High Court Summaries on Criminal Law (Keyed to Kadish, Schulhofer, and Barkow)
Author:
Editorial Staff, Publisher's
Edition:
10th
Copyright Date:
2018
165 chapters
have results for High Court Case Summaries on Criminal Law
Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co. 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Spiegel, J.) Yes. Beneficial (D3) argues that corporate criminal liability should be determined under the standard set by the Model Penal Code, where the criminal acts of agents can be imputed to the corporation if the conduct was “performed, authorized, ratified, adopted or tolerated by the corporation’s directors, officers or other ‘high managerial agents.’ ” In contrast, the trial court instructed the jury with a different standard with Beneficial (D3) incurring liability where it is found that it placed its employees in a position where they had enough authority and responsibility to act for and on behalf of the corporation in handling the particular corporate matter and committed the criminal act in furtherance of that particular corporate matter. The cases dealing with this issue have reflected the difficulty of imposing theories of vicarious liability on corporate actors since corporate action can only take place through its human agents. Thus, the primary issue is whether...
- The “responsible corporate officer” doctrine reflects the decentralized nature of corporations. This theory assumes that corporate actions are composed of the actions of all employees as a whole, and, therefore, cannot be limited to the actions or intentions of only the higher level employees. In addition, corporate responsibilities are delegated to all employees, but each of these employees is granted a narrow “kingdom” of authority. Thus, the corporate mail clerk can’t negotiate the next big merger, but he has supreme rule over the mailroom. As a result, under this theory, any action taken by any employee of the corporation is part of that corporation’s actions and intentions as if done within the authority vested in him by the corporation. Criminal liability attaches where the employee commits a criminal act in furtherance of his corporate responsibilities. Thus, a mail clerk that intentionally discards, along with the junk mail, a summons issued for the CEO is acting within his...
- Two employees of Beneficial Finance Company (“Beneficial”) (D3) bribed state banking officials in order to receive favorable treatment from the State Small Loans Regulatory Board. One of the employees, Farrell (D1), was an officer and director of a wholly owned subsidiary of Beneficial (D3). The other employee, Glynn (D2), was a lower level employee of another wholly owned subsidiary of Beneficial (D3). Beneficial (D3) argued that the corporation should not be held criminally liable for their acts unless their conduct was “performed, authorized, ratified, adopted or tolerated by the corporation’s directors, officers or other ‘high managerial agents.’ ” The trial court instructed the jury to find Beneficial (D3) guilty if it had placed the employees in a position where they had enough authority and responsibility to act for and on behalf of the corporation in handling the particular corporate matter and committed the criminal act in furtherance of that particular corporate matter....
- A corporation can be held criminally liable for the acts of its agent if it placed the agent in a position where he has enough authority and responsibility to act for and on behalf of the corporation in handling the particular corporate matter and committed the criminal act in furtherance of that particular corporate matter.
- A CORPORATION THAT PROPERLY DELEGATED ITS AUTHORITY TO AN AGENT IN RELATION TO A BUSINESS MATTER IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR ANY CRIMINAL ACTS THE AGENT COMMITS IN FURTHERANCE OF THAT PARTICULAR BUSINESS MATTER
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Powell v. Texas 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Marshall, J.) Yes. The “findings of fact” are not findings of fact in any recognizable, traditional sense in which that term has been used in a court of law. They are nothing more than disguised premises designed to bring this case within the scope of this court’s decision in this court held as unconstitutional a state law which imposed jail time on a defendant solely based upon his “status” of being a drug addict. On its face the present case does not fall within that holding, since Powell (D) was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion. The criminal sanction is imposed on public behavior which may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for Powell (D) and the public, and which offends the moral and esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the community. The dissent suggests that ...“criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.”...
- Powell (D) asked the court to apply the rule in , that is, to find that the sanctions for being intoxicated in public inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court refused to extend the rule to the facts presented here. It did not consider the “status” of “being addicted” to be the same thing as the “act” of “being drunk in public.” Texas (P) had the right to determine the extent to which it would define and penalize a person’s offensive actions. Justice White, although attempting to provide constitutional protection to at least some chronic alcoholics, also seems to think that while they are drunk they should be more responsible. This doesn’t seem to be a practical possibility. Justice Stewart, who penned ...various views on punishing alcoholics/addicts. One view is that to punish alcoholics deters others from drinking in the first place. It also brings to the individual alcoholic’s attention that society considers his drinking and resulting behavior to be unacceptable....criminal
- May a state court interpreting a state law find as a matter of law that chronic alcoholism (even if it is a disease) is not a defense to the crime of public intoxication?
- (Fortas, J.) Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change. In this case, Powell (D) is charged with a crime composed of two elements—being intoxicated and being found in a public place while in that condition. The crime, so defined, differs from that in , for in both cases the particular defendant was accused of being in a condition which he had no capacity to change or avoid. A person may not be punished if the condition essential to constitute the defined crime is part of the pattern of his disease and is brought about by a compulsion symptomatic of the disease. Such punishment violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
- Leroy Powell (D) (Powell) was arrested, charged, convicted, and fined $50.00 for being found in a state of intoxication in a public place. A psychiatrist (Dr. Wade), after examining Powell (D), testified that Powell (D) is a “chronic alcoholic,” who by the time he is intoxicated is not able to control his behavior, and who has reached this point because he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink. When asked, on cross-examination, whether Powell’s (D) act in taking the first drink when he was sober was a “voluntary exercise of his will,” Dr. Wade answered yes. He qualified his answer, however, by stating that “these individuals have a compulsion, and this compulsion, while not completely overpowering, is a very strong influence, an exceedingly strong influence, and this compulsion coupled with the firm belief in their mind that they are going to be able to handle it from now on causes their judgment to be somewhat clouded.” He admitted that when Powell (D) is sober he knows the...
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Title Page 3 results
State v. Crenshaw 4 results
- test is disputed by scholars, and other jurisdictions are divided on the issue. This court has held that, “when is used, all who might possibly be deterred from [committing] criminal acts are included within the sanctions of the criminal law.” (Wash. 1962). “Only those . . . ‘who have lost contact with reality so completely that they are beyond . . . the influences of the criminal law,’ may have the benefit of the insanity defense. . . .” (Wash. 1977). Under this holding, the trial court should assume that one who knew the illegality of his act was not beyond influence of criminal law. Thus, the court’s jury instruction here was correct. Alternately, the court’s jury instruction here is correct because, in this case, legal wrong is synonymous with moral wrong. Under ...’s, because holding otherwise would allow criminals to escape punishment solely because they believed their acts were not morally wrong. Here, there was medical evidence that Crenshaw (D) knew his... ...on... ...law...
- The Washington courts’ prior decisions held that anyone who comprehends enough to be deterred by the threat of prosecution should be deemed sane, which accomplishes the law’s goal of punishing and deterring crime, but stops short of punishing those who cannot be deterred by punishment. Thus, the law deems sane/punishable those who can understand that their acts are either illegal or considered by society to be immoral. As the court notes, the test of immorality must be objective rather than subjective, or unrepentant criminals would escape punishment. In this sense, the court’s decision furthers public policy. However, Crenshaw (D) was correct in contending that the trial court misstated the doctrine in its jury instruction. The trial court said that, when the ...excuses a defendant so insane he is unaware his act is immoral, but not a defendant who is unaware his act is punishable as a crime. Ignorance of the law is, again, no defense, though ignorance of the crime’s immorality is...
- Appeal from criminal conviction for murder, 1st degree, seeking reversal because of erroneous jury instruction.
- ...) tried to conceal the crime, cleaning the hotel room of blood and fingerprints and hiding the body. Crenshaw (D) then picked up two hitchhikers and attempted to enlist their help in dumping his wife’s car into a river. The hitchhikers contacted the police, who apprehended Crenshaw (D). [Hence the saying that you shouldn’t trust hitchhikers.] Crenshaw (D) confessed voluntarily. Crenshaw (D) was tried for murder, 1st degree. At trial, Crenshaw (D) pleaded the insanity defense. Crenshaw (D) testified he followed the Muscovite religious faith, which requires husbands to kill adulterous wives. Crenshaw (D) gave as his reason for killing his wife his sense that “it wasn’t the same Karen . . . she’d been with someone else.” Crenshaw (D) also presented evidence of his past hospitalization for mental problems. The court instructed the jury that, under the M’Naghten rule as codified by Washington statutes, to acquit by reason of insanity, the jury must find that, “as a result of mental...
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Duncan v. Louisiana 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (White, J.) No. Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the 14th Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all state criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee. Since we consider the appeal before us to be such a case, we hold that the Constitution was violated when Duncan’s (D) demand for jury trial was refused. The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression and arbitrary action by the Government. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. Beyond this, the jury trial
- Because trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all state criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.
- the United States Supreme Court, through the Fourteenth Amendment, extended to the states the obligation and constitutional duty to provide jury trials in all criminal prosecutions other than petty offenses. Prior to this decision, the right to a jury trial in a criminal case could only be invoked in federal court. Thus, this decision vastly changed the landscape of criminal law. Justice White emphasized the importance of preventing oppression and arbitrary action by the government, safeguarding against corrupt or overzealous prosecutors, and protecting against biased or eccentric judges. Further, the jury trial right reflects a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of citizens to one judge.
- While driving along one day in October of 1966, Duncan (D), a black man, saw two of his cousins on the side of the road speaking with four white boys. Knowing that the cousins, recent transfers to a previously all-white high school, had experienced some negative racial bias at school, Duncan (D) pulled over and encouraged his cousins to end the encounter. As he and the cousins were getting back into the car, Duncan either slapped or merely touched one of the white boys on the elbow (depending on who was asked). He was subsequently tried for simple battery in Louisiana (P) state court. Under Louisiana (P) law, simple battery was punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a $300.00 fine. Duncan (D) sought a jury trial, but was denied that right as Louisiana (P) gave jury trials only in cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor might have been imposed. Duncan (D) was convicted and sentenced to 60 days in jail and a fine of $150.00. He appealed the conviction,...
- Certification to the United States Supreme Court of a Louisiana Supreme Court decision not to review a criminal conviction appealed on the ground that the convicted party did not receive a trial by jury.
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McCleskey v. Kemp 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Justice Powell) No. McCleskey’s (D) first argument is that the fact that the Georgia death penalty statute has a disproportionate impact on blacks means that he was unconstitutionally discriminated against based on his race and the race of his victim. In order to prevail under the Equal Protection clause, McCleskey (D) must show that he was the victim of purposeful discrimination. He does not offer evidence that shows that he was the particular victim of anyone’s purposeful discrimination. Instead, he relies only on the Baldus Study, and argues that the study proves discrimination that would extend to all capital cases involving a white victim and a black defendant in Georgia, including his. The United States Supreme Court requires clear proof that a state court has abused its discretion in order to reverse its decision. The Baldus Study does not constitute clear proof that any of the decision makers in his case acted with purposeful discrimination. McCleskey (D) argues that the...
- In reading this case it is important to understand that race still plays a significant role within the system. If you walk into any criminal court in a major city in the United States, you will see that minority groups are seriously over-represented as defendants, while they are seriously under-represented as judges, lawyers, clerks, and bailiffs. All of the justices in this case acknowledge that the system is inevitably imperfect, and that discrepancies will exist. This is a tacit admission that race will always play a role. Some level of imperfection will have to be accepted in the criminal justice system as a whole, because we need to have a criminal justice system, and it has to be run by fallible human beings. But we do not need to have a death penalty. The court split five-to-four on this case. After his retirement, Justice Powell indicated that he regretted his vote and his opinion in this case. If he had changed his vote at the time, what is currently the dissent would have...
- (Brennan, J.) The fact that McCleskey (D) cannot prove the influence his race had on the sentencing process in his case is irrelevant to his 8th Amendment claim. This Court, in analyzing an 8th Amendment claim, does not concern itself with whether or not an arbitrary sentence has been imposed, but with the risk that the death penalty might be imposed arbitrarily. The emphasis the Court places on risk suggests that the Court is concerned with the rationality of the capital punishment system as a whole. The Baldus Study shows conclusively that jury discretion leads to racially discriminate outcomes. The study is backed up by Georgia’s long history of racism and its historically race-conscious criminal justice system. The majority’s policy arguments ignore the particular repugnance the justice system feels for racism and the fact that minorities and convicts have weak voices in state legislatures.
- (Blackmun, J.) Under past Court decisions, a defendant can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that “the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” From then on the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that there was no such purpose. McCleskey (D) has shown that he was more likely than not the victim of racial discrimination. The majority’s insistence that procedural safeguards protected McCleskey (D) from discrimination ignores the fact that there were no such safeguards.
- McCleskey (D), a black man, was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia on October 12, 1978. McCleskey (D) had planned the armed robbery of a furniture store with three accomplices. During the robbery, a police officer entered the store in response to a silent alarm. The officer was shot twice and killed. The officer was white. At least one of the bullets had been fired by McCleskey (D). McCleskey (D) was convicted of murder and the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that McCleskey’s armed robbery and the fact that he killed a police officer constituted two aggravating circumstances that justified the jury’s imposing the death penalty. McCleskey (D) did not offer any evidence that would allow the jury to mitigate the sentence. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the death sentence. After the state court challenges to the sentence, McCleskey (D) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus...
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Commonwealth v. Root 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Jones, J.) Yes. If an actor chooses to engage in subsequent actions that recklessly risk harm to the actor, the chain of causation will be broken and the defendant will not be criminally responsible for any harm to the actor. In so ruling, we believe that the proper standard to be applied in criminal proceedings is the direct causal connection, rather than the more liberalized proximate cause standard used in civil proceedings. In order to prove involuntary manslaughter in this case, there must be evidence that Root (D) was driving in a reckless or unlawful manner. There is clearly sufficient evidence to establish this element. However, another essential element for involuntary manslaughter is that the unlawful or reckless conduct by Root (D) must be the direct cause of the death of the decedent. This second element has not been met. The concept of proximate law, although borrowed from the field of tort law, should not be applied in criminal proceedings in the same liberalized...cases
- This case rejects the civil proximate cause standard and adopts the more stringent direct causal connection standard. However, in , the Supreme Court of Iowa declined to follow the holding in and applied the proximate cause standard with its foreseeability requirement to criminal matters. The subsequent action in this case involves recklessly risking harm. Note that although the focus of the case in on the deceased’s reckless conduct, the underlying principle is the same as in the case. Nothing caused the deceased to act in the manner he did; rather, the deceased chose to act on his own free will. The difference between those two cases is that in , it is presumed that the deceased did not intend to kill himself, yet he intentionally chose to drive on the wrong side of the road. The court in held that reckless conduct on the part of the deceased that risked death or injury broke the chain of causation. He chose to do what he did and suffered the consequences.
- Root (D) was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter for the death of his competitor during an automobile race on a highway. Both were exceeding the speed limit and driving recklessly. The deceased, in an attempt to overtake Root’s (D) vehicle, crossed over the dividing line in a no-passing zone and drove on the wrong side of the highway at a high rate of speed. The deceased collided head-on with an oncoming truck and was killed. [This is why no-passing zones exist.] Root (D) appeals his conviction of involuntary manslaughter on the ground that he did not cause the death of the decedent.
- PROXIMATE CAUSE PRINCIPLE REJECTED IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN FAVOR OF MORE STRINGENT DIRECT CAUSAL CONNECTION STANDARD
- Appeal following criminal conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
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People v. Lauria 4 results
- by contrast, the conviction on federal narcotics laws of a drug wholesaler was affirmed on a showing that the company had actively promoted the sale of morphine. In both cases, however, the element of knowledge of the illegal use of the goods or services and the element of intent to further that use must be present in order to make the supplier a participant in a criminal conspiracy. Proof of knowledge is ordinarily a question of fact. Lauria (D) admitted he knew that some of his customers were prostitutes. He probably knew that some of his customers were subscribing to his service in order to further their trade. The Government argues that this knowledge serves as a basis for concluding that Lauria (D) intended to participate in the criminal activities. We note some characteristic patterns in precedent cases: (1) intent may be inferred from knowledge, when the purveyor of the legal goods for illegal use has acquired a stake in the venture; (2) intent may be inferred from knowledge...
- Some argue that conspiracy laws should apply only to those with criminal goals, rather than “seek to sweep within the dragnet of conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the main offenders.” They argue that the law should not be extended to punish “legitimate businessmen” like Lauria (D). On the other hand, others contend that persons should be convicted solely on the basis of their knowledge that they are contributing to a criminal enterprise, even if they do not intend the same goals as the conspiracy. They argue that business people should not be immunized from criminal responsibility under the guise of free enterprise.
- The intent of a supplier who knows his supplies will be put to criminal use may be established by (1) direct evidence that he intends to participate, or (2) through an inference that he intends to participate based on (a) his special interest in the activity, or (b) the felonious nature of the crime itself.
- ...focused their attention on three prostitutes who used Lauria’s (D) telephone service. An undercover policewoman, Stella Weeks, signed up for Lauria’s (D) services. Weeks hinted that she was a prostitute, and wanted to conceal that fact from the police. Lauria (D) assured her that his service was discreet and safe. A few weeks later, Weeks called Lauria (D) and complained that because of his operation she had lost two “tricks,” Lauria (D) claimed that her tricks probably lied about leaving messages for her. Lauria (D) did not respond to Weeks’ hints that she needed more customers, other than to invite her over to become better acquainted. A couple of weeks later Weeks again complained that she had lost two tricks, and the office manager said she would investigate. Two weeks later, Lauria (D) and the three prostitutes were arrested. Lauria (D) testified before the Grand Jury that he only had 9 or 10 prostitutes using his service, and he kept records for known or suspected...
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Commonwealth v. Mochan 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Judicial enforcement of the criminal common law vests the courts with authority nearly unchecked by the separation of powers doctrine and threatens due process notions of fairness and notice. If no statute exists criminalizing specific conduct and no court decision had established the defendant’s actions as injurious to public morality, even a well-intentioned citizen may fall within the court’s expansive common law authority to enforce the public morals. For this reason, criminal codes typically define the extent of criminal acts and abrogate criminal enforcement of the common law.
- (Woodside, J.) While reprehensible, the defendant’s conduct cannot be punishable by law. Before an individual may suffer criminal sanctions, there must be some fair notice as to what the law declares to be unacceptable conduct. By criminalizing conduct on the basis of the common law, rather than by statute, the judiciary takes on a legislative role that is subject to no checks.
- Mochan (D) was charged with offending the “morals and manners of the good citizens” of Pennsylvania by repeatedly telephoning the home of Louise Zivkovich and referring to her “as a lewd, immoral and lascivious woman of an indecent and lewd character.” He was convicted without a jury and he appealed, arguing that the offenses charged were neither criminal under any Pennsylvania statute nor supported by the common law.
- (Hirt, J.) Yes. Even in the absence of legislative action, misdemeanors may arise under state common law. In Pennsylvania, the common law of England remains in force unless abrogated by statute. Accordingly, although the indictments cite no statute violated by Mochan (D), the common law is sufficiently broad to punish his conduct as a misdemeanor where it is injurious to the public morality, public justice, or the administration of the government. Had Mochan (D) merely attempted to persuade a married woman to commit adultery, no crime would have been committed. However, his vile and disgusting references to sodomy and other immoral acts in a manner in which others could overhear him makes his conduct sufficiently injurious to public morality to support the common law misdemeanor charges. Affirmed.
- COMMON LAW: The body of law derived from judicial decisions, rather than from statutes or constitutions.
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Regina v. Stewart 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Criminal law is designed to prevent wrongs against society as a whole. From a social point of view, whether confidential information should be protected requires a weighing of interests much broader than those of the parties involved. As opposed to the alleged owner of the information, society’s best advantage may well be to favor the free flow of information and greater accessibility to all. If the unauthorized appropriation of confidential information becomes a criminal offense, there would be far-reaching consequences that the courts are not in a position to contemplate. Moreover, because of the inherent nature of information, treating confidential information as property simply for the purposes of the law of theft would create a host of practical problems. For instance, what is the precise definition of “confidential information”? Is confidentiality based on the alleged owner’s intent or on some objective criteria? At what point does information cease to be confidential and...
- (Lamer, J.) No. We are here dealing not with the theft of a list or any other tangible object containing confidential information, but with the theft of confidential information per se, a pure intangible. The assumption that no tangible object would have been taken was part of the agreed statement of facts, and the case was argued throughout on that basis. The word “anything” is not in itself a bar to including any intangible, whatever its nature. It is clear that to be the object of theft, “anything” must be property in the sense that to be stolen, it has to belong in some way to someone. For instance, no conviction for theft would arise out of a taking or converting of the air that we breathe, because air is not property. It is possible that, with time, confidential information will come to be considered as property in the civil law or even be granted special legal protection by statutory enactment. Even if confidential information were to be considered property under civil law,...
- The accused was acquitted by a single judge court, but on appeal (In Canada, a prosecutor may appeal an acquittal) the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed and entered a verdict of conviction, and the defendant appealed.
- THE UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION IS NOT A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
- CASE VOCABULARY
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United States v. Dougherty 13 results (showing 5 best matches)
- As this case demonstrates, the law still recognizes the doctrine of jury nullification, under which a jury can, in its discretion, wholly disregard the law and all evidence and acquit a defendant even when, under the proper law and according to the evidence, they should not do so. What the majority further demonstrates, however, is that courts have no duty to tell the jury about its power of nullification. The majority opinion sets forth a number of justifications for its holding, but perhaps more important is the impact of the holding on criminal jury trials. In sum, that impact is that a defendant has no right to tell the jury of their power of nullification, or to ask the jury directly to invoke that power on his or her behalf. is the majority rule. The federal courts follow
- (Leventhal, J.) No. There has evolved in the Anglo-American system an undoubted jury prerogative-in-fact, derived from its power to bring in a general verdict of not guilty in a criminal case, that is not reversible by the court. The pages of history shine on instances of jury exercise of its prerogative to disregard uncontradicted evidence and instructions of the judge, such as the 18th century acquittal of Peter Zenger of seditious libel. But while juries have an unreviewable and unreversible power to acquit a defendant in disregard of the instructions on the law given by the trial judge, there is no doubt that the judge may instruct the jury that they are required to follow the instructions of the court on all matters of law. This is because under a republic the protection of citizens lay not in recognizing the right of each jury to make its own law, but in following democratic processes for changing the law. The right of jury nullification is put forward in the name of liberty...
- While juries have an unreviewable and unreversible power to acquit a defendant in disregard of the instructions on the law given by the trial judge, there is no doubt that the judge may instruct the jury that they are required to follow the instructions of the court on all matters of law.
- (Bazelon, J.) The majority concedes that the power of nullification is a necessary counter to case-hardened judges and arbitrary prosecutors, and that the exercise of the power may enhance the overall normative effect of the rule of law. The sticking point, however, is whether or not the jury should be told of its power to nullify. Here the judge not only denied an instruction on the power, but also barred defense counsel from raising the issue before the jury. I see no justification for, and considerable harm in, this lack of candor. The justification lies in a fear that occasionally noble doctrine will, if acknowledged, often be put to ignoble and abusive purposes. The Court assumes that these abuses are most likely to occur if the doctrine is formally described to the jury, but it seems to me that the opposite is true. Awareness is preferable to ignorance, and I simply do not understand the justification for relying on a haphazard process of informal communication of the power to...
- Seven criminal defendants appealed a judge’s decision not to instruct the jury that it was free to disregard the law and the evidence and acquit them.
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United States v. Moore 5 results
- (Leventhal, J.) Addiction does not qualify as insanity, and does not warrant similar treatment. Moore (D) contends that, since the insanity defense excuses irresistible impulses caused by mental disease or defect, then addicts should be excused because addiction negates free will, much like an irresistible impulse, without creating mental disease. Traditionally, criminal law excuses actions which are completely involuntary or forcibly compelled, or lack a guilty mental state. This is inapplicable to drug possession, which involves voluntary acts and guilty mental state. For policy reasons, criminal law must be allowed to reach the vast bulk of the population, even those of admitted limited mental capacity or high susceptibility to impulses. The criminal law sometimes recognizes a condition deserving exculpation, such as insanity. However, insanity was recognized as such only after systematic research and a consensus on its effects. For drug use, however, there is no consensus on...
- This case indicates that courts will not read but specifically left possession as a proscribable offense. However, this case, with its many dissenting opinions, is perhaps more valuable to highlight judges’ widely divergent views on drug addiction’s psychological effects and the best drug-control policy.
- (Wilkey, J.) No. Drug addiction is no defense to prosecution for drug possession. We believe it clear from the evidence that Moore was not merely an addict, but engaged in the drug trade. Yet even if he were a nontrafficking addict, his conviction must be sustained. Moore (D) contends that common law requires the capacity for control a prerequisite for conviction, and that he, as an addict, has lost the power of self-control. We believe heroin addicts may be able to control themselves in some cases. Further, holding that addicts are never responsible for addiction-compelled acts would violate public policy, since it would tend to excuse every crime committed for drug money. This would frustrate necessary anti-heroin programs. Our holding is consistent with
- Appeal from federal conviction for drug possession and trafficking, seeking reversal on basis of drug addiction.
- (Wright, J.) The developing common law of
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Lambert v. California 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- case is easily distinguishable from the instant case. Balint was obviously guilty of committing some act that was illegal. He had knowledge that dealing in narcotics was against the law and, whether he knew it or not, failure to pay taxes on the drugs is a collateral issue. Lambert (D), on the other hand, was guilty of nothing more than moving to Los Angeles. She had no indication that her conduct in any way implicated any criminal codes. Therein lies the crux of the Court’s ruling. Behavior that would seem benign to any normal, rational citizen, that gives no indication of being unlawful so as to put the actor on notice that he may be breaking the law, may not be punished unless the actor has prior notice. Justice Frankfurter’s position that volumes of the United States Reports would be required to document the legislation that would fall or be impaired was alarmist. The Court’s ruling here is narrow enough to avoid that problem, as history has borne out.
- (Douglas, J.) No. The registration provision includes no element of willfulness and such an element is not read into the provision by the California courts. For the purposes of this appeal we assume that Lambert (D) had no actual knowledge of the requirement that she register under the ordinance because she offered proof of this defense which was refused by the court. The question is whether a registration act of this character violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge. The lawmakers have wide latitude to declare an offense and exclude elements of knowledge from its definition. But here the conduct was wholly passive. It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer of his duty to act. The rule that ignorance of the law will not excuse is deeply ingrained in our law. But due process does place some...
- (Frankfurter, J.) The present laws of the United States and of the forty-eight States [shows you how old this opinion is] are thick with the command that some things not be done and others be done, although persons convicted under such provisions may have had no awareness of what the law required or that what they did was wrongdoing. Surely there can hardly be a difference as a matter of fairness, of hardship, or of justice, if one may invoke it, between the case of a person wholly innocent of wrongdoing, in the sense that he was not remotely conscious of violating any law, who is imprisoned for five years for conduct relating to narcotics (see (involving a defendant prosecuted under a narcotics taxing act)), and the case of another person who is placed on probation for three years on condition that she pay $250, for failure, as a local resident, convicted under local law of a felony, to register under a law passed as an exercise of the State’s “police power.” What the Court does...
- Certification to the U.S. Supreme Court from an appeal on due process grounds after conviction for failure to comply with the city’s felon registration law.
- Section 52.39 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits any person ever convicted of a felony to be or remain in Los Angeles for more than five days without registering with the Chief of Police. Section 52.43(b) makes the failure to register a continuing offense, with each day’s failure constituting a separate offense. Lambert (D) was arrested for suspicion of having committed another offense and was charged with violating the registration law. The jury found Lambert (D) guilty and she was fined $250 and placed on probation for three years.
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Morissette v. United States 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Jackson, J.) No. The requirement of criminal intent is an old and imbedded tradition in law. Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in American soil. As states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation. There have been cases where an intent requirement has been held inapplicable, but these cases dealt with regulatory or “public welfare offenses,” crimes which have been deemed to not require intent because they are regarded as offenses against the state’s authority. Such offenses impair the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted. In this...
- in criminal statutes that is normally required at common law does not mean the crime is strict liability; such statutes will be interpreted to require the of such crimes required at common law.
- If a crime normally required intent under the common law, but as codified does not expressly include an intent requirement, can a criminal defendant be proven guilty without proving intent?
- Morissette (D), a junk dealer, openly entered an Air Force practice bombing range where he retrieved spent bomb casings that had been lying about for several years exposed to the weather and rusting away. He then sold them at junk market at an $84 profit. At trial it was adduced that there was no question Morissette (D) knew that what he took and sold were Air Force bomb casings. Morissette’s (D) defense was that he honestly believed the casings had been abandoned by the Air Force and that he therefore had not violated anyone’s rights by taking them. The trial judge rejected this defense and instructed the jury that the “question on intent is whether or not he intended to take the property.” Morissette (D) was convicted of a felony under . The Appeals Court held that since the statute did not expressly require criminal intent then Morissette (D) was guilty even if he didn’t have such intent.
- Certification to the U.S. Supreme Court after the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction for “knowingly converting” government property.
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Regina v. City of Sault Ste. Marie 4 results
- (Dickson, J.) Yes. There are various and several arguments advanced to justify absolute liability in public welfare offenses. Two predominate. First, it is argued that the protection of social interests requires a high standard of care and that absolute liability will cause people to pay more attention to such standards if they know ignorance or mistake will not excuse a failure to adhere to them. The second main argument is based on administrative efficiency. Because of the difficulty of proving mental culpability and the high number of such petty cases that jam judicial calendars, proof of fault is just too great a burden in time and money to place upon the prosecution and may result in most violators escaping without consequence. It is therefore contended that absolute liability is the most efficient and effective way of ensuring compliance with minor regulatory legislation and the social ends to be achieved are of such importance as to override the unfortunate by-product of...
- Proving criminal intent is a very difficult, time-consuming and resource-consuming venture. Forcing the state to carry such a burden in all public welfare offense cases would be taxing to say the least, and could result in many more people getting off without suffering the consequences. Instead of forcing the prosecution to prove intent, the model posited by Judge Dickson basically forces the defendant to prove he did not have the requisite criminal intent, or conversely, that he took all reasonable care to avoid violating the law and ended up doing so despite these efforts. Such a scheme would cost very little in the form of time and expense and would not be prone to letting more people off the hook. There are very few people who claim lack of intent or voluntary act when it comes to public welfare offenses, because, first, the penalties are so small, and second, very few actually have a valid defense that they can prove at trial. Adoption of such a burden-shifting scheme would...
- Not stated. The case does not go into the facts of any specific offense, but merely discusses the relative merits of strict liability offenses, offenses requiring
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Regina v. Dudley and Stephens 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Pursuant to the principle of general deterrence, courts punish criminal offenders to warn other members of society to anticipate similar punishment if they violate the law. A careful reading of this case suggests that the court used a mixed theory to punish Dudley (D1) and Stephens (D2). The court states that it is to allow the temptation of starvation to justify the killing of an innocent person. This culpability supports punishing the two men under the principle of retribution, because their culpability makes punishment their just desert. However, the court also states that it is to allow the temptation of starvation to justify the killing of an innocent person. This language suggests permitting a justification for killing under the circumstance in this case places society on a slippery slope. Individuals could begin to cloak themselves in the law to justify the killing of innocent people. The implication is that the court should punish Dudley (D1) and Stephens (D2) to deter...
- (Coleridge, J.) No. The prospect of starvation is not a justification for killing an innocent person for subsistence, and a proposition that justifies such a killing as anything other than murder is dangerous, immoral, and opposed to all legal principle and analogy. If the extreme necessity of hunger does not justify larceny, how can it justify murder? The issue is whether Mr. Dudley’s (D1) and Mr. Stephens’s (D2) acts constitute murder. The special verdict states that it is unlikely that the teenager would have survived and that it is likely that he would have died before the men. Whether they were or were not rescued in a timely manner, the killing of the teenager is unnecessary. The present law does not permit a person to save his life by killing, if necessary, an innocent and unoffending individual. Therefore, the temptation that led to the killing at issue is not a necessity under the law. The law and morality are not the same. Immoral conduct may be legal. Notwithstanding, an...
- GENERAL DETERRENCE: A principle that supports punishing a criminal offender to deter others from committing crimes by warning them to anticipate similar punishment if they violate the law.
- On July 5, 1884, Mr. Dudley (D1), Mr. Stephens (D2), Mr. Parker, and a teenage English boy set out to sea on a yacht. Subsequently, a storm carried the yacht 1600 miles away from the Cape of Good Hope and forced the men and the teenager to abandon the yacht and board an open boat. For three days, the four individuals subsisted upon two 1-pound cans of turnips. On the fourth day, they caught a small turtle. On the twelfth day in the boat, they had completely consumed the remains of the turtle. From the twelfth day to the twentieth day, the men and the teenager were without food. On the twentieth day, Mr. Dudley (D1), with the assent of Mr. Stephens (D2), approached the teenage boy, who was ill, and fatally cut his throat. The three men then consumed the teenager’s body parts. Four days after the incident, a vessel rescued the three men. An English court tried Mr. Dudley (D1) and Mr. Stephens (D2) for murder. The jury returned a special verdict and asked the Queen’s Court to tell it...
