoover (P) denied the charge and requested a hearing. The Agency (D) presented two physicians as experts at the hearing. The experts’ had not examined any patient or patient record; the sole basis of their testimony was from pharmacy records. Dr. Hoover (P) testified in great detail about her diagnoses and courses of treatment. The hearing officer recommended that the complaint be dismissed. The Agency (D) filed exceptions to the finding and the Board of Medicine (D) set aside the hearing officer’s findings and penalized Dr. Hoover (P). Dr. Hoover (P) appealed.
- District Court of Appeal of Florida, 676 So. 2d 1380 (1996)
- District court review of a medical board decision to revoke medical licensure.
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- Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
- : A woman gave birth to twins conceived through artificial insemination. The sperm donor sought recognition of parental rights, alleging he had an oral agreement with the twins’ mother to act as their father. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas artificial insemination statute, which denies paternity rights in such cases unless the parties agree in writing that paternity rights exists. Because there was no written contract, the court held, paternity rights did not exist.
- : A court ordered that A.C. (D), pregnant and dying, undergo a Caesarian section to save the baby.
- A court may not order an individual to undergo a Caesarian section to save the baby’s life.
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Chapter Eleven. Public Health Care Financing Programs: Medicare and Medicaid 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- : The Bellevue Hospital Center (P) filed an action challenging the Department of Health and Human Services’ method for calculating Medicare reimbursements. Because the statutory scheme requires hospitals’ costs to be averaged, hospitals with dissimilar costs would inevitably be lumped together.
- : Westside Mothers (Mothers)(P) brought suit against James Haveman (D), the director of the Michigan Department of Community Health, alleging the state of Michigan failed to provide medical services required by the Medicaid program.
- : Exceptional Child Center (P) sued two officials (D) in Idaho’s Department of Health and Welfare, claiming that Idaho violated Medicaid law by reimbursing habilitation service providers at rates lower than the law permits.
- (1) The Medicare statute authorizes the use of “metropolitan statistical areas” (MSAs) as a proxy for “geographical area” as specified in the statute. (2) Expansion of the New York City MSAs to include New Jersey hospitals, where wages are somewhat lower, is not arbitrary or capricious even though it causes the average wage level in the MSA to drop. (3) The Department of Health and Human Services’ implementation of adjustments regarding hiring decisions at hospitals was arbitrary and capricious.
- : The district court found that regulations must be first challenged through government agency procedures and not in federal court.
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Westside Mothers v. Haveman 5 results
- Westside Mothers (Mothers)(P) brought suit against James Haveman (D), the director of the Michigan Department of Community Health, alleging the state of Michigan failed to provide medical services required by the Medicaid program.
- The Medicaid program provides federal subsidies to participating states to reimburse poor persons for the cost of certain medical care. Participating states must comply with the requirements imposed by the Act, as well as with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). One such requirement is the provision of “early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services” for eligible persons under 21 years of age. See ...S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B). These services include periodic physical exams, immunization, laboratory tests, eye exams, eyeglasses, dental exams and teeth maintenance, hearing exams and treatment of hearing disorders, and health education. The Secretary of HHS has the authority to withhold funding to states in noncompliance with any of Medicaid’s requirements. Westside Mothers (Mothers)(P) alleged that James Haveman (D) refused to provide, or require participating HMOs to provide, the above-names services and sought declaratory and...
- (Merritt, J.) (1) No. Medicaid is not a contract between the states that participate and the federal government. The Supreme Court has already spoken to this issue and has held that the Medicaid Act, and its accompanying regulations, are federal laws and are not contractual provisions. See 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 to enforce rights provided under Medicaid. The Supreme Court has recognized a private right for suit pursuant to . Applying this framework, the Court finds that the regulations at issue were clearly designed to benefit the plaintiffs, the provisions are binding upon the state of Michigan, and these provisions are not vague or ambiguous so as to defeat judicial enforcement. Plaintiffs have pleaded a proper cause of action pursuant to § 1983 and the district’s court dismissal is reversed.
- Appeal from ruling of district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
- INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: A court order issued as a remedy, requiring a person to do, or prohibiting that person from doing, a specific act.
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- Since a patient’s health care payor is not responsible for discharge determinations, liability will not attach to the payor for a negligent discharge.
- : A jury found that Ostrowski’s (P) health habits had been the principal cause of her medical complications following treatment by Azzara (D) and, consequently, denied her damages in a malpractice action.
- That a patient’s health habits are the principal cause of posttreatment complications is not a basis for denying damages for malpractice.
- Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound
- : Trial court dismissed Herskovits’s (P) malpractice action when she failed to show that her decedent would probably have survived absent the alleged malpractice.
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- Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center
- : Dr. Berlin (P) sought to have a restrictive covenant prohibiting him from competing with Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center (D) declared unenforceable.
- : The circuit court found that Avera St. Luke’s (D) did not have the right to initiate actions that affected the privileges of medical staff such as Dr. Mahan (P) when they had previously delegated this authority.
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- : The Shannons (P) alleged that their physician, Dr. McNulty (D), and their health maintenance organization, HealthAmerica (D), were vicariously liable for the premature delivery and subsequent death of their son.
- When a benefits provider such as a health maintenance organization (HMO) interjects itself into the rendering of medical decisions affecting a subscriber’s care, it must do so in a medically reasonable manner.
- The fact that a physician retains independent medical judgment does not preclude a court from finding the existence of an employer-employee or principal-agent relationship between the hospital and physician.
- : Two women brought lawsuits against West Virginia University Hospital, alleging they were injured by negligent treatment received at the hospital. The trial court did not allow the women to present evidence to support their claims that the physicians who treated them appeared to be hospital employees, even though they were actually independent contractors.
- : A woman alleging negligent post-surgery care by two doctors sought to also sue the hospital on the theory the hospital negligently credentialed one of the doctors. The appeals court ruled that Minnesota law precluded such a cause of action against the hospital.
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- The trustees (D) of the Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, a nonprofit institution that provided health care to the poor, did not invest the School’s liquid assets.
- The court went on the emphasize that management of a nonprofit charitable hospital imposed severe obligations on its trustees. The court ordered that each newly elected trustee read its opinion and order in this case. Section 8.30 of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act follows this decision and adopts the corporate standard for fiduciary duties of nonprofit trustees.
- The Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries (the School) was established in 1891 for the purpose of providing health care services to the poor. It was incorporated as a charitable institution, and the Sibley Memorial Hospital (the Hospital) (D) was built to facilitate its work. The Board was to consist of twenty-five to thirty-five trustees who were to meet twice annually. The Board was to handle all financial matters of the School. In fact, from the early 1950s until 1968, two trustees (D) handled all of these matters. The Finance and Investment Committees never met for years at a time. Some of the trustees (D) were associated with financial institutions. The Hospital (D) maintained most of its liquid assets in these same institutions in non-interest-bearing accounts. A class action suit was brought against the trustees (D) by patients (P) of the Hospital (D) challenging their actions, claiming mismanagement, non-management, and self-dealing.