- Request to Queen’s Court to determine if murder was justifiable after lower court rendered a special verdict.
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Regina v. Kingston 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal from criminal conviction for sexual assault, seeking reversal on the grounds of involuntary intoxication. This case presents the opinion of both the Court of Appeal and its superior court, the House of Lords.
- OF COURT OF APPEAL: (Taylor, J.) Yes. Involuntary intoxication is a defense to criminal prosecution if the intoxication was accomplished by another’s trick or fraud, and if the defendant would not have formed the required criminal intent but for the intoxication. Criminal law must inhibit anti-social acts. Having paedophiliac inclinations is not proscribed; practicing them is. The criminal law should not punish people who performed the act solely because their inhibitions were removed by another’s clandestine act. A man is not responsible for conditions produced “by stratagem, or the fraud of another.” If drink or drug, surreptitiously administered, causes a person to lose his self-control and form an intent which he would not otherwise have formed, the law should exculpate him because the operative fault is not his. The law permits a finding that involuntary intoxication negatives ...formed was not criminal. Here, the judge effectively withdrew this defense from consideration,...
- OF HOUSE OF LORDS: (Mustill) No. Involuntary intoxication is no defense to criminal prosecution, though it may allow a lesser sentence. Here, Kingston’s (D) paedophiliac tendencies would ordinarily have been kept under control. The drug (whatever it was) temporarily changed Kingston’s (D) mentality, lowering his ability to resist temptation so that his desires overrode his resistance. Thus, the drug is not alleged to have created the desire, but rather enabled it. The appellate court’s decision was explicitly founded on the general principle that, if blame is absent, the necessary must also be absent, but this principle has never been part of the historical common law. “ ...all offenses except [strict liability], (ii) it is a complete defense, which does not allow prosecution for lesser charges, and (iii) it is subjective, since it turns only on whether the particular defendant’s inhibitions were overcome by the drug, and rewards defendants with the lowest inhibitions. Proving...
- 4 All E.R. 373 (Court of Appeal, Criminal Division 1993), rev’d, [1994] 3 All. E.R. 353 (House of Lords)
- This holding represents the widespread American doctrine that involuntary intoxication is not defense. Even the Model Penal Code only allows it if the intoxication renders the defendant legally insane. The House of Lords’ opinion tries to catalogue some of the dangers of allowing the defense. The opinion protests that such a subjective standard would open the floodgates of proof, allowing for spurious defenses. Yet we (and they) tolerate the insanity defense, which has the same drawbacks, because we believe criminal law should not punish those who act involuntarily. In truth, it seems involuntary intoxication is a rarely invoked defense, since the scenario needed to support it rarely occurs, so there does not seem to be a great danger of opening Pandora’s box by allowing it. There is also arguably little economic rationale for punishing acts that cannot be prevented in the future, since deterrence is impossible.
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People v. Hall 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Bender, J.) Yes. Whether a risk of death is substantial and unjustifiable must be determined based on the circumstances of each case. To prove reckless manslaughter, the People (P) must show that Hall (D) recklessly caused Cobb’s death. By statute, recklessness requires that the “actor must have consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death could result from his actions.” While the district court construed the term “substantial” to mean that it is “at least more likely than not that death would result,” even a slight risk may be substantial depending on the circumstances of the case. Like driving a car, skiing too fast does not ordinarily carry a high degree of risk. Yet, under certain circumstances, each can give rise to recklessness. Here, several witnesses testified that Hall (D) was skiing at an excessive speed, out of control, and with improper technique. Taking these facts as true, a reasonably prudent person would appreciate the substantial risk of...
- Whether a risk of death is substantial and unjustifiable must be determined based on the circumstances of each case.
- While skiing in Colorado, Hall (D) flew off a knoll and collided with Cobb, who sustained a traumatic brain injury and later died. Hall (D) was charged with reckless manslaughter. At a probable cause hearing, the county court dismissed the charges, finding that Hall’s (D) conduct was not sufficiently dangerous to support a conviction. On appeal, the district court affirmed, reasoning that skiing too fast is not an activity that would more likely than not cause another’s death.
- It is important to recognize the procedural stage at which this decision was rendered. In reviewing the case, the court was not asked to consider whether the facts established Hall’s (D) recklessness or his ultimate culpability. Rather, the court merely concluded that the facts, if proven, could give rise to an inference of recklessness that could support the charges of reckless manslaughter. Following remand, however, Hall (D) was indeed found guilty and sentenced to ninety days in jail, three years’ probation, and community service. Additionally, he was ordered to pay restitution to the victim’s family.
- Appeal to the Supreme Court of Colorado to review a district court finding of no probable cause.
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In re Winship 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The reasonable doubt standard applies uniquely to criminal cases in both state and federal courts. involved a juvenile court proceeding governed by state law, which declared the proceedings to be criminal in nature. Yet, whether a proceeding is civil or criminal in nature is a matter of federal law as it relates to the appropriate constitutional standard that governs.
- (Brennan, J.) Yes. In juvenile court, guilt of criminal charges must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because a criminal prosecution threatens the defendant’s liberty and involves a public stigma, society demands a criminal justice system that ensures his guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”
- (Harlan, J.) While a preponderance of the evidence standard in civil cases involves no greater risk to one party than to the other, its application to criminal matters places considerably more risk upon the accused than upon the government. It is far better to free a guilty defendant than to convict one who is innocent.
- In juvenile court, guilt of criminal charges must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
- ALL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
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Keeler v. Superior Court 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In this case, the Supreme Court of California primarily used the common law to ascertain the intent of the 1850 and 1872 legislatures. It is interesting to note that the court presumes that the legislatures were familiar with the relevant common law. The court also presumes that common law language in statutory form means that the legislature intended a common law interpretation. Armed with these presumptions, the court states that under the common law in 1850, an infant could not be the subject of a homicide unless it had been born alive. The statute employs common law language. As a result, the case is resolved. This raises two interesting questions. Is a presumption of common law knowledge by a legislature a good one, or is the presumption simply a technique used to make a finding of legislative intent when the a court cannot truly ascertain the intent? It is reasonable to presume that the Supreme Court of California is not interested in a thrashing by the United States Supreme
- (Mosk, J.) Yes. There is a violation of the Due Process Clause when a court construes a criminal statute contrary to the legislative intent and applies its expanded definition of the statute retroactively to a person’s conduct. Section 187 of California’s Penal Code defines murder as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. The legislature of 1872 enacted section 187. It took the language for this section from an 1850 enactment. An important question is whether the fetus that Mr. Keeler (D) is alleged to have murdered is a human being under California law. The inquiry begins by examining the intent of the 1850 legislature. This court presumes that the legislature was familiar with the common law in 1850. It further presumes that a legislature intends to continue common law rules in statutory form when it uses common law language in its enactments. Pursuant to the ...law of 1850, a child must be born alive to support a charge of murder. Additionally, an infant...
- There is a violation of the Due Process Clause when a court construes a criminal statute contrary to the legislative intent and applies its expanded definition of the statute retroactively to a person’s conduct.
- Is there is a violation of the Due Process Clause when a court construes a criminal statute contrary to the legislative intent and applies its expanded definition of the statute retroactively to a person’s conduct?
- (Burke, J.) The majority incorrectly suggests that it must confine its reasoning to common law concepts and the common law definition of murder. The California Penal Code defines homicide as the unlawful killing of a human being. The interpretation of the term human being need not remain static or fixed in time. The duty of this court is to render a fair and reasonable interpretation of the term in accordance with present conditions to promote justice and carry out the evident purpose of the legislature when enacting section 187. Human existence is a spectrum that stretches from birth to death. Damaging a corpse is not homicide, because a corpse is not a human being. Nonetheless, medical life revival, restoration, and resuscitation advancements have modified society’s understanding of what constitutes a corpse. If the majority would not ignore these advancements nor exonerate a killer of an apparently drowned child simply because the child would have been considered dead in 1850,...
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Girouard v. State 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The court in this case applies the common-law rule that a murder can only be mitigated if the provocation alleged falls into one of a few narrow categories. These categories are intended to reflect the few cases where all reasonable people agree the circumstances would cause any person to commit murder. In refusing to extend the number of mitigating circumstances Maryland courts will consider, the court in in preventing murder defendants from using the behavior of their victims to excuse their actions. To allow defendants to do this would be to extend tort principles of contributory negligence into criminal law. This would not serve society well, as society has an interest in using criminal punishment to deter wrongdoing. If potential murderers know that they will not be punished for killing people they can characterize as “bad,” the stiff punishments for murder will not be effective deterrents.
- (Cole, J.) No. Under Maryland law, words alone cannot constitute adequate provocation to support the mitigation of a homicide from murder to manslaughter. In order to show the kind of provocation that would mitigate a homicide from murder to manslaughter, a defendant ordinarily must show that the provocation falls into one of a few specific categories such as the sudden discovery of a spouse’s infidelity. Prior case law in Maryland holds that words alone do not constitute adequate provocation, and this court cannot in good conscience create a new category that would allow a domestic argument to constitute adequate provocation. Public policy would not support a holding that encouraged people to use domestic violence to resolve disputes. The provocation in this case was not enough to cause a reasonable man to stab his provoker 19 times. Judgment affirmed.
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- Under Maryland law, words alone are not enough to constitute adequate provocation to mitigate a murder conviction.
- Under Maryland law, can words alone constitute adequate provocation to support a finding that a homicide was committed in the heat of passion and thus was manslaughter rather than murder?
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People v. Dlugash 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal to highest appellate court of state following lower appellate court’s reversal of criminal conviction of murder.
- Dlugash (D), Bush and Geller had been out drinking. [You know from previous cases that trouble lies ahead.] On several occasions that evening, Geller had demanded that Bush pay him money because he had been staying at Geller’s apartment. After they returned to Geller’s apartment, they continued drinking. Geller again demanded money from Bush, whereupon Bush shot Geller three times with his gun. [The guy gets shot over a measly $100 bucks.] Geller fell to the floor. After two to five minutes passed, Dlugash (D) took his own gun and shot Geller in the head and face approximately five times. He contended that by the time he fired shots, it looked as if Geller was already dead. After repeated questioning by the police as to why he did such a thing, Dlugash (D) said that he guessed it must have been because he was afraid of Bush. At trial, the prosecution sought to show that Geller was still alive at the time Dlugash (D) shot him. However, there was conflicting medical testimony and it...
- This case provides an example of a statute that dispenses with the defenses of factual and legal impossibility. Had they been available as defenses, the outcome may have been different. The prosecution was unable to prove whether Geller was alive or dead at the time Dlugash (D) fired the gun. If, however, it was shown that he was dead, there could be no crime of attempted murder. Shooting a dead person is not murder, although there may be lesser crimes that could have been charged. The court noted that, after the enactment of the statute at issue, what is important is that which is in the defendant’s own mind. Thus, liability is measured on the facts as the defendant believes them to be. The court concluded that, since the jury found Dlugash (D) guilty of murder, it must have thought that he believed Geller was alive. Since the jury must have concluded that Dlugash (D) believed Geller was alive, the court held that the judgment should have been modified to convict for attempted murder.
- CHARGE THE JURY: Where the judge instructs the jury on the law.
- (Jasen, J.) Yes. The statutory law of this state now makes the defenses of legal and factually impossibility inapplicable to attempt, if the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be. The statute is patterned after the Model Penal Code, and eliminates the defenses of factual and legal impossibility. Thus, to constitute an attempt, it is still necessary that the result intended by the defendant constitute a crime. However, the defendant’s intent should be the standard for determining criminal liability. Under this statute, a person is guilty of an attempt when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of the crime. It is no defense that, under the attendant circumstances, the crime was factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant
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People v. Hood 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Traynor, J.) No. Under California law, voluntary intoxication is no defense to assault. We reverse the conviction for assault, because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple assault, and reverse the conviction for assault with intent to kill, because we find the trial court’s jury instructions on intoxication “hopelessly conflicting.” To guide the retrial, we will now decide whether voluntary intoxication is a defense to assault. California appellate courts are in conflict on whether the crimes of simple assault and assault with a deadly weapon are “specific intent” or “general intent” crimes. This distinction evolved to deal with intoxicated offenders, because while the moral culpability of a drunken criminal is frequently less than that of a sober person inflicting like injury, it is commonly felt that a person who voluntarily gets drunk and commits a crime should not escape the consequences. Formerly, the common law refused to...
- At common law, intoxication was a defense to crimes requiring “specific” intent—robbery, assault, larceny, burglary, forgery, false pretenses, embezzlement, attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy—to the extent it could be proven that the drunken defendant was capable of performing the proscribed acts, but was rendered incapable of formulating the intent to accomplish the goal, which was usually to steal property or injure/kill the victim. An intoxicated defendant would still be guilty of lesser included offenses not requiring specific intent. Other crimes were classified as “general intent” crimes, and courts did not recognize intoxication as a defense to them. This case properly points out that the distinction’s theoretical basis is vague. For example, assault, a “general intent” crime, could be characterized by either the general intent to use violence/intimidation or by the specific intent to injure through violence. However, the court, having noted this arbitrary dichotomy,...
- Appeal from criminal conviction for (i) assaulting a police officer with a deadly weapon and (ii) assault with intent to kill, seeking reversal and jury instructions to allow voluntary intoxication as a defense.
- SPECIFIC INTENT: Technically, the intent traditionally required for common law robbery, assault, larceny, burglary, forgery, false pretenses, embezzlement, attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy, which is the intent not only to commit the crime’s elements, but also the intent to achieve a further result. For example, common law robbery comprises illegally taking property from another’s person or presence through violence or intimidation, plus the specific intent to keep the property or deprive the owner of it.
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Commonwealth v. Carroll 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Bell, C.J.) No. The evidence of a defendant’s good character and the testimony of a psychiatrist that the homicide was not premeditated does not require the court to find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder. Under Pennsylvania’s murder statute, first degree murder includes killings by poison, lying in wait “or any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” In determining whether the defendant had the specific intent to kill necessary to constitute first-degree murder, courts look at factors including the defendant’s words and conduct and the circumstances surrounding the homicide. Specific intent to kill will be inferred when the defendant has used a deadly weapon on a vital body part of another person. Even if everything Mr. Carroll (D) alleged was true, his killing of his wife constituted murder in the first degree. Mr. Carroll (D) based his first argument on the axiom that “no time is too short for a wicked man to frame...
- Under Pennsylvania law, does the evidence of a homicide defendant’s good character together with the testimony of a psychiatrist that the homicide was not premeditated require the court to fix the degree of the defendant’s guilt as no higher than murder in the second degree?
- In Pennsylvania, when determining whether a murder was premeditated and therefore of the first degree, a court will disregard the length of time it took for the defendant to form the intention to kill and will not treat the testimony of a psychiatrist as conclusive on the issue of premeditation.
- ...1955. Mr. Carroll (D) maintained a good reputation as an employee, co-worker, and neighbor. In 1958, Mrs. Carroll fractured her skull while trying to get out of her car during an argument with Mr. Carroll (D). This injury may have contributed to her mental illness—she was later diagnosed as a “schizoid personality type.” In January, 1962, Mr. Carroll (D) attended an electronics school in North Carolina for nine days. Mrs. Carroll had been violently opposed to Mr. Carroll’s (D) leaving her alone, and at her suggestion Mr. Carroll (D) left a loaded .22 caliber pistol on the windowsill above their bed. When he returned from North Carolina, Mr. Carroll (D) informed his wife that he would be taking a teaching job in Chambersburg and would be required to spend four nights a week out of town. Mr. and Mrs. Carroll argued violently about this until 4 a.m. According to Mr. Carroll (D), Mr. and Mrs. Carroll went to their bedroom at 3 a.m. and continued to argue. Sometime between 3 and 4 a.m...
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Chapter One Institutions and Processes 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Because trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all state criminal cases which were they to be tried in a federal court would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.
- While juries have an unreviewable and unreversible power to acquit a defendant in disregard of the instructions on the law given by the trial judge, there is no doubt that the judge may instruct the jury that they are required to follow the instructions of the court on all matters of law.
- Seven criminal defendants appealed a judge’s decision not to instruct the jury that it was free to disregard the law and the evidence and acquit them.
- In juvenile court, guilt of criminal charges must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Winship (D) was found guilty in juvenile court of acts constituting larceny by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Fischer 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Beck, J.) No. Even if we were inclined to change the law, we could not do so in the context of an appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Fischer (D) claims his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not seek a jury instruction regarding mistake of fact. About 18 years ago, in [where defendant drove victim to dark place and threatened to kill her if she did not have sex, and victim said “go ahead,” mistake of fact instruction not available], we held that it is up to the legislature, not the courts, to decide whether a defendant’s mistaken belief about the victim’s state of mind should be a defense to rape. Fischer (D) argues that can be distinguished on two grounds. First, Fischer (D) argues that .... Fischer (D) also argues that the laws with respect to rape and all its permutations have changed significantly in the last decade. Specifically, the legislature has broadened the definition of the “forcible compulsion” element of rape to include intellectual...
- Appeal of criminal conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
- By not allowing a jury instruction regarding Fischer’s (D) mistaken belief that the victim consented, the court adopts a general intent approach to rape. In other words, Fischer (D) had the requisite if he voluntarily committed a sexual act, whether or not he intended to rape her. Other courts have held that a mistaken belief bars a conviction unless the belief is negligently held. For example, in , the defendant testified that the woman voluntarily went to his apartment and willingly engaged in intercourse. The woman testified that the defendant used force and threats of force prior to the intercourse. The California Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to an instruction on mistake of fact regarding the woman’s consent. The court reasoned that due to the severe penalty imposed, the legislature probably did not intend to exclude the element of wrongful intent from the crime of rape. The court applied an objective negligence standard, i.e., whether a reasonable person...
- : A criminal intent.
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State v. Canola 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Conford, J.) No. Under New Jersey law, a defendant cannot be found guilty of the killing of an accomplice by the victim of an armed robbery. The traditional definitions of felony murder do not encompass situations such as the one in this case. Traditionally, the felony murder rule has only been invoked when the defendant himself killed the victim. The general rule throughout the United States is that the felony murder rule may not be applied to homicides not attributable to the defendant. No court currently attaches liability under the felony murder rule to any death proximately caused by the perpetration of the felony, even when the homicide was committed by the victim of the felony. The theory of proximate cause that holds that if a felon sets in motion a chain of events that could foreseeably lead to the death of another he is liable for any death that results was adopted by courts in Pennsylvania and Michigan in cases involving the killing of police officers, but these cases...
- Canola (D) attempted an armed robbery of a jewelry store with three accomplices. The store owner and his employee resisted the robbery. One of the accomplices fired a weapon, and the store owner returned the gunfire. Both the store owner and the accomplice were fatally wounded. The accomplice was killed by the store owner. Canola (D) and two of his accomplices were indicted on two counts of murder, one count of robbery, and one count of armed robbery. Canola (D) was found guilty on both murder counts and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment. The Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s denial of a defense motion to dismiss the count of murder addressed to the killing of the accomplice with one dissent, so the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- (Sullivan. J.) The legislative intent behind the New Jersey felony murder statute compels a different reasoning from that employed by the majority. The statute is designed to hold a criminal liable for any killing that ensues during the commission of a felony, even if the felon or his accomplice did not do the actual killing. The only exception to this rule should be the death of an accomplice. The killing during an armed robbery of an accomplice by the victim of the robbery is a justifiable homicide and does not fall under the statute.
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- Under New Jersey law, can a defendant be found guilty of felony murder when during his robbery of a store one of the robbery victims shoots one of the defendant’s accomplices?
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Yates v. United States 18 results (showing 5 best matches)
- 1519 imposes if the law is read broadly. That brings to the surface the real issue: overcriminalization and excessive punishment in the U.S. Code. I tend to think, for the reasons the plurality gives, that § 1519 is a bad law—too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which give prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion. And I’d go further: In those ways, § 1519 is unfortunately not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal criminal code. But whatever the wisdom or folly of § 1519, this Court does not get to rewrite the law.
- (Ginsburg, J.) No. The meaning of a term in a criminal statute is not solely determined by reference to the language itself, but also by the specific context in which the language was used and the context of the statute as a whole. A word’s usage ordinarily accords with its dictionary meaning. In law as in life, however, the same words, placed in different contexts, may sometimes mean different things.
- SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: P.L. 107-204; a federal law that set or expanded requirements for the management of publicly-held companies, and that added new penalties for criminal misconduct.
- 1519. The caption of the section—“Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy”—conveys no suggestion that the section prohibits spoliation of all physical evidence. The title of the section of Sarbanes-Oxley (“Criminal penalties for altering documents”) likewise conveys no such suggestion. While those headings are not commanding, they supply clues that Congress did not intend an all-encompassing ban on the spoliation of evidence. The contemporaneous enactment of §
- Finally, if the use of traditional tools of statutory construction leaves any doubt, we would invoke the rule that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” The rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal. Before we choose the harsher alternative, it is appropriate to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. Reversed.
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People v. Luparello 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Wiener, J.) I concur “under the compulsion of” existing case law; however, I find this principle of law to be logically inconsistent and theoretically unsound. The “foreseeable consequence” doctrine has evolved away from its original definition, “probable and natural consequences”, to the current standard of “natural and reasonable consequences”. This doctrine creates a problem when assessing the degree of culpability for the accomplice because it depends on the fortuity of the mental state of the perpetrator. Admittedly, Luparello’s (D) original conspiracy involved a foreseeable risk of death or serious injury that would normally find Luparello (D) criminally negligent in failing to appreciate the amount of risk. This, usually, would allow a person to be found guilty, at most, of involuntary manslaughter. However, the rule in this case does not base Luparello’s (D) on his individual mental state but instead on the mental state of the perpetrators. Thus, if the perpetrators were...
- (Kremer, J.) Yes. The trial court found Luparello (D) guilty of first-degree murder based on aiding and abetting liability. Luparello (D) argues that the perpetrator and the accomplice must share the exact same intent in order to be charged with the same offense. However, accomplice liability does not require an identical intent, but “an equivalent ”. Thus, liability is extended to cover the actual crime committed as opposed to the crime intended. This is done “on the policy [that] aiders and abettors should be responsible for the criminal harms they have naturally, probably and foreseeably put in motion.” As a result, Luparello (D) is guilty of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by anyone he aids and abets in the commission of the offense he intended. The judgment is affirmed.
- for the crime intended, the accomplice can be held liable for all foreseeable acts committed by the perpetrator in furtherance of the original crime. Thus, as long as the accomplice has a culpable mental state and assists or encourages the perpetrator to act, any further reasonably foreseeable acts committed by the perpetrator can form the basis for the guilt of the accomplice. This creates the same problems and concerns raised by the felony murder rule. As the concurrence points out, the degree of punishment the accomplice receives is completely based on the fortuity of the actions and mental state of his co-conspirators. It also raises the additional challenge of ascertaining what actions are “reasonably foreseeable”. Obviously, in this case, the court found that Luparello’s (D) instructions to his “friends” created a reasonably foreseeable consequence that they would kill Martin.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal of a trial court conviction of the defendant for murder.
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M.C. v. Bulgaria 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Bulgarian Criminal Code defines rape of a woman over fourteen years old as intercourse with a woman “who was compelled by means of force or threats.” What is decisive is the definition given to the terms “force” and “threats.” The Supreme Court of Bulgaria held in one case that “force” means not only direct violence, but could also be placing the victim in a situation where she could see no solution other than to submit against her will. Similarly, the criminal statutes of most European countries require proof of “force,” “violence,” or “immediate danger to life or limb” for a rape conviction. In case law and legal theory, however, lack of consent, not force, is the important element of the offense. Non-consensual sexual acts are prosecuted by means of interpretation of the relevant statutory terms, and a context-sensitive assessment of the evidence. The traditional definition of rape has, however, undergone reform in both civil and common law countries, as well as under...
- In M.C.’s (P) case, the Prosecutor (D) determined that a lack of consent could not be inferred in the absence of physical evidence of resistance, and also seems to have found that, without proof of resistance, it could not be concluded that P and A understood that M.C. (P) did not consent. The situation called for a context-sensitive assessment of the credibility of these contentions. The Prosecutor (D) should have investigated all of the surrounding circumstances, and not put so much evidence on finding “direct” proof. The Prosecutor (D) also should have considered the special psychological factors in cases involving the alleged rape of minors. The Prosecutor’s (D) approach did not meet the requirements inherent in a state’s obligation to establish and apply a criminal law system that punishes all forms of rape and sexual abuse. The government’s (D) argument that M.C. (P) could bring a civil action against P and A has no merit, as effective protection against rape requires criminal-
- M.C (P) filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that local law and practice requiring proof of physical resistance by the victim left unpunished certain acts of rape, and that this practice was based solely on tradition and culture. She also alleged that setting the age of consent for intercourse at fourteen and limiting rape prosecutions to cases involving violent resistance left children insufficiently protected against rape.
- The District Prosecutor (D) had M.C.’s (P) case investigated. The Prosecutor (D) concluded that the use of force or threats by P or A had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and so terminated the proceedings. The decision was affirmed by the Regional Prosecutor (D), who held that there is no criminal rape unless the victim was coerced by physical force or threats. Force or threats presupposes resistance, but there was no evidence that M.C. (P) resisted. The Regional Prosecutor’s (D) decision was affirmed by the Chief Public Prosecutor (D).
- (Per curiam) No. The protection of individual rights requires the prosecution and penalizing of perpetrators of any non-consensual sexual act, including those without evidence of physical resistance by the victim. Rape is understood as an offense against a woman’s autonomy, and its essential element is a lack of consent. Although states may make their own choices of the means to secure the protection of individuals and individual rights, effective deterrence against acts such as rape requires efficient criminal law provisions.
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Clark v. Arizona 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Courts have for centuries recognized that criminal defendants who lack understanding of their actions also lack moral culpability, and therefore should be treated differently by the legal system than other, more culpable defendants. In recent years, however, some cases have raised concerns that the insanity defense goes too far. When John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity for shooting then-President Ronald Reagan, for instance, some thought that the law was too liberally applied, which led to widespread reassessment of the insanity defense. Courts continue to struggle with balancing the need for uniformity in the enforcement of criminal justice standards against the recognition that mentally ill persons must, in appropriate cases, be afforded special treatment.
- The fact that mental-illness evidence may be considered in deciding criminal responsibility does not compensate for its exclusion from consideration on the element of the crime. The Court’s decision forces the jury to decide guilt in a fictional world with undefined and unexplained behavior, but without mental illness. This rule has no rational justification and imposes a significant burden on a straightforward defense: Clark (D) did not commit the crime with which he was charged.
- Clark (D) was charged with first-degree murder for intentionally or knowingly killing a law enforcement officer in the line of duty when he was pulled over for a traffic stop. In a bench trial, Clark (D) pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and argued that, due to his paranoid schizophrenia, he could not have formed the requisite intent to commit the crime of which he was charged. The trial court ruled that Clark (D) could not rely on insanity evidence to negate the intent requirement, and convicted Clark (D) of first-degree murder, sentencing him to life in prison. After the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, Clark (D) appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
- : The state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness. is the second of two essential elements of every crime at common law, the other being the
- . However, the traditional right to introduce relevant evidence may be curtailed if there is a sufficiently good reason for doing so. Arizona (P) had such a good reason in this case because it has the authority to define its presumption of sanity and place the burden of persuasion on the defendant. Moreover, the rule does not violate due process, and we therefore affirm the ruling of the Arizona Court of Appeals.
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Gregg v. Georgia 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Justice Stewart) No. The death penalty does not violate the 8th Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” The meaning of the language of the 8th Amendment changes over time as society’s values change. However, the Court must consider other factors besides the public perception of the death penalty. A criminal penalty must be in accordance with the “dignity of man,” which means that it cannot be “excessive.” In order to decide whether a punishment is excessive the Court must determine whether the punishment involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. The Court must also determine whether the punishment is grossly out of proportion with the crime. At the same time, it is important that the Court remember that assigning penalties to crimes is primarily a legislature’s job and courts must presume that the punishment assigned by a democratically-elected legislature is valid. History and precedent support a finding that the death penalty does not violate the...
- WRIT OF CERTIORARI: A writ directing that a case be remanded to a higher court.
- A man convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death appeals the sentence to the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the death penalty is a violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments.
- This case represents a constitutional challenge to the death penalty in general and to the provisions in the Georgia death penalty statute that allow the jury to consider specific aggravating circumstances in determining whether to sentence a convicted murderer to death. What the Court is really doing here is refusing to allow its own conception of the “dignity of man” to override those of the individual states. By refusing to invalidate Georgia’s death penalty statute, the Court is staying above the fray and allowing the American people to resolve the death penalty debate through the democratic process. When American society decides that the death penalty is an unacceptable form of punishment, we can legislate it ...the long run, the Court’s decision allows the definition of “cruel and unusual” to truly change over time as society’s views change, rather than giving it one precedential definition developed by nine unelected justices. Georgia’s statute can continue to serve Georgia’s...
- (Justice Marshall) The constitutionality of the death penalty depends on the opinion of an informed citizenry. The fact is that the American people are for the most part unaware of the information necessary for a true understanding of the morality of the death penalty. Capital punishment is not an adequate deterrent. There is also no evidence that the death penalty does more that life imprisonment to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands.
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State v. Hayes 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- It would be illogical to transform a non-criminal act into a criminal one merely because the principal tricked the accomplice into going along with her plan. Strictly speaking, on a public policy level, we don’t want to encourage the police and others to entrap people merely for their criminal thoughts. Also, we don’t want law enforcement agents committing criminal acts to capture people with criminal propensities. The law is designed to prevent criminal acts, not encourage them. On the other hand, if Hayes (D) had acted as the principal or had actually entered the building, his actions alone would establish a charge of burglary against him.
- (Thomas, J.) No. The trial court instructed the jury to find Hayes (D) guilty of burglary if he had a felonious intent and assisted and aided Hill to enter the building, regardless of Hill’s own intent. This jury instruction was in error. The evidence was clear that Hill did not enter the building with an intent to steal, and committed no crime. Yet, the act became criminal when it was imputed to Hayes (D) because of his felonious intent. This may have been appropriate if Hill was a “passive and submissive agent” who was acting under the “control and compulsion” of Hayes (D). However, Hill was working with Hayes (D) on his own free will with the intent to entrap Hayes (D). The intent and acts do not combine to form the elements of the crime. Hayes (D) did not enter the building and, therefore, did not commit the crime of burglary. To make Hayes (D) responsible for Hill’s breaking and entry, they must have had a “common motive and common design”. But, in fact, “the design and the...
- Hayes (D) approached Hill to join him in the burglary of a store. Their grand plan was to [, quite literally, take home the bacon]. Hayes (D), [not exactly a criminal mastermind], did not know that Hill actually happened to be a relative of the store’s owners. Hill played along with Hayes (D), but warned the store’s owners about the plan. They decided to try to catch Hayes (D) red handed and have him arrested. On the night of the planned burglary, they arrived at the store, and Hayes (D) opened a window and helped Hill inside the building. Hill picked up a side of bacon and handed it out to Hayes (D). Soon after, they were arrested. Hayes (D) was convicted of burglary and larceny, and he appealed.
- AN ACCOMPLICE CANNOT BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE IF THE PRINCIPAL HAD NO CRIMINAL INTENT
- An accomplice cannot be held criminally liable if the principal had no criminal intent.
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United States v. Guidant LLC 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A plea agreement made pursuant to the rule authorizing the government to agree to a specific sentence or sentencing range, like all plea agreements, is binding on both the government and the defendant, but such plea agreements are unique in that they are also binding on the court once the court accepts the agreement. Whether to approve or reject a plea agreement is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the court would not accept a plea agreement that failed to require probation. The agreement did not adequately address the manufacturer’s criminal conduct, the court said, whereas a term of probation would both serve the public’s interest and address the manufacturer’s accountability.
- Guidant LLC (D) manufactured defibrillator devices that were implanted in patients to treat abnormal heart rhythms. Two models had a defect that could cause short-circuiting, rendering the device non-functional. Guidant (D) fixed the problem but did not notify the FDA as required by law. Guidant (D) pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor violations of the FDA reporting requirements, pursuant to a plea agreement. The agreement imposed a fine and a criminal forfeiture penalty, but no restitution or probation. Victims and physicians urged the court to reject any plea agreement that did not include probation.
- Can a corporate criminal defendant be placed on probation?
- RESTITUTION: Full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim, not awarded in a civil trial, but ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition of probation.
- (Frank, J.) Yes. A term of probation is appropriate for corporate defendants to hold them accountable and serve the public interests. Probation would not be a waste of the government’s money, because it could be conditioned on a requirement of reimbursing the government for the costs of probation. Guidant (D) could also be required to establish a compliance and ethics program as a condition of probation. It makes no difference that Boston Scientific acquired Guidant (D) after the acts in question. The interests of justice are not served by allowing a company to avoid probation simply by changing its corporate form. Advances in medical technology have inflated the public’s expectations so much that when a medical device fails, many assume that a crime has been committed or someone is at fault. This is not necessarily always the case. But when a breach of public trust has occurred and regulatory requirements are violated, a medical device company must be held accountable. The court...
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United States v. Jackson 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Judge Posner’s concurring opinion is somewhat perplexing. Judge Posner begins by rejecting incapacitation as a reason to impose a prison sentence. He believes that while incapacitation removes one criminal from the streets, it serves as an invitation for another person to take his place. Yet, he advocates incarcerating criminals for a period of time that would make them harmless to society. That is one of the goals of selective incapacitation. Selective incapacitation seeks to sentence criminal offenders based on predictions that they would commit crimes at a high rate if they were not incarcerated. Judge Posner admits that Jackson (D) is likely to commit another bank robbery if corrections authorities immediately release him from prison, but suggests that he would not commit another bank robbery after serving a determinate sentence of twenty years. In other words, he predicts that Jackson (D) will commit criminal offenses at a high rate if he is not incarcerated for a period of time.
- (Easterbrook, J.) Yes. General deterrence and incapacitation are appropriate sentencing considerations when sentencing a career criminal. Even though Mr. Jackson (D) acknowledges that the sentencing statute permits any term of imprisonment that is not less than fifteen years, he contends that the statute only allows the imposition of a determinate sentence. Therefore, he further contends that the statute does not authorize a life sentence. Mr. Jackson (D) misinterprets the sentencing statute. When parole is not a sentencing option, a sentencing judge may impose a determinate sentence or a life sentence, because a long determinate sentence term may in effect equate to a life sentence. Mr. Jackson’s (D) life imprisonment sentence is permissible because it is within the statutory sentencing range. The instant offense and Mr. Jackson’s (D) prior offenses define him as a career criminal. Mr. Jackson’s (D) criminal history demonstrates that specific deterrence remedies have not deterred...
- A trial court sentenced a career criminal to life in prison for bank robbery.
- Mr. Jackson (D) was serving a prison sentence for two bank robberies when prison authorities released him from prison to participate in a work release program. On the day of his release, Mr. Jackson (D) robbed a bank. The trial court convicted Mr. Jackson (D) for his latest bank robbery. A federal criminal statute mandates that a person who has three previous felony convictions of robbery receive a prison sentence term that is not less than fifteen years. The statute also prohibits suspension of the sentence, the grant of a probationary sentence, and a grant of parole with respect to the sentence. Since Mr. Jackson (D) brandished a firearm when he robbed the bank and had four prior armed bank robbery convictions and an armed robbery conviction, the trail judged sentenced him to life in prison, and Mr. Jackson (D) appealed his sentence.
- (Posner, J.) The court’s judgment is correct, but Mr. Jackson’s (D) sentence is too harsh. Mr. Jackson’s (D) criminal history demonstrates that he is a dangerous and hardened criminal; however, the fact remains that he has never inflicted physical injury when committing his criminal offenses. This fact is relevant and vitiates the need to impose a life sentence. The trial judge found that a life sentence was required to prevent Mr. Jackson (D) from ...sentence, since twenty years from today, Mr. Jackson (D) would be unlikely rob another bank at that age. To incarcerate him into is seventies or eighties and then presume that he could commit a crime upon his release is too speculative to impose a life sentence. The value of retribution is in question, and incapacitation may simple replace one criminal with another. Therefore, deterrence is the most appropriate ground for punishment. However, whether the last ten or twenty years of Mr. Jackson’s (D) life sentence will deter others from...
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United States v. Gementera 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Gementera (D) next argues that the condition imposed in his case was not related to the court’s asserted purposes. He contends that shaming experiences simply are not rehabilitative. In reality, however, criminal penalties nearly always cause shame and embarrassment. The sandwich-board condition could indeed risk social stigmatization, but it was coupled here with more socially useful conditions as well—lecturing at high schools, writing letters of apology, etc.—which could actually promote the offender’s social reintegration. In other words, the sandwich-board requirement was not a standalone condition intended to humiliate, but rather a part of a comprehensive plan to allow Gementera (D)—who did not appear to realize the seriousness of his crime and its impact on the victims—to repair his relationship with society. Accordingly, under the specific circumstances of this case, the sandwich-board condition was reasonably related to the legitimate objective of rehabilitation. Affirmed.
- Much of the appellate court’s reasoning in this case focused on the trial court’s pairing of the signboard condition with other more socially useful conditions of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court had, by combining the various conditions, successfully built a regime by which the defendant, although initially pushed away from society, would be drawn back in as a productive, rehabilitated citizen. In other words, a reasonable relationship existed between the sandwich-board condition and a socially acceptable goal because of the shaming provision’s relationship to the entire package of sentencing provisions imposed by the court.
- (Hawkins, J.) All that will be accomplished by the sandwich-board condition is humiliation akin to the pillories and stocks of years past. To sanction such use of sentencing power runs the risk of instilling a sense of disrespect for the criminal justice system itself. I would vacate the sentence and remand for re-sentencing, instructing the district court that public humiliation has no place in our system of justice.
- Gementera (D), although just twenty-four years old, already had a lengthy criminal history when he was indicted for mail theft for stealing mail from San Francisco mail boxes. Gementera (D) pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two months’ incarceration and three years’ supervised release, subject to certain conditions. One of those conditions was that Gementera (D) perform 100 hours of community service, consisting of standing in front of a post office wearing a sandwich board that declared in large letters, “I stole mail. This is my punishment.” Gementera (D) filed a motion to have the sandwich-board condition removed from his sentence, and the court modified his sentence, limiting the sandwich-board time to eight hours and adding other conditions that were deemed more in keeping with the aims of the criminal justice system. Gementera (D) appealed the eight-hour sandwich-board portion of his sentence as inconsistent with the Sentencing Reform Act.
- (O’Scannlain, J.) No. The Sentencing Reform Act affords courts broad discretion in fashioning conditions of supervised release that are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. In determining whether a condition is appropriate, the reviewing court must ask, first, whether the sentencing judge imposed the condition for a permissible purpose, and second, whether the condition is reasonably related to that purpose. Gementera (D) contends here that the condition at issue was imposed for the impermissible purpose of humiliation. Although it is true that a sentence should not be humiliating to the defendant, here the sentencing court’s written order stresses that the goal was not to humiliate for humiliation’s sake, but to create a situation in which the public exposure will serve the dual purposes of rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the public. The defendant’s first argument fails.
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United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Campbell, J.) No. In Dotterweich and Park, the court dispensed with a scienter requirement and established liability under the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine. However, these cases concerned misdemeanor charges and dealt with public welfare statutes in which it was well-established law that no scienter was required to hold a defendant criminally liable. There exists no precedent for ignoring a scienter requirement where Congress has expressly included one in a criminal statute. This is especially true where the crime is a felony carrying the possibility of imprisonment. While the trial court properly instructed the jury to infer knowledge [such as willful blindness] based on circumstantial evidence, it improperly instructed the jury that D’Allesandro’s (D2) status as a “responsible corporate officer” was sufficient, conclusive proof that D’Allesandro (D2) had the “knowledge” required for ...illegal disposal charged in this case. The mere fact that D’Allesandro (D2) is...
- The opinion recognizes that the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine arose out of the public welfare statutes and regulations that traditionally held violators to a strict liability standard. It refused to expand corporate agent liability outside the scienter context in the applicable statute. Such an expansion could have potentially exposed individual corporate agents to a flood of criminal indictments with few of the protections criminal law traditionally provides in defining . Juries and judges would effectively be re-writing criminal statutes and making their own law if they replaced the scienter requirements of a statute with the vague “responsible corporate officer” doctrine. Hazardous waste disposal may be a public health issue deserving as much attention as food or medicine; however, absent a specific directive of Congress making illegal waste disposal a strict liability offense, the courts should not be able to substitute their judgment for that of the legislature.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal of a district court conviction.
- Unless the applicable statute requires strict liability, a corporate agent cannot be held criminally liable under the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine and can only be convicted based on the
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Ewing v. California 19 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The compounded penalty here is imposed on the commission of a criminal’s third violent or serious felony. Whether or not an offense can be characterized as violent is obvious in most cases. Here, Ewing’s (D) stealing of golf clubs was not violent; there is no indication he took the clubs at gunpoint or even threatened the staff at the pro shop. Accordingly, his qualification for punishment under the three-strikes law was based on the state’s characterization of his crime as “serious.” While all crime may be considered serious by its victims, stealing $1,200 worth of golf clubs is not as serious as a crime involving a deadly weapon or threatening physical violence. In the long string of California cases that have come after , the courts have been quick to point out that what makes many of these defendants worthy of punishment as serious offenders is their inability to conform their behavior to social requirements, as demonstrated by their tendency to repeat their offenses.
- (Scalia, J.) Proportionality is a notion that is tied to the concept of retribution; however, it is difficult to speak of proportionality once the criminal law goals of deterrence and rehabilitation are given the weight they are due. A laudable goal of the criminal justice system is also incapacitation, and it is furthered by the imposition of the “three-strikes law.” The Constitution does not mandate that states adopt a specific theory of criminal punishment, and it does not require proportionality. Whatever goal a state chooses to emphasize must be respected. Proportionality represents just a part of the punishment scheme. A proper assessment should not stop with deciding whether the crime fits the punishment; it should also consider whether the punishment fits the stated goals of the state’s criminal law.
- , the Court determined that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing a sentence of life without parole for multiple nonviolent felonies. There, the defendant had been convicted of passing a bad check. In striking down the life sentence, the Court considered three factors relevant to a determination of proportionality: (1) the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in that jurisdiction, and (3) the penalties imposed in other jurisdictions for the same violations. Applying these factors, the Court distinguished the case from
- DETERRENCE: The act or process of discouraging certain behavior, particularly by fear; especially as a goal of criminal law, the prevention of criminal behavior by fear of punishment.
- (Breyer, J.) Courts faced with a gross disproportionality claim must necessarily make a threshold comparison of the crime with the sentence imposed. If the sentence appears comparatively disproportionate to the crime, only then should the sentence be compared to that imposed to other criminals in similar circumstances. In doing so, three factors must be considered—the length of the prison term, the criminal conduct at issue, and the defendant’s criminal history. Here, Ewing’s shoplifting is materially identical to the conduct of passing a bad check in . Under the circumstances, Ewing is likely to die before his release. While shoplifting no doubt takes a considerable financial toll on business retailers, it lacks the social and individual harm justifying a life sentence. The sentence meets the threshold disproportionality test.
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Pinkerton v. United States 5 results
- The court’s decision in this case, taken at face value, appears sound. However, the underlying facts make the judgment a bit harder to understand. The proof showed that Walter alone committed the substantive crimes, and there was no proof that Daniel (D) even knew that he had done so. In fact, Daniel (D) was in prison for other crimes when some of Walter’s crimes were committed. Walter and Daniel (D) became partners in crime by virtue of their agreement and, without more on his part, Daniel (D) became criminally liable for everything Walter did thereafter, so long as there was no proof of a clear withdrawal from or revocation of the agreement. The dissent correctly labels Daniel’s (D) liability as vicarious, and it seems to present a sound argument that vicarious liability should remain in the civil law, and not transferred to the criminal field.
- (Rutledge, J.) The judgment concerning Daniel Pinkerton (D) should be reversed. It is my opinion that it is without precedent here and is a dangerous precedent to establish. The result is a vicarious criminal responsibility as broad as, or broader than, the vicarious civil liability of a partner for acts done by a co-partner in the course of the firm’s business.
- Walter and Daniel Pinkerton (D) are brothers who live a short distance from each other on Daniel’s (D) farm. They were indicted for violations of the Internal Revenue Code. The indictment contained ten substantive counts and one conspiracy count. The jury found Walter guilty on nine of the substantive counts and on the conspiracy count. It found Daniel (D) guilty on six of the substantive counts and on the conspiracy count. A single conspiracy was charged and proved. Each of the substantive offenses found was committed pursuant to the conspiracy.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- ...It is contended that there was insufficient evidence to implicate Daniel (D) in the conspiracy, but we think there was enough evidence for submission to the jury. There is, however, no evidence to show that Daniel (D) participated directly in the commission of the substantive offenses on which his conviction has been sustained, although there was evidence to show that these substantive offenses were committed by Walter in furtherance of the unlawful agreement or conspiracy existing between brothers. We take the view here that there was a continuous conspiracy which Daniel (D) never took any affirmative action to withdraw from. So long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act for each other in carrying it forward. It is settled that an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act. Thus we hold that Daniel’s (D) participation in the conspiracy is enough to sustain his conviction for the substantive offense...
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People v. Ashley 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Traynor, J.) Yes. Ashley’s (D) defense was not based on distinctions between title and possession, but rather he contends that there was no unlawful taking of any sort. To support a conviction of theft for obtaining property by false pretenses, it must be shown that Ashley (D) made a false pretense or representation with intent to defraud the owners of their property, and that the owners were in fact defrauded. It is unnecessary to prove that Ashley (D) benefitted personally from the fraudulent acquisition. The false pretense or representation must have materially influenced the owners to part with their property, but the false pretense need not be the sole inducing cause. If the conviction rests primarily on the testimony of a single witness that the false pretense was made, the making of the pretense must be corroborated. In this state, false promises can provide the foundation of a civil action for deceit. In such actions, something more than nonperformance is required to prove...
- (Schauer, J.) I concur in the judgment solely on the ground that the evidence establishes, with ample corroboration, the making by Ashley (D) of false representations as to existing facts. On that evidence the convictions should be sustained pursuant to long accepted theories of law.
- Ashley (D), the business manager of a corporation chartered for the purpose of “introducing people,” obtained a loan of $7,200 from Mrs. Russ, a 70 year-old woman [now that’s dirty]. He promised Mrs. Russ that the loan would be secured by a first mortgage on certain improved property of the corporation, and that the money would be used to build a theater on other property owned by the corporation. In fact, the corporation leased but did not own the improved property, and no theater was ever built. The money was used instead to meet Ashley’s (D) corporation’s operating expenses. After Ashley (D) received the money, Mrs. Russ frequently quarreled with him over his failure to deliver the promised first mortgage. She finally received a note of the corporation secured by a second trust deed on some unimproved property owned by the corporation. She testified that she accepted this security because Ashley (D) told her to “take that or nothing.” She subsequently received four postdated...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal from the defendant’s conviction and the court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
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Cheek v. United States 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (White, J.) Yes. The general rule is that a mistake of law is no excuse. A limited exception applies when a mistake of law negates the specific mental state required for conviction. The statute makes it a criminal violation to willfully evade federal income tax obligations. Because of the extreme complexity of the modem tax code, our cases have repeatedly interpreted the term “willfully” to mean a voluntary, intentional violation of a In order for a mistake of law to negate willfulness, then, the mistake must relate to whether the accused of a legal duty. If, because of the complexity of the tax laws, an individual does not know of a legal duty, the mistake affords him a defense because it negates the requirement that he voluntarily and intentionally violate a known legal duty. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that such a mistake must be reasonable. Even an unreasonable mistake would negate a finding that the individual knew of a legal duty. In this case, if the jury...
- The common law rule is that ignorance of the law or a mistake of the law is no defense. Because the tax code has grown so complex, though, the courts have had to soften the common law rule with respect to tax offenses. The government is not interested in punishing those individuals who genuinely did not know they were subject to a particular provision of the code. Instead, the government seeks to punish those who know they have a legal duty to pay taxes but purposefully and intentionally do not do so. Thus, the courts have interpreted the statutory requirement of “willfulness” in the tax code as meaning the individual voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty. It is because of this definition of willfulness that the Court finds that the lower courts erred by instructing the jury that only a reasonable mistake on Cheek’s (D) part would constitute a defense. Cheek (D) was essentially claiming that he did not know of his statutory duty to pay taxes on his wages. As is the
- Cheek (D) was a pilot for American Airlines. He duly filed his tax returns through the year 1979, but thereafter ceased to file his returns. Beginning in 1980, he began claiming excessive withholding deductions—eventually claiming 60 [not a typo!] allowances on his W-2—and also claimed he was exempt from federal income taxes. Cheek (D) did so because he had become associated with and influenced by a group that believed that the federal income tax system was unconstitutional. He was charged with tax evasion under a statute that provided, “any person who willfully attempts . . . to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title . . . shall be guilty of a felony.” Evidence was presented at trial that Cheek (D) was involved in a number of civil lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the federal income tax between 1982 and 1986. At each of those trials, Cheek (D) and the other plaintiffs were told that their claims were frivolous or had been repeatedly rejected by the courts. At...
- A MISTAKE OF LAW THAT RELATES TO THE SPECIFIC MENTAL STATE REQUIRED AND NEGATES SPECIFIC INTENT IS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
- Is a mistake of law that relates to the specific intent of a crime a defense to criminal prosecution?
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People v. Acosta 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Crosby, J.) I do not believe the risk was foreseeable. The helicopters were not within the range of apprehension of a fleeing criminal on the ground, nor were they in the zone of danger. The manner and circumstances of the collision could not have been foreseen. This was a highly extraordinary result, and beyond the long arm of the criminal law.
- When the defendant’s conduct places the victim in a position that allows some other action to cause the harm, the other action is an “independent intervening cause.” Often times, the independent intervening cause will supersede the defendant’s act so as to preclude a finding of proximate cause. However, if the possibility of some harm of the kind that might result from the defendant’s conduct was reasonably foreseeable, the independent intervening cause will not supersede the defendant’s conduct. In this case, the majority held that the helicopter collision was a possible consequence that might have been contemplated, even though there was no evidence that such an event had occurred before. The dissent, on the other hand, concluded that it was not foreseeable, and relied upon the law of foreseeability as used in civil law. In this case, Acosta (D) should have foreseen that his dangerous driving during the police chase could result in others acting in a negligent or reckless manner,...
- (Wallin, J.) Yes. Proximate cause may exist, even with intervening third party negligence and recklessness, if the harm from the defendant’s conduct is a possible consequence which reasonably might have been contemplated. “Proximate cause” requires that an act be the actual cause of the injury. The test is but for the defendant’s act would the injury have occurred? If not, it will not be considered a proximate cause. The issue in this case is whether or not the deaths of the helicopter pilots were foreseeable. The standard for determining proximate cause should be to exclude extraordinary results, and allow the trier of fact to determine the issue on the particular facts of the case using common sense. The appellate courts upon review must give due deference to the trier of facts. In this case, but for Acosta’s (D) conduct of fleeing the police, the helicopters would never have been in position for the crash. Although a similar occurrence is not known to have occurred, it was a...
- INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE WILL NOT SUPERSEDE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT IF THERE IS A REASONABLY FORESEEABLE POSSIBILITY OF SOME HARM FROM THE DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT
- Fleeing criminal suspect, Acosta (D), was pursued by police in a 48 mile car chase, and the two police helicopters assisting in the chase collided and killed three people.
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Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The court’s reliance on the separation of powers doctrine to defer to the prosecutor’s decision not to pursue charges against the defendants could arguably do away with all judicial review of prosecutorial decisions. Yet, clearly government prosecutors are not vested with unfettered discretion in enforcing and upholding the law. Courts frequently preside over selective prosecution claims based on race, gender, and other grounds, but the court chose not to second-guess the prosecutors in this case. Were other considerations at play here?
- (Mansfield, J.) No. Courts are reluctant to interfere with prosecutorial discretion. While it appears that the plaintiffs here have standing to bring their claims because of the direct injury suffered from the defendants’ alleged actions, that issue need not be decided, because the relief sought must nonetheless be denied. With respect to the federal district attorney, mandamus is available only to compel him to perform a duty owed to the plaintiffs. Yet, the decision whether to prosecute or not properly lies within the discretion of the prosecutor, and the separation of powers doctrine directs courts to refrain from exercising their discretion in the prosecutor’s place. Prosecutors often make reasoned decisions based on information not readily available to the public, such as confidential grand jury testimony and their own investigative files. Meaningful judicial review would require access to all such information and enable any person to access otherwise confidential information...
- On appeal to review a district court decision dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.
- SELECTIVE PROSECUTION: The practice or an instance of a criminal prosecution brought at the discretion of a prosecutor rather than as a matter of course in the normal functioning of the prosecuting authority’s office.
- MANDAMUS: A writ issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly.
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Rosemond v. United States 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Kagan, J.) No. For purposes of aiding and abetting law, a person who actively participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense intends that criminal scheme’s commission. Under federal statutory law (18 U.S.C. § 2), as well as under common-law principles, a person is liable for aiding and abetting a crime if (and only if) he takes an affirmative act in furtherance of that offense, with the intent of facilitating the commission of the offense. The intent requirement is satisfied when a person actively participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense. Thus, an active participant in a drug transaction has the intent needed to aid and abet a violation of § 924(c) when he knows that one of his confederates will carry a gun. In that case, the participant has decided to join in the transaction with full awareness that the plan calls for an armed drug sale.
- For purposes of aiding and abetting law, a person who actively participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense intends that criminal scheme’s commission.
- (Alito, J.) The Court confuses two fundamentally distinct concepts: intent and motive. The intent to undertake some act is perfectly consistent with the motive of avoiding the adverse consequences that would otherwise occur. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion which places on the Government (P) the burden of proving that the alleged aider and abettor of a § 924(c) offense had what the Court terms a “realistic opportunity” to refrain from engaging in the conduct at issue.
- Rosemond (D) accompanied Joseph and Perez on a sale of marijuana. When the sale went bad, either Rosemond (D) or Joseph exited the car and fired several shots from a handgun. Rosemond (D) was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) by using a gun in connection with a drug trafficking crime, or aiding and abetting that offense. The Government (P) alleged that Rosemond (D) either fired the shots, or that he aided and abetted the violation. The district court judge instructed the jury that it could convict if Rosemond (D) knew that Joseph used a firearm in the drug trafficking crime, and if Rosemond (D) knowingly and actively participated in the crime.
- For all of that to be true, in a case under § 924(c), when he chooses to participate in a drug transaction knowing it will involve a firearm. He makes no such choice when that knowledge comes too late for him to be reasonably able to act on it. Reversed.
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Regina v. Dudley and Stephens Part 2 4 results
- The defense of necessity justifies a criminal offense when the accused acted with the reasonable belief that the commission of the offense would prevent the occurrence of a greater harm. Nonetheless, the law does not justify as a necessity the killing of an innocent human being. When a person kills an aggressor in self-defense, the homicide is justifiable, as the aggressor is not innocent. In the instant case, Dudley (D1) and Stephens (D2) faced death by starvation and preserved their own lives by killing and eating the body parts of an innocent teenager. Even though they faced dire circumstances and unimaginable temptation, the killing of the innocent teenager was not justifiable. As the opinion states, to save one’s own life is a duty, but the highest duty may be to sacrifice it.
- ..., J.) No. The preservation of one’s own life is not a justification for killing an innocent person. The issue is whether Mr. Dudley’s (D1) and Mr. Stephens’s (D2) acts constitute murder. The special verdict states that it is unlikely that the teenager would have survived and that it is likely that he would have died before the men. Whether the men and the teenager were or were not rescued in a timely manner, the killing of the innocent teenager is unnecessary. Some individuals say there are books of authority that state it is lawful to take the life of another to preserve one’s own life. However, English legal precedence does not support such a contention. English law regards the private necessity that justifies killing another human being to be self-defense. Therefore, no man has the right to kill an innocent person, even if he faces the peril of death. If the extreme necessity of hunger does not justify larceny, how can it justify murder? To save one’s own life is a duty,...
- On July 5, 1884, Mr. Dudley (D1), Mr. Stephens (D2), Mr. Parker, and a teenage English boy set out to sea on a yacht. Subsequently, a storm carried the yacht 1600 miles away from the Cape of Good Hope and forced the men and the teenager to abandon the yacht and board an open boat. For three days, the four individuals subsisted upon two 1-pound cans of turnips. On the fourth day, they caught a small turtle. On the twelfth day in the boat, they had completely consumed the remains of the turtle. From the twelfth day to the twentieth day, the men and the teenager were without food. On the twentieth day, Mr. Dudley (D1), with the assent of Mr. Stephens (D2), approached the teenage boy, who was ill, and fatally cut his throat. The three men then consumed the teenager’s body parts. Four days after the incident, a vessel rescued the three men. An English court tried Mr. Dudley (D1) and Mr. Stephens (D2) for murder. The jury returned a special verdict and asked the Queen’s Court to tell it...
- Request to Queen’s Court to determine if murder was justifiable after lower court rendered a special verdict.
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Regina v. Feely 4 results
- The lower court mistakenly relied on two decisions when deciding to take the issue of defining “dishonestly” away from the jury. The first case involved a man who took money from his place of employment without the honest belief that the money could be repaid. That case, however, can easily be distinguished from the facts in this case as a strong inference of fraud was raised there. In the second case, a man took money from a till without any present intent to replace the money. Such intent was not raised until after he had been charged with the offense of larceny. Again, the facts are significantly different in this case, where Feely (D) made his intention of repayment known immediately. On appeal, this court was astute enough to distinguish these facts from the prior case law to arrive at a just conclusion. While people who take money from tills without permission are usually thieves, it is for the jury, not the judge, to decide whether they have acted dishonestly.
- (Lawton, L.J.) Yes. The trial judge directed the jury that if Feely (D) had taken the money from either the safe or the till (which was already admitted) it was no defense for him to say that he had intended to repay it and that his employers owed him more than enough to cover what he had taken. At no stage of his summation did the judge leave the jury to decide whether the prosecution had proved that Feely (D) had taken the money dishonestly. This was because the judge seems to have thought that he had to decide as a matter of law what amounted to dishonesty and he expressed his concept of dishonesty as follows: “. . . if someone does something deliberately knowing that his employers are not prepared to tolerate it, is that not dishonest?” We do not agree that judges should define what “dishonestly” means. This word is in common use whereas the word “fraudulently” has acquired as a result of case law a special meaning. Jurors, when deciding whether an appropriation was dishonest...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Can it be a defense in law for a man charged with theft, and proved to have taken money, to say that when he took the money he intended to repay it, and had reasonable grounds for believing, and did believe, that he would be able to do so?
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People v. Zackowitz 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- —that evidence of other crimes or actions to show bad character may not be introduced to demonstrate that, because of malicious propensities, a defendant is more likely to have committed the charged offense—is embodied in federal statutory law as well as in case law. Today, the Supreme Court articulated the reasons behind the rule: “The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.” Thus, the purpose of the rule is to protect a criminal defendant from evidence that is likely to arouse the undue hostility of the jury and affect the result of the trial in some improper way. Further, the rule serves to keep the focus of the trial on the crime charged. Finally, the rule serves to protect a defendant who has already paid his debt to society from being convicted for the...
- As a part of its case-in-chief, can the prosecution in a criminal case put forth evidence of a defendant’s poor character?
- ...of mind at the time of the homicide—whether he killed with premeditation or in the heat of the moment. In such a case, the jury has the duty of getting into the mind of the defendant, to decide what exactly he was thinking. Doing so is difficult enough without a blurring of the issues by evidence illegally admitted and carrying with it in its admission an appeal to prejudice and passion. Such evidence was admitted here. From the beginning of the trial, the People (P) began the endeavor to load Zackowitz (D) down with the burden of an evil character. He was put before the jury as a man of murderous disposition, and to that end the People (P) were allowed to prove that at the time of the encounter, he had in his apartment a radio box, three pistols, and a teargas gun, none of which were involved in the crime. The purpose of this irrelevant evidence was to persuade the jury that Zackowitz (D) was a man of vicious and dangerous propensities, who because of these propensities...
- CHARACTER IS NEVER AN ISSUE IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNLESS THE DEFENDANT CHOOSES TO MAKE IT ONE
- (Pound, J.) The real question here is whether the matter relied on has such a connection with the crime charged as to be admissible on any ground. If Zackowitz (D) had been arrested at the time of the killing and these weapons had been found on his person, the People (P) would not have been barred from proving that fact, and the further fact that they were nearby in his apartment should not preclude the proof as bearing on the entire deed of which the act charged forms a part. Defendant was presented to the jury as a man having dangerous weapons in his possession, making a selection therefrom and going forth to put into execution his threats to kill; not as a man of a dangerous disposition in general, but as one who, having an opportunity to select a weapon to carry out his threats, proceeded to do so.
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United States v. Armstrong 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Note that a claim of selective prosecution is not a defense to the merits of the criminal charge itself, but an independent claim that a prosecutor exceeded the bounds of his or her discretion by bringing a criminal charge for constitutionally impermissible reasons. Generally, selective-prosecution claims are not likely to succeed because of the heavy burden criminal defendants bear in order to prove them. Also, federal courts are reluctant to review the decisions of federal prosecutors, because federal prosecutors are members of the executive branch of government, whose duty to assist the President in executing federal laws originates in the Constitution.
- Armstrong (D) and others were indicted on charges involving conspiring to possess crack cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, and federal firearms offenses. Armstrong (D) moved the court for discovery, claiming that he was singled out for prosecution because he was black. The prosecution argued that Armstrong (D) did not produce enough evidence to entitle him to discovery on a claim of selective prosecution. The court granted the motion and ordered the Government (P) to provide information relating to all cocaine and firearm offenses for the previous three years, indicating the race of each defendant. The Government (P) moved for reconsideration and filed a detailed affidavit explaining why the defendants were charged. After reconsideration of the discovery order was denied, the court dismissed the case. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
- (Rehnquist, C.J.) Yes. In selective-prosecution claims based on race, in order to obtain discovery, the claimant must produce preliminary evidence that similarly situated offenders of a different race could have been prosecuted but were not. In such cases, the court is called upon to exercise its judicial power over a special province of the executive branch, which is constitutionally charged with carrying out and enforcing the nation’s laws. Because of this constitutional tension, a strong presumption exists that the Government (P) has exercised its powers faithfully and competently. Only clear evidence to the contrary will overcome this presumption.
- SELECTIVE PROSECUTION: The practice or an instance of a criminal prosecution brought at the discretion of a prosecutor rather than as a matter of course in the normal functioning of the prosecuting authority’s office.
- (Stevens, J.) While the defendants did not establish the facts necessary to establish a selective prosecution defense, the facts were sufficient to require some disclosure. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, the penalties for possession and distribution of crack cocaine are severe, especially in comparison to the penalties for possession and distribution of powder cocaine. The statistics reflect that although sixty-five percent of crack users are white, eighty-eight percent of those charged with its possession and distribution are black, and the sentences imposed on black defendants are over forty percent longer than those imposed on white defendants. These objective facts warrant consideration of the motives underlying the government’s prosecutorial policy to uncover any discriminatory intent. The court should take judicial notice of these facts and compel the government to justify its decisions to prosecute.
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Staples v. United States 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- required for such a violation. However, silence on this point by itself does not necessarily suggest that congress intended to dispense with a conventional element. On the contrary, we must construe the statute in light of the background rules of the common law, in which the requirement of some as an element of a crime. The Government argues that the Act fits in a line of precedent concerning what we have termed “public welfare” or “regulatory” offenses, in which we have understood Congress to impose a form of strict criminal liability through statutes that do not require the defendant to know the facts that make his conduct illegal. In construing such statutes, we have inferred from silence that Congress did not intend to require proof of ...is true that in such cases we have reasoned that as long as the defendant knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a character that places him in responsible relation to a public danger he should be alerted to the probability...
- Justice Thomas begins by looking at the offense in light of the common law and coming to the conclusion that there must be some requirement. He supports this conclusion by looking at the maximum penalty allowed for a conviction under the Act and suggesting that when such serious consequences are involved, there must be some form of criminal intent. He compares the possession of hand grenades with possession of a normal appearing gun that happens to have been modified to fire in fully automatic mode. What he says, in a roundabout way, is that grenades, just by being grenades—devices that are not normally found in homes, or anywhere besides military installations for that matter—are of such characteristics as to put the possessor on notice that there is a good chance the devices are very closely and strictly regulated. A normal appearing rifle, on the other hand, does not ...and very commonplace in America. Mere possession, therefore, does not show the owner has any sort of criminal...
- A criminal statute written without a requirement will be construed in light of the background of the common law for such crimes to include a
- REQUIREMENT, A CRIMINAL STATUTE WILL BE CONSTRUED IN LIGHT OF THE RULES OF THE COMMON LAW TO REQUIRE
- Certification to the U.S. Supreme Court after the Circuit Court of Appeals denied defendant’s appeal from a felony conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon.
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People v. Olsen 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Grodin, J.) I am convinced that the Court is correct in its holding that the legislature did not want a reasonable mistake of age to be a defense against a charge under § 288, subd. (a). What troubles me is the notion that a person who acted with such belief, and is not otherwise shown to be guilty of any criminal conduct, may not only be convicted but sentenced to prison notwithstanding his eligibility for probation when it appears his belief did not accord with reality. That is cruel and unusual punishment. While our legal institutions include certain “strict liability” crimes, these are mostly confined to “regulatory” or “public welfare” offenses. But even in the regulatory sphere judicial and academic acceptance of liability without fault has not been enthusiastic. With respect to traditional crimes, it is a widely accepted normative principle that conviction should not be had without proof of fault. When a person has acted under a reasonable belief that his actions are in...
- Appeal to the State’s highest court after a conviction in the trial court for the statutory rape of a girl less than fourteen years old.