- ...investment decisions. Both trustees and corporate directors can be liable for losses occasioned by negligent mismanagement of investments. Generally, trustees are held to a higher standard of care and are liable for simple negligence. However, in cases involving trustees of charitable institutions, the gross negligence standard for corporate directors is more appropriate. It is also proper to apply the lower standard with regard to non-management. Trustees of charitable companies should be permitted to delegate investment decisions to a committee as long as the directors assume the responsibility for supervision. For allegations of self-dealing, trustees are not absolutely barred from placing funds under their control in their own institutions. However, there must be full disclosure. In the present case, the trustees (D) failed to exercise any supervision over the investment decisions of the Hospital (D). Some of the trustees (D) also knowingly permitted the Hospital (D) to enter...
- CLASS ACTION: A suit commenced by a representative on behalf of an ascertainable group that is too large to appear in court, who shares a commonality of interests, and who will benefit from a successful result.
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Shannon v. McNulty 5 results
- The Shannons (P) alleged that their physician, Dr. McNulty (D), and their health maintenance organization, HealthAmerica (D), were vicariously liable for the premature delivery and subsequent death of their son.
- When a benefits provider such as a health maintenance organization (HMO) interjects itself into the rendering of medical decisions affecting a subscriber’s care, it must do so in a medically reasonable manner.
- (Melvin, J.) Yes. When a benefits provider such as an HMO interjects itself into the rendering of medical decisions affecting a subscriber’s care, it must do so in a medically reasonable manner. The corporate liability applicable to hospitals may be extended to HMOS as care providers with a substantial role in the total health care of patients. Here, HealthAmerica (D) provided a phone service for emergent care staffed by triage nurses. Hence, it was under a duty to oversee that the dispensing of such advice by those nurses would be performed in a medically reasonable manner. HMOs may therefore be held corporately liable for a breach of duties that causes harm to its subscribers. Reversed and remanded.
- The court in this case cited to the case of
- When Mrs. Shannon (P) suffered abdominal and back pain during her first pregnancy, she repeatedly called her physician, Dr. McNulty (D), and her HMO’s (D) emergency phone line for advice. McNulty (D) was impatient with Shannon (P) and did not want to see her again, and the triage nurses told her to call her physician. She later went into preterm labor and delivered a baby who died due to his severe prematurity. Mrs. Shannon (P) sued for negligence under either a corporate or vicarious liability theory, but the trial court granted McNulty’s (D) motion for a compulsory nonsuit. The Shannons (P) filed timely post-trial motions seeking to have the nonsuit removed. After denial of such motions, this appeal followed.
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Alphabetical Table of Cases 18 results (showing 5 best matches)
Chapter Sixteen. Antitrust 4 results
- West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPMC; Highmark, Inc.
- Federal Trade Commission and State of Illinois v. Advocate Health Care Network, et al.
- Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc.; Federal Trade Commission & State of Idaho v. St. Luke’s Health System
- A prima facie case under the Clayton Act does not require proof that a merger or other acquisition has caused higher prices in the affected market; all that is necessary is that the merger create an appreciable danger of such consequences in the future.
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- ...under the third element. In order to assess whether an MFN clause unreasonably restrains trade, the rule of reason applies. The clause violates the rule of reason if it may suppress or even destroy competition, rather than promote competition. In order to survive a motion to dismiss under this test, the complaint must plausibly allege that the MFNs produced adverse anticompetitive effects within relevant product and geographic markets. Here, the complaint alleges that the MFN clauses have negatively impacted competition in the health insurance markets throughout Michigan by raising competitors’ costs, likely increasing premiums, and directly increasing costs to self-insured employers. The complaint sets forth various examples of specific geographic areas affected. The plaintiffs claim that the requirement that the hospital charge competing insurers at least 23% more than it charges Blue Cross affects potential competitors. In some cases, the hospitals at issue are the only ones...
- health
- Blue Cross (D) is a nonprofit healthcare corporation headquartered in Michigan. It is subject to federal taxation but exempt from state and local taxes. Blue Cross (D) sought to include MFNs (Most Favored Nation) (sometimes called most favored pricing or parity clauses) in its agreements with hospitals. Over the course of several years, it had agreements including MFNs with at least 70 Michigan hospitals, which operated more than 40% of the state’s acute care hospital beds. The MFNs required that Blue Cross would be charged less, or at a minimum no more, than its competitors for hospital services. The United States and Michigan (P) argued that the MFNs caused many hospitals to raise prices to Blue Cross’s (D) competitors by substantial amounts or demand prices that were too high to allow competitors to compete, effectively excluding them from the market.
- Federal district court consideration of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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- : The National Federation of Independent Business (P) brought suit against Sebelius (D), claiming that the mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requiring individuals to purchase health insurance violated Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
- Virginia taxpayers argued that Virginia’s insurance exchange, which was operated by the federal government, did not entitle them to the advance tax credits available under the Affordable Care Act to purchasers of health insurance through a state-run exchange.
- A taxpayer is eligible for a tax credit if he or she enrolls in an insurance plan through an insurance Exchange, whether established and operated by a state or by the Department of Health and Human Services.
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Bellevue Hospital Center v. Leavitt 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Bellevue Hospital Center (P) filed an action challenging the Department of Health and Human Services’ method for calculating Medicare reimbursements. Because the statutory scheme requires hospitals’ costs to be averaged, hospitals with dissimilar costs would inevitably be lumped together.
- (3) Was the Department of Health and Human Services’ implementation of adjustments regarding hiring decisions at hospitals arbitrary or capricious?
- The Bellevue Hospital Center (Bellevue)(P) filed an action challenging the Department of Health and Human Services’ method for calculating Medicare reimbursements. Bellevue (P) argued that the new metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) for New York City, which included New Jersey hospitals, an area where wages are somewhat lower, led Bellevue (P) to conclude that it would receive $812 million less in reimbursements over the next 10 years than they would have under their former wage adjustment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the term “geographical areas” in the Medicare statute was ambiguous, and that the use of MSAs to fill the gap was reasonable. Because the statutory scheme requires hospitals’ cost to be averaged, hospitals with dissimilar costs would inevitably be lumped together.
- (1) The Medicare statute authorizes the use of “metropolitan statistical areas” (MSAs) as a proxy for “geographical area” as specified in the statute. (2) Expansion of the New York City MSAs to include New Jersey hospitals, where wages are somewhat lower, is not arbitrary or capricious even though it causes the average wage level in the MSA to drop. (3) The Department of Health and Human Services’ implementation of adjustments regarding hiring decisions at hospitals was arbitrary and capricious.