- (Bird, C.J.) No. The language of § 288 is silent as to whether a good faith, reasonable mistake as to the victim’s age constitutes a defense to a charge under that statute. This Court previously held, against established precedent, in that an accused’s good faith and reasonable belief that a victim was 18 years or more of age was a defense to a charge of statutory rape. One Court of Appeal has declined to apply this holding to a case where a marijuana dealer made out a reasonable mistake of age defense to a charge of offering or furnishing marijuana to a minor. That court distinguished the case from ...court recognized this consideration when it made clear that it did not contemplate applying the mistake of age defense when the victim was of such tender years. This conclusion is also supported by the legislature’s enactment of § 1203.066, subd. (a)(3) which makes people convicted of the crime Olsen (D) has been convicted of eligible for probation if they “honestly and reasonably...
- The holding of this court seems to be in line with the dissent in the case—that when an actor would not be guilty of any crime had the facts been as he believed them to be, as long as the mistake of fact is reasonable it will constitute a valid defense. California is in the minority in this regard, but there are a substantial number of states that agree and allow a defense of reasonable mistake of age. In footnote 2 of Judge Grodin’s opinion he points out that even though the prosecution suggests that Olsen (D) was at least guilty of having sexual intercourse with a female under eighteen years, he was never charged with such a crime let alone convicted, and that it is not clear from the record that Olsen (D) even had intercourse with Shawn. In light of this revelation, how is it that Olsen’s (D) reasonable mistake of age defense was not allowed? Perhaps the Court relied on the reasoning of Judge Bramwell in
- Olsen (D) was convicted of committing a lewd or lascivious act with a child under fourteen years old. At trial the victim, named Shawn, who was just under fourteen years at the time if the incident testified that she was staying in her family’s trailer in their driveway due to the presence of a number of houseguests. That during the third night she’d locked the trailer as directed by her parents and was sleeping when she was awakened by Olsen (D) knocking on the window and asking to be let in. That she ignored his requests and he soon left only to have another person named Garcia come and also knock on the window asking to enter. Once again she did not answer and Garcia left. That she was once again awoken by barking dogs and by Garcia who had a knife by her side and his hand over her mouth. Garcia is then said to have called out to Olsen (D) to enter the trailer. That upon entering the trailer, Garcia told Olsen (D) to have intercourse with the girl which Olsen (D) proceeded to do....
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United States v. Elliott 5 results
- This case holds that a series of agreements that under pre-RICO law would constitute multiple conspiracies could under RICO be tried as a single enterprise conspiracy. What ties these conspiracies together is not the mere fact that they involve the same enterprise, but is instead an agreement on an overall objective. What RICO does is to provide a new criminal objective by defining a new substantive crime. That crime consists of participation in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Elliott (D) and the other defendants could not have been tried on a single conspiracy count under pre-RICO law because they had not agreed to commit any particular crime. They were properly tied together under RICO only because the evidence established an agreement to commit a substantive RICO offense. The agreement was an implicit one, but it was an agreement nonetheless.
- (Simpson, C.J.) Yes. The Court has previously held that proof of multiple conspiracies under an indictment alleging a single conspiracy constituted a material variance requiring reversal where a defendant’s substantial rights had been affected. At issue was the right not to be tried en masse for the conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses committed by others. This protects against the transference of guilt from members of one conspiracy to members of another. The impact of that decision was soon limited by the Court in a case where the chain conspiracy rationale was born. The Court reasoned that since the scheme which is the object of the conspiracy must depend on the successful operation of each link in the chain, an individual associating himself with this type of conspiracy knows that for its success it requires an organization wider than may be disclosed by his personal participation. This rationale applies only insofar as the alleged agreement has a common end or...
- The indictment charged Elliott (D) and five others with conspiring with each other, with 37 unindicted co-conspirators, and with “others to the grand jury known and unknown,” to violate Section 1962, subsection (c), of RICO [that’s one big party!]. The essence of the conspiracy charge was that Elliott (D) and the others agreed to participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise whose purposes were to commit thefts, fence stolen goods, illegally traffic in narcotics, obstruct justice, and engage in “other criminal activities.” The evidence supported the Government’s (P) claim that Elliott (D) and the others were involved in one or more of the criminal endeavors. However, at no time did more than three of the defendants participate in any specific criminal endeavor, although one person, J.C. Hawkins, was linked to all of the crimes. The thread tying all of these individuals together was the desire to make money.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal from the lower court’s conviction of the defendant.
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B (A Minor) v. Director of Public Prosecutions 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Arguably, the honest-belief approach better serves the underlying purposes of criminal punishment. While the civil law expects a person to act as a reasonable person would in similar circumstances, the criminal law generally requires a guilty intent. If a person commits an unlawful act believing that his act is indeed within the law, criminal punishment seems unjustified and unlikely to serve the aims of deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. Yet, because the honesty of one’s belief is difficult to ascertain, the reasonableness standard necessarily lurks in the background when determining whether criminal punishment is justified.
- (Lord Nicholls, J.) Yes. Absent legislative direction, the common law presumes that an accused’s honest belief that negates the requisite of the crime is a valid defense. The Indecency with Children Act, like most statutory offenses, does not provide the requisite mental state necessary to commit the crime. In such cases, the common law presumes that a certain mental state remains an essential element of the crime absent clear indication to the contrary. Traditionally, this presumption provides that an honestly mistaken belief by the defendant concerning the illegality of his actions is no defense unless it is reasonable under the circumstances. More recently, however, courts have reexamined this presumption and recognized the defendant’s honest belief as a defense even when unreasonable. Accordingly, unless a statute incorporates a reasonableness requirement measuring the defendant’s culpability in objective terms, the defendant’s subjective intent determines his criminal guilt...law
- : The state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness. is the second of two essential elements of every crime at common law, the other being the
- has no place in modern law. There should be no special rule with respect to age-based offenses, and a defendant should be judged on the basis of the facts as he believed them to be.
- Review of a trial decision denying the defendant’s criminal defense.
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State v. McFadden 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case declines to follow the holding in . At first blush, it appears that these two cases are identical but reach exactly opposite conclusions. Both involved unlawful car racing, and both defendants were charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection with the deaths of other racers. The court in upheld the criminal conviction but the court in reversed the conviction. How do the cases differ? First, they involve different state supreme courts. Second, the deceased in intentionally chose to drive on the wrong side of the road and into the oncoming traffic lanes, in an effort to overtake the other race car. By so doing, he recklessly took the risk of injury or death that obviously exists by driving in the wrong way lane. In
- (Allbee, J.) No. We first examine the theory of liability that McFadden (D) committed involuntary manslaughter by recklessly engaging in a drag race so as to proximately cause the death of both Sulgrove and the child. By participating in unlawful racing, McFadden(D) initiated a series of events resulting in the death of two others. The fact that Sulgrove voluntary and recklessly participated in the drag race does not of itself absolve McFadden (D) of criminal responsibility for Sulgrove’s death. The acts of McFadden (D) were contributing and substantial factors in bringing about the deaths of others [despite his argument that it was all Sulgrove’s fault]. Where the acts and omissions of two or more persons work concurrently as the efficient cause of an injury, each act is regarded as a proximate cause. We also reject the contention that the trial judge erred in applying the civil standard of proximate cause to this case, rather than the direct causal connection used in ...criminal...
- PROXIMATE CAUSE PRINCIPLE APPLIED IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS INSTEAD OF MORE STRINGENT DIRECT CAUSAL CONNECTION STANDARD
- Appeal following criminal convictions of involuntary manslaughter.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Burns v. State 4 results
- (Marshall, J.) No. Error is assigned because the court instructed the jury to the effect that, if Burns (D) converted to his own use any of the insane man’s money he did so as bailee. It is suggested that the court should have defined the term “bailee,” as used in the statute, and left it to the jury to find the fact as to whether the circumstances satisfied such statute or not. A court may properly instruct a jury in a criminal case, as well as any other, respecting any fact, or facts, established by the evidence beyond any room for reasonable controversy. An essential of any ultimate conclusion sought, it is not harmful error, if error at all, to treat such essential as having been proven, as the court here did in saying that Burns (D) was a bailee of whatever of the insane man’s money came into his possession. Taking possession without present intent to appropriate raises all the contractual elements essential to a bailment. So the person who bona fide recovers the property of...
- If one, without the trespass that characterizes ordinary larceny, comes into possession of any personalty of another and is duty bound to exercise some degree of care to preserve and restore the thing to such other, or to some person for that other, or otherwise account for the property, he is a bailee. It is the element of lawful possession, however created, and the duty to account for the thing as the property of another, that creates the bailment, regardless of whether such possession is based on contract in the ordinary sense. A bailment is created by delivery of the personalty to one person by another, to be dealt with as the property of such other person under a contract, express or implied, but the word “contract” is used in a broad sense. The mutuality may be created by operation of law as well as by the acts of the parties with intention to contract, such as in this case.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Did the court err by instructing the jury to the effect that if Burns (D) converted to his own use any of the insane man’s money he did so as bailee?
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People v. Phillips 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Tobriner, J.) No. Under California law, a homicide committed during the perpetration of a fraud cannot be held to be a felony murder. The trial court erred in giving a felony murder instruction. Phillips (D) argues that the California Penal Code does not set forth any provision for second degree felony murder. The felony murder rule is deeply imbedded in California law. But only felonies that are in themselves “inherently dangerous to human life” fall under the felony murder rule. In order to determine whether a felony is inherently dangerous to human life, California courts do not look to the facts of individual cases, but rather, look to the elements of the felony in the abstract. The felony murder rule is narrowly construed in general and has been widely criticized, and even abandoned in England. No prior case has held that the felony murder rule may be invoked where a death results from the perpetration of a fraud. The prosecution argues that the court should create a new...courts
- The felony murder rule can only be invoked when the underlying felony is inherently dangerous to human life. The policy behind limiting the application of the rule may be to reduce the number of defendants found guilty of murder in cases where the homicide would have been manslaughter if the defendant had not been committing a crime at the time of the killing. This is an important policy interest when long prison terms are at stake. The requirement that the felony be dangerous to life has been stated in two different ways. Under one approach, the question is whether, on the facts of the particular case, including the circumstances under which the felony was committed, there was a foreseeable danger to human life. The other approach limits the felony-murder doctrine to those felonies that are “inherently dangerous,” that is, the peril to human life must be determined from the elements of the felony in the abstract rather than from the facts of the particular case. Under this view,...
- Under California law, can a chiropractor whose cure for cancer did not succeed in saving his patient’s life be found guilty of felony murder based on his act of fraud?
- ...only means available to save or prolong the child’s life. Instead of following the doctors’ advice, the Eppings opted to follow the advice of a chiropractor, Phillips, (D). Phillips (D) told the Eppings that he could cure the child without surgery by administering a treatment designed “to build up her resistance.” Phillips (D) charged the Eppings $700. Linda died in about six months. Phillips (D) was indicted for murder in the second degree. After the trial, the trial court gave a three-part instruction to the jury, explaining the definition of murder in the second degree. In the third part of the instruction, the trial judge told the jury that the unlawful killing of another person with malice aforethought but without the deliberate and premeditated intent to kill, is murder in the second degree if “the killing is done in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a felony such as Grand Theft. If a death occurs in the perpetration of a course of conduct amounting to Grand Theft...on
- APPLICATION OF FELONY MURDER RULE NARROWED TO CASES WHERE FELONY ITSELF THREATENS HUMAN LIFE
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United States v. Schoon 5 results
- (Boochever, J.) No. Protesters performing indirect civil disobedience may not claim the necessity defense. To invoke the necessity defense, defendants colorably must show that (i) they were faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil, (ii) they acted to prevent imminent harm, (iii) they reasonably anticipated their conduct would directly cause the harm to be averted, and (iv) they had no legal alternatives to violating the law. We could affirm the trial court’s decision for the reasons cited, but we find a deeper systematic reason for the absence of federal case law recognizing a necessity defense in indirect civil disobedience cases. “Civil disobedience” is the willful violation of a law for social or political protest. “Direct” civil disobedience involves protesting a law by breaking that law. “Indirect” civil disobedience involves violating a law or interfering with a government policy that is not itself the object of protest. Here, this case involves indirect...
- The “choice of evils” is essentially a utilitarian doctrine that allows a lesser evil in order to abate greater societal harm. Purely symbolic protests that have no chance of changing law or government policy should not be permitted, since the nuisance cost outweighs their nonexistent benefit. Interestingly, the court leaves open the possibility of justifying civil disobedience with the defense of necessity. However, direct disobedience is largely impossible in cases where the government supports tyrannical regimes with money and semi-covert help, since the Supreme Court has held that taxpayers lack standing to challenge how the government spends its money. The real reason why courts usually won’t justify civil disobedience is not economic but political, no government wants its appointed officials to permit its laws to be disregarded. Allowing individuals to violate any laws they find unjust would undermine the legislature’s ability to govern by majority rule, which is a practical...
- INDIRECT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: Violating a law or interfering with a government policy as a political/social protest, where the violated law is not itself the object of protest. For example, here, the protesters opposed American involvement in El Salvador. Rather than protesting
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Schoon (D), Kennon (D), Manning (D), and others protested American involvement in El Salvador by disrupting and vandalizing an IRS office. A federal police officer ordered them to disperse. When they refused, Schoon (D), Kennon (D), and Manning (D) were arrested and charged with the federal crimes of (i) obstructing IRS activities and (ii) failing to comply with orders from a federal officer. At bench trial, they asserted the defense of necessity, contending they acted solely to prevent further bloodshed in El Salvador [by American-supported government death squads]. The judge held that the necessity defense was unavailable as a matter of law to humanitarian protesters, because (i) the harm was not immediate, (ii) the protest would not prevent the harm, and (iii) other legal alternatives existed. They were convicted of obstruction and noncompliance, but appealed, contending necessity was a proper defense.
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Maher v. People 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Christiancy, J.) Yes. Evidence that a defendant in an assault case had reason to believe that the victim was engaged in a prolonged sexual relationship with the defendant’s wife would be enough under Michigan law to constitute evidence of provocation. In determining whether Maher (D) is guilty of assault and battery or assault with intent to murder, the court must examine Maher’s (D) motivation. The court must treat the case as if Hunt had died as a result of the injuries Maher (D) inflicted in order to determine whether, had Hunt died, Maher (D) would have been guilty of manslaughter or murder. If Maher (D) would have been guilty of manslaughter, he cannot be found guilty of assault with intent to murder. The court must examine the events leading up to the assault to determine whether Maher (D) experienced sufficient provocation to reduce his action from assault with intent to murder to assault and battery. It is the judge’s role to determine what the law will consider reasonable...
- This case stands for the principle that when considering whether a defendant is guilty of manslaughter as opposed to murder, a jury should look at any circumstances leading up to the crime that might lead a reasonable man to lose self-control. Juries should not be forced to consider only conduct witnessed by the defendant, but also words uttered in his presence. This is a flexible approach that may be problematic. Allowing juries too much discretion in deciding whether a defendant was sufficiently provoked so that his crime is reduced to manslaughter causes inconsistency in the law. Some juries may be more lenient than others, and cases with similar factual backgrounds may wind up with different results. When punishment is severe and includes long stretches of prison time, the law should perhaps be as unambiguous as possible in order to allow the punishment to serve as an effective deterrent. If everyone knows that killing someone based on a rumor one hears is punishable by prison...
- (Manning, J.) The evidence was properly excluded because it would not have shown that Maher (D) was given sufficient provocation. Had this been a case where the court would have to determine whether Maher (D) was guilty of murder or manslaughter, the court would have to decide whether the provocation Maher (D) asserted would have caused a reasonable man to commit the same crime. In order to be found reasonable, the provoking action must have occurred in Maher’s (D) presence. Maher (D) did not catch his wife and Hunt in the act of sexual intercourse. To allow juries to find sufficient provocation in cases where defendants merely hear gossip about their spouses’ adulterous behavior would undermine society’s interest in punishing people who take the lives of others. In a state where the death penalty has been abolished, the public policy reasons for strict scrutiny and the broad interpretation of the law in the defendant’s favor are less important than the public policy in favor of...
- Would evidence that a defendant in an assault case had reason to believe that the victim was engaged in a prolonged sexual relationship with the defendant’s wife be enough under Michigan law to constitute evidence of provocation and therefore to reduce an assault with intent to murder charge to an assault and battery charge?
- Appeal of conviction of assault with intent to murder on the grounds that the trial court erred in granting the prosecution’s motion to suppress evidence.
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People v. Williams 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The common law defined larceny as the taking and carrying away of someone else’s personal property, by trespass, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. Larceny requires a trespassory taking, which is a taking without the property owner’s consent. The reasoning supporting larceny by trick’s inclusion within the crime of larceny—that fraud vitiates the property owner’s consent to the taking—was not extended to cases involving the fraudulent transfer of title. These limitations on the common law crime of larceny spurred the creation of the separate statutory offenses of theft by false pretenses and embezzlement. Unlike larceny, the newly enacted offense of theft by false pretenses involved acquiring title over the property, not just possession. Britain’s 18th century division of theft into the three separate crimes of larceny, false pretenses, and embezzlement made its way into the early criminal laws of the American states. In the early 20th century, many...
- (Kennard, J.) No. Theft by false pretenses is not a felonious taking because it involves neither asportation nor a non-consensual taking. To determine the meaning of the term intended by the Legislature, it is necessary to examine the common law roots of California’s robbery statute.
- Appeal from an order of the Court of Appeals.
- Because California’s robbery statute uses the common law phrase “felonious taking,” we conclude that theft by larceny, and not by false pretenses, is a necessary element of robbery. Larceny requires “asportation,” which is a carrying away of stolen property. Asportation makes larceny a continuing offense, so that a defendant who uses force or fear in an attempt to escape with property taken by larceny has committed robbery. But theft by false pretenses
- Williams (D) used credit cards that had been re-encoded with a third-party’s credit card information to buy gift cards at Walmart. A store employee noticed that the numbers on the card did not match the numbers on the receipt, and confronted Williams (D) about the discrepancy. Williams (D) headed for the store exit and shoved a security guard. After a brief struggle, Williams (D) was handcuffed. He was convicted of multiple counts of robbery, defined as the “felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” It was alleged that shoving the security guard constituted “force or fear.”
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City of Chicago v. Morales 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Chicago City Council enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits “criminal street gang members” from “loitering” with one another or with any other person in any public place. The ordinance creates a criminal offense based upon four predicates: 1) the police officer must reasonably believe that at least one of the two or more persons present in a “public place” is a “criminal street gang member;” [Are baggy pants and tank tops the gang member look?] 2) the persons must be “loitering,” which the ordinance defines as “remaining in any one place with no apparent purpose;” [taking care of gang business is an “apparent purpose” isn’t it?] 3) the officer must then order “all” of the persons to disperse and remove themselves “from the area;” and, 4) a person must disobey the officer’s order. If any person, gang member or not, disobeys the officer’s order, that person is guilty of violating the ordinance. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the ordinance violates the...
- Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law where the ordinance 1) fails to provide notice to enable the ordinary person to understand what conduct it prohibits and 2) where it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory police enforcement.
- (Stevens, J.) Yes. Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law where the ordinance 1) fails to provide notice to enable the ordinary person to understand what conduct it prohibits and 2) where it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory police enforcement. We first note that the ordinance covers a significant amount of additional activity than the intimidating gang members’ conduct that interferes with the neighborhood residents’ enjoyment of their homes and surrounding areas. Morales (D) contends that the scope of the additional coverage makes the ordinance too vague. With respect to proper notice, the definition of the term “loiter” in the ordinance—“to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose”—does not have a common and accepted meaning. An ordinary citizen standing in a public place with a group of people would not know if he or she had an “apparent purpose.” However, since the City (P) obviously did not mean to criminalize each instance a citizen stands in...
- Can a criminal ordinance be declared invalid if it is vague?
- Chicago’s ordinance unfortunately failed in two areas—it did not give the citizens adequate notice of what was meant by “loitering” and it gave the police too much discretion in enforcing the law. Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, gave the City guidance in how the ordinance could have been construed more narrowly, even suggesting a definition of the term “loiter.” Justice Thomas, in his strongly worded dissent, shamed the majority for focusing exclusively on the imagined “rights” of the two percent of the people in the City who were causing the problems that keep the other ninety-eight percent in their homes and off the streets and afraid to shop. However, Justice Thomas addresses the “vagueness” argument by saying that common sense dictates what would or would not be covered by the ordinance. This is a weak argument, when contrasted with the majority’s examples of what persons should do once a dispersal order has been given. As the majority noted, if the loitering is in...
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Regina v. Serné 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In this case, the court asked the jury to apply a new standard for determining whether felony murder was committed. The standard articulated by the court could not be found in the common law of the time, but was a standard likely to be upheld on appeal. The reason for narrowing the standard for felony murder may have been to lessen the number of defendants found guilty of murder and sentenced to death when their actions would have been found to be evidence of mere manslaughter if the defendant had not also been guilty of a felony. The court in this case may not have wanted the fact that Serné (D1) and Goldfinch (D2) were accused of a felony to unfairly prejudice the jury and encourage it to decide whether the defendants were guilty of murder, without also considering whether the defendants had actually started the fires.
- 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311 (Central Criminal Court 1887)
- DOCK: In British criminal procedure, criminal defendants are separated from their defense counsel, witnesses, and the jury in the courtroom during trial. The area where criminal defendants sit is known as “the dock.”
- (Stephen, J.) No. Under English law, only an action taken with intent to commit a felony that is known to create a danger to human life can constitute felony murder. Murder is an unlawful homicide committed with malice aforethought. “Malice aforethought” is a legal term and must be construed in the light of previous cases, rather than according to the meanings each individual juror is likely to assign to it. One type of murder with malice aforethought is the killing of another person through an action taken with the intention to commit a felony. Another type of murder with malice aforethought is an action taken with the knowledge that that action will probably cause the death of another person. If Serné (D1) and/or Goldfinch (D2) killed Sjaak Serné either through an action undertaken with intent to commit a felony, such as insurance fraud, or through an action undertaken in the knowledge that that action would lead to someone’s death, then Serné (D1) and/or Goldfinch (D2) will be...law
- ENGLISH COURT APPLIES NARROW DEFINITION OF “FELONY MURDER” IN INSURANCE-FIRE CASE
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Regina v. Prince 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Upon all the cases I think it is proved that there can be no conviction for crime in England in the absence of a criminal mind or is present in the case of the person who knowingly does acts which would constitute a crime if the result were as he anticipated, but in which the result may not improbably end by bringing the offense within a more serious class of crime. For example, when a man strikes with the intent to do grievous bodily harm, and kills, the result makes the crime murder. The man has run the risk. The same would be the case where one takes a girl without any belief as to her age, or without caring how young she is. He has run the risk. It is clear that ignorance of the law is not an excuse. It is a different case where one, if the facts were as he believed, would be guilty of no crime at all because in such a case the required ...exist. I come to the conclusion that a mistake of facts, on reasonable grounds, to the extent the facts were as believed, would make him not...
- Judge Bramwell bases his holding mostly on the normative consideration that because the act was “wrong,” and Prince (D) had to know it was “wrong,” the fact he thought the girl was eighteen does not excuse his conduct. He seems to be saying that because the act in and of itself is morally wrong no criminal intent is required. He fails to support his contention with any type of rational argument, instead he simply says that “no argument is necessary,” or seemingly that everyone knows as a matter of common knowledge that the act is wrong and therefore there should be strict liability. Judge Brett draws a more lenient line. He feels that if the facts were as the actor believed them to be there would be no crime, then such a mistake will be a valid defense as long as the mistake is reasonable. However, if the facts as believed by the actor would still make the act a crime, albeit a lesser one, or if the actor has acted with a reckless disregard as to what the facts are, then his belief,...
- (Bramwell, J.) Nowhere in the statute is there any requirement that the defendant not have a belief that the girl is sixteen years old or greater in order for guilt to lie. For the following reasons this Court is not bound to read such a requirement into the statute: The act forbidden is wrong in itself; I do not say illegal, but wrong. No argument is necessary to prove this; it is enough to state the case. The legislature has decided that anyone who does this wrong act, does it at the risk of her turning out to be under sixteen. This opinion gives full scope and accord to the doctrine of . In such a case he would not know he was doing the forbidden act. He would not know he was doing an act wrong in itself, whatever was his intention, if done without lawful cause. The same principle holds true in other cases. For instance, the man held liable for striking a police officer in the execution of his duty, though he did not know the man was a police officer. Why? Because the act is...
- Criminal statutes that do not require the proscribed conduct to be done “knowingly” cannot be defended against by a mistake of fact, they are strict liability.
- : The frame of mind, pursuant to a criminal statute, the prosecution must prove the actor had in order to establish guilt.
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Commonwealth v. Roebuck 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In reaching its decision, the court considered the Model Penal Code commentary on accomplice liability, observing that the Pennsylvania statute was based on the MPC. The court noted the observation of some commentators that the MPC formulation was unduly ambiguous in imposing legal accountability on accomplices for the unintended consequences of reckless conduct, but it disagreed with that observation. The court also disagreed with the judicial decisions suggesting that an accomplice’s liability cannot extend to results beyond those within the contemplation of shared criminal purposes. For those reasons, the court concluded that holding an accomplice criminally liable for a result requiring a mental state of recklessness was not theoretically impossible, contrary to the defendant’s assertion.
- (Prosecuting Authority) v. (Criminal Defendant)
- (Saylor, J.) Yes. Accomplice liability does not require the defendant to have the conscious objective to cause a particular result when such an outcome is an element of the offense. An accomplice is accountable for contributing to criminal conduct to the degree his culpability equals what is required to support liability of a principal actor. An accomplice may be held legally accountable when he aids another in planning or committing criminal conduct with the purpose of promoting or facilitating it, and acts with recklessness in so doing. An accomplice need not always intend results essential to the completed crime. “One who solicits an end, or aids or agrees to aid in its achievement, is an accomplice in whatever means may be employed, insofar as they constitute or commit an offense fairly envisaged in the purposes of the association.” When a wholly different crime has been committed, involving conduct not within the conscious objectives of the accomplice, however, he is not liable...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Is it possible, as a matter of law, to be convicted as an accomplice to third-degree murder?
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Graham v. Florida 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Roberts, C.J.) I see no need to invent a new constitutional rule in reaching the conclusion that life without parole violates the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in this particular case. I agree with the result reached with regard to this defendant, but disagree with the Court’s categorical ban on life without parole in all juvenile, non-homicide cases. Our sentencing system requires the application of reasoned judgment on a case-by-case basis.
- As the Court notes in this case, the concept of proportionality, which is central to the Eighth Amendment, is viewed less through a historical prism than according to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. The clearest and most reliable evidence of contemporary values, for purposes of an Eighth Amendment challenge, is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures, but there are measures of consensus other than legislation, and actual sentencing practices are an important part of the Court’s inquiry into consensus. Community consensus, while entitled to great weight, is not determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is, by its nature, disproportionate to the offense and in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
- (Kennedy, J.) No. The Eight Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide. The concept of proportionality is central to an Eighth Amendment analysis. The Court has considered Eighth Amendment challenges to the length of particular defendants’ sentences and to the death penalty, but has not yet considered a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence as applied to an entire class of offenders, as in this case. The state argues that there is no national consensus against the type of sentence imposed in this case, such that the sentence is appropriate, but the state’s argument is unavailing. The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of offenders in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question. This inquiry includes a consideration of whether the sentence serves legitimate penological goals. Juveniles have lessened culpability...
- Certiorari to review the juvenile defendant’s challenge to his criminal sentence.
- CULPABILITY: Blameworthiness, or the quality of being culpable. Criminal culpability generally requires a showing that the defendant acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to each element of the offense charged.
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Smallwood v. State 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A conviction for attempted murder (or the attempt of any other crime) is proper only when the state proves that the defendant possessed the specific intent to commit the particular substantive crime. Several rationales justify the specific intent requirement. The first of these justifications is that one cannot attempt to produce a result without an intent to do so. For example, it makes no sense to attempt to negligently cause an injury. Another rationale is that one who intends to achieve a criminal result is more morally reprehensible than one who does so recklessly or negligently. This case deals with the issue of how that specific intent may be proved. The court notes that specific intent can be inferred through the defendant’s conduct. However, if the prosecution relies solely on the defendant’s conduct for proof of intent, that conduct must naturally and probably result in commission of the crime. In certain cases, the inference is a matter of common sense. The example used...
- (Murphy, C.J.) No. The specific intent necessary for an attempt conviction may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct only if the crime attempted would have been the natural and probable result of such conduct, but for the lack of its successful completion. We have previously held that the intent in the crimes of assault with intent to murder and attempted murder is the specific intent to murder, i.e., the specific intent to kill under circumstances that would not legally justify, excuse or mitigate the killing. Because it is a subjective matter otherwise requiring the cooperation of the defendant, the intent to kill may inferred from the conduct of the defendant and other circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the State (P) argues that Smallwood’s conviction may stand based on prior cases holding that the intent to kill can be inferred from using a deadly weapon aimed at a vital part of the body. However, this case is different. First, those holdings are based on the notion that...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- SPECIFIC INTENT: The mental purpose of committing criminally prohibited acts combined with the purpose to violate the law.
- Based on the fact that he knew he was HIV positive and had been warned of the need to practice safe sex, Smallwood (D) was convicted of assault with intent to kill his rape victims. Smallwood (D) challenged his conviction on the ground that the specific intent to kill could not be inferred from his conduct. He argued that the most that could be inferred from his actions was the reckless endangerment of his victims. The State (P) argued that Smallwood’s (D) acts were akin to aiming and firing a loaded weapon at his victims.
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United States v. Jewell 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Browning, J.) No. The legal premise of the instructions given by the trial court is firmly supported by leading commentators here and in England. The substantive justification of the rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable. The textual justification is that in common understanding one “knows” facts of which he is less than absolutely certain. In other words, when one acts with an awareness of the high probability that some fact exists, he is acting “knowingly” with respect to that fact. This principle does not apply, however, when the actor has actual belief the fact does not exist. This rule is meant to keep actors from escaping liability through “wilful blindness” or “connivance,” when the actor is aware of the probable existence of a material fact but does not satisfy himself that it does not in fact exist. This required state of mind differs from positive knowledge only so far as necessary to encompass a calculated effort to avoid the...
- restricts the English doctrine in important ways. It requires an awareness of a high probability that a fact exists, not merely a reckless disregard, or a suspicion followed by a failure to make further inquiry. It also establishes knowledge as a matter of subjective belief. In light of the Model Penal Code’s definition, the “conscious purpose” jury instruction has three flaws. First, it fails to mention the requirement that Jewell (D) have been aware of a high probability that a controlled substance was in the car. It is not culpable to form a “conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth” unless one is aware of facts indicating a high probability of that truth. Thus, a conscious purpose instruction is only proper when coupled with a requirement that one be aware of a high probability of the truth. Second, the instruction did not alert the jury that Jewell (D) could not be convicted if he “actually believed” there was no controlled substance in the car. This failure to emphasize...
- The approach taken by the Model Penal Code is to separately define the mental states of knowledge and intent (or purpose). The Code says that one acts “purposely” when it is the person’s “conscious object” to cause the criminal result, while one acts “knowingly” when he is aware that the results are “practically certain.” Putting the two together, one acts “purposely” with regard to the nature of his conduct when he has the conscious objective to engage in such conduct, and he acts “knowingly” with regard to the nature of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature. As illustrated here, the Model Penal Code does have an exception for cases like where the defendant has deliberately avoided actual knowledge in an attempt to skirt the bounds of the law. Remember that the exception is one predicated on a subjective theory of knowledge. Therefore, one may not be convicted because, given the circumstances, he should have known because a reasonable person would have....
- TO ACT KNOWINGLY IS TO ACT WITH AN AWARENESS OF THE HIGH PROBABILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FACT IN QUESTION
- The “knowledge” element of a crime does not require actual positive knowledge, but only requires the defendant to have had an awareness of a high probability of the existence of the fact of which “knowledge” is required.
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Jones v. United States 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The case arises on appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals after a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Assigned as error by the trial court is its failure to instruct the jury on the requirement of a legal duty of care.
- How is it that criminal liability may be imposed when a defendant has not committed any affirmative act? The law gets around this dilemma by requiring that there be a legal duty to render aid. This legal duty is usually imposed by some provision of the civil law, such as the law of tort, which imposes a duty to act in the given circumstances. But the burden of proof for imposing liability under the civil law is usually much less stringent than in the criminal law, because the interests at stake are of differing values. Therefore, imposing criminal penalties for violating a duty imposed by the civil law implicates constitutional issues of due process and fundamental fairness.
- (Wright, J.) Yes. An element of a crime of omission of a duty owed to one individual by another is that the duty be one imposed by law, not simply a moral duty. Also, the omission must be the immediate and direct cause of the harm to the victim. There are at least four situations in which a failure to act may constitute breach of a legal duty: (1) where a statute imposes a duty to care for another; (2) where one stands in a certain status relationship to another, such as a parent to a child; (3) where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; and (4) where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person so as to prevent others from rendering aid. The prosecution submits that either the third or fourth ground applies here. However, in any of the four there are critical issues of fact that the jury must pass on. Here it is whether Jones (D) had entered into a contract with the child’s mother for the care of the infant or, in the...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- OMISSION: Failure to fulfill a duty imposed by law.
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United States v. Park 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Burger, J.) Yes. The statute in question does not require proof of “consciousness of wrongdoing”, but imposes liability on those who have “responsibility in the business process resulting in” the violation. The statute was drafted for the purpose of protecting public health in the modem industrial age. “In the interest of the larger good”, it imposes a duty on those who may be responsible for preventing or causing a public danger. question of responsibility for any individual employee depends on the evidence produced at trial and the judgment of the jury. Dotterweich, and the cases that have followed it, reveal a requirement that corporate agents have “a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they occur” and “a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur.” While the statute requires “the highest standard of foresight and vigilance”, it does not eliminate any defense against liability. A defendant may still raise the defense of being...Court
- .... The inspectors found that these warehouses, which were used to hold food for shipment, were accessible to rodents and exposed to contamination by rodents. The inspectors also found evidence of rodent-contaminated food items. Acme pled guilty to various counts of violating the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Park (D) pled not guilty to these counts. The evidence at trial revealed that Park (D) had the overall responsibility for managing the entire operation of the company. Park, in his testimony, also conceded that he was ultimately responsible for the sanitary conditions at the warehouses in question. Park (D) also admitted that he was aware of the FDA inspections and had received letters from the agency documenting the unsanitary conditions. Park (D) delegated the problem to subordinates, and stated that he did not think “there was anything [he] could have done more constructively than what [he] found was being done.” Based on this evidence, the jury convicted him...
- A corporate officer can be criminally liable without proof of any wrongful action if the officer was in a position of authority and responsibility to prevent or correct the criminal violation.
- Can a corporate officer be held criminally liable without proof of any wrongful action if the officer was in a position of authority and responsibility to prevent or correct the criminal violation?
- (Stewart, J.) I agree with most of the majority’s opinion; however, I believe the jury instructions in this case where inadequate. The jury instructions stated that Park (D) could be found guilty if it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Park (D) had a position of authority and responsibility in regards to the violation. However, the jury instructions did not define the meaning of “responsibility” and left it to their “unguided discretion” to define what that term meant. As a result, there were no jury instructions dealing with whether or not Park’s (D) actions were wrongful conduct “amounting at least to common law negligence.”
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State v. Davis 4 results
- This case shows the difference between the crime of attempt and solicitation. Attempt requires an overt act. Solicitation, on the other hand, exists if one requests that another person commit a crime. In this case, had Davis (D) been charged with solicitation he would have rightly been found guilty. However, the necessary element of an overt act performed toward the commission of the crime did not exist under the facts presented. The court held that they were mere acts of preparation. For an attempt conviction, acts more proximate in space, time, and causation are required. In the court’s view, preparation is not a proximate cause. Not all courts are in agreement with the holding of this case. In , the military court of appeals upheld the conviction of attempted murder based on very similar facts.
- Appeal following criminal conviction for attempted first degree murder.
- (Davis, J.) No. Something more than solicitation is required before one may be convicted of attempt. The elements of attempt are: 1) The intention to commit the crime; 2) performance of some act toward the commission of the crime; and 3) the failure to consummate its commission. With respect to the second element, the physical overt act required for attempt is distinguishable from solicitation and preparation. There must be an act moving directly toward the commission of the offense. Solicitation is a crime by itself when declared so by law. However, merely soliciting one to commit a crime does not constitute an attempt. The facts of the case do not show overt acts toward the commission of a crime. The acts of having a verbal arrangement with one selected to kill, plus delivery of photographs, drawings and partial payment, are mere acts of preparation. The acts of entering into a contract for hire and payment of money, were not acts moving directly toward the consummation of the...
- Davis (D) was convicted of attempted first degree murder. He and a married woman planned to kill the woman’s husband in order to collect life insurance money [and live together happily ever after]. He sought the help of one Earl Leverton in obtaining an ex-convict to kill the husband. Leverton told a police officer of the plot, and the officer decided to pose as the ex-convict. Davis (D) paid the undercover officer money to kill the husband. They had several discussions about arranging a plan for the killing, and Davis (D) provided photographs, drawings and partial payment. When the officer went to the home of the intended victim, he revealed his identity and then went to Davis’ (D) home and arrested him. Davis (D) was convicted and appealed. On appeal, Davis (D) argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that there was performance of some act toward the commission of the crime.
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Elonis v. United States 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Elonis’s (D) conviction was premised solely on how his posts would be understood by a reasonable person. Such a “reasonable person” standard is a familiar feature of civil liability in tort law, but is inconsistent with the convention that criminal conduct requires awareness of some wrongdoing. Having liability turn on whether a “reasonable person” regards the communication as a threat—regardless of what the defendant thinks—“reduces culpability on the all-important element of the crime to negligence.” Under these principles, what Elonis (D) thinks does matter. Reversed.
- (Roberts, C.J.) Yes. As a general rule, a guilty mind is a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime. Mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent should not be read as dispensing with it. The central thought is that a defendant must be “blameworthy in mind” before he can be found guilty.
- On remand, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that any error in how the jury was instructed was harmless.
- CRIMINAL STATUTES MUST BE INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE SCIENTER
- Elonis (D) was convicted of violating a statute that made it criminal to communicate a threat to injure the person of another, and he argued that the jury should have been instructed that the U.S. (P) needed to prove that he intended to communicate a threat.
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People v. Arzon 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The primary holding of this case is that the defendant’s conduct need not be the sole and exclusive factor in the victim’s death. Even if intervening conduct contributes to the death, there will still be criminal responsibility if the defendant’s conduct was a direct cause of the harm and the ultimate harm is something foreseen as being related to the conduct of the defendant. In , the intervening conduct was in the form of civil negligence or recklessness. In this case, the intervening conduct is criminal conduct. The court did not note this fact, but it is significant for purposes of establishing causation. Both intervening criminal conduct and civil conduct will not eliminate liability. However, as discussed in
- (Milonas, J.) No. The defendant’s conduct need not be the sole and exclusive factor in the victim’s harm. If the conduct of a defendant is a sufficiently direct cause of the victim’s death, it is not necessary that the ultimate harm be intended by a defendant. Thus, if an intoxicated robbery victim is abandoned by the side of the road by the thieves and is hit by a truck and dies, there is a causal link in that the ultimate harm is something which should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the acts of the accused. [In other words, dumping a passed-out person on the side of the road is not a smart thing to do!] However, an obscure or merely probable connection between a defendant’s conduct and another person’s death is not enough to support a charge of homicide. Thus, if a stabbing victim is operated on for the wound inflicted by the defendant, but the victim dies from an unrelated hernia procedure performed by the surgeon after treating the stab wound, there is no...
- MOTION TO DISMISS: Challenging the right of the court to entertain the matter on various legal theories.
- Motion to dismiss grand jury indictment charging criminal conduct.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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McBoyle v. United States 4 results
- As a matter of statutory construction, courts are constrained to give effect to the precise language used by the legislature in enacting a criminal statute. Yet, as here, statutes often intentionally use general terms to be sure that all contemplated conduct is sufficiently included within the reach of the statute. In such cases, courts must look first to the language of the statute and then to the intent of the legislature, as required, to determine whether the statute has been violated.
- (Holmes, J.) No. Legislation must be drafted in such a way as to give citizens fair warning of what conduct is encompassed within the statute. The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act makes it a crime to knowingly transport a motor vehicle, defined as “an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails,” across state lines. The list of specifically named vehicles calls up a picture of one moving along the ground, leading one to reasonably believe that a self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails would not include one that flies. When the statute was drafted, Congress certainly was aware of air transportation but never in its reports or debates discussed the effect of the statute on airplanes. Had the statute intended to encompass vehicles not included in the class of ground travel, it certainly could have so provided. Although a criminal will not likely read the law before he acts, he must...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- McBoyle (D) was convicted of knowingly transporting a stolen airplane from Illinois to Oklahoma in violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act. He was sentenced to three years in prison and fined $2,000. The conviction was affirmed on appeal.
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Bordenkircher v. Hayes 13 results (showing 5 best matches)
- After being indicted on a charge of uttering a false instrument, Hayes (D) was told by the prosecutor that if he didn’t plead guilty to that charge, the prosecutor would reindict Hayes (D) under the state’s Habitual Criminal Act and, if convicted, he would be sentenced to life in prison. Hayes (D) did not plead guilty and the prosecutor reindicted him on the more serious charge. Hayes (D) was found guilty and, as required by the Act, sentenced to life in prison. After the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, Hayes (D) petitioned the federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal court denied the writ, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s conduct was a vindictive exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion.
- DUE PROCESS: The constitutional guarantee of notice and the opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of case; the guarantee of due process requires that every person have the protection of a day in court and the benefit of general law.
- Is it a vindictive exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion and a violation of the Due Process Clause to carry out a threat made during plea negotiations to reindict a criminal defendant on more serious charges if the defendant does not plead guilty to the offense with which he or she was originally charged?
- RECIDIVIST: Habitual criminal; a criminal repeater.
- (Blackmun, J.) It was a vindictive exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion, and, therefore, violative of the Due Process Clause, to reindict Hayes (D) under the Habitual Criminal Act because the sole reason for the new indictment was to discourage Hayes (D) from exercising his right to a trial. An outcome contrary to the majority’s decision, however, remains adverse to the accused, for prosecutors will be compelled to charge the most severe available offenses from the onset, departing downward to reach a plea. In the end, the accused faces greater bail and the increased risk that the court refuses to accept the plea.
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People v. Marrero 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Bellacosa, J.) No. A mistake of law does not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. Contrasted with kidnapping, which allows a showing of good-faith belief in the legality of the conduct to negate intent, a weapons statute violation imposes criminal liability regardless of intent. The mistake of law defense is available to defendants who have relied on an “official statement” of the law, either expressed in a statute or by a public servant or agency charged with administering, enforcing, or interpreting the law. Marrero (D) claims that his conduct was based on an official statement of the law contained in the statute itself. In view of the ambiguous wording, Marrero (D) argues that his “reasonable” interpretation falls under this exception. However, allowing Marrero (D) this exception would make mistake of law a generally applied or available defense, rather than an unusual exception. The Government (P) analogizes New York’s ...acts in reliance on a statute that actually...
- Marrero (D), a federal corrections officer, was convicted of unlawful possession of a pistol under a statute containing an exemption for “peace officers.” The statutory definition of “peace officers” included “correction officers of any state correction facility or of any penal correctional institution.” The trial court dismissed the charge, but the Appellate Division ruled by a 3-2 vote that only state and not federal officers were covered by the provision. At the ensuing criminal trial, the court refused to instruct the jury that it should acquit Marrero (D) if he reasonably believed himself to be a peace officer under the statutory definition. Marrero (D) claimed that he relied on interpretations of fellow officers and teachers, as well as the language of the statute itself, in forming his belief that he could carry a pistol.
- (Hancock, J.) In interpreting a statute, a court should look first to the particular words of the statute in question. Here, there is but one natural and obvious meaning: If a defendant founded his interpretation on an official interpretation of the statute, he should have a defense. The precise phrase from the Model Penal Code limiting the defense to reliance on a statute “afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous” was omitted from New York’s penal code. How can the legislature be assumed to have enacted the very language that it specifically rejected? Also, the majority suggests that the Legislature intended the defense to be available solely in acts involving mala in se offenses, such as kidnapping. On the contrary, it is with mala prohibita (regulatory) offenses that reasons of policy and fairness call for a relaxation of the rule limiting the mistake of law defense.
- An erroneous interpretation of the law does not excuse violation of the law, even where the interpretation is reasonable.
- MISTAKE OF LAW: An incorrect interpretation of the legal effect of a given law or set of facts.
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State v. Norman 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Mitchell, J.) No. Self-defense, perfect or imperfect, requires an imminent risk of death or serious injury, which does not include perceived threats of later harm. Under North Carolina criminal law, a defendant is entitled to have the jury consider acquittal by reason of death or great bodily harm, and the defendant was not the aggressor who triggered the fatal confrontation. An “imminent” threat is defined (i) by Black’s Law Dictionary as “immediate danger, such as must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against by calling for . . . assistance” and (ii) by our case law as “about to [happen].” Here, Norman (D) cannot claim perfect self-defense, because the evidence doesn’t suggest Norman (D) faced harm from her sleeping husband, and she had ...she reasonably expected imminent harm. The expert testimony on battered wife syndrome may suggest Norman (D) felt generally threatened by her husband, and subjectively believed she would be harmed at some indefinite future point,...
- ...abused for 25 years by her husband, who constantly beat her, threw things at her, burned her with cigarettes, starved her, forced her into prostitution, humiliated her by making her eat pet food and sleep on the floor, threatened to maim or kill her, etc. Norman (D) was afraid to file charges, since her husband inevitably retaliated. She tried suicide, but was rescued despite her husband’s instructions. Finally [finally!] Norman (D) shot her husband while he slept. After the first shot, after determining he was still alive, she shot him twice more, killing him. Norman (D) was charged with first degree murder. At trial, she presented evidence she suffered from battered wife syndrome as proof of perfect self-defense (i.e., that her killing of her husband was reasonable self-defense under the circumstances). Her expert witness testified that Norman (D) “believed herself . . . doomed . . . to a life of the worst . . . torture and abuse, . . . that it would only get worse, and that...
- Appeal from appellate court decision ordering retrial of defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
- (Martin, J.) The evidence presented is sufficient to suggest perfect self-defense under existing law. The expert testified that 20 years of abuse gave Norman (D) the belief, given the circumstances as she saw them, that Norman (D) was in constant danger from her husband, even while he slept. Given evidence of the acute abuse over the last 3 days and the chronic abuse over 20 years, the jury could have reasonably concluded that her husband’s threats were viable, that serious harm was imminent, and that it was necessary for Norman (D) to kill to escape that harm.
- An long-abused wife who shot her sleeping husband is charged with murder and claims self-defense on the ground she expected he would kill her eventually.
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New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Day, J.) Yes. The railroad company (D) argues that it is unconstitutional to hold a corporation liable to criminal prosecution because any punishment imposed would actually punish innocent stockholders and deprive them of their property in violation of due process. While earlier common law held that corporations were excluded from criminal liability, the modern rule accepts the capacity of corporations to commit crime. It is an established rule that a corporation can be held responsible in tort for the damages caused by acts of one of its agents acting in the scope of his employment. Since a corporation acts by its officers and agents, their individual “purposes, motives, and intent” are part of the corporation. If a corporation can engage in conduct, it can intend to do such conduct. The officer or agent is acting to benefit the principal, which is, in this case, a corporation. If the conduct is criminal, the corporation must be held accountable for the acts. The payment of...
- WRIT OF ERROR: An order by an appellate court directing the trial court to produce the record of the case it is reviewing.
- The underlying theory for imposing liability on a corporation is analogous to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under respondeat superior, an employer can be held liable for torts committed by an employee during the scope of employment. Courts hold the employer or the corporation liable because they assume that the agent, when acting in the scope of her employment, is committing the wrongdoing for the benefit of the employer or corporation. Thus, it seems logical to hold the superior actor liable for the actions of subordinates to whom the superior delegates authority. Of course, a corporation cannot be held liable for crimes that cannot be committed by corporations in a practical sense. For example, an employee of the corporation may burglarize a competitor’s home, but the act of breaking and entering can only be committed by an individual, not the “ether” of the corporation.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal of a federal circuit court decision finding the railroad company guilty of violating a federal statute against rebates.
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People v. Evans 4 results
- (Greenfield, J.) Yes. Rape is defined in our Penal Law as engaging in sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion, among other ways not relevant to this case. Forcible compulsion is defined as physical force that overcomes earnest resistance or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury. . . The question in this case is whether the act that occurred between Evans (D) and Miss P. was rape according to our Penal Code. Provided there is actual consent to the act, it is not rape, despite the fact that the consent was obtained by fraud or trickery. Rape requires forcible compulsion. The lesser crime of seduction, recognized in some states, consists of engaging in sexual intercourse after obtaining consent by artifice, deception, flattery, fraud or promise. This state does not recognize either a criminal or civil action for seduction. It is clear from the evidence that Miss P. was intimidated and confused; she may even have been...
- At common law, there was a civil action for seduction, which entailed enticing a person to have sex—usually adultery—by the use of flattery, promises, fraud, or deception. Some jurisdictions also criminally penalized seduction. In modern times, however, there is generally no civil or criminal liability for seduction or seduction-like conduct. There have been limited efforts to make sexual intercourse obtained by such methods a lesser crime, but the vast majority of rape statutes require forcible compulsion or its equivalent. Contrast this “no liability for consent obtained by fraud or deception” standard with the fact that every criminal code recognizes some form of larceny by trick. Larceny by trick is accomplished when a person knowingly uses a misrepresentation or fraud to obtain personal property. Many rape reform advocates protest the fact that the law recognizes the taking of personal property by fraud or deception as a crime but does not recognize the arguably more serious...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- SEDUCTION: A common law civil action available when a man unlawfully persuaded a woman to have sex with him by means of flattery, trickery or false promises, i.e. by falsely promising to marry her. Some jurisdictions criminalized seduction in addition to providing a civil remedy.
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United States v. Lyons 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Rubin, J.) Our criminal law should punish willful blameworthy choices. This ideal requires a free agent confronted with a choice between right and wrong, and freely choosing to do wrong. Defendants who, because of their medical condition, are unable to make that choice, should get the benefit of the insanity acquittal. The majority opinion accepts this ideal, but incorrectly restricts the insanity defense on incorrect public policy decisions. The majority opinion suggests that the public is endangered by allowing violent criminals to escape punishment by fraudulently pleading insanity, but empirical data suggests little harm to public safety, because the insanity defense is rarely made and even more rarely successful. Also, the majority opinion assumes that defendants pleading insanity are quickly released, which is empirically false. Further, the majority assumes that juries are easily manipulated by vague standards of insanity and misleading experts, but this is not a widespread...
- The majority clearly believes that current psychiatric evidence on what constitutes an “irresistible impulse” is so vague and inconsistent that admitting it is more likely to confuse and manipulate the jury than to guide it. The majority suggests that what constitutes an “irresistible impulse” may be absolutely unknowable. However, the court retains the Model Penal Code insanity test’s second prong of the inability to understand morality, due to mental disease/defect, without examining whether psychiatrists and jurors are better at determining these criteria than they are at identifying irresistible impulses. The dissent cites compelling statistics showing that lay people (jurors) often reject the insanity plea impulsively, because they irrationally believe that plea is an effective sham that endangers them by frequently releasing violent criminals, which is empirically false. Specifically, the studies cited show that people believe the insanity plea is entered in 13% to 57% of
- test, because the insanity defense’s volitional prong—incapacity to conform one’s conduct to legal requirements—does not comport with current scientific knowledge. Most psychiatrists now believe they lack sufficient scientific basis to measure a person’s capacity for self-control, and are thus unable to opine whether defendants’ impulses were irresistible and whether they could conform their conduct to legal requirements. Also, such testimony confuses jurors. We now hold that a person is deemed not guilty by reason of insanity only if, at the time of his conduct, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct as a result of mental disease or defect. This test is more accurate because (i) psychiatrists can more easily opine on whether defendants understood the morality of their acts, (ii) there is considerable overlap between the inability to understand and the inability to control, (iii) evidence of understanding is more ...to control themselves, as required by case...
- Appeal from criminal conviction for knowingly and intentionally securing controlled narcotics, seeking reversal because evidence was excluded improperly.
- Lyons (D) was caught carrying drugs and was indicted for knowingly and intentionally securing controlled narcotics. At trial, Lyons (D) offered an insanity defense, contending he had become addicted to painkillers taken to treat painful ailments, and presented witnesses who would testify that Lyons’s (D) addiction caused physiological (brain) damage and psychological (behavior) changes, which left Lyons (D) substantially incapable of conforming to law. The trial court excluded this evidence, holding evidence of narcotics addiction cannot support an insanity defense, since it does not prove the required element of “mental disease or defect.” Lyons (D) was convicted of securing narcotics. Lyons (D) appealed, contending his evidence showed a “mental disease or defect” was caused by drug use.
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Atkins v. Virginia 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Mentally retarded defendants face big challenges in the criminal justice arena. The likelihood of forced confessions is higher and the ability of the defendant to explain mitigating factors is reduced. Their ability to participate in their own defense is also reduced. As a result,
- DETERRENCE: The act or process of discouraging certain behavior, particularly by fear; especially, as a goal of criminal law, the prevention of criminal behavior by fear of punishment.
- , a mildly retarded defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Harris relied on to establish his claim that punishment of this magnitude imposed on a mentally retarded individual was unconstitutional. The court distinguished based on the fact that Harris was only mildly retarded. The court also confined the ruling from to cases involving capital punishment. Imposing a life sentence on a mentally retarded individual was not viewed as contrary to the Eighth Amendment.
- (Stevens, J.) Yes. The execution of a mentally retarded person is “cruel and unusual punishment” and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment. Generally, those with mental defects are required to conform their behavior to the law and can be punished when they fall short. However, those with defects in reasoning and judgment are generally not viewed as having acted with the same level of moral culpability that is displayed in most serious crimes. Further, those with mental defects often face impediments to ensuring a fair trial. In 1988, when the federal government reinstated the death penalty, it prohibited use of the sentence against defendants with mental retardation. Since then, many states have revisited the issue and passed laws in line with the federal government’s prohibition. The nearly unanimous, across-the-board change helps establish that society views mentally retarded individuals as less morally culpable than criminals of average intelligence.
- (Scalia, J.) The majority’s decision is justified by neither history nor modern social trend. The majority somehow devises a national consensus forbidding the execution of mentally retarded criminals by the fact that eighteen of the thirty-eight states permitting the death penalty have banned it based on mental handicap, despite the fact that twenty of those thirty-eight states have no such exclusion. Moreover, whatever the views of the world community may suggest, such views are entirely irrelevant to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, for notions of American justice are not universally shared and respected.
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United States v. Jackson Part 2 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Frederick van Pelt Bryan, J.) Yes. In reaching the decision to convict, the trial judge applied the following two-tiered inquiry: First, the defendant must have been acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime he is charged with attempting; and second, the defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime, and that it be strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent. We note that this analysis conforms closely to the definition of an attempt as set forth in the Model Penal Code. The comments to the Model Penal Code state that such an approach shifts the emphasis from what remains to be done—the chief concern of the proximity tests—to what the defendant has already done. approach which requires that the defendant’s conduct must itself manifest the criminal purpose. The trial judge in this case concluded that on two [not one, but two] occasions Jackson (D)...
- RES IPSA LOQUITUR APPROACH: Also known as the equivocality test—To determine whether the conduct is of such a nature that it is itself, on the face of it, evidence of the criminal intent necessary to constitute criminal attempt.
- This case demonstrates the use of the Model Penal Code’s test, also known as the equivocality test. Note that the Model Penal Code’s test—draws on the elements of both the proximity and the equivocality tests. There is sometimes a difference of opinion among courts of appeals in applying the Mode Penal Code test. In a similar attempted bank robbery case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, noting that the defendants in that case did not take a single step toward the bank; they displayed no weapons and no indication that they were about to make an entry. The court held that their conduct did not constitute the requisite “appreciable fragment” of a bank robbery, nor a substantial step toward the crime. Finally, note that the Model Penal Code contains a section with examples of conduct that may be held to constitute a substantial step. Some examples include lying in wait, enticing the victim to go to the place contemplated for the commission of the crime, reconnoitering the...
- Jackson (D), Scott and Allen were convicted, after a court trial, of attempted robbery of a bank, as well as conspiracy. They appealed the convictions of attempted robbery on the ground that their conduct was mere preparation and did not rise to the level of attempt. A female unindicted co-conspirator acted as a government informant and informed law enforcement of the initial plan to rob the bank, which she had organized and participated in, but which was aborted and rescheduled for the following week. The plan was not carried through because they observed a number of bank patrons inside the bank. Before the new date arrived, the female co-conspirator was arrested on unrelated charges and immediately [became a snitch and] began cooperating with the Government. She told the authorities of what had transpired and of the new date planned for the robbery. On the date scheduled for the robbery, the police observed a car and three individuals in it matching the descriptions given to...
- Conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime, and is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent may establish attempt.
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Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Rehnquist, J.) No. Competent adults have a constitutional “due process” right to refuse or discontinue life-preserving treatment, but for incompetents, states may require life support continue absent a clear showing the incompetent, while still competent, expressed an intent to die under such circumstances. This Court has long observed that no right is more sacred than an individual’s right to the control of his own person, free from interference by others. This notion was embodied in the common-law doctrine that competent adults must make an informed consent to medical treatment. The logical corollary of the “informed consent” doctrine is the patient’s right to refuse treatment. Under girl’s parents may disconnect her respirator], the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a person has the right to discontinue life support, under the Federal Constitution’s privacy right. After most courts based the right to refuse treatment on the common-law right to informed consent and/or the...
- Nancy Cruzan (P) was involved in a car crash which left her in a persistent vegetative state (without significant cognitive brain function) with virtually no chance of recovery. Missouri paid her hospital costs. Cruzan’s parents (P) asked the hospital to let her die by discontinuing feedings. Missouri law allows an incompetent’s surrogates to withdraw life support, but only if the surrogates present clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent, while still competent, expressed a wish to discontinue life support in such circumstances. The hospital refused to honor the request without court approval. The Cruzans (P) petitioned the trail court for an order directing the hospital to let Nancy Cruzan (P) die. The trial court granted the order, holding a person in a persistent vegetative state has a fundamental right to refuse or terminate “death-prolonging procedures,” under the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions, and finding Nancy Cruzan’s (P) earlier conversations with a roommate...
- (Scalia, J.) Federal courts have no business in this field, because American law has always given the State the power to prevent suicide, by force if necessary, and suicide includes refusing life-preserving treatment. The Due Process Clause does not protect individuals against deprivation of liberty, it only prevents such deprivation “without due process of law.” No “substantive due process” claim may be maintained unless the claimant demonstrates the State deprived him of a right historically and traditionally protected against state interference. English common law did not allow suicide under any circumstances, so the right to die is not a protected right. Whether the suicide is accomplished through action or inaction is immaterial, since the effect is the same. Further, preventing suicide is not improper interference with body integrity, because the law permits interference with suicide, a felony. [If suicide was classified under English common law as a felony, and English law...
- Appeal from state supreme court judgment in civil rights case seeking declaratory judgment or injunction to permit hospital to terminate life support.
- A comatose patient’s parents seek a court order allowing the hospital to discontinue life support.
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Pope v. State 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (1) May criminal liability be imposed for a failure to take affirmative action or intervene when a parent is abusing his or her child? (2) May criminal liability be imposed under the common law rule of omission for failure to intervene or take reasonable affirmative action to prevent a crime, or report it?
- ...is whether Pope (D) was “responsible for the supervision of” the child. However, the record shows that the child’s mother was always present. To impute responsibility for the child under the statute out of the action of taking the mother and child in is simply illogical. Pope (D) had no right to usurp the role of parent and as long as the mother was present, Pope (D) cannot be held responsible for the ultimate well-being of the child. It would be extremely ironic if one who, out of concern for the well-being of a mother and child, took them in could then be held criminally liable for abusing the child she sought to look after. While Pope (D) may have had a moral obligation to intervene, she had no legal obligation to do so and cannot be punished for a failure to meet a moral obligation. We hold that the evidence was insufficient to prove Pope (D) fell within the class of persons to whom the child abuse statute applies. Reversed. (2) No. The Court assumes for the sake of... ...law....
- Appeal from the trial court after a conviction for the common law crime of misprision of felony.
- ...stay, Pope (D) fed Norris and her infant, and looked after the infant in a variety of ways. One day, Norris experienced one of her episodes and claimed she was God and that Satan had hidden himself in the body of her child. With Pope (D) present, Norris beat, ripped, and tore at the infant, causing the child serious injury. During the prolonged period of this episode, Pope (D) took no action to protect the child, summon the authorities or seek medical assistance. At some point the infant died from the beatings received from Norris. Pope (D) was convicted of felony child abuse under a statute that imposed criminal liability for abuse occurring to a child when the defendant was “. . . in loco parentis to, or responsible for the supervision of a minor child. . . AND caused, by being in some manner accountable for, by act of commission or omission,” abuse to the child in the form of (a) physical injury or injuries sustained by the child as the result of (i) cruel or inhumane... ...law...
- The Court relies quite heavily on the fact that Pope (D) had taken Norris and her child into her home, fed them, provided them with lodging, and generally took care of them. Are these facts germane to the issue of whether she was guilty of the crime charged? Nowhere in the statute is there an exception for good Samaritans. The Court stated quite simply that it did not believe Pope (D) was in the class of persons covered by the statute because the mother of the child was present at all times—indeed, it was she who committed the abuse. This was enough to reverse without all of the sentimental window dressing about it being ironic that a person with only good intentions should be prosecuted for abuse.
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Chapter Seven Group Criminality 15 results (showing 5 best matches)
- For purposes of aiding and abetting law, a person who actively participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense intends that criminal scheme’s commission.
- The intent of a supplier who knows his supplies will be put to criminal use may be established by (1) direct evidence that he intends to participate, or (2) through an inference that he intends to participate based on (a) his special interest in the activity, or (b) the felonious nature of the crime itself.
- A corporation can be held criminally liable for the acts of its agent if it placed the agent in a position where he has enough authority and responsibility to act for and on behalf of the corporation in handling the particular corporate matter and committed the criminal act in furtherance of that particular corporate matter.
- A corporate office can be held criminally responsible for the actions of others in the corporation, without proof of any wrongful action on the part of the officer, if she was in a position of authority and therefore was responsible for preventing or correcting the criminal violation.
- A person may be convicted of being an accessory before the fact to the crime of manslaughter arising through criminal negligence.
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Garcia v. State 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Here, the rule requiring a bilateral or multilateral agreement of criminal intent is discarded in favor of holding the defendant liable for her conspiratorial tendencies. This result is intuitive in the sense that the crime of conspiracy seeks to punish those who have the intent to commit a crime and enlist others to assist. Even if the others fake cooperation, the defendant still holds the criminal intent. However, this interpretation creates new problems of a more fundamental nature. Conspiracy laws were created with the recognition that collective, group criminality is a greater social danger than unilateral criminal action. Group criminal actions are more likely to succeed and encourage future criminal activity. Yet, these concerns dissolve where the co-conspirator has no intention of committing the crime. The problem is evident where the co-conspirator is a law enforcement agent trying to entrap the defendant. This creates the danger of the government creating and entrapping...
- (Prentice, J.) Yes. Traditionally, conspiracy was considered a “bilateral” or “multilateral” crime requiring that two or more persons agree to commit a crime with the intent to commit it. As a result, if the other co-conspirators duped the defendant, there was no conspiratorial agreement and a conspiracy conviction was not possible. However, the Model Penal Code adopts a “unilateral” approach in which a defendant’s culpability is unaffected by the culpability of the co-conspirators. The reason for this approach is that the existence of a firm purpose to commit a crime, which is the concern of conspiratorial liability, is there regardless of the intentions of the co-conspirators. In 1976, Indiana adopted a statute that follows the unilateral approach. It provides the defendant with no defense if the co-conspirator “cannot be prosecuted for any reason”. Despite the prior case law, this new statute is controlling. Judgment is affirmed.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal of a trial court conviction of conspiracy to commit murder.
- A distraught wife asked her friend to hire someone to kill her husband, but the friend called the cops on her.
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State v. Guminga 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Kelley, J.) The strong public interest in prohibiting the sale of liquor to minors justifies the imposition of vicarious liability on the bar owner/employer for illegal sales to minors made by an employee. The majority has failed to give proper weight to the clearly expressed, longstanding public policy of this state as reflected in . Such has been the law in this state since 1905. Without the deterrent of possible personal criminal responsibility and a sentence, the legislature could have rationally determined that liquor establishment owners will be less likely to impress upon employees the need to require identification of age before serving liquor. The gravity of the problems associated with minors who consume alcoholic beverages justifies the importance by the legislature of harsher punishment on those who help contribute to those problems. The state has the right to impose limited criminal vicarious liability on bar proprietors as a reasonable exchange for the state-granted...
- (Yetka, J.) Yes. We find that the statute in question does violate the due process clauses of the Minnesota and the United States Constitutions and thus answer the certified question in the affirmative. Under Minnesota law, a defendant who commits a gross misdemeanor, the level of crime Guminga (D) is charged with, may be sentenced to “imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000 or both.” In addition, a defendant convicted under may, at the discretion of the licensing authority, have his license suspended, revoked or be unable to obtain a new license. Even if Guminga (D) were to ultimately not receive any prison sentence, a gross misdemeanor conviction will affect his criminal history score were he to be convicted of a felony in the future. A due process analysis of a statute involves a balancing of the public interest protected against the intrusion on personal liberty while taking into account any alternative means by which to achieve...
- , which imposes vicarious criminal liability on an employer whose employee serves intoxicating liquor to a minor. The state does not contend that Guminga was aware of or ratified the waitress’s actions. Guminga (D) moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that violates the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court denied this motion. The court of appeals asked the State Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over the question.