- (Katzmann, J.) (1) Yes. The Medicare statute authorizes the use of “metropolitan statistical areas” (MSAs) as a proxy for “geographical area” as specified in the statute. The use of MSAs to fill the gap left by the ambiguous term “geographical areas” is reasonable. Health and Human Services’ Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has used MSAs to fill the statutory gap for more than two decades without any action from Congress expressing disapproval, which demands deference at this point. (2) No. Expansion of the New York City MSAs to include New Jersey hospitals, where wages are somewhat lower, is not arbitrary or capricious even though it causes the average age level in the MSA to drop. It is rational and ...circumstances, the agency’s continued use of MSAs was not arbitrary and capricious. (3) Yes. The Department of Health and Human Services’ implementation of adjustments regarding hiring decisions at hospitals was arbitrary and capricious. Application of the adjustment...
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Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Parents) v. (Health department)
- The Cruzans (P), whose daughter was involved in a traffic accident that left her permanently comatose, requested that life support be withdrawn. The facility giving care refused to do so without court approval. The Missouri Supreme Court considered evidence that the Cruzans’ (P) daughter had once mentioned to a housemate that she would not want to live if she couldn’t take care of herself, but it ruled that this did not meet Missouri’s (D) statutory requirement that life support could not be terminated without clear and convincing evidence that this comported with the patient’s wishes. The United States Supreme Court granted review.
- Review of state court decision regarding the provision of life-sustaining medical treatment.
- (O’Connor, J.) The right to refuse medical treatment flows from liberty interests against involuntary invasions of bodily integrity. In addition, it should be emphasized that the Court today does not address the role of a surrogate decision-maker.
- (Brennan, J.) The liberty interest of avoiding unwanted medical care should be recognized as a fundamental right. State abridgements of fundamental rights are to be strictly scrutinized, rather than given the deferential treatment accorded by the Court.
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- (Business Group) v. (Secretary of Health and Human Services)
- P.L. 111–148, in 2010. The law contained a provision that expanded the scope of the federal Medicaid program. The law also increased the number of individuals a state must cover. Under the Act, a state that did not expand its Medicaid program as required would lose all federal Medicaid funds. The expansion required states to extend Medicaid to cover all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty level. The Act also established a package of health benefits that states were required to provide to all new Medicaid recipients. The state governments (P) claimed that the Medicaid expansion requirements exceeded Congress’s power under the Spending Clause.
- Appeal from an order of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals holding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act unconstitutional in part.
- ...programs at issue here, we agree. Conditions that take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the state governments (P) to accept policy changes. The federal government (D) claims that the Medicaid expansion is merely a modification of the existing program because the states agreed that Congress could change the terms of Medicaid when they signed on in the first place. But the Medicaid expansion accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree. Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is no longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage. Although Congress’s power to legislate under the Spending Clause is broad, it does not include surprising participating states with post-acceptance or “retroactive” conditions. Justice Ginsburg claims that this expansion is no different from previous changes to...
- A number of federal programs condition a state’s receipt of funds on compliance with a federal mandate. The Court’s refusal to make a clear delineation of the distinction between coercion and incentive arguably threatens the continued viability of many of those programs. Some guidance is provided u
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United States v. Starks 3 results
- Starks (D) was employed by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in a federally funded research project counseling pregnant women about drug abuse treatment. Siegel (D) was the president of a corporation that developed and operated treatment programs for drug addiction. Siegel (D) began giving Starks (D) $250 for each patient she referred to his program. A federal grand jury convicted Starks (D), Siegel (D), and others for conspiring against the United States (P) for offering to pay renumeration for referral of Medicare patients and for soliciting and receiving such referral payments. Starks (D) appealed, alleging that the district court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct the jury that, because of the antikickback statute’s mens rea requirement, Starks (D) had to have known that the referral arrangement violated the antikickback statute in order to be convicted, and because the Social Security Act’s prohibition on paid referrals, when...
- (Birch, J.) Yes. A statute that proscribes conduct that is clearly prohibited or illegal may impose liability on persons engaged in such conduct for acting “willfully,” or with the knowledge that such conduct is clearly unlawful and does not pose a danger of ensnaring persons engaged in apparent innocent activity. The district court did not err when it refused to give Stark’s (D) requested instruction, and the antikickback statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Starks (D). The antikickback statute is not a highly technical tax or financial regulation that poses a danger of ensnaring person engaged in apparently innocent conduct. The giving or taking of kickbacks for medical referrals is hardly the sort of activity a person might expect to be legal. Such kickbacks are more malum in se, rather than malum prohibitum. Thus, we see no err in the district court’s refusal to give any
- The court in this case explained that since this was not a First Amendment case, the claim of constitutional vagueness has to be evaluated only on an as-applied basis. Starks (D) had claimed that persons working in the medical field could not anticipate what was prohibited under the statute and what was protected under its safe harbor provision. Under the safe harbor provision, the statute’s prohibition on referral payments would not apply to any amount paid by an employer to an employee for employment in the provision of covered items and services.
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Roe v. Wade 3 results
- (Blackmon, J.) No. A state may not, consistent with the Constitution, absolutely prohibit elective abortions. State abortion laws do not enjoy the historical pedigree some believe. For the most part, they were passed in the second half of the nineteenth century, as a response to the high mortality rate of abortions in those days, a concern that is no longer relevant today. The Constitution gives no express right of privacy, but that right has been recognized since perhaps 1891. This right exists as a corollary to provisions of the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. This Court believes that this right encompasses that of a woman to elect to terminate a pregnancy. Until such time as a fetus is viable, the state has no interest in the potential life the woman is carrying and cannot prohibit elective abortions. After viability, a state may take steps to protect the fetus, up to and including proscriptions of abortions. Reversed.
- Roe (P) was threatened with prosecution under a Texas law that prohibited all abortions other than those necessary to save a mother’s life. Roe (P) later challenged the law as unconstitutional. The district and appellate courts held the law constitutional, and the United States Supreme Court granted review.
- This instant case represents probably the most controversial United States Supreme Court decision since the Dred Scott decision of the 1850s. It was hailed as a landmark for women’s rights by some. It has been attacked from some quarters both for its result and for its reasoning, which pushed the edge of judicial activism. Despite the furor, the opinion has survived numerous legislative and political attacks.
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- ...) also planned to transform the Harlem clinic into a freestanding Diagnostic and Treatment center (D&T). In addition, there were plans to add further D&T centers in the South Bronx. The property of the 64th Street complex was appraised between $46 and $50 million and ultimately MEETH (P) agreed to sell the complex for $41 million to MSKCC and Downtown. MSKCC planned to use the portion of the real estate it purchased to expand its cancer treatment and research, while Downtown planned to use its portion to build and apartment complex. There was also discussion by the board of directors to revise the corporation’s purpose to that of its “original” purpose, which was serving the poor in under-serviced areas in the City. However, the articles of incorporation were never amended. MEETH (P) had planned to time its petition for approval of the sale to follow the Department of Health’s (DOH) approval for creation of the D&T’s centers and after the hospital had been closed. However, this...
- A large number of not-for-profit health insurance companies and HMOs have recently chosen to convert to for-profit status. Blue Cross organizations have led the way in this movement. In the typical conversion, the assets are sold to a for-profit entity. To comply with internal revenue laws, the money derived from the sale of the not-for-profit assets is supposed to be distributed to charitable organizations that are eligible pursuant to
- Procedurally, in the charitable-corporations context, there were no shareholders to represent the corporation’s interests, so to ensure protection of the interests held by the beneficiaries of the not-for-profit hospital, the court appointed the Attorney General (Spitzer) to those interests.
- .... “Monetizing” the value of the physical assets does nothing to capture the full value of its not-for-profit provision of world-renowned medical services. As for the second prong of the analysis, whether or not the corporation’s purpose will be promoted, the evidence of MEETH’s (P) plan to amend its article of incorporation to align the corporation’s new purposes with the function of its newly proposed D&T centers demonstrates that the corporation was well aware that it was not meeting this requirement under the terms of the transaction. While the definition of “hospital” includes the functions of what the D&T centers would provide in terms of general medical practice, the center’s deviation from specialty eye, ear, nose and throat surgery and research cannot be ignored or denied. The transaction before the court can best be summarized as one where an organization sells major assets to solve financial difficulties and then undertakes a completely new mission. MEETH’s (P...
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In re Williams 1 result
Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Mrs. Jones went to the hospital for emergency care after losing two thirds of her body’s blood due to a ruptured ulcer. Mrs. Jones and her husband were Jehovah’s Witnesses. The teachings of that sect prohibited the injection of blood into the body. As Mrs. Jones’s death became imminent, the hospital sought the advice of counsel. Counsel applied to the district court for an order allowing the administration of blood, but the court denied it. Counsel then turned to the court of appeals. Mr. Jones stated that if the court ordered the transfusion, the responsibility was not his. The judge was able to minimally communicate with Mrs. Jones, who indicated that the administration of blood would be against her will, but if the court ordered it, it would not be her responsibility. The appellate court issued the order.
- Federal circuit court review of a district court decision declining to order a blood transfusion.
- A hospital patient faced imminent death from blood loss but refused to consent to a transfusion based on her religious beliefs; the hospital sought a court order compelling the life-saving treatment.
- It is the duty of a court of general jurisdiction to assume the responsibility of guardianship for someone unable to make medical decisions for herself, to the extent of authorizing life-saving treatment.
- Did the district court err in refusing to grant the hospital’s application for an order permitting the transfusion of blood to a patient who was a Jehovah’s Witness?
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Hall v. Hilbun 4 results
- The court’s decision here did not constitute a complete abrogation of the locality rule. While expert witnesses no longer had to be “locals,” the court did recognize that some localities simply do not have the facilities enjoyed by others. For this reason, a nonlocal expert would have to be aware of what facilities would be at a doctor’s disposal before rendering an opinion regarding that doctor’s standard of care.
- Katskee Hall’s (P) wife underwent surgery for lower digestive tract blockage. The surgeon was Hilbun (D). Following the procedure, while Hall’s (P) wife was in the recovery room, Hilbun (D) retired for the evening. He left no particular instructions to the nurses. Meanwhile, Hall’s (P) wife was moved to a private room. About 14 hours later, she died from cardiopulmonary failure. Hall (P) sued for medical malpractice/wrongful death. At trial, Hall (P) sought to introduce the testimony of one Dr. Hoerr, a retired Cleveland physician. The trial court excluded much of Hoerr’s testimony on the grounds that he was unfamiliar with local standards. The same occurred with another proffered expert witness, Dr. Sachs. At the close of trial, the court entered a directed defense verdict. Hall (P) appealed.
- A verdict ordered by the court in a jury trial.
- ...’s duty of care to a patient is to be judged by national, not local, standards. For years, courts have followed the “locality rule” in medical malpractice cases. This rule holds that the standards of care owed a patient by a physician would be judged by reference to local standards. However, this rule has become obsolete. Medical school admission standards are largely the same across the country. Physicians are much more mobile than before. Medical education and literature are available nationwide. Beyond that, the needs of a patient are largely the same for any particular medical condition, no matter where the patient is geographically located. For these reasons, a physician’s standard of care should be measured by local standards only to the extent that some localities have greater resources than others. Apart from that, the standard of care owed by a physician to a patient should be judged by the medical community on a nationwide basis. [Here, the testimony of Drs. Hoerr and...
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Vacco v. Quill 2 results
- RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW: A test employed by the court to determine the validity of a statute in equal protection actions, whereby the court determines whether the challenged statute is rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate state interest.
- Quill (p) and three gravely ill patients who have since died sued New York State’s Attorney General (D). They urged that because New York (D) permits a competent person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, and the refusal of such treatment is “essentially the same thing” as physician-assisted suicide, New York’s (D0 ban on assisting suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court disagreed, but the court of appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that those in the final stages of fatal illness who were in life-support systems were allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but those who were similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, were not allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs. The court of appeals concluded that this supposed unequal treatment was not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. The Supreme Court...
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- The court “split the baby.” Courts have traditionally been reluctant to extend property rights to donated tissues for fear of chilling research and development of new medical treatment. The classic case on this issue is
- ...in the confidential database. Unknown to Greenberg (P), Dr. Matalon applied for and received the patent for the genetic sequence that was discovered. The patent allowed the doctor and MCHRI (D) to restrict any activity related to the Canavan’s disease gene, including all testing and treatment. Matalon and MCHRI (D) began selling licenses to perform testing and research, restricting public access to any information unless royalty fees were paid, and threatened enforcement actions. Greenberg (P) sued, alleging: (1) lack of informed consent; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) fraudulent concealment; (5) conversion; and (6) misappropriation of trade secrets. Greenberg (P) sought a permanent injunction to prevent enforcement of the patent rights and alleged that MCHRI (D) and Matalon were unjustly enriched from the royalties they were charging for testing and from federal research grants that followed the discovery. The trial court dismissed and Greenberg (...
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Larson v. Wasemiller 3 results
- Mary Larson (P) filed a lawsuit against Dr. James Wasemiller (D) and Dr. Paul Wasemiller (D), claiming they provided negligent post-surgery care. Larson (P) also brought a negligent credentialing claim against St. Francis Medical Center (the hospital) (D), asserting the hospital should have known that James Wasemiller (D) posed an unreasonable danger of harm to patients undergoing bariatric surgery. The trial court denied the hospital’s (D) motion to dismiss, recognizing a common-law cause of action for negligent credentialing or privileging. The trial court also concluded that Minnesota’s peer-review statute did not grant immunity or limit liability of a hospital or other review organization. The appeals court ruling found the confidentiality provisions in Minnesota’s peer-review statute ( ....64) did not indicate any legislative intent to create or recognize a cause of action for negligent credentialing or privileging, saying it was up to the state’s supreme court or legislature to...
- A woman alleging negligent post-surgery care by two doctors sought to also sue the hospital on the theory the hospital negligently credentialed one of the doctors. The appeals court ruled that Minnesota law precluded such a cause of action against the hospital.