- Certification of a question of law to the State Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals, after the trial court had ruled that vicarious liability does not violate due process.
- Vicarious criminal liability provisions make it much easier to hold an employer responsible for the missteps of employees, because proving that the employer knew or authorized the employee’s conduct can be extremely difficult. By making such elements irrelevant, the legislature has relieved prosecutors of time-consuming burdens. Vicarious liability may cause employers to be more careful in choosing who to hire and how to supervise employees. But the imposition of criminal liability without fault runs counter to the traditions of the American legal system. One possible solution is to place on the defendant the burden of proving he took reasonable steps to prevent the crime by his employees and then allow the jury to decide if the steps were in fact reasonable. This would help reduce the danger of an employer being held liable even after taking all reasonable actions, something that most vicarious liability statutes do not make room for.
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Commonwealth v. Welansky 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Lummus, J.) Yes. A defendant who has breached a duty of care and caused the deaths of others through his wanton or reckless conduct can be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter under Massachusetts law. In this case, Welansky (D), as the dominant and ...wanton or reckless conduct. Wanton or reckless conduct is different from the negligence or gross negligence required to sustain a tort cause of action. In wanton or reckless conduct cases, it is the conduct that is intentional, not the harm caused by the conduct. The standard for determining wanton or reckless conduct is both subjective and objective. Grave danger to others must have been apparent and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk of causing harm rather than modify his conduct in order to prevent harm. Even if the “reasonable man” would not have realized that a grave danger existed, if the evidence shows that the defendant knew there was a danger, his decision to run the risk will constitute wanton or... ...higher...
- In spite of Welansky’s (D) conviction, this case shows how difficult it is to hold corporate actors criminally liable for conduct that causes death. In order to convict Welansky (D), the court had to find him guilty of wanton or reckless conduct, a standard higher even than the gross negligence standard applied in tort cases. In order to show wanton or reckless conduct, a prosecutor must show that the defendant knew there was a grave risk and ran the risk. In this case, the corporation that owned the club was completely dominated by one man. Welansky (D) would have been aware of the club’s safety policies, and may even have developed them himself. Before his illness, he visited the club regularly and paid close attention to the business. If Welansky (D) had not taken such an interest in New Cocoanut Grove, Inc., he would not have been found guilty of involuntary manslaughter because the prosecutor would not have been able to show that Welansky knew of the risk that patrons would be...
- Under Massachusetts law, can a defendant who has committed the tort of breach of the duty of care and caused death be found guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter based on his wanton or reckless conduct?
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court of a conviction of numerous counts of involuntary manslaughter through wanton or reckless conduct.
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United States v. Deegan 5 results
- Sentencing guidelines provide a presumptive sentence or sentencing range that should be imposed in the majority of cases. Under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, the applicable range reflects the gravity of the crime and the defendant’s criminal history. It is within the trial judge’s authority, however, to make a departure from the presumptive sentence. An appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with a sentence falling within the presumptive sentence range, even if there are grounds that would justify such a departure.
- (Collton, J.) Yes. A sentence within the guidelines range is accorded a presumption of reasonableness. The record in this case includes evidence of both aggravation and mitigation. Deegan’s (D) offense could be viewed as unusually heinous, cruel, and brutal, and thus deserving or harsh punishment. But Deegan (D) also presented evidence of her personal history of abuse and family circumstances. We condemn the violence that is inflicted against American Indian women. But we are firm in our view that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to impose a more lenient sentence. The sentence was fair, in view of the fact that an innocent life was lost. Whatever Deegan’s (D) personal history, the sentence imposed must reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense. The more lenient sentences cited as examples were state court decisions, and a federal court does not need to concern itself with state/...
- (Bright, J.) This is the most clear case of sentencing error I have ever seen. Deegan (D) suffered extensive physical abuse at the hands of her father, and extensive sexual abuse by her father’s drinking buddies. When Deegan (D) confided in her mother, her mother called her a slut and beat her. At the age of fifteen, Deegan began a relationship with one of her foster brothers, and she bore four children fathered by him, including the victim in this case. The children’s father beat Deegan (D) regularly, but she did not leave him based on his repeated assurances he would stop. Deegan (D) became depressed. It is unlikely the guidelines commission had circumstances like this in mind when considering the appropriate punishment for second-degree murder. Neonaticide is a crime based on bad circumstances rather than bad character. And as far as the sentencing disparities go, the only reason this is a federal case is because it occurred on an Indian reservation. We ought to compare the...
- Deegan (D) gave birth to a baby boy in her home. She fed, cleaned, and dressed him and put him in a basket, then left the house for two weeks. When she returned, the baby was dead. Deegan (D) put his remains in a suitcase and put the suitcase in a ditch, where it was later discovered. Deegan (D) pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. She urged the court to vary from the guidelines range because of her psychological and emotional condition at the time of the offense, her history as a victim of abuse, and the fact that she acted impulsively. Her expert witness testified that she presented a very low risk of reoffending and did not merit a lengthy prison sentence, especially since under similar circumstances other women had received three-year sentences. Deegan (D) was sentenced to ten years in prison, which was at the low end of the guidelines range. On appeal, Deegan (D) argued that the sentence was unreasonable because the guideline for second-degree murder is not based on...
- Federal appellate court review of the defendant’s sentence.
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Public Committee Against Torture v. State of Israel 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Barak, J.) No. We hold that the “necessity” defense may not be used to promulgate rules permitting certain conduct in advance of any criminal activity. Initially, we conclude that the GSS’s general mandate to conduct interrogations does not encompass the authority to use physical means based upon both Israeli law and International law. The State (D) asserts that physical interrogation should be permitted in exceptional situations based upon the criminal law defense of “necessity.” This defense [or “defence” as they say in Israel] provides that criminal liability will not be imposed upon one who commits any act “immediately necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or property, of either himself or his fellow person, from substantial danger of serious harm, imminent from the particular circumstances, at the requisite [time], and absent alternative means for avoiding the harm.” The State (D) therefore argues that GSS investigators are authorized to apply physical...Law
- The Israel Supreme Court refused to apply the necessity defense as a rule in advance, giving government agents the authority to use physical means during interrogations. The court indicated, however, that should physical means be used, resulting in criminal charges against the GSS, the necessity defense would be available. The basis for the holding is that, although the defense will bar criminal liability where one commits an act that is immediately necessary to prevent imminent harm, it cannot form the basis for an advance directive authorizing certain conduct. The “ticking time bomb” argument was used by the government to argue that threat of injury and danger was imminent here. The court was unwilling to allow the defense to be expanded to such a situation, and instead limited its application to those situations where a crime has first been charged.
- Petition to Supreme Court of Israel for an order prohibiting the use of physical means during interrogation of criminal suspects.
- (Criminal Suspects) v. (State of Israel)
- Criminal suspects challenged Israel’s methods of interrogation, which permitted physical shaking etc., and concept of “necessity” was asserted to permit such interrogation.
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People v. Jaffe 4 results
- This case demonstrates the doctrine of legal impossibility as a defense. The criminal code section that Jaffe (D) was convicted of violating required that the person know the property to have been stolen. Jaffe (D) intended to commit a crime, and if the property had been stolen, he would have been able to commit a crime. Thus, Jaffe (D) had done everything he had intended to do, but still had not committed the crime. The pick-pocket and extortion cases referred to by the court in its opinion are examples of factual impossibility cases. Factual impossibility, unlike legal impossibility, is not a defense to the crime of attempt. The approach in has been rejected by many modern day courts. As is discussed in
- (Bartlett, J.) No. If one intends to commit a crime and mistakenly believes that his act will be a crime, but in fact it will not, there is no attempt. This case is distinguishable from those that hold that one may be convicted of an attempt notwithstanding the existence of facts unknown to the defendant which would have rendered the complete perpetration of the crime itself impossible. Examples of such cases include: Pick-pocketers are convicted for attempt to commit larceny without the need to prove that there was anything in the pockets; and extortionists are convicted even though they do not know that their intended victim is a decoy for the police, and thus could not be induced with fear to pay money. In this case, the act would not have been a crime if it had been consummated. Thus, no matter what Jaffe (D) thought, he could not commit the crime since the property was not stolen property. [He sure did luck out!] In the pick-pocket cases, the immediate act, if carried out,...
- Appeal following criminal conviction of attempt to buy and receive stolen property.
- Jaffe (D) was convicted of attempting to buy and receive stolen property. Jaffe (D) attempted to buy the property, consisting of 20 yards of cloth, believing it to have been stolen. However, the property no longer had the character of stolen goods when Jaffe (D) attempted to buy it. The property had been returned to the owners, and was being offered to Jaffe (D) through their authority and agency. [Jaffe (D) still was considered a big time criminal for having the mere intent to commit a crime.] Jaffe (D) appealed the conviction contending that the completed act would not have constituted a crime. He argued that he should not have been convicted of attempting to commit an act which would not have been criminal if completed.
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State v. Miller 4 results
- Under statutes like the one in this case, many American courts take the same view of the law; only certain “things” may be the subject of the crime of false pretenses. The offense of false pretenses, under the English statutes, has always been construed as largely analogous to, and closely bordering on, that of larceny, applying only to personal property that was capable of manual delivery. Real property under the English law was never the subject of the offense either of cheating or of false pretenses. Even though the statute included “a thing in action,” that did not help the prosecution, because the guaranty was not, so far as Miller (D) was concerned, a “thing in action.” It is doubtless true that a guaranty is a chose in action, a right to indemnity from the guarantor, but it is the right of the creditor who extends credit on the faith of the guaranty, not of the debtor to whom credit is given. Accordingly, Miller (D) did not receive even a chose in action from the Hub Lumber...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Miller (D) induced the Hub Lumber Company to agree to guarantee his indebtedness to the Howard Cooper Corporation on the false representation that he owned a tractor free of encumbrance and on his executing a chattel mortgage thereto as security. In fact, Miller (D) was purchasing the tractor under a conditional sales contract. He was convicted of obtaining property from Hub Lumber by false pretenses.
- ...conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment.” Reduced to its simplest terms, this indictment means that by false pretenses Miller (D) induced the Hub Lumber Company to agree to pay his indebtedness to the Howard Cooper Corporation if he should fail to pay it. The question is whether this amounts to an allegation that, in the sense of the statute, Miller (D) obtained “any property” from the Hub Lumber Company. If not, then the indictment does not charge a crime. This court has recognized that “property” under the statute must be something capable of being possessed and the title to which can be transferred. It need hardly be said that the thing which Miller (D) is charged with obtaining in the present indictment, the guaranty, or, to be more accurate, the benefit of the guaranty which the Hub Lumber Company gave to the Howard Cooper Corporation, could not be possessed, and that there could be no such thing as holding title to it. Had the indictment alleged that Miller (D...
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State v. DeLawder 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- DeLawder (D) was found guilty after a jury trial of carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 14. His counsel was not permitted to ask the victim about her past sexual history. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison. His conviction was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals on direct appeal. He later sought post-conviction relief from the same court, arguing that the United States Supreme Court decision in [holding that the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment applies to state as well as federal criminal defendants] affected the validity of his conviction.
- Rape shield laws and other laws that limit the admissibility of otherwise relevant and probative evidence can occasionally come into conflict with the federal Constitution. When they do, the Constitution obviously trumps the shield laws. Several courts have held that highly restrictive rape shield laws violate the Constitution when they bar the use of relevant sexual history evidence. So as to avoid a conflict between the need to protect the victim and the defendant’s constitutional rights, some shield statutes allow the use of such evidence when it is necessary to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment. Absent such language, some courts have avoided striking shield laws by judicially implying a catch-all that would operate to preserve the defendant’s constitutional rights. In other words, the courts will admit the evidence if its probative value significantly outweighs its prejudicial effect, or if it is otherwise necessary to ensure that the...
- (Orth, C.J.) Yes. An accused must be permitted to effectively cross-examine the witnesses against him. We affirmed DeLawder’s (D) conviction prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in At the time, we held that the trial court properly excluded the defense counsel’s attempts to cross-examine the victim regarding her prior sexual relations with other men. The general rule is that because consent is not an issue in carnal knowledge prosecution, evidence of the victim’s sexual relations with others is immaterial. The trial judge correctly applied the general rule, and we affirmed accordingly. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided in that the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is secured in both state and federal criminal proceedings. In the Court held that it was a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights for the trial court to have prohibited the cross-examination of a witness regarding his record as a juvenile. The trial court had excluded the...
- A criminal defendant must be afforded the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Skilling v. United States 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The original mail-fraud provision simply proscribed using the mails to advance any scheme or artifice to defraud. Congress later added language to the statute to prohibit obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. As the law developed, a scheme or artifice to defraud came to include deprivations of not only money or property, but also of intangible rights. After the courts first recognized the deprivation of intangible rights as actionable, the honest-services doctrine developed. Unlike fraud in which the victim’s loss of money or property supplied the defendant’s gain, with each being the mirror image of the other, the honest-services theory targets corruption that lacks such symmetry. For example, if a mayor accepts a bribe from a third party in exchange for awarding that party a city contract, the city itself may suffer no tangible loss, even though it was the betrayed party, but actionable harm lay in the denial of the...
- This case was remanded for further consideration of the honest-services count. On remand, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the instructions that permitted the jury to convict Skilling (D) of conspiracy on either a securities-fraud theory or an improper honest-services theory, even if erroneous, were harmless. The jury was presented with overwhelming evidence that the defendant conspired to commit securities fraud by participating in a scheme to deceive the investing public about Enron’s financial condition in order to maintain or increase the company’s stock price, so the verdict would have been the same absent any alternative-theory error.
- (Scalia, J.) The Court maintains that the intangible right of honest services means the right not to have one’s fiduciaries accept bribes or kickbacks. The problem is that the doctrine is not so limited. It could apply to any action that is contrary to public policy or immoral, or an abuse of a position of trust by a public official. The Court should have given greater consideration to the vagueness argument. The decision provides no guidance on the character of the fiduciary capacity to which the bribery and kickback restriction applies. Just public officials? Or private individuals, too? Or everyone, everywhere? Even with the bribery and kickback limitation, the statute does not answer the question, “What is the criterion of guilt”?
- Supreme Court review of a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision affirming the federal district court.
- Enron Corporation collapsed in 2001 and declared bankruptcy. The Government’s (P) investigation of the Enron collapse uncovered an elaborate scheme to prop up Enron’s short-run stock prices by overstating the company’s financial well-being. Enron Corporation executive Skilling (D), among others, was prosecuted for crimes committed before the corporation’s 2001 collapse. One of the charges against him alleged that Skilling (D) sought to deprive Enron and its shareholders of the intangible right to his honest services. He was also charged with securities fraud, wire fraud, making false representations to Enron’s auditors, and insider trading. Skilling (d) was convicted on nineteen counts. He appealed, claiming that the jury improperly convicted him of conspiracy to commit “honest-services” wire fraud. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Skilling’s (D) convictions, and Skilling (D) sought further review in the Supreme Court. Skilling (D) claimed that the honest-services statute was...
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United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Browning, J.) Yes. Congress has the constitutional power to impose criminal liability on a corporation for the acts of its agents acting within the scope of their employment even though the actions are outside the agent’s actual authority or are contrary to express instructions. While the text of the Sherman Act does not expressly address this issue, we believe that this interpretation of the act “best achieves its purpose”. It is reasonable for Congress to conclude that exposing a corporation to criminal liability provides a strong incentive for the corporation to prevent illegal actions by employees. Since violations of the Sherman Act are predominantly motivated by the desire to maximize profits, they often involve large and highly decentralized corporate business practices where it is difficult to pinpoint particular corporate agents who acted illegally. At the same time, the complexity of such practices makes it likely that high management officials of the corporation have...
- A corporation can be held liable for the acts of its agents even though it has instructed the agents not to engage in those acts. Under traditional accomplice liability theory, for the corporation to be held liable, evidence would be required to show that the corporation and the agent had the same or similar intent. In this case, it appears that the intent of the corporation is irrelevant. However, the opinion, in reality, takes into account the corporation’s intent, although not quite expressly. The opinion notes that violations under the Sherman Antitrust Act are usually of the type that benefit the corporation, making it very unlikely that a corporation would be anxious to curtail any such illegal activity. In addition, since these activities are often done on a large, complex scale, it is likely that high management has participated in formulating the illegal practices or is at least aware of them. While there was no evidence that Hilton (D) compelled its purchasing agent to...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal of a district court conviction under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
- PER SE: On its face, without reference to additional evidence.
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Blake v. U.S. 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case shows why some courts have chosen to adopt the Model Penal Code’s definition of “insanity.” The Government (P) obviously did not want to the court to adopt the Model Penal Code standard, because it would allow Blake (D) an opportunity to show that he might have been insane at the time of the robbery because he lacked “substantial” capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to that required by the law. If the standard urged by the Government (P) had been adopted. Blake (D) would not have been able to prove that he suffered from complete mental disorientation. The facts of the case show the limitation of the ...of self-control. Under the Model Penal Code standard, however, Blake (D) would not be criminally responsible if, because of his mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law...
- Appeal following criminal conviction for robbery.
- ...discharge after suffering an epileptic seizure. Thereafter, he had mental difficulties and received electro-shock treatment, and was hospitalized for two to three months a year later. He taught school, married, had children, and worked with his father in construction. He became a heavy drinker. He was hospitalized again for two months, spent time in psychiatric institutions and received further electro-shock treatment. He began to use stimulants and drugs, and had yet additional shock treatment. He was eventually adjudged incompetent and placed under his father’s guardianship and housed in a private institution. After discharge, he continued psychiatric treatment, divorced, and married again. He was arrested for shooting his second wife. He was thereafter placed in a mental hospital for several months, and then was released on probation. He was sentenced to prison after violating probation. While in prison, he was hospitalized a number of times and saw the prison psychiatrist. He...
- standard of lack of “substantial” capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform to the law should be used. The government (P) asserts that there must be a “complete” lack of mental capacity as set forth in in order for insanity to be a defense. The facts of this case show that Blake (D) would not be considered insane under the
- CASE VOCABULARY
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State v. Toscano 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Under New Jersey law, may a criminal claim the common law defense of duress if he claims he was coerced with the threat of future violence?
- (Pashman, J.) Yes. Under New Jersey law [and the Model Penal Code], duress is a defense to any crime, other than murder, if the defendant committed the crime because he was coerced by the use/threat of unlawful force against himself/another, which a reasonable person in the situation would be unable to resist. We granted certiorari to consider the status of duress as an affirmative defense to a crime. Since New Jersey has no applicable statute defining the defense of duress, we are guided only by common law principles. At common law, duress was recognized only when the coercion is alleged to involve threats of “present, imminent and pending” harm “of such a nature as to induce a well grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done.” Duress was permitted as a defense to prosecution for serious offenses other than the killing of an innocent. To excuse the crime, the threatened injury must induce “such a fear as a man of ordinary fortitude and courage...
- DURESS: Excuse to criminal prosecution, allowing actors to avoid criminal liability for most crimes committed under threat of violence.
- This case presents the law of duress from the perspective of both the common law and the Model Penal Code. At traditional common law, duress was a valid defense only if the person committed a crime under threat of death or serious injury, and the threat was so grave that a reasonably courageous person would succumb. A threat of future harm was insufficient, because the law held the threatened person responsible for escaping or alerting police. The threat of monetary loss or property damage was also insufficient. At common law, the duress defense was also unavailable to defendants who murdered an innocent person under duress; they were still deemed guilty of murder. Under the Model Penal Code, the draft New Jersey statute, and this decision, duress is a valid defense against prosecution for crimes other than murder committed under threat of either imminent or future harm, if the threat was so grave a reasonably brave person would have capitulated. If a defendant was forced to kill...
- Appeal from appellate affirmation of criminal conviction for fraud, seeking reversal because of duress.
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Chapter Three Defining Criminal Conduct—The Elements of Just Punishment 26 results (showing 5 best matches)
- in criminal statutes that is normally required at common law does not mean the crime is strict liability; such statutes will be interpreted to require the of such crimes required at common law.
- Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law where the ordinance 1) fails to provide notice to enable the ordinary person to understand what conduct it prohibits and 2) where it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory police enforcement.
- A criminal statute written without a requirement will be construed in light of the background of the common law for such crimes to include a
- There is a violation of the Due Process Clause when a court construes a criminal statute contrary to the legislative intent and applies its expanded definition of the statute retroactively to a person’s conduct.
- The “knowledge” element of a crime does not require actual positive knowledge, but only requires the defendant to have had an awareness of a high probability of the existence of the fact of which “knowledge” is required.
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Nolan v. State 4 results
- (Collins, J.) No. The law holds that if the case is larceny at common law because the money was taken from the prosecutor’s possession, the charge for embezzlement fails. The embezzlement statutes were passed, not to cover any cause within the common law range of larceny, but to cover new cases outside of that range. If the goods were taken from the owner’s possession, the crime is larceny, not embezzlement. Goods which have reached their destination are constructively in the owner’s possession although he may not yet have touched them and, hence, after such termination of transit, the servant who converts them is guilty of larceny, not of embezzlement. The money was not taken by Nolan (D) until it had been placed in the cash drawer and balanced at the end of the day. When it was taken, the cash was in the possession of the Federal Discount Corporation. We must therefore conclude that there was not sufficient evidence in this case to find Nolan (D) guilty of embezzlement. The case...on
- (Prescott, J.) Courts sometimes indulge in an ethereal refinement between larceny and embezzlement that in practical operation very often results in the criminal escaping his just punishment.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- The opinion of Judge Prescott is labeled a concurrence, but reads more as a dissent. The majority’s opinion gets caught up in semantics, and the import of the law is pushed to the it is placed in a drawer you are guilty of embezzlement, but if you steal that same money after it has been placed in that drawer it is larceny, and larceny alone? This seems too subtle a distinction to make good law. A better solution may be to provide that, under an indictment for larceny, or for larceny in one count and embezzlement in another, there may be a conviction of either offense.
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United States v. Bernard L. Madoff 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Chin, J.) Yes. While the court must give the sentencing guideline range fair and respectful consideration, it is not bound by it and must make an individualized sentencing assessment based on all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, ultimately imposing a sentence that is reasonable. The fraud here was staggering. The victims’ losses total many billions of dollars. Moreover, this is not just a matter of money. The breach of trust was massive. Investors were repeatedly lied to and made important life decisions—when to retire, how to care for elderly parents, whether to buy a house, how to pay for their children’s college expenses, etc.—based on these lies. The impact on institutional investors was similarly horrific. Madoff (D) took large sums of others’ money for his personal use. Yet, unlike in other cases, the court received not a single letter attesting to Madoff’s (D) good side. The absence of such support is telling.
- While the court must give the sentencing guideline range fair and respectful consideration, it is not bound by it and must make an individualized sentencing assessment based on all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, ultimately imposing a sentence that is reasonable.
- Prosecutors argued for a sentence at the top of the guidelines range, but defense counsel urged the court to consider a much shorter sentence, based on Madoff’s relatively short (D) life expectancy.
- (Prosecuting Authority) v. (White-Collar Criminal Defendant)
- Sentencing hearing for notorious criminal defendant Bernard Madoff.
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People v. Campbell 5 results
- This case involves the doctrine of If there is intentional subsequent action, then foreseeability, as discussed in the previous cases, is not applicable. Human actions are different from those events that happen regularly and necessarily in accordance with the laws of nature, which is the basis of the principle of causation. Intentional subsequent human actions are not natural results of a chain of events governed by the laws of nature, because nothing causes a person to act; rather, the person chooses to act on his own free will. If there were not a doctrine of subsequent human action, the foreseeability doctrine would have resulted in Campbell’s conviction. Note, however, that only voluntary or intentional subsequent human actions are outside the laws of causation. Truly involuntary actions can be caused, as well as actions taken without full knowledge or those that are constrained by factors of compulsion of duty or excusable conditions.
- (Hoehn, J.) No. Where intentional subsequent human action exits, the foreseeability doctrine is not applicable to establish causation. Homicide is defined in the common law as “the killing of one human begin by another”. The prosecution (P) urges that inciting one to commit suicide, coupled with furnishing the gun, is willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. We reject this [unfounded and without any statutory basis] argument because the term suicide excludes by definition a homicide and, in this case, Campbell (D) did not kill another person. There was no present intention to kill on the part of Campbell (D), although he certainly hoped that Basnaw would kill himself. We also reject the holding of ...was convicted of her murder after complying with wife’s request to make a lethal potion of poison so that she could reach it and kill herself, which she did, after her past suicide attempts failed.]. We find that this decision does not represent the current law of the state. The...
- Appeal following denial of motion to quash information and warrant and dismiss criminal proceedings charging murder.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Campbell (D) was charged with murder in connection with the suicide of Mr. Basnaw. The two had been drinking heavily and Campbell (D), upset at Basnaw for having sex with his wife, encouraged [the no good] Basnaw to kill himself. Basnaw responded that he had no weapon whereupon Campbell (D) [wanting to do everything he could to get Basnaw off the planet] offered to sell him his own gun. Campbell (D) eventually gave Basnaw the gun and ammunition and left. Shortly thereafter, Basnaw shot himself to death with Campbell’s (D) gun. Campbell (D) after being formally charged with murder moved to quash the information and warrant and dismiss the proceedings on the ground that providing a weapon to one who uses it to commit suicide does not constitute murder. He asserted that he should not be responsible for Basnaw’s subsequent intentional action [i.e., killing himself]. The motion to quash was denied and Campbell (D) appealed.
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United States v. Peterson 5 results
- This case was included in the textbook to demonstrate the traditional common law doctrine of self-defense. Today, all states have superseded the common law with a codified definition of self-defense, but most state statutes retain the elements of the common law. Of course, it is impossible to say if this case was decided correctly, since the facts were omitted.
- [Facts omitted from casebook.] Apparently, Peterson (D) killed and claimed he had a common law right to kill justifiedly in self-defense, even though no statute specifically authorized it. Peterson (D) was convicted of homicide when the court refused to recognize a common law right to self-defense. Peterson (D) appeals.
- Appeal from criminal conviction for homicide, seeking reversal.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- [Facts omitted from casebook.] Apparently, a man who killed claimed the killing was justified as self-defense under common law.
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State in the Interest of M.T.S. 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The court in this case applied what has been characterized as the “intrinsic force” standard. Courts that apply this standard require no showing of force greater than that which is necessary to accomplish sexual penetration. The intrinsic force standard is a minority standard. Still, it is less ambiguous than other force requirements. The far more common rule is called the “extrinsic force” standard, which requires a showing of force beyond that which is sufficient to accomplish nonconsensual sexual penetration. There is much more room for disagreement over what constitutes sufficient force to meet the “extrinsic force” standard. In other words, whether such force exists in a particular case, and to what degree, will largely depend on the facts, evidence, and circumstances of the case.
- (Handler, J.) No. The act of penetration itself is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of force for sexual assault. The statute does not define “physical force” or “coercion.” It has been left to the courts to define these terms. The state (P) urges us to define force as any amount of sexual touching that occurs without consent. The Public Defender would have us interpret force as some amount of force over and above the act of non-consensual penetration. In deciding which definition to apply, we examine the recent incidents of rape law reform that have taken place in our state. The legislature has defined sexual assault as penetration brought about by the use of physical force or coercion. Although it did not define these terms, legislative history shows that the legislature’s concept of sexual assault was influenced by its understanding of assault and battery law. Any unauthorized and offensive touching of another is a battery. Likewise, any unauthorized sexual contact is a crime...
- RAPE LAW REFORM: Efforts made to change rape laws by advocates who believed that the traditional rape laws were too harshly constructed and placed too much of a burden on women to prove non-consent, resistance and forcible submission.
- Fifteen-year-old C.G. was living with her mother and siblings and several other people, one of whom was seventeen-year-old M.T.S. (D). M.T.S. (D) slept downstairs on the couch while C.G. had her own bedroom on the second floor. Each teenager told very different versions of the incident at trial. The trial court did not credit either fully. C.G. claimed that on the day of the incident M.T.S. (D) told her three or four times that he was going to pay her a surprise visit in her bedroom that night. She claimed that she thought he was joking. She also claimed that M.T.S. had tried to fondle and kiss her on other occasions, but that she had rejected his advances. C.G. testified that she awoke about 1:30 A.M. to find M.T.S. (D) standing in her doorway, but didn’t think anything of it. She went to use the bathroom, then returned to her room and fell in to a deep sleep. C.G. claimed that the next thing she remembered was waking up with M.T.S. (D) on top of her. She said her clothes were off...
- Appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court of an appellate reversal of a trial court’s adjudication of delinquency for having committed a sexual assault.
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State v. Riggins 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The critical question in this case is whether Riggins (D) was the agent of Tarrant. The majority has no difficulty in ruling that indeed Riggins (D) was Tarrant’s agent. But Riggins (D) maintained his own office, had his own employees, and collected accounts for approximately 500 other individuals and firms. He was subject to no control whatsoever by any of his clients in making his collections. His clients knew that he kept all of his collections in a single account. It seems that the picture would be quite different, and Riggins (D) would not be labeled Tarrant’s agent, if vicarious liability were asserted against Tarrant on account of Riggins’s (D) conduct in the course of his collection activities. The majority may have oversimplified this case, which is not to say that Riggins’s (D) conduct should not be made criminal.
- (Hershey, J.) Yes. To decide whether Riggins (D), a collection agent, can be guilty of embezzlement in Illinois, it is helpful to consider our embezzlement statutes in the historical context of this crime. Embezzlement, unknown at common law, is established by statute, and its scope, therefore, is limited to those persons designated therein. Viewed in their entirety, our laws relating to embezzlement are broad and comprehensive. In this instance, we are particularly interested in the general embezzlement statute, and the special statute under which Riggins (D) was indicted. In significant part, the statute provides that “any clerk, agent, servant, . . . receiving any money, . . . in his fiduciary capacity . . . shall be punished . . . [for] larceny . . . irrespective of . . . any commission or interest in such money.” It can hardly be disputed but that Riggins (D) acted as agent for Tarrant in collecting her accounts. He undertook the collections on her behalf by virtue of authority...
- (Schaefer, J.) The conclusion of the majority that Riggins (D) was an agent rests upon the assertion that the term “agent” as used in the embezzlement statutes is construed in its popular sense. That generalization runs counter to the basic rule that criminal statutes are strictly construed. If “agent” has the broad meaning which the majority gives it, each of the other terms is superfluous because all are embraced within the single term “agent.” Many of the specific enumerations in the statute referred to by the majority likewise become largely, if not entirely, meaningless, for the particular relationships they seek to reach are also swallowed up in the expanded definition of the term “agent.”
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal from appellate court’s reversal of the defendant’s indictment and conviction for embezzlement.
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- While the court must give the sentencing guideline range fair and respectful consideration, it is not bound by it and must make an individualized sentencing assessment based on all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, ultimately imposing a sentence that is reasonable.
- A trial court sentenced a career criminal to life in prison for bank robbery.
- Prosecutors argued for a sentence at the top of the guidelines range, but defense counsel urged the court to consider a much shorter sentence, based on Madoff’s relatively short (D) life expectancy.
- General deterrence and incapacitation are appropriate sentencing considerations when sentencing a career criminal.
- The Sentencing Reform Act affords courts broad discretion in fashioning conditions of supervised release that are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
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Stephenson v. State 5 results
- This case is an example of a factual scenario where the subsequent human action does not break the chain of causation. Recall that only voluntary or intentional subsequent human actions are outside the laws of causation. Although the victim here intentionally bought and took the poison and refused Stephenson’s (D) offer to go to the hospital, her actions were not truly intentional, because she was rendered irresponsible by being mentally and physically wounded by Stephenson (D). Moreover, her state of mind was the natural and probable consequence of Stephenson’s (D) horrific conduct. In addition, this case expands previous case law so that the wound inflicted on the victim which results in her being rendered irresponsible may be mental as well as physical. Here, the victim was rendered irresponsible by the shame and humiliation of having been raped. This case is unique in that the victim, although distraught and upset, was alone when she took the poison. The motive for suicide may...
- (Per Curiam) Yes. Causation exits where subsequent human action occurs as a result of being rendered irresponsible from mental and physical injuries inflicted by the defendant. Stephenson (D) contends that he cannot be guilty of murder since the victim’s attempted suicide without his knowledge and of her own free will breaks the chain of causation between his acts and her death. [Stephenson (D) gives “free will” a new meaning.] Stephenson (D) relies on [defendant not guilty where he wounded a person who was taken to the hospital and developed scarlet fever from which she died]. The holdings of these cases are not controlling here. We conclude that when suicide follows either a physical or mental wound inflicted by the defendant, his act is homicidal if the victim was rendered irresponsible by such wound and as a natural result of it. In this case, the victim was at all times entrapped by Stephenson (D) and under his custody and control. [His free will argument is laughable.] She...
- Appeal following criminal conviction of second-degree murder.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- PER CURIAM: An opinion by the whole court, rather than one judge.
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Commonwealth v. Tluchak 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- One who is in lawful possession of the goods or money of another cannot commit larceny by feloniously converting them to his own use, for the reason that larceny, being a criminal trespass on the right of the possession, cannot be committed by one who, being invested with that right, is consequently incapable of trespassing on it.