- The court notes that there is an issue about whether a patient must first prove negligence on the part of a physician before a hospital can be liable for negligently credentialing the physician, but does not find this to be a barrier to the patient’s cause of action, stating that “these are questions of trial management [that are] best left to the trial judge and that cannot be effectively addressed in the context.” But remember to apply this principle to similar fact patterns on exams. Also note that this case follows the majority view that a hospital can be negligent for a credentialing decision.
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United States v. Krizek Part 2 3 results
- The court in this case found that the district court’s determination that the Krizeks (D) had acted with reckless disregard was amply supported by the evidence. The doctor was found to be no less liable that his wife. Their actions rose to the level of reckless disregard because there were multiple submissions made with little or no factual basis.
- The Krizeks (D) requested reimbursement for patient treatment under the Medicare/Medicaid program. The Government (P) brought civil suit against the Krizeks (D) under the False Claims Act and common law. The district court found the Krizeks (D) liable for knowingly submitting false claims and entered judgment against them for $168,105. The Krizeks (D) filed a cross-appeal, alleging that the district court has assessed civil penalties based on erroneous standards as to whether the defendants filed one claim or many. The court turned to an inquiry on the specific conduct of the defendants to determine whether multiple false claims had been filed.
- (Sentell, J.) Yes. A False Claims Act violation for “knowingly” filing false claims may be established without reference to the subjective intent of the defendant. A person acts knowingly if he has actual knowledge of the information, or acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information. Dr. Krizek (P) delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his behalf. In failing utterly to review the false submissions, he acted with reckless disregard. The district court erred in its calculation of the civil penalty. Reversed and remanded.
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Conservatorship of Valerie N. 3 results
- State supreme Court review of a court decision against the parents.
- : Method by which courts determine the constitutionality of a law, when a law affects a fundamental right (
- ...30. At 29 years old, she lived with her mother and stepfather and expressed her wish to remain with them. She received therapy and training for modification of her aggressive sexual behavior towards men, but the therapy was unsuccessful. Valerie’s parents were attempting to prepare for the time when they would no longer be able to care for Valerie. They asked to be named conservators of Valerie’s person, including the additional power to authorize a tubal ligation. Valerie’s doctor and her counselor supported the parents’ application. The counselor explained that due to a need to keep Valerie out of social situations in which she may behave inappropriately toward men, her social activities had to be overly limited. She also opined that due to Valerie’s significant developmental disability, no other form of birth control would be effective. However, California’s statutory law barred nontherapeutic sterilization of conservatees. The court ruled against the parents’ application...
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Davis v. Davis 2 results
- The court noted that its rule did not create an automatic veto. To resolve disputes involving the disposition of pre-embryos, courts should first look to the preferences of the progenitors. Where there is a dispute, any prior agreement concerning disposition should be enforced, but where no agreement exists, the interests of the parties must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail.
- In attempting a much-wanted pregnancy, Mary Sue (D) and Junior (P) Davis, through in vitro fertilization (IVF), produced a number of pre-embryos, seven of which had been cryogenically frozen for later transfer to Mary Sue’s (D) uterus. When Junior (P) began a divorce action, Mary Sue (D) asked for control of the “frozen embryos” to attempt a post-divorce pregnancy. Junior (P) objected. They agreed upon all terms of dissolution except for disposition of the embryos. After both parties later remarried, Mary Sue (D) wanted to donate the embryos to a childless couple. Junior (P) adamantly objected. The trial court, determining that the embryos were “human beings” from the moment of fertilization, awarded “custody” to Mary Sue (D). The court of appeals reversed, giving the parties joint control and equal voice over the disposition of the embryos. Mary Sue (D) appealed.
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In re Guardianship of Hailu 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal to the state supreme court from a district court decision denying a restraining order.
- Although courts defer to the medical community to determine the applicable criteria to measure brain functioning, it is the duty of the law to establish the applicable standard that those criteria must meet.
- ...damage from the lack of oxygen during the procedure and she never woke up. Within the next two weeks, Hailu underwent three electroencephalograms, all of which showed brain functioning. A later exam, however, indicated that Hailu’s condition was declining. The hospital performed an apnea test, which involved taking Hailu off the ventilator for 10 minutes to see if she could breathe on her own; Hailu failed the test. The doctor concluded that the test unequivocally confirmed brain death. The hospital notified Hailu’s father that it intended to discontinue use of the ventilator and other life support. Her father opposed taking Hailu off life support and sought a restraining order. The district court held a hearing, and the parties stipulated that life support would continue until an independent neurologist could examine Hailu. Hailu’s father was unable to obtain the services of a neurologist within the allotted time, so he filed an emergency petition for an injunction. The parties...
- Did the district court err in failing to consider whether the AAN guidelines adequately measure all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, and are accepted medical standards?
- (Pickering, J.) Yes. Although courts defer to the medical community to determine the applicable criteria to measure brain functioning, it is the duty of the law to establish the applicable standard that those criteria must meet. Here, the briefing and record before us do not answer two key questions: first, they do not establish whether the AAN guidelines are considered accepted medical standards among states that have enacted the Uniform Determination of Death Act; and second, they do not establish whether the AAN guidelines adequately measure the extraordinarily broad standard laid out by Nevada statute, which requires an irreversible cessation of all functions of the person’s entire brain, including his or her brain stem. A report on the Declaration of Death Act indicates that the AAN guidelines need more research. The report concluded that the guidelines were not so broadly adopted and utilized as to have become the accepted medical standard for determining brain death. ...court...
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Canterbury v. Spence Part 2 1 result
Betancourt v. Trinitas Hospital 3 results
- Appellate court review of a trial court decision granting an injunction against the hospital.
- An appeal from this decision followed, but Betancourt died before the appeal could be heard. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, and the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, despite the fact that the case presented a matter of substantial public importance that would likely arise again. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied further review.
- PER CURIAM: By the court. A term used to distinguish an opinion of the whole court from that written by any one judge; often used in brief or unimportant decisions.
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Sermchief v Gonzalez 2 results
- The court’s decision here was rather narrow. It did not attempt to define the outer scope of what a nurse can do; it merely held that the tasks performed by the nurses in this case were acceptable. The court felt that trying to make rigid rules as to exactly what constitutes the practice of medicine was inappropriate in the context of this case.
- The Missouri Action Agency provided medical services at several locations, largely to low-income individuals. Protocols of the Agency allowed nurses to perform procedures such as taking histories, conducting examinations, performing lab tests, dispensing certain medications, and giving family planning information. The Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts (D) threatened to cite the nurses for unauthorized practice of medicine and the physicians at the clinic for aiding and abetting. Several of these nurses and doctors filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that they were not in violation of the law and an injunction against the Board (D) prohibiting it from prosecuting a case against them. The trial court, holding that the clinic allowed unauthorized medical practice, denied relief. An appeal was made.
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- (Breyer, J.) The FTC (D) has jurisdiction over this case, but I would affirm the FTC (D) just as the court of appeals did below. I hope the courts’ efforts to blend the procompetitive objectives of the law of antitrust with administrative necessity has not been abandoned.