- (Reno, J.) No. While Tluchak (D) contends that the evidence is not sufficient in law to sustain a conviction, we shall assume, for the purposes of this decision, that the testimony established a of the personal property by Tluchak (D) and his wife to the prosecutor and his wife. That is, Tluchak (D) and his wife sold but failed or refused to deliver the goods to the purchasers. Tluchak (D) and his wife had possession of the goods, not mere custody of them. The evidence indicates that they were allowed to retain possession without trick or artifice and without fraudulent intent to convert them. Presumably title passed upon payment of the purchase price; nevertheless Tluchak (D) and his wife had lawful possession thereafter. One who is in lawful possession of the goods or money of another cannot commit larceny by feloniously converting them to his own use, for the reason that larceny, being a criminal trespass on the right of possession, cannot be committed by one who, being invested...
- Tluchak (D) and his wife entered into a written contract to sell their farm to the prosecutor and his wife. The agreement did not include any personal property but it did cover “All buildings, plumbing, heating, lighting fixtures, screens, storm sash, shades, blinds, awnings, shrubbery and plants.” When the purchasers took possession of the farm, they discovered that certain articles which had been on the premises at the time the agreement was executed were missing. These articles were charged in the indictment as subjects of the larceny. Tluchak (D) and his wife were found guilty of larceny. The court below overruled their motions for new trials and arrest of judgment. Tluchak (D) was sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to make restitution. This appeal followed.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal from the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial and arrest of judgment following his conviction and sentence for larceny.
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Chapter Nine Theft Offenses 4 results
- One who is in lawful possession of the goods or money of another cannot commit larceny by feloniously converting them to his own use, for the reason that larceny, being a criminal trespass on the right of the possession, cannot be committed by one who, being invested with that right, is consequently incapable of trespassing on it.
- A demand for settlement of a civil action, accompanied by a malicious threat to expose the wrongdoer’s criminal conduct, if made with intent to extort payment, against his will, constitutes the crime of blackmail.
- Confidential information is not “property” for the purposes of the law of theft.
- Nelson (D) lied to his supplier regarding a security interest he offered in return for more credit, and then he defaulted on his account.
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Commonwealth v. Atencio 4 results
- , a slightly different Russian Roulette situation existed. The defendant introduced a fifteen-year-old boy to the game and played it on several occasions without incident. The youngster later played the game by himself, outside the presence of the defendant, and the gun went off, killing the boy. Although the court agreed that the youngster would not have died if the defendant had not directed, instructed, and influenced him to play, it held that there was no criminal liability because the free will of the youngster was an intervening cause that broke the chain of causation. The difference between the two cases is that the
- DIFFERENT STANDARDS ARE APPLIED IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT TO VOLUNTARY SUBSEQUENT ACTION BY VICTIM
- (Wilkins, J.) No. Subsequent human actions that recklessly risk resulting harm will not break the chain of causation where the defendant encourages or cooperates in a joint activity with the victim which results in harm. We hold that the wanton or reckless conduct of the deceased and others could be found in the concerted action and cooperation of Atencio (D) and the other defendants in helping to bring about the deceased’s foolish act. [More like a stupid and crazy act.] It could be found that there was mutual encouragement in a joint enterprise. [This means that the idiots agreed among themselves to play Russian Roulette, a so-called game]. Atencio (D) and the others did not have a duty to prevent the deceased from playing the game. However, there was a duty on their part not to cooperate or join with him in the game. It is not necessary for the decedent to be forced to play or to suggest that he play. It would be incorrect to say that had the deceased been the first one to play, no
- CASE VOCABULARY
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United States v. Bruno 4 results
- The type of conspiracy addressed in this case is called a “chain” conspiracy, as contrasted with the “wheel” conspiracy described in the previous case. This opinion establishes the proposition that a conspiracy can be found where the defendants aid a conspiracy and merely have knowledge of each other’s actions. Is this not changing the original definition of what a conspiracy is? A conspiracy is supposed to occur where there is an agreement and intent to achieve a criminal objective. Arguably, an agreement cannot take place unless there .... This is the purpose of an agreement. Do the smugglers in this case intend to, in any way, help the retailers get rich, or are they only interested in making sure that they fill up their own pockets with money? Since the drug smuggling and sales had already been committed, wouldn’t it make more intuitive sense to prosecute them as accomplices and not conspirators? These problems resulted in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt... ...with criminal...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- PER CURIAM: An opinion written by the court as a whole.
- , rev’d on other grounds,
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United States v. Girard 4 results
- and its predecessors. These words are found in so many criminal statutes throughout the United States that they have in a sense become words of art. The word “thing” notwithstanding, the phrase is generally construed to cover tangibles as well as intangibles. Although the content of a writing is an intangible, it is nonetheless a thing of value. The existence of a property in the contents of unpublished writings was judicially recognized long before the advent of copyright laws. Although we are not concerned here with the laws of copyright, we are satisfied, nonetheless, that the Government (P) has a property interest in certain of its private records which it may protect by statute as a thing ...a constitutional infirmity simply because the statute might conceivably trespass upon the First Amendment rights of others. In view of the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep in regulating conduct, it is not so substantially overbroad that any overbreadth that may exist cannot be cured on...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- , which prohibits threats made through the mails with the intent to extort money or any other “thing of value.” Conversion has been held to be the misuse or abuse of property or its use in an unauthorized manner; thus, Girard (D) was properly found to have converted the DEA’s computerized records. Girard (D), a former employee of the DEA, must have known that the sale of DEA confidential law enforcement records was prohibited. The DEA’s own rules and regulations forbidding such disclosure may be considered both a delimitation and clarification of the conduct proscribed by the statute. Thus Girard’s (D) conviction was proper.
- ...with James Bond regarding a proposed illegal venture that involved smuggling a planeload of marijuana from Mexico into the United States [didn’t know 007 was one of the bad guys!]. Girard (D) told Bond that for $500 per name he could, through an inside source, secure reports from the DEA files that would show whether any participant in the proposed operation was a government informant. Unfortunately for Girard (D), Bond himself became an informant and disclosed his conversations with Girard (D) to the DEA [ooh, the double-cross!]. Thereafter, dealings between Bond and Girard (D) were conducted under the watchful eye of the DEA. Bond asked Girard (D) to secure reports on four men whose names were furnished to him by DEA agents. DEA records are kept in computerized files, and the DEA hoped to identify the inside source by monitoring access to the four names in the computer bank. In this manner, the DEA learned that Girard’s (D) informant was Lambert, a DEA agent who...
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Williams v. New York 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Murphy, J.) The jury unanimously recommended life imprisonment as a suitable punishment for the defendant. Though vested with the statutory authority to do so, a judge should hesitate to increase the severity of such a community expression. The “high commands of due process were not obeyed” in this case.
- The death sentence imposed here was not void under the Due Process Clause solely by reason of the fact that the court had considered additional information contained in the pre-sentence investigation and provided by other sources. The defendant was not denied due process of law by the judge’s consideration of this evidence, and the decision of the lower court affirming his sentence was correct. Affirmed.
- May a judge properly consider information contained in a pre-sentence report when sentencing a convicted criminal to death?
- The imposition of a death sentence for murder in the first degree is not void under the Due Process Clause solely because the trial court, before imposing sentence, considered additional information obtained through the court’s probation department and other sources.
- (Black, J.) Yes. The imposition of a death sentence for murder in the first degree is not void under the Due Process Clause solely because the trial court, before imposing sentence, considered additional information obtained through the court’s probation department and other sources. A judge, who is charged with the responsibility of imposing sentences, is not restricted by the Due Process Clause to the consideration of only information received in open court. The sentencing judge is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His or her task, within statutory or constitutional limits, is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined.
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Regina v. Cunningham 5 results
- evolved over time from a general notion of moral blameworthiness, i.e., being possessed of “evil intent” or an immoral motive, to a more narrowly defined state of mind—often one that is specifically required by the wording of the offense. This case shows that evolution because, quite clearly, the trial court and the appellate court applied two different definitions of . The trial court followed the “culpability” approach to , which would support a finding of guilt based on more general immoral or improper motives. In this case, the offense required that an actor “maliciously” cause poison to be administered to a person. The trial court’s instruction suggested that Cunningham (D) could be convicted if he acted wickedly; that is, if he was morally blameworthy in a general sense for stealing the gas meter, or if he knew he was doing something wrong. But Cunningham (D) certainly knew he was doing something wrong when he stole the meter. The crucial question becomes whether his...
- requirement of maliciousness, the actor must either intentionally set out to cause the harm that resulted, or he must have been reckless with regard to whether the harm would in fact result. If the actor did not intend to bring about the harm, he must at least have been able to foresee that the harm could occur if he persisted in his actions. He would be acting recklessly if he chose to disregard the foreseeable risk of harm and to act anyway. In the instant case, it does not appear that Cunningham (D) intentionally released the gas to poison Mrs. Wade. [The notion is open to debate, however, as Mrs. Wade was his mother-in-law to be, after all.] The trial judge instructed the jury that the statutory concept of “malicious” meant wicked; that is, they could convict if they found that Cunningham (D) was doing something he knew he should not have been doing, something that was wrong. We think that definition was too broad. In the context of this statute, an act is “malicious” if it is...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- MALICE: A state of mind showing an evil intent, or one that causes a person to purposely or willfully commit an act with no regard for its effect on others.
- Cunningham (D) was engaged to Mrs. Wade’s daughter. Mrs. Wade owned a house that had been divided into two individual homes. Mrs. Wade lived on one side with her husband and Cunningham (D) was to live on the other side after his marriage to the Wades’ daughter. Cunningham (D) was out of work and needed money, so he went into the basement of the unoccupied portion of the house and stole the gas meter. In a statement to the police, Cunningham (D) admitted that he wrenched the gas meter from the wall, stole the money from within (8 shillings) and discarded the meter. Although there was a shut off valve about 2 feet from the meter, Cunningham (D) did not turn off the gas. As a result, gas leaked through the basement wall and into Mrs. Wade’s house, where it partially asphyxiated her while she was sleeping in her bedroom. Cunningham (D) was indicted for violating Section 23 of the Offenses against the Person Act [making it a felony to unlawfully and maliciously administer poison to a...
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United States v. Brawner 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This case presents the doctrine commonly called “diminished capacity.” When a defendant has a mental illness that falls short of legal insanity (i.e., the illness did not prevent him from understanding or controlling his actions), but that may have prevented his forming the criminal intent charged, he is entitled to a lesser charge consistent with the criminal intent he actually formed. A “diminished capacity” plea does
- (Federal Prosecution) v. (Criminal Defendant Pleading Insanity)
- Not Stated. Apparently, appeal from criminal conviction for first degree (premeditated) murder, seeking introduction of evidence of mental condition to support conviction for lesser included offense.
- Can defendants who are legally sane introduce evidence of mental illness to disprove the requisite criminal intent?
- DIMINISHED CAPACITY: Doctrine whereby defendants with a mental illness which falls short of legal insanity, but prevented their forming the criminal intent charged, are entitled to a lesser charge, but not acquittal.
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People v. Chun 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- To avoid the anomaly of putting a person who merely intends to frighten a victim in a worse legal position than the person who actually intended to shoot at the victim, the court reconsidered its holding in the case, ultimately overruling it. The California Supreme Court held in Robertson that the merger doctrine did not bar conviction of second-degree murder predicated on the felony of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner.
- Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that Chun (D) be convicted of felony-murder based on his shooting at an occupied vehicle without the intent to hit anyone?
- (Prosecuting Authority) v. (Criminal Defendant)
- (Chin, J.) No. When the underlying felony is assaultive in nature, the felony merges with the homicide and cannot be the basis of felony-murder. An assaultive felony is one that involves a threat of immediate violent injury. In determining whether a crime merges, the court will look at its elements, and not the facts of the case. This approach avoids the necessity of consulting facts that might be disputed and extends the protection of the merger doctrine to potentially less culpable defendants whose conduct is not assaultive. We do not have to decide at this point all felonies to which the merger doctrine applies, but we conclude that shooting at an occupied vehicle is assaultive in nature and hence cannot serve as the underlying felony for purposes of the felony-murder rule.
- Onesavanh, Ouch, and Onethavong were driving to the store in the car owned by Onesavanh’s father. Onesavanh’s brother also sometimes drove the car. As they stopped at a light, a Honda with tinted windows pulled up next to them, and gunfire erupted from the Honda. All three occupants of Onesavanh’s car were hit. Onethavong was killed. The other two injured parties identified the Honda’s driver as Chan, a member of a rival street gang. Chan was never found. Two months later, Chun (D) was arrested and subsequently admitted he was in the backseat of the Honda. He also admitted he fired a gun but did not point it at anyone; he just wanted to scare them. Chun (D) was tried, and the court gave a second-degree felony murder instruction to the jury based on shooting at an occupied vehicle.
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United States v. Fleming 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In this case, the court draws a distinction between dangerous conduct that leads to murder and dangerous conduct that leads to manslaughter. The court states that the difference is one of degree—the difference between murder and manslaughter is found both in the extent to which the defendant is aware of the risk and in the probability of danger that arises from the defendant’s action. In other words, Fleming (D) was guilty of murder rather than manslaughter because serious accidents are likely to result when drunk people drive recklessly on congested highways, and because he knew that his actions created a probability of serious harm and ignored the risk. The problem with the court’s decision here is that Fleming was drunk when he got into his car, and during the period when he was driving recklessly on the highway his mental state may not have been up to the task of weighing the risks associated with drunk and reckless driving. The difference between murder and manslaughter usually...
- A drunk driver drove at high speeds and occasionally into oncoming traffic on a busy highway. He crashed into another car and was found guilty of the murder of the driver.
- Under federal law, in a case where a vehicular homicide was the unintentional result of the defendant’s drunk driving, can the defendant’s actions be held to constitute evidence of malice aforethought and therefore support a conviction of second degree murder?
- (Winter, C.J.) Yes. Under federal law, a vehicular homicide committed by a drunk driver constitutes murder in the second degree with malice aforethought, rather than involuntary manslaughter. Malice aforethought is the characteristic that serves to distinguish murder from manslaughter. Proof of malice does not have to include proof that the defendant felt any particular hostility toward his victim, nor does it have to include proof that the defendant intended to kill anyone. The government can establish malice by showing conduct that evidences a reckless, wanton, or gross breach of the standard of care in such a way that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was aware that his actions created a risk of death or serious bodily harm. In this case, the government had to show that Fleming (D) intended to drive the way he did and that he acted without regard for the lives and safety of others. Fleming’s (D) conduct was sufficient to show that he acted with malice... ...case...
- At 3:00 p.m. on June 15, 1983, David Earl Fleming (D) was driving southbound on the George Washington Memorial Parkway in Virginia (the Parkway is within federal jurisdiction) at speeds estimated by witnesses to be between 70 and 100 miles per hour (the Parkway speed limit was 45 miles per hour). Several times Fleming (D) drove his car into oncoming traffic in order to avoid the heavy congestion on his side of the road. About six miles from where police first observed Fleming (D) driving at excessive speed, Fleming (D) lost control of his vehicle on a sharp curve. His car slid across the northbound lanes and hit the curb on the northbound side of the Parkway. Fleming (D) then straightened out his car and struck a car driven by Mrs. Haley. At the moment of impact, Fleming’s (D) car was traveling at between 70 and 80 miles per hour (the speed limit at that point was 30 miles per hour). Mrs. Haley died before she could be pulled from the wreckage of her car. Fleming (D) survived. When...
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People v. Ceballos 4 results
- (Burke, J.) No. Courts have concluded that a person may be held criminally liable for injuries or death resulting from a deadly mechanical device that he sets on his premises. However, an exception to the rule is recognized where the defendant would have been justified in taking the life or inflicting the injury with his bare hands. However, allowing persons to employ deadly mechanical devices imperils fireman, police officers, and children. When the actor is present, he may realize that deadly force is not necessary, but deadly mechanical devices are without mercy or discretion. Furthermore, even if the rule justifying the use of deadly mechanical devices were applied here, Ceballos (D) would not be justified in shooting Stephen. A killing in defense of property is justified, inter alia, when committed against one who manifestly intends to commit a felony. Furthermore, the felony intended to be committed must be a forcible and atrocious crime, such as murder, mayhem, rape and...
- Under the old common law rules, a deadly mechanical device could be used where the intrusion was such that the person, if he were present, would be justified in taking the life or inflicting the harm with his own hands. Now many states hold that a resident may not justifiably use a spring gun to repel an intruder, even if he would be justified in inflicting the same harm with his bare hands. As the court in noted, spring guns kill indiscriminately. Under the old common law rules, the two kids who entered Ceballos’s (D) garage committed larceny, not burglary, since they entered during the daytime, and in a typical common law jurisdiction, Ceballos (D) would not have been allowed to use deadly force. Had they entered at night, their act likely would have constituted burglary, and Ceballos (D) would have been justified in using deadly force.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Don Ceballos (D) lived in a small home with the living quarters above the garage, though Ceballos (D) sometimes slept in the garage. In the garage Ceballos (D) had about $2,000 worth of property. In March of 1970, Ceballos (D) noted that some tools had been stolen from his home. In May he noticed that the lock on his garage door was bent and that there were pry marks on the door. The next day he mounted a .22 pistol in the garage. The pistol was aimed at the center of the garage doors and was connected by a wire to one of the doors so that the pistol would discharge if the door were opened several inches. Two boys, Stephen, aged 16, and Robert, aged 15 came to Ceballos’ (D) house while he was away. Both were unarmed with a knife or a gun. Stephen removed the lock with a crowbar, and as he pulled the door outward, was hit in the face with a bullet. Stephen testified that he was not sure if he was going to steal anything, but wanted to go in the garage and look. Ceballos (D) testified...
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State v. Rusk 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Murphy, C.J.) Yes. The appellate court reversed the conviction because it found that the evidence must support a conclusion either that the victim resisted and was overcome by force or that she was prevented from resisting by threats to her safety. The appellate court concluded that the evidence in this case was insufficient to show either of these factors. In its words, “we have been unable to see any resistance on her part . . . and certainly can we see no fear as would overcome her attempt to resist.” We recognize that lack of consent is generally established by proof of resistance or failure to resist due to force or threats to the victim’s safety. However, the majority of courts have held that the victim’s reasonable fear for her life or her safety obviates the need to prove force or resistance. We think that is the correct standard to apply in this case. We disagree with the appellate court that the evidence was insufficient to show this degree of fear in Pat. The appellate
- A woman named Pat went out for the evening with her friend, Terry. After they attended a high school alumni meeting, the women went to a bar in Fells Point to have a few drinks. Rusk (D) approached the two women, and Terry interrupted her conversation with another to say, briefly, “Hi Eddie.” Rusk (D) then began talking to Pat and during the conversation they learned that they had both recently separated from their spouses and each had a child. Rusk (D) asked for a ride home. Pat agreed to give him a ride home because she thought her friend Terry knew him. On the ride home, Pat cautioned Rusk (D) that she was giving him a ride and it meant nothing more. When they arrived at Rusk’s home, which was located in an area with which Pat was unfamiliar, Rusk (D) asked Pat to come up to his room. She refused but he reached over and turned the car off and took her keys. Rusk (D) then got out of the car and asked Pat if she would come up to his room now. Pat later testified that she went with...
- (Cole, J.) The majority concludes that the jury could have found that Pat’s fear was reasonable under the circumstances. I submit that that issue should not have been reached without first deciding whether Rusk’s (D) behavior could reasonably have been seen as able to give rise to such a fear. I recognize that courts no longer require a woman to resist to the utmost in a rape case. But it is not enough for a woman to simply say, “I was scared.” We cannot convict a man of rape on the basis of that naked statement. A victim’s statement that she was scared does not by itself transform consent or mere unwillingness into submission by force. The woman must make it plain that she regards the sexual acts as abhorrent and that they offend her very sense of pride and dignity. And she should resist unless the man has made it clear to her that he will force her if she tries to resist. There is no evidence of such fear in this case as would prevent Pat from resisting. She testified that she did...
- The fundamental disagreement between the majority and the dissent here is over when resistance is required and to what degree. The element of force or the threat of force is usually required in order to obtain a rape conviction. One way of proving force is for the victim to show that she tried to resist in some manner. Some rape statutes actually require a showing of resistance as an element of the crime. The old requirement that a woman “resist to the utmost” has been abandoned by all American jurisdictions, but many, if not most, courts still require a showing of reasonable resistance, despite the fact that many studies have shown that it can actually be more dangerous for a victim to resist her attacker than to submit. Many advocates of rape law reform would have the courts recognize the serious issues that surround a requirement of resistance. As a result, some states, like New York, have removed the resistance requirement entirely from their rape statutes.
- Appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland of a conviction for rape and subsequent reversal of the conviction by the Court of Special Appeals.
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Graham v. United States 5 results
- (Washington, J.) No. Graham’s (D) principal contentions are, first, that the evidence supports the proposition that Gal voluntarily gave Graham (D) complete title to the money and therefore Graham (D) is entitled to a directed verdict. We think this contention without merit. If the jury believed Gal’s testimony and did not believe Graham (D), we think it possible for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Graham (D) fraudulently induced Gal to give him the $2,000 to be used to bribe the police, that Graham (D) did not intent so to use the money, and converted it to his own use. This would be larceny by trick. Graham (D) also contends that the trial court’s charge to the jury was erroneous in not sufficiently distinguishing between the situation where one obtains complete title to another’s property by fraud or trick and the case where possession only is obtained. The appropriate Code section provides: “Whoever shall feloniously take and carry away anything of value of...
- Did the trial court err in not sufficiently distinguishing between the situation where one obtains complete title to another’s property by fraud or trick and the case where possession only is obtained?
- GRAND LARCENY: Theft of a high value; required amount set by statute.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Larceny by trick is theft by stealth. It punishes misappropriation effected by unauthorized disposition of the owner’s property. The focus is on the defendant’s behavior behind the owner’s back. One cause of confusion is that larceny by trick requires some deceit in addition to the unauthorized disposition of property that is its gravamen. It is thus thought of as a type of theft by fraud. However, the requirement of deceit in larceny by trick stems from its history rather than its function and plays a minor role. Fraud for this highly technical purpose need not be subjected to close scrutiny or held to an exacting standard, for there is adequate external evidence of Graham’s (D) antisocial bent in his subsequent misappropriation. Indeed it is true generally that the only substantial evidence of the initial fraud is found in the subsequent unauthorized appropriation.
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People v. Casassa 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: A defense that must be raised by the defendant. Some other affirmative defenses in criminal law include self-defense, insanity, alibi, coercion, and duress.
- (Jasen, J.) No. This case is to be decided under section 125.25 of the New York Penal Code, which provides that if the killer can show that he acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, he qualifies for an affirmative defense reducing murder in the second degree to manslaughter. Section ...was basically adopted from the Model Penal Code. The “extreme emotional disturbance” defense in the Model Penal Code is an outgrowth of the “heat of passion” defense found in the common law, but it is considerably broader. It eliminates entirely the provision which required that there be no cooling off period between the provocation and the actions which caused the death. It also eliminates the rigid rules concerning what is and what is not adequate provocation. Several incidents can be combined to form the reasonable explanation of the killer’s extreme emotional disturbance. The arguments presented by individual defendants...
- Victor Casassa (D) (Casassa) met Victoria Lo Consolo (Lo Consolo) because they lived in the same apartment complex. They dated a few times casually. Lo Consolo informed Casassa (D) that she was not falling in love with him. Casassa (D) says that this rejection devastated him. After this initial rejection Casassa (D) started doing some odd things. He broke into the apartment below Lo Consolo’s so that he could eavesdrop on her while she pursued other relationships. He claims the things he heard further devastated him. He broke into her apartment and lay naked in her bed. He reports having had a knife with him at that time of the break-in. He said he knew he was going to either kill himself or her. Finally on February 28, 1977 he brought several bottles of wine and liquor to her as a gift. When she did not accept this gift he pulled out a steak knife and stabbed her in the throat, after which he pulled her to the bathroom and submerged her body in the tub to make sure she was dead....
- What all of the cases like this have in common is that it is very difficult to define the point where we should have compassion for a person who kills after being pushed too far. It has been argued that manslaughter no longer makes sense. The loss of control is not necessarily a good way to identify someone who should spend less time in prison. The fact that a person can lose control and kill someone because of external circumstances does not tend to lessen a person’s dangerousness to society. Feminists have long objected to manslaughter on the basis that it is used as an excuse when abusive men murder their wives. On the other hand, is there really anyone who can honestly say that they can’t imagine any situation in which he or she might be pushed to kill?
- The test of whether the extreme emotional disturbance of the killer had a reasonable explanation or excuse depends on a reasonable evaluation of the external circumstances that the killer believed he was facing and not on the killer’s personal point of view.
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Gordon v. U.S. 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This opinion was later reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court, essentially for the reasons given by the dissent. The court was applying a standard that had evolved in response to the uniqueness of corporate liability. Because a corporation has no free will of its own and is driven by the actions of its agents, a theory of constructive knowledge is essential to subject it to criminal liability. A corporation, like any other individual, must have the requisite as other individuals. It would be odd to find one person not guilty of being an accomplice, and another guilty under the exact same circumstances solely on the reason that one person is an employer and the other not. The Supreme Court has also treated partnerships as entities that, like corporations, can be held criminally liable for the acts of their employees.
- (Murrah, J.) Yes. The statute at issue requires willfulness as an element of the offense. Willfulness or a guilty mind is “an essential ingredient” of any punishable offense, and is a notion “deeply rooted in our criminal jurisprudence.” The trial court instructed the jury that Gordon’s (D) intent could be ascertained by circumstantial evidence. The circumstantial evidence was the acts and knowledge of the employees. The trial court did not discard the requirement of willfulness or guilty knowledge. Instead, it charged the employers with “constructive” knowledge of the illegal acts. As partners and employers, the defendants have a responsibility and duty under law to run their business properly. This responsibility extends from the employer to the employees and agents. The action or omission could be construed by a trier of fact as intentional and deliberate or inadvertent and negligent. Since the jury instructions were proper, this is an issue properly left to the jury. Judgment...
- AN UNKNOWING EMPLOYER CAN BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR AN EMPLOYEE’S WILLFUL CRIMINAL ACTS MADE WHILE ACTING IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
- An unknowing employer can be held criminally liable for an employee’s willful criminal acts made while acting in the course of employment.
- Can an unknowing employer be held criminally liable for an employee’s willful criminal acts made while acting in the course of employment?
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Topolewski v. State 4 results
- (Marshall, J.) No. The case is very near the borderline, if not across it, between consent and nonconsent to the taking of the property. It has been held that if the property was delivered by a servant to the defendant by the master’s direction, the offense cannot be larceny, regardless of the purpose of the defendant. In this case the property was not only placed on the loading platform, as was usual in delivering such goods to customers, with knowledge that Topolewski (D) would soon arrive, having a formed design to take it, but the packing company’s employee in charge of the platform, Ernst Klotz, was instructed that the property was placed there for a man who would call for it. Klotz had every reason to infer from such a statement that when Topolewski (D) arrived and claimed the right to take the property, that he was the one to which the management referred. He had every right to believe that it was proper to make delivery to Topolewski (D), and he acted accordingly. While...
- The logical basis for the doctrine relied upon by the Court is that there can be no larceny without a trespass. So, if one procures his property to be taken by another intending to commit larceny, or delivers his property to such other, with the latter intending to commit such crime, the element of trespass is lacking and the crime is not fully consummated. That does not militate against a person’s being free to set a trap to catch one whom he suspects intends to commit the crime of larceny, but the setting of such trap must not go further than to afford the would-be thief the amplest opportunity to carry out his purpose. There must be no inducement on the part of the owner of the property so as to put him in the position of having consented to the taking. There is a great deal of criticism for practicing deception to facilitate and encourage the commission of a crime. Some believe that the owner’s deception is sufficient reason to excuse the would-be criminal, or to preclude his...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Dolan, an employee of the Plankinton Packing Company, owed Topolewski (D) money. In lieu of payment, Topolewski (D) arranged for Dolan to place three barrels of the company’s meat on the loading platform. The plan was for Topolewski (D) to then load the meat barrels on his wagon and drive away as if he were a customer [what a deal!]. Dolan reported the plan to the company’s representatives, who instructed him to feign cooperation and carry out his end of the plan. Topolewski (D) took the barrels as planned and was arrested, charged and convicted of stealing the barrels of meat.
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Chapter Five Homicide 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A drunk driver drove at high speeds and occasionally into oncoming traffic on a busy highway. He crashed into another car and was found guilty of the murder of the driver.
- Whether a risk of death is substantial and unjustifiable must be determined based on the circumstances of each case.
- In Pennsylvania, when determining whether a murder was premeditated and therefore of the first degree, a court will disregard the length of time it took for the defendant to form the intention to kill and will not treat the testimony of a psychiatrist as conclusive on the issue of premeditation.
- A man convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death appeals the sentence to the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the death penalty is a violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments.
- A man convicted of murder petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, where he used a statistical study to assert that the state’s capital sentencing procedure has an unconstitutional disproportionate impact on blacks.
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Washington v. Glucksberg 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The subject of euthanasia, or assisted suicide, is a hotly debated topic. The courts, as this case demonstrates, are hesitant to become involved, but are called upon at times to decide the constitutionality of the statutes in question. The court in this case was unwilling to extend the holdings of to reach the conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are “liberties” protected by the Due Process Clause. This case demonstrates that actions by those who assist in taking the life of another are not legally justified because the suicidal person has consented to or requested such assistance. A distinguishing factor between this case—wherein the Supreme Court rejected the due process argument—and —wherein the Supreme Court upheld a competent person’s due process right to refuse medical treatment—is that the latter is not taking affirmative action to end his life. Rather, by refusing medical treatment, the person is merely letting nature take its course.
- (Rehnquist, J.) No. The state statute at issue in this case prohibits aiding another person to attempt suicide. For over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide. In a long line of cases, we have held that the Due Process Clause protects the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion. We have also assumed that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. [competent adults have due process right to refuse or discontinue life support based in part on common law rule that forced medication was a battery]. In ..., intimate, and personal decisions are protected is not warranted. [In other words, there’s a limit on the due process protections.] We are thus lead to conclude that the asserted “right” to... ...’s ban on...
- Glucksberg (P) and other terminally ill patients and their physicians sued the state of Washington for a declaratory judgment that the state’s statutory ban on assisted suicide violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute was unconstitutional. The state of Washington (D) petitioned the United States Supreme Court.
- DECLARATORY JUDGMENT: A form of a judgment whereby the court declares the rights of parties or renders its opinion concerning issues of law.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Perry v. State 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- At a follow-up interview, E.P. admitted that Young had abused her sexually. Perry (D) was charged with conspiracy to commit capital criminal sexual battery. At trial, he moved for judgment on acquittal, and his motion was denied.
- (Van Nortwick, J.) No. The offense of conspiracy is committed when there is an agreement to commit a crime, and the existence of the agreement may be inferred. Direct proof is not necessary. In this case, there was no direct proof of a conspiracy and the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to show an agreement between Perry (D) and his wife or mother-in-law for the commission of a sexual battery, or the intent to conspire. Reversed.
- JUDGMENT ON ACQUITTAL: A judgment that acquits a defendant on the grounds that the evidence introduced against him at trial is insufficient to support a conviction.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Although the court reversed Perry’s (D) conviction for conspiracy, it affirmed his conviction for acting as Young’s accomplice. Accomplice liability does not require an agreement. A person could be convicted as an accomplice for taking actions to facilitate a crime even if he does so voluntarily, without the principal actor’s advance knowledge that he intends to do so.
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Commonwealth v. Sherry 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Liacos, J.) Yes. Sherry (D1), Hussain (D2), and Lefkowitz (D3) contend that the judge’s jury charge was inadequate and the cause of prejudicial error. However the instructions given by the trial judge placed before the jury the essential elements of the crime required to be proved. The judge instructed the jury that intercourse must be accomplished with force sufficient to overcome the woman’s will, or by threats of bodily harm, inferred or expressed, which engendered sufficient fear so that it was reasonable for her not to resist. These instructions correctly stated the elements of proof required for a rape conviction. Sherry (D1), Hussain (D2), and Lefkowitz (D3), appear to have been seeking to raise a defense of good faith mistake on the issue of consent. They would require the jury to “find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of [the victim’s] lack of consent.” In doing so, they argue that mistake-of-fact negating criminal intent is a defense to the...
- Rape is a general-intent offense. Therefore, a defendant is guilty of rape if he possessed a morally blameworthy state of mind regarding the female’s lack of consent. Thus, as a general rule, a person is not guilty of rape if he entertained a genuine and reasonable belief that the female voluntarily consented to intercourse with him. As you can see, this rule conforms with ordinary common law mistake-of-fact doctrine relating to general-intent offenses. As illustrated by the opinion, the issue of is more significant in acquaintance-rape prosecutions, in jurisdictions where the resistance rule has been eliminated, and in jurisdictions where a conviction may be obtained in the absence of force beyond that which is necessary for intercourse. Moreover, the analysis of this issue is the same in rape cases as it is in other general-intent offenses. All in all, the main purpose of this case is to show that, although the issue of ...of mistake-of-fact are rare in rape cases, they are...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Certification to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts of a conviction for rape.