- On remand, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case. That court relied on expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit did not remand the case back to the FTC (D) for further proceedings.
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Flynn v. Holder 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Federal appellate court review of a district court decision dismissing the case.
- : Method by which courts determine the constitutionality of a law. Under this test, the legislature must have had a rational basis for enacting a law, and the law must reasonably relate to a legitimate governmental objective, for it to be constitutional. This is the most permissive of tests used by courts for constitutional questions.
- (Kleinfeld, J.) No. The National Organ Transplant Act does not prohibit compensation for donations of blood and the substances in it, which include the peripheral blood stem cells that are used for modern-day bone marrow transplants. The Secretary of Health and Human Services has not exercised regulatory authority to define blood or peripheral blood stem cells as organs. Under prior practice, the soft, fatty substance in bone cavities had to be extracted during a process painful to the donor in order for a donation to occur, but this is no longer the case. Congress may have had reason to include that process and substance in the definition of “organ” and prohibit payment. But those methods are no longer employed, and the process is similar to a regular blood donation. Because the process no longer involves the donation of an “organ” as defined in the Act, we need not decide whether prohibiting compensation for these donations would be unconstitutional.
- : A statement of the court declaring the rights and duties of the parties in a case or stating an opinion on a question of law without awarding relief. This judgment is binding, whereas an advisory opinion is not.
- : An equitable remedy in which the court orders a party to perform or to desist from a particular act.
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In re A.C. 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A.C. (D), a chronic cancer patient, became pregnant. When she was twenty-five weeks pregnant, she entered a hospital, complaining of pain. Tests revealed an inoperable tumor, and she was diagnosed as terminal. Based on conversations with doctors, she agreed to undergo a Caesarian section (C-section) at twenty-eight weeks. However, her condition rapidly worsened, and by twenty-six weeks she had begun lapsing into and out of consciousness. Medical personnel believed that the only way to save the baby was an immediate C-section. However, they were not able to obtain A.C.’s (D) consent, as she was mostly unconscious and not lucid when she was conscious. A court hearing was rapidly convened to determine what next to do next. The court engaged in a balancing test between the state’s interest in the fetus, the fetus’s interests, and A.C.’s (D) interests. The court order the C-section; unfortunately, the baby died, as did A.C. (D) two days later. The district court of appeals reviewed the...
- (Terry, J.) No. A court may not order an individual to undergo a Caesarian section to save the baby’s life. It is well-grounded common-law rule that an individual is under no duty to take steps to save another’s life. For instance, a person cannot be compelled to donate blood or an organ to save another’s life. This rule applies with equal force in the context of a dying woman and her fetus: the woman cannot be compelled to undergo a procedure to save the fetus’s life. Consent is required. If the woman is no longer competent, a court may hold an inquiry as to whether her consent would have been given if she were competent. However, the scope of inquiry can only go so far as consent; the fetus’s interests are not to be considered, nor those of the state, except perhaps in extraordinary circumstances. As the court considered those interests, it erred. Reversed.
- INDIVIDUALS MAY NOT BE COURT-ORDERED TO UNDERGO A CAESARIAN SECTION TO SAFE THE BABY’S LIFE
- A court ordered that A.C. (D), pregnant and dying, undergo a Caesarian section to save the baby.
- A court may not order an individual to undergo a Caesarian section to save the baby’s life.
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Johnson v. Calvert 4 results
- In its discussion, the majority applied, through analogy, certain portions of the Uniform Parentage Act and the Evidence Code to make its parental determination. The court saw no clear legislative preference in the Act between blood-testing evidence and proof of having given birth as a means of determining parentage. Despite advances in reproductive technology rendering a different outcome biologically possible, California law recognizes only one natural mother. The court declined to accept the contention of amicus curiae, namely, that the court should find that the child has two mothers.
- Because the Calverts (P) could not have children after Crispina’s (P) uterus was removed, they turned to surrogacy. Since Crispina’s (P) ovaries could still product eggs, the Calverts (P) signed a contract with Johnson (D), providing that an embryo created by Mark’s (P) sperm and Crispina’s (P) egg would be implanted in Johnson (D). Johnson (D) relinquished all parental rights to the child, agreeing to accept payment for her services in a series of installments. Johnson (D) later demanded the balance of the payments due, refusing to give up the child otherwise. The Calverts (P) filed suit, seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the unborn child. After the child’s birth, although blood tests excluded Johnson (D) as the genetic mother, she was granted temporary visitation rights. The trial court ruled that the Calverts (P) were the child’s genetic, biological, and natural father and mother and terminated Johnson’s (D) visitation rights. The court of appeal affirmed,...
- : A third party, not implicated in the suit, which seeks to file a brief containing information for the court’s consideration in conformity with its position.
- Application of the majority’s rule of intent will not serve the child’s best interests in every case. The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.
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- Humphers (P), then known as Elwess, gave birth to a girl. The attending physician was Mackey. The baby was given up for adoption the next day. Twenty-one years later, the daughter sought out Mackey, and with his help was able to gain access to sealed adoption papers. She was then able to locate Humphers (P). Humphers (P) was distressed by this. Mackey having since died, Humphers (P) subsequently filed a lawsuit against his estate (D), administered by First Interstate Bank (D), seeking damages under a variety of theories. The trial court sustained the estate’s (D) demurrer on all counts. The court of appeals reversed on two counts based, respectively, on invasion of privacy and breach of contractual obligation of secrecy. The Oregon Supreme Court granted review.
- SUBPOENA: A mandate issued by court to compel a witness to appear at trial.
- Billions of medical records exist in the United States. Parties other than the patient may wish to gain access to a patient’s records for any number of reasons. All records enjoy some level of protection from scrutiny; generally, at the very least, a subpoena is necessary for access to be gained. Particularly sensitive records, such as though relating to substance abuse or sexual matters, often require a court order to be inspected.
- (Linde, J.) Yes. A physician who divulges information about a patient that allows her adopted-out child to locate her may be liable in damages therefor. Under a general invasion of privacy theory, this is not so. This court does not believe that simply knowing facts about a person’s location and telling them to another constitutes an invasion of privacy. However, with respect to a physician’s obligations to keep confidences, matters are different.
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In the Interest of K.M.H. 4 results
- A woman gave birth to twins conceived through artificial insemination. The sperm donor sought recognition of parental rights, alleging he had an oral agreement with the twins’ mother to act as their father. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas artificial insemination statute, which denies paternity rights in such cases unless the parties agree in writing that paternity rights exists. Because there was no written contract, the court held, paternity rights did not exist.
- A woman, S.H. (D), gave birth to twins conceived through artificial insemination. The sperm donor, D.H. (P), sought recognition of parental rights, alleging he had an oral agreement with the twins’ mother to act as their father. S.H. (D) filed a “child in need of care” petition to establish that the donor had no parental rights under Kansas law. The two are not married. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas artificial insemination statute, which denies paternity rights in such cases unless the parties agree in writing that paternity rights exist. Because there was no written contract, the court held, paternity rights did not exist.
- The court actually considered six issues (1) whether the district judge erred in ruling that Kansas law would govern, since two inseminations took place in Missouri; (2) whether the district judge erred in finding the Kansas AI statute constitutional; (3) whether the district judge erred in interpreting and applying the “provided to a licensed physician” language of the Kansas AI statute; (4) whether the district judge erred in determining that S.H.’s (D) petition did not satisfy the requirements of a writing in the Kansas artificial insemination statute; (5) whether the Kansas AI statute granted D.H. (P) parental rights; and (6) whether equity demanded reversal of the district court. The most important—and most interesting—is the constitutional law question and its interplay with the Statute of Frauds, and your mastery of those issues is necessary.
- DUE PROCESS RIGHTS: The constitutional mandate requiring the courts to protect and enforce individuals’ rights and liberties consistence with prevailing principles of fairness and justice and prohibiting the federal and state governments from such activities that deprive its citizens of a life, liberty, or property interest.
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- Brook (P), a two-year-old, had a urological problem that required certain X-ray studies involving injection of a contrast dye. The standard location of injection was the buttocks. However, Fischer (D), the radiologist performing the procedure, had seen literature to the effect that injecting the substance into their buttocks and thighs could be harmful to young patients. He wanted to inject in the buttocks but could not find a vein. He then injected into the calves. Subsequent to this, Brook (P) developed an Achilles tendon condition, which required therapy. Brook (P) sued Fischer (D) for malpractice. The trial court rejected Brook’s (P) proffered instruction that injection in a site other than that recommended by the medical community constituted improper experimentation on her. A jury rendered a defense verdict. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the instruction should have been given. The Indiana Supreme Court granted review.
- (Hunter, J.) No. A physician does not conduct an experiment on a patient by undertaking an unusual procedure if the physician has a reasonable basis for doing so. Matters of judgment should not be confused with experimentation. The everyday practice of medicine sometimes presents unusual situations requiring therapeutic innovation. Such innovation, if done at reasonable grounds, is not tantamount to experimentation. Here, Fischer (D), based on literature he had read, declined to affect the injection in the usual manner. This was not an experiment, as he based his decision on legitimate information. Consequently, the trial court here was right in excluding Brook’s (P) instructions. The judgment of the trial court is in all respects affirmed.
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Scott v. SSM Healthcare St. Louis 3 results
- The fact that a physician retains independent medical judgment does not preclude a court from finding the existence of an employer-employee or principal-agent relationship between the hospital and physician.
- Does the fact that a physician retains independent medical judgment preclude a court from finding the existence of an employer-employee or principal-agent relationship between the hospital and physician?
- (Teitelman, J.) No. The fact that a physician retains independent medical judgment does not preclude a court from finding the existence of an employer-employee or principal-agent relationship between the hospital and physician. First, a jury question is presented when the evidence is sufficiently conflicting that reasonable minds could differ as to whether agency existed. There is no dispute that Doumit (D) was on staff, and therefore was an agent of the hospital (D) Koch (D), however, worked for RIC, which was a partnership and signatory to a contract with the hospital (D). The hospital (D) did not pay Koch (D), assign his hours, or bill for his services. But on the other hand with respect to Koch (D), the hospital (D) set the medical standards, established qualifications, set prices, set liability insurance requirements, maintained a right to terminate, and provided office space, among other things. And the fact
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Thompson v. Nason Hospital 2 results
- The court here adopted the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate liability as a theory of hospital liability. A hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care. Such corporate liability is an emerging modern trend.
- When Mrs. Thompson (P) was admitted to Nason Hospital (Nason) (D) after an automobile accident, she was in intensive care for three days. The fourth day she developed complete paralysis of the left side, from which she never recovered. Thompson (P) sued Nason (D), alleging that her injuries were the direct and proximate result of the negligence of Nason (D) acting through its agents, servants, and employees in failing to adequately examine and treat her. The court adopted a theory of corporate liability with respect to Nason (D) and found it liable. Nason (D) appealed.
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- Appeal of a trial court denial of a temporary injunction.
- Ruebke (D) worked as a lay midwife, comprehensively assisting pregnant women with prenatal care, delivery, and post-partum care. She followed a thorough set of standards to ensure safe practice, and she regularly consulted with physicians. The State Board of Healing Arts (P) and the State Board of Nursing (P) sought a temporary injunction to stop Ruebke’s (P) alleged practice of medicine and nursing. A gynecologist testified that many of Ruebke’s (P) assessments were obstetrical diagnoses, and a nurse testified that Ruebke (P) practice nursing functions during deliveries. The trial court found that the two acts cited by the Boards (P) were unconstitutionally vague and that, even if the acts were constitutional, Ruebke’s (D) acts fell within exceptions to them. The trial court denied the injunction. The State Board of Nursing (P) and the State Board of Healing Arts (P) appealed the decision.
- court order requiring a person to do or prohibiting that person from doing a specific act.
- States disagree widely as to how midwifery should be treated. Nursing boards have attempted to carve out the field of midwifery from medicine by certifying nurses as nurse-midwives. Various courts have separated the act of assisting at birth with the act of delivery a child, a rather tenuous distinction. However, with the trend in medicine toward low-cost alternatives, midwives will likely gain increased favor for low-risk births.
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United States v. Greber 1 result
Canterbury v. Spence 2 results
- (Robinson, J.) Yes. Prior to a medical procedure, a physician must disclose to a patient all risks that a reasonable person would consider significant in deciding whether to undergo the procedure. It is universally accepted that, prior to a surgical procedure, a patient must consent thereto. It is further accepted that such consent must be informed, as the average lay patient lacks the expertise to make unassisted judgments regarding the propriety of any particular medical treatment. The risks of a particular procedure are clearly an element that must be disclosed. However, the question arises as to what risks must be disclosed. Many courts have held, and the district court below agreed, that the key to this question is what is standard in the medical community for the type of procedure involved. This court does not agree. First, as a practical matter, no particular custom will exist on a profession-wide basis. Rather, the standard should be one of reasonableness: Would a reasonable...
- Canterbury (P), then a minor, presented himself to orthopedist Spence (d), complaining of upper back pain. Following a diagnostic procedure, Spence (D) concluded that Canterbury (P) had a ruptured intervertebral disc, and that a laminectomy was indicated. Canterbury (P) underwent the procedure, which at first seemed successful. However, while still hospitalized, Canterbury (P) fell out of bed, and began experiencing paralysis and incontinence thereafter, conditions that persisted. Canterbury (P) brought a malpractice action against Spence (D). One contention was that he had not been advised of the risk of paralysis. At the close of his case, the district court granted Spence’s (D) motion for directed verdict as Canterbury (P) had produced no expert testimony that advice of such risk had been required. Canterbury (P) appealed.
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Bouvia v. Superior Court 4 results
- (Quadriplegic patient) v. (Court)
- The court’s position on this issue is by now so well accepted as to not be controversial. The concurrence’s point of view, however, is something else. Medically assisted suicide has generated a good deal of controversy, as demonstrated by the 1992 events surrounding Dr. Jack Kevorkian, a Michigan pathologist who assisted several individuals who wished to die. He was prosecuted, but charges were dismissed when the court found that he broke no law. Michigan’s legislature responded by passing a law criminalizing assisted suicide as of April 1993. The Netherlands, on the other hand, enacted about the same time a euthanasia law, permitting physician-assisted death under strict controls.
- : A court order issued commanding a public or private entity, or an official thereof, to perform a duty required by law.
- Elizabeth Bouvia (P), suffering from cerebral palsy and arthritis, slowly lost the use of her body to the point that she could not use her limbs. She lived off the government assistance in a public hospital. Wishing to die, she refused food. Medical personnel responded by feeding and hydrating her through a stomach tube inserted through her nose. Finding that Bouvia (P) could live indefinitely in her state, not being terminally ill, the trial court denied the injunction. Bouvia (P) appealed, petitioning for a writ of mandamus.
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- (Scalia, J.) States may, if they wish, permit abortion-on-demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so. By continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish surrounding an issue that arouses deep passions.
- This opinion represents an unusual approach by the Court, in that the majority opinion was authored by three of the Justices, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, with the other Justices joining in or dissenting from various parts of the opinion. The Court announced it was retaining the essential holding of
- : Doctrine whereby courts follow legal precedent unless there is good cause for departure.
- , was wrongly decided, it can and should be overruled, consistent with this Court’s traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases. The challenged provisions of the statute should be upheld in their entirety.
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In re Eichner 4 results
- Review of lower court decisions in application for injunction to terminate life support.
- Fox, a member of a Roman Catholic religious order, suffered cardiac arrest during an operation. Loss of oxygen to the brain rendered him permanently comatose. Eichner (P), the head of Fox’s religious order, requested, as Fox’s representative, that medical personnel (D) discontinue life support. They refused. A petition for an injunction ordering such cessation was made. Evidence at the hearing demonstrated that Fox had clearly stated that he did not wish to be kept alive on life support. [The casebook opinion did not state the trial court’s or appellate division’s decisions.] The New York Court of Appeals granted review.
- INJUNCTION: A court order requiring a person to do or prohibiting that person from doing a specific act.
- RIGHT TO DIE: Proposed legislation which would decriminalize doctor-assisted suicide that has been rejected by federal courts but is being pursued through continuing ballot initiatives
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- INJUNCTION: A court order requiring a person to do, or prohibiting that person from doing, a specific act.
- JUDICIAL REVIEW: The authority of the courts to review decisions, actions, or omissions committed by another agency or branch of government.
- Prior to 1985, Fresno Community Hospital (FSH) (D) had an “open” system of staffing for its anesthesiologists, meaning that the various doctors worked out their schedules among themselves. FCH (D) became concerned that the system utilized by the thirteen staff anesthesiologists resulted in inefficient resource utilization and, in some cases, substandard care. To alleviate this problem, FCH (D) signed an exclusive contract with Dr. Hass, P.C. (D) giving Hass (D) the right to regulate the hours of any physician with whom it might wish to subcontract. Six of the anesthesiologists (P) refused to sign the subcontract offered by Hass (D), believing that it infringed on their professional freedom. A trial court entered a preliminary injunction against the contract but, after a hearing, dissolved the injunction and dismissed. An appeal was taken.
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- When Darling (P) broke his leg, he was taken to the emergency room at Charleston Community Memorial Hospital (D). The attending physician, Alexander (D), set the break and put the leg in a cast. The next day, Darling’s (P) toes turned dark and cold. The cast was removed, but much of the tissue in the leg had become necrotic as a result of the constriction caused by the cast. The lower leg eventually had to be amputated. Darling (P) sued Alexander (D) and Charleston (D). After settling with Alexander (D), Darling (P) tried the case against the Charleston (D). The jury returned a verdict of $150,000. This was affirmed by the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court of Illinois granted review on the issue of whether a hospital could be held liable for the negligence of its staff.
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Ricks v. Budge 2 results
- DAMAGES: Monetary compensation that may be awarded by the court to a party who has sustained injury or loss to his or her person, property or rights due to another party’s unlawful act, omission, or negligence.
- From March 11 to March 15 [the year is not stated in the casebook excerpt] Ricks (P) was treated by Dr. Budge (D) for an infected hand. Ricks (P) was released on March 15. On March 17, Ricks (P) again presented himself, being symptomatic. Dr. D.C. Budge (D) sent him to a hospital, where Dr. S.M. Budge (D) was on staff. Dr. S.M. Budge (D) refused to treat Ricks (P) because his account was past due. Ricks (P) went to another facility, where he was treated. Eventually, part of his hand had to be amputated. Ricks (P) sued the Budges (D) for malpractice. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Budges (D), and Ricks (P) appealed.
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Newmark v. Williams 1 result
- (Moore, J.) Yes. The state’s interest in preserving life must be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual. Parents can choose, for religious reasons, to refuse medical treatment for their children. The parental right to choose for a child can only be invaded for the most compelling of reasons. To determine what is in Colin’s best interests, the court must consider the effectiveness of the treatment prescribed for him and the treatment’s probable effect on him. In this case, the chemotherapy recommended by his doctor would have subjected Colin to great agony and probably failed in the end. The Newmarks’ (D) parental prerogative and Colin’s right to some human dignity in the short time left to him, when weighed against futile and painful medical treatments, are paramount.
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Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran 2 results
- 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 alleging an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed, and this appeal ensued.
- ...body of the decedent. While there is no question that the individual has a fundamental right to the possession and control of his own person, it is not as clear whether the Due Process Clause extends to the rights of kin in relation to possession and control of a deceased relative’s body. A dead body has traditionally been viewed as not being the subject of property rights, and it is clear California has a significant state interest in obtaining corneas and other tissue for transplantation. However, following traditional common-law principles, this court recognizes that preservation of the dignity of the human body is also firmly rooted in both social and legal traditions. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), adopted by California in 1968, grants the next of kin the right to transfer body parts for medical purposes and limits such transfers to preclude the sale of body parts. Consent for such transfers is required, and the prohibition of ascribing a positive monetary value...
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- Publication Date: December 5th, 2019
- ISBN: 9781684673704
- Subject: Health Law
- Series: High Court Case Summaries
- Type: Case Briefs
- Description: This title contains briefs for each major case in Furrow, Greaney, Johnson, Jost, Schwartz, Clark, Fuse Brown, Gatter, King, and Pendo's casebook on Health Law. These briefs will help you identify, understand, and absorb the core knowledge points from each case. They are followed by legal analysis, providing contextual background about each case, and connecting the case to the broader concepts developed throughout the casebook. This title also supplies case vocabulary, with definitions of new or unusual legal words found throughout the cases.