- A defense of mistake-of-fact must be based on a reasonable good faith standard.
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Nelson v. United States 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The dissent believes, and heartily argues, that Nelson (D) was merely guilty of a moral wrong in falsely and grossly misrepresenting his debt to the bank, but that in the circumstances he should not have been indicted and convicted of it. The dissent argues that a grave injustice has been done in this case, as even a liar is entitled to the full protection of the law. But Nelson (D) purposely misled his supplier, Potomac Distributors, in order to get merchandise from it. He would not have been able to obtain the goods any other way, and so he lied. The fact that the car had a value in excess of the value of the television sets does not relieve him of this falsehood, for if he truly believed that was enough he wouldn’t have needed to lie in the first place. Additionally, Nelson (D) promised to make a cash payment on the note within a few days. Again he defaulted. The evidence indicates an intent to defraud Potomac Distributors, so the majority was correct in upholding the lower court...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Nelson (D) purchased merchandise for resale over a period of months from Potomac Distributors. His account was in arrears more than thirty days when he sought immediate possession of two television sets and a washing machine, which he had already sold and received payment for. Schneider, the secretary-treasurer for Potomac Distributors, told Nelson (D) that no further credit could be extended to him because of his overdue indebtedness. Nelson (D) offered to give security for the desired items as well as for the delinquent account. He represented himself as the owner of a Packard car for which he paid $4,260.50, but failed to disclose an outstanding prior indebtedness on the car of $3028.08 secured by a chattel mortgage in favor of City Bank [sucker!]. Instead, he represented that he owed only one payment of $55, not then due. Relying on such representations, Potomac Distributors delivered two televisions worth $136 each to Nelson (D), taking in return a demand note for the entire...
- WRONGFUL ACTS KNOWINGLY OR INTENTIONALLY COMMITTED CAN NEITHER BE JUSTIFIED NOR EXCUSED ON THE GROUND OF INNOCENT INTENT
- Nelson (D) lied to his supplier regarding a security interest he offered in return for more credit, and then he defaulted on his account.
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Commonwealth v. Malone 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Pennsylvania homicide statute at the time of this case divided murder into two degrees. A conviction of murder in the first degree required a showing of “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” Under Pennsylvania law at the time, “all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree.” This case tries to draw a line between the broad statutory category of second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. The court is looking for a general hostility, or recklessness and disregard for human life that will have the effect of characterizing an unintentional killing as the result of malice rather than accident. In this case, Malone (D) decided to play with a loaded gun. A loaded gun is a deadly weapon and an obviously dangerous choice for a toy. Whether Malone (D) had loaded the bullet in the chamber he thought would fire last, as he testified at trial, or whether he had actually loaded the bullet and then spun the revolver’s cylinder as in a traditional game...
- Under Pennsylvania law, if a conviction of murder in the second degree requires a showing of malice on the part of the killer, can a defendant who has killed another in a Russian Roulette game be convicted of murder in the second degree?
- (Maxey, J.) Yes. Under Pennsylvania law, a defendant who has killed another in a Russian Roulette game can be found guilty of second-degree murder. A conviction of second-degree murder requires a showing of malice on the part of the killer. “Malice” does not necessarily mean hostility toward the victim, but can include general hostility or a “wicked disposition.” When an individual commits an act of gross recklessness and must have reasonably anticipated that another person’s death would likely result from his action, he is exhibiting the kind of general “wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences” that can constitute “malice.” Long’s death resulted from an intentional act committed by Malone (D) in reckless and wanton disregard of the consequences. There was at least a 60% chance that Malone’s pulling the trigger would result in a fatal shot because he had loaded one bullet into a gun and fired it three times into a vital part of Long’s body.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of a sentence of five to ten years in prison under a conviction of murder in the second degree.
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State v. Guthrie 5 results
- This case and illustrate the split that exists among jurisdictions with respect to the meaning of premeditation and deliberation. The court here expressly rejects the approach taken in which essentially held that premeditation requires only the formation of an intent to kill prior to the act of killing. As the court noted in this case, the blurs the distinction between first and second degree murder. Because first-degree murder is a creation of statute the court here believed it was necessary to give meaning to the distinction between a mere intent to kill and a premeditated killing. Although the holding accomplishes this, it raises the question as to what kind of evidence is necessary to prove premeditation. One court has held that evidence regarding planning, motive, and the nature of the killing are all relevant to the question of the existence of premeditation and deliberation.
- A man sought to appeal his conviction for premeditated murder on the ground that the evidence established that the stabbing of which he was convicted was the result of teasing and not preexisting intent to kill.
- In order to obtain a conviction for murder in the first-degree based on a premeditated and deliberate killing, must there be a showing that the defendant weighed his decision to kill?
- Dale Guthrie (D) and Steven Farley worked together as dishwashers in a restaurant. One evening, Farley began to tease Guthrie (D), who appeared to be in a bad mood, and snapped Guthrie (D) several times with a dish towel. When Farley snapped Guthrie’s (D) nose, Guthrie (D) became enraged and started towards Farley, who persisted with the teasing. Guthrie (D) then took out a pocket knife and stabbed Farley in the neck. Evidence at trial showed that Guthrie (D) suffered from a host of psychiatric problems and panic attacks. The trial court instructed the jury that, to establish that a killing was deliberate and premeditated, it was not necessary to prove that the intent to kill existed for any particular time prior to the killing; it was only necessary to prove that the intent to kill have existed at the time of the killing, or prior thereto.
- ...In order to establish that a murder is premeditated and deliberate there must be some proof that the defendant considered and weighed his decision to kill. The most significant problem with the jury instruction given by the trial court is that it fails to inform the jury the distinction between first and second-degree murder. Instead, it equates premeditation with an intent to kill. Premeditation and deliberation should be defined in a manner to give juries both guidance and reasonable discretion. Premeditation and deliberation are not measured by any specific period of time, but there must be some period between the formation of the intent to kill and the actual killing. Such a showing indicates the killing is by prior calculation and design. We do not mean to require that existence of some elaborate plan or scheme. Nevertheless, it is clear that the instruction’s notion of instantaneous premeditation and momentary deliberation does not comport with the requirements of a first...
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United States v. Peterson Part 2 4 results
- (Robinson, J.) No. The aggressor in a conflict culminating in death cannot invoke the protection of self-defense, unless he (i) attempted to withdraw from the violent altercation in good faith and (ii) communicated his intent to his adversary by word or deed. It has long been accepted that one cannot support a claim of self-defense by a self-generated necessity to kill. This doctrine is grounded on the principle that defensive killings are unnecessary if the occasion for them can be averted. Here, the uncontroverted evidence shows Peterson (D) was the aggressor, because he threatened Keitt with a pistol as Keitt was about to depart, challenging him to attack. At that point, Keitt was no longer the aggressor. Case law generally holds that issuing an illegal challenge reasonably calculated to provoke a deadly fight nullifies the right to deadly self-defense. ...adversary]. Here, the jury could easily conclude from the facts that Peterson (D) issued such a challenge. While case...
- Appeal from criminal conviction for manslaughter seeking reversal for improper jury instruction.
- The principle presented here is theoretically semi-sound. To hold otherwise would allow people to intentionally kill with impunity by provoking deadly fights with their intended victims. Note, however, that this principle seemingly applies different standards to the defender’s behavior than it does to his adversary’s. First, the trial court held that mere words are insufficient to justify violence. But the appellate court held that defenders may reasonably expect their verbal challenges to provoke a deadly fight, suggesting the court realizes that some words will provoke even a reasonable man to violence.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Patterson v. New York 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Powell, J.) The effect of Maine’s unconstitutional statute is no different from the effect of New York’s (P) statute. The Court is upholding New York’s (P) law which requires the defendant to prove extreme emotional disturbance. The Court struck down Maine’s law because the defendant was required to show that he acted in the heat of passion, in order to negate the element of malice. We held that this shifting of the burden of proof was unconstitutional. The Court states that because the burden showing extreme emotional disturbance is written as an affirmative defense, it passes constitutional scrutiny. We struck down the statute in because it required a defendant to disprove an element of the crime charged. Maine’s statute was invalid, the Court reasoned, because it defined murder as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied. Malice, the Court reiterates, in the sense of the absence of provocation, was part of the definition of the...
- the charge was murder under a Maine statute which included an element of malice aforethought, whether express or implied. Maine’s manslaughter statute provided a lesser punishment for “whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought . . . .” In instructed that malice could be implied from “any deliberate, cruel act committed by one person against another suddenly or without a considerable provocation,” in which event an intentional killing was murder unless by a preponderance of the evidence it was shown that the act was committed “in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation.” We held that Maine’s statute unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant in that it required the defendant to prove that the killing had occurred in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. While we did hold that under the due process clause the prosecution had the burden of proving
- ...John Northrup (Northrup) to whom she was at one time engaged. Patterson (D) borrowed a rifle, went to his father-in-law’s house, and through a window saw Roberta (partially undressed) and Northrup together. He entered the house and shot Northrup in the head twice which [of course] killed him. Patterson (D) was charged with second degree murder. There are two elements to New York’s (P) statute, (1) Intent to cause the death of another person, and (2) Causing the death of such person or of a third person. New York (P) also has a manslaughter statute under which “a person is guilty of manslaughter if he intentionally kills another person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse.” Extreme emotional disturbance is an affirmative defense in New York. Although Patterson (D) confessed to the killing, at trial he raised this defense. The jury was... .... On...
- AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: A legal defense that, when proved, relieves the accused from the responsibility for his otherwise criminal conduct.
- The Supreme Court upheld New York Court of Appeals judgment finding state statute constitutional and convicting defendant.
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People v. Reid 4 results
- under a claim of right to recover his own property, he was not guilty of robbery, but only of some lesser crime, such as assault or unlawful possession of a weapon. This contention is not without support, as several jurisdictions have held that one who acts under a claim of right lacks the intent to steal and should not be convicted of robbery. That logic is tenable when a person seeks to recover a specific chattel, it is less so when asserted under the circumstances presented in this case. Since forcible conduct is not merely a transgression against property, but also entails the risk of physical or mental injury to individuals, the court was correct in determining that it should be subjected to criminal sanctions.
- (Simons, J.) No. The issue presented here is whether a good-faith claim of right, which negates larcenous intent in certain thefts, negate the intent to commit robbery by a defendant who uses force to recover cash allegedly owed him. We hold that it does not. We have not had occasion to address the issue, but the Appellate Divisions to which it has been presented have uniformly ruled that claim of right is not a defense to robbery. Their determinations have been based upon the interpretation of the applicable statutes and a policy decision to discourage self-help, and they are consistent with what appears to be the emerging trend of similar appellate court decisions from other jurisdictions. For similar reasons, we conclude that the claim of right defense is not available in this case. We need not decide the quite different question of whether an individual who uses force to recover a specific chattel which he owns may be convicted of robbery. It should be noted, however, that...
- Reid (D) and Riddles were convicted of armed robberies of money from their victims, despite evidence that they were only trying to recover money owed to them [now that’s how to collect a debt!]. The trial court, conducting a trial without a jury, stated that it credited the testimony of Reid (D) that he had taken the money to satisfy a debt, but the court denied him the defense of claim of right because he used force.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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People v. Kevorkian 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Cavanagh, C.J.) No. The common law definition of murder does not encompass the act of intentionally providing the means by which a person commits suicide. To convict a defendant of criminal homicide, it must be proven that the death occurred as a direct and natural result of the defendant’s act. Unlike the common law, many modern statutes now treat assisted suicide as crime separate from murder. Recent decisions have drawn a distinction between active participation in the suicide and involvement in the events leading up to the suicide. Thus, a defendant may be convicted of murder where he pulls the trigger or holds the gun, but not where he merely furnishes the weapon. Remanded.
- This case serves as application of the point made in that an intentional subsequent act breaks the chain of causation, without regard to the foreseeability of the result. The court’s holding that active participation in a suicide may support a murder conviction, whereas mere assistance does not, is in line with the modern view held by most courts. How then does one distinguish between active participation and mere assistance? The court here draws a bright-line rule holding that death is the direct and natural result of the defendant’s act only where he participates in the that leads to death. The court provides little rationale for its holding, except for stating that many statutes now make it a separate crime to assist in a suicide. There still remains a question of whether Kevorkian’s (D) action crossed the line established by the court. The dissent argues that it did. In Justice Boyle’s view, Kevorkian’s (D) conduct was analogous to holding the gun while his “victims” pulled...
- Appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan challenging the holding of the court of appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court quashing an information.
- The common law definition of murder does not encompass the act of intentionally providing the means by which a person commits suicide.
- A doctor was indicted on two counts of murder after he assisted two terminally ill women in committing suicide.
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State v. Guido 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Weintraub, J.) Yes. At a criminal trial incorporating an insanity defense, expert witnesses may change their conclusions of sanity or insanity without prejudice, if they do so in good faith, even without diagnosing a change in the defendant’s condition. During Guido’s (D) trial, defense counsel and psychiatrists were subject to unwarranted humiliation, because their change in the report was honest, if mistaken. The doctors explained they changed their report based on Guido’s (D) attorney’s explanation of the exact diseases excused, but specifies the requisite effect the disease must create—at the time of the act, the accused must have labored under a defect of reason such that he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or did not know the act was wrong. Though the emphasis is on the state of mind, it is nonetheless required that that state be due to “disease,” not something else, so our cases do not excuse “emotional insanity” or “moral insanity” which is...
- At a criminal trial incorporating an insanity defense, expert witnesses may change their conclusions of sanity or insanity without prejudice, if they do so in good faith, even without diagnosing a change in the defendant’s condition.
- At a criminal trial incorporating an insanity defense, may expert witnesses change their conclusions of sanity or insanity without finding a change in the underlying condition?
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Adele Guido (D) shot and killed her husband, who was unfaithful, possessive, threatening, and occasionally abusive, and would not let Guido (D) divorce him. Guido (D) claimed she had taken a pistol from her suitcase intending to kill herself, but then reconsidered. As she put the pistol back, she saw her sleeping husband and killed him. Guido (D) was charged with murder, 2nd degree. At trial, Guido (D) claimed “temporary insanity.” Guido (D) was examined by 2 court-appointed psychiatrists, whose report found Guido (D) had “anxiety neurosis,” but pronounced her “legally” sane. However, the psychiatrists changed their ruling to “legal” insanity after discussions with Guido’s (D) attorney, though their medical findings were unchanged. At trial, the prosecutor accused the doctors of collaborating with Guido’s (D) attorney in defrauding the court. The psychiatrists explained they changed their conclusions because Guido’s (D) attorney convinced them that “anxiety neurosis” qualifies under
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State v. Williams 4 results
- Some suggest that the threat of criminal liability does not serve as a deterrent to negligent conduct. The negligent person is unaware of the risk, and cannot be deterred by a thought of possible punishment for taking an unreasonable risk that, in fact, he does not know he is taking. The competing argument contends that the threat of punishment makes people think harder about their conduct generally. When people consider the risks of their conduct, they tend to reduce the risks and thus create a safer society. Another issue that arises in is the cultural issue, though the court does not make much of it. There is a great deal of scholarship on the problem of the reasonable person definition, which is primarily informed by a world view that is white, male, and middleclass. To some extent, a trial by jury consisting of one’s peers may counteract some of the potential for injustice in application of the predominant reasonable person standard.
- ...There is a parental duty to provide medical care to a dependent, minor child. To prove involuntary manslaughter, the common law requires that a breach of this duty had to amount to more than mere ordinary or simple negligence—a showing of gross negligence was required. In Washington, however, the statutes defining manslaughter require only a showing of simple or ordinary negligence. The concept of ordinary negligence requires a failure to exercise the “ordinary caution” necessary to make out the defense of excusable homicide. Ordinary caution is the kind of caution that a man of reasonable prudence would exercise under the same or similar conditions. If the conduct of a defendant, regardless of his ignorance, good faith, or good intentions, fails to measure up to this standard, he is guilty of ordinary negligence. If such negligence proximately causes the death of the victim, the defendant is guilty of manslaughter. Timeliness in the furnishing of medical care must be... ...law...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Walter Williams (D) is a 24-year-old Sheshont Indian with a 6th grade education. His wife, Bernice Williams (D), is a 20-year-old part-Indian with an 11th grade education. At the time of the marriage, Bernice had two children, the younger of whom was a 14-month-old son. Both Walter and Bernice had a great deal of love for the child. The child became ill on September 1. Both defendants were aware that the child was ill. However, Bernice and Walter “were ignorant,” and did not realize how sick he was. They thought he had a toothache, which they did not believe to be life-threatening. They gave the child aspirin in hopes of improving his condition. They did not take the child to a doctor for fear that the Welfare Department would take the baby from them. The abscessed tooth developed into an infection of the mouth and cheeks, eventually becoming gangrenous. This condition, accompanied by the child’s inability to eat, brought on malnutrition, which lowered the child’s resistance and...
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People v. Goetz 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The rule announced by the court in this “Subway Vigilante” case is not a truly objective standard, but a hybrid objective/subjective standard. The actions of a defendant are to be evaluated according to an objective standard, but the circumstances of the defendant still must be considered. Query whether the court’s reference to “prior experiences . . . which could provide a reasonable belief that another person’s intentions were to injure or rob him” refers to a traumatically induced condition, akin to battered-woman syndrome, or whether it refers to a more generally held knowledge, or “street smarts.” Following his acquittal of most of the charges against him, Goetz (D) ran unsuccessfully for Mayor of New York on a platform that espoused vegetarianism and kindness to animals. His campaign materials referred obliquely to the shootings as part of his work as an “activist” against crime.
- Goetz (D) boarded a subway train in New York City, carrying a pistol in a holster. Four youths, who had boarded the train at a prior stop, approached Goetz (D), and one of them said, “Give me five dollars.” None of the youths displayed a weapon, although two of them had screwdrivers under their coats. Goetz (D) took out his gun and began shooting. He hit three of the four youths (one of them in the back) and, after surveying the scene, he shot the fourth. The train stopped and Goetz (D) told the conductor that the youths had tried to rob him. Goetz (D) then fled and ultimately surrendered to police in New Hampshire nine days later. Goetz (D) made a statement to the police that he had been carrying a handgun for three years, since he was injured in a mugging. Goetz (D) stated that he knew none of the youths was armed, but that he knew from the smile on one of their faces that they wanted to “play” with him. He said he was afraid, based on his prior experiences, that he would be...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- INDICTMENT: The formal written accusation of a crime, made by a grand jury and presented to a court for prosecution against the accused person; the act or process of preparing or bringing forward such a formal written accusation.
- protect himself against death or serious injury. Under the Code, a defendant who actually possesses such a belief, but who was negligent or reckless in forming that belief, may be nonetheless guilty of an offense commensurate with his actual state of mind at the time of the crime. The New York Penal Law, however, includes no such graduated degrees of culpability. Under the New York law, self defense is available so long as the defendant
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M’Naghten’s Case 4 results
- This legislative hearing produced the traditional English common law on insanity, the M’Naghten Rule. The common law test of insanity is fairly strict. To qualify for the insanity defense, the defendant must have a ...” is unclear: it may mean (i) only verifiable brain damage or deformity; or (ii) that and recognized forms of insanity, or something broader. The words seem to suggest a permanent or chronic impairment is required; poor impulse control is insufficient, and isolated acts/feelings may not be. The act’s “nature and quality” presumably means the crime’s circumstances; e.g., presumably, M’Naghten (D) would have been acquitted if he had thought the secretary he shot was a deer, or if he thought the shot would improve the secretary’s health. As the court explains, “immorality” does not mean that the defendant must understand the act he committed is punishable as a crime, only that it was morally wrong, or at least deemed wrong by the British judiciary, it is necessarily...
- M’Naghten (D), who had delusions that the [conservative party] Tories were persecuting him, came to London to kill Prime Minister Robert Peel. M’Naghten (D) instead shot Peel’s secretary, Drummond, who he mistook for Peel. M’Naghten (D) was arrested, and explained “the tories [conservatives] in my city follow and persecute me wherever I go, and have entirely destroyed my peace of mind. They do everything in their power to harass and persecute me; in fact they wish to murder me.” M’Naghten (D) was charged with attempted murder. At trial, his defense team of 4 lawyers and 9 doctors [!] presented evidence that M’Naghten (D) was acutely insane and delusional. At trial, the judge instructed the jury to acquit M’Naghten (D) as insane if they found he “was not sensible, at the time he committed it, that he was violating the laws both of God and man” and not “in a sound state of mind.” The jury found M’Naghten (D) “not guilty, on the ground of insanity.” The acquittal attracted public...
- After a delusional man who shot an official was acquitted as insane, the legislature holds hearings on the insanity defense.
- (Tindal, J.) [In England], a jury evaluating an insanity defense should be instructed to acquit as insane a defendant who, at the time of the act, (i) had a mental disease (ii) which caused a defect or reason (iii) which made him unable to understand either the act’s nature/quality or its wrongness. We submit that jurors ought to be told that every man is presumed sane, possessing sufficient reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved. To establish an insanity defense, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act, or that the act was wrong. Customarily, the question presented to the jury was whether the accused knew the very act he did was wrong [i.e., illegal], but this is confusing, since it may lead the jury to believe the accused must have had actual knowledge of the law to be convicted, which is not required.
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Brady v. United States 4 results
- (White, J.) No. A guilty plea is not involuntary merely because it was entered into to avoid the possibility of the death penalty. A plea is valid if it was (1) voluntary and (2) knowingly and intelligently made with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and the likely consequences. A guilty plea is not invalid whenever motivated by a defendant’s desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty, rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction, and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged. The exchange of personal rights for decreased punishment is the essence of plea bargaining, and nothing in the Constitution prohibits such a bargain.
- , the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal law that allowed a jury to recommend the death penalty was invalid because it discouraged assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and could deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial. In , the Court made it clear that, although did not hold that the federal law was inherently coercive or that a plea of guilty under the statute was invalid, even though a fear of the death penalty may have been a factor in the plea.
- Appeal from a court of appeals decision affirming the district court’s finding that the defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary.
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Wilcox v. Jeffery 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- An accomplice may still be guilty, even if the aid or encouragement, in actuality, provides no assistance or encouragement to the principal. Of course, in any case, the illegal act must take place, but the rule does not unequivocally require that the accomplice’s aid or encouragement actually have an impact on the illegal act. In this case, nothing in the evidence suggests that, if Wilcox (D) had not bought a ticket and attended, Hawkins would have cancelled his concert. With or without Wilcox’s (D) assistance or encouragement, the concert and the resulting illegal act would still have taken place. The opinion seems somewhat concerned that Wilcox (D) obtained some personal benefit from Hawkins’ concert by writing a magazine article. In reality, issues of personal benefit should have no bearing on an accomplice’s liability in terms of prohibited conduct. However, Wilcox’s (D) magazine article may be relevant in determining an intent to aid or encourage—in this case, by buying a...
- Under the law of the United Kingdom, aliens are not permitted to take paid or unpaid employment. Coleman Hawkins was a famous United States saxophone player who was invited to come to the United Kingdom. Herbert William Wilcox (D), who owned a music magazine, greeted Hawkins on his arrival but did not invite him, arrange his visit, or arrange a concert for him. However, Wilcox (D) did have interest in writing an article in his magazine about Hawkins’ visit. Wilcox (D) paid for and attended a concert in which Hawkins performed. While there was no evidence that he applauded during the concert, Wilcox (D) did print an article that extolled Hawkins performance. With these facts, the magistrate found Wilcox (D) guilty of aiding and abetting the violation of the alien employment law [we know—we were shocked too]. Wilcox (D) appealed.
- A PERSON MAY BE GUILTY OF AIDING AND ABETTING A CRIMINAL ACT BY BEING PRESENT, TAKING PART, CONCURRING IN, OR ENCOURAGING THE ACT
- A person may be guilty of aiding and abetting a criminal act by being present, taking part, concurring in, or encouraging the act.
- May a person be guilty of aiding and abetting a criminal act by being present, taking part, concurring in, or encouraging the act?
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People v. Newton 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A crime that requires, as one element, a voluntary act requires that the actor be conscious of what he is doing. A person who commits criminal acts without knowing is not culpable. After all, three of the goals of the criminal justice system are (1) to punish the guilty mind, (2) deterrence, and (3) to rehabilitate criminals. If a person had no knowledge of committing the criminal act, then he simply cannot have a “guilty mind.” Furthermore, how can the defendant and others be deterred from crime when they never had the subjective intent to commit a crime in the first place? Finally, what good does it do to rehabilitate a person who was not aware of his actions at the time they were committed? Why is it that unconsciousness is not a defense when the person has voluntarily made themselves unconscious of their actions—for instance, when a person is intoxicated? It is not the act of being intoxicated that is illegal, but the act stemming from intoxication. Is it reasonable to say there...
- UNCONSCIOUSNESS, IF NOT SELF-INDUCED, IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO A CRIMINAL ACT
- When a person commits an act that is criminal if done voluntarily, lack of consciousness is a complete defense.
- (Rattigan, J.) Yes. Even though the evidence presented is both conflicting and confused as to who shot whom and when, there is support for the inference that Newton (D) was shot first. Given this, and Newton’s (D) testimony of his sensations when shot—supported to some degree by Dr. Diamond’s testimony—there is some support for the conclusion that Newton (D) was unconscious when Officer Frey was shot. The rule regarding unconsciousness is clear. Where not self-induced—such as voluntary intoxication—unconsciousness is a complete defense to a charge of criminal homicide. “Unconsciousness,” as used in this rule does not imply the normal definition of unconsciousness—coma, inertia, incapability of locomotion, ...defendant has physically acted in fact, but was not conscious of those actions. Because Newton (D) presented some evidence of unconsciousness, the trial judge’s refusal to give the requested instruction on the subject, and its effect as a complete defense if found to have...
- Did the trial judge commit reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of unconsciousness?
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People v. Rizzo 4 results
- For example, discharge of a gun that winds up killing another is sufficient to constitute murder. However, in the context of crimes of attempt, the issue of which acts are punishable becomes more nebulous because an attempt may have no immediate result. The attempt statute at issue in this case made it a crime to commit an “act, done with intent to commit a crime, and tending but failing to effect its commission.” Most statutes have similar language, making punishable acts committed “in furtherance of” or “toward the commission of” a crime. But courts limit liability for attempt to only certain acts. The rationale for limiting liability is to preserve for defendants an opportunity to abandon their efforts before any harm results. It would seem unfair to convict a defendant of attempt if he recants and does everything in his power to prevent the harm from occurring. Because many states do not observe the defense of “abandonment,” the “dangerous proximity test” adopted by this court...
- ABANDONMENT: The act of deserting a criminal purpose or enterprise; in some jurisdictions abandonment may relieve a defendant of liability for crimes such as attempt and conspiracy.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- ...crime which are so near to its accomplishment that in all reasonable probability the crime itself would have been committed, but for timely interference, can constitute an attempt. The law recognizes a difference between preparation for the commission of a crime and a punishable attempt to commit a crime. The difference, as stated by Justice Holmes, is a conviction for attempt requires that there be a “dangerous proximity to success.” The question then is whether the acts of the Defendants (D) came dangerously close to the commission of a robbery. The intended victim could not have been robbed until he came into sight of the Defendants (D), who never actually found Rao. In fact, an endless search would have proved fruitless because there was no victim who could have been robbed. To analogize, a man cannot be found guilty of attempted murder if he starts out to find his intended victim but is unsuccessful. Here the defendants were not guilty of an attempt to commit robbery...
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People v. Russell 3 results
- stands for the simple proposition that two or more people who intentionally participate in an inherently dangerous and unlawful activity share culpability (responsibility) for any crime that results from that activity. Thus, as in the case of , that principle is applied in the case of a gun battle. In such a battle, all participants, and not just the shooter whose bullet killed the victim, are responsible for the murder. Interestingly, the court did not give any significance to the fact that the participants in the shooting were shooting at one another, or that they were attempting to kill one another (a far cry from a drag race). Despite the intent to kill one another, the court still found that a joint undertaking had occurred, or that the participants had engaged in a common undertaking and as such could be convicted as accomplices of one another.
- ...negligent homicide when an innocent man was killed by one of them during a race], in which it was held that two people’s intentional participation in an inherently dangerous activity requires that they share culpability. After all, both party’s participation makes the activity possible. In this case, the jurors were instructed: “If you find that the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants took up each other’s challenge, shared in the venture and unjustifiably, voluntarily and jointly created a zone of danger, then each is responsible for his own acts and the acts of the others . . . [and] it makes no difference [whose bullet] penetrated Mr. Daly and caused his death.” There was adequate proof to justify the finding that the three defendants tacitly agreed to engage in a gun battle that placed the life of any innocent bystander at grave risk and ultimately killed Daly. Indeed, unlike an unanticipated ambush or spontaneous attack that might have taken... ...case...
- On December 17, 1992, Russell (D) and two others engaged in a gun battle in a neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York. During the battle, Patrick Daly, an innocent party, was killed. Ballistics were inconclusive in determining which of the three participants fired the bullet that killed Daly. At trial, the prosecution argued that each of the three defendants acted with the mental culpability required for the commission of the crime, and that each intentionally aided the one who fired the fatal shot. All three defendants were convicted of second degree, depraved indifference murder. All three, including Russell (D), appealed on grounds of insufficient evidence.
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Hines v. State 4 results
- Undoubtedly, hunting accidents such as this were not the kind of dangerous activity the legislature had in mind when it adopted the felony-murder statute. Nonetheless, keeping in mind the various fundamental goals of criminal punishment, it seems clear that Hines (D) must face some punishment for his acts. Presumably, Hines (D) was aware that he was not permitted to possess a firearm, which sanction he chose to ignore. The fact that he consciously chose to disobey a condition of his earlier sentence would seem to support a harsher punishment in this case to achieve the goal of general deterrence and lessen the chances of even accidental deaths such as this.
- (Sears, J.) A felony murder conviction carries severe penalties and should not be sustained unless the underlying felony carries “a high probability that death will result.” Hines (D) testified that he heard a turkey gobble, saw it fan out and made a split-second decision to shoot. He may have been negligent by failing to positively identify the object, but his unintentional actions are not accompanied by a high probability of death. The felony-murder statute should not punish him more severely than his culpability requires.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Hines (D) was turkey hunting with a group of friends when he heard a turkey and saw it fan its feathers. He fired through foliage and unintentionally struck and killed a hunting companion. Hines (D) was charged with felony murder based on the underlying crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
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State v. McVay 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A question of law was certified to the state supreme court in order to resolve the issue before trial.
- Kelley (D3) instructed the captain, George W. McVay (D1), and engineer, John A. Grant (D2), of a passenger steamship to depart despite knowledge of a dangerous condition with the ship’s boilers. The steamship’s boilers later exploded killing three people. Grant (D2) and McVay (D1) were indicted for manslaughter and Kelley (D3) [got the heat as well] and was indicted as an accessory before the fact. Specifically, the indictment stated that Kelley (D3) did “feloniously and maliciously aid, assist, abet, counsel, hire, command and procure” the captain and engineer to commit manslaughter. Kelley (D3) [was understandably steamed] and argued that a person could not be an accessory before the fact to manslaughter that arose out of criminal negligence. The issue was brought to the state supreme court for certification before the trial began.
- (Barrows, J.) Yes. Kelley (D3) claims that because the captain and engineer were indicted on manslaughter without malice he cannot be said to have incited a sudden and unpremeditated crime that is “inadvertent and unintentional by its very nature”. However, not all charges of manslaughter involve unpremeditated acts. Manslaughter also includes intentional unlawful acts that result in unintentional killing. It also may include an unintentional killing as a result of gross negligence stemming from lawful acts. In either case, there are premeditated acts that can be involved in involuntary manslaughter. In this case, the facts allege that Kelley (D3) intentionally directed and counseled the grossly negligent act that resulted in the crime. While Kelley (D3) may not have consciously intended to take life, the facts allege that he was conscious that the boiler was unsafe and negligently chose to use the boiler nevertheless. The defendants “exercised a choice among courses of conduct” and...
- A PERSON MAY BE CONVICTED OF BEING AN ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT TO THE CRIME OF MANSLAUGHTER ARISING THROUGH CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
- A person may be convicted of being an accessory before the fact to the crime of manslaughter arising through criminal negligence.
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People v. Fichtner 5 results
- (Johnston, J.) Yes. Fichtner requested the court to charge that if the jury found that Fichtner (D) honestly believed that the amount which Smith paid or agreed to pay represented the amount of the merchandise he had previously stolen then Fichtner must be acquitted. The court refused this request “except as already charged.” Although two members of the court are of the opinion that the trial court was justified in refusing to charge as requested, four members of the court are of the further opinion that the request was legally incorrect and, therefore, should have been refused. In other words, we believe that the portion of the main charge to the effect that, under the circumstances of this case, extortion is committed only when one obtains property from another by inducing fear in that other by threatening to accuse him of crime unless he pays an amount over and above what was rightfully due was more favorable to Fichtner (D) than that which he was entitled to receive. In our...
- The jury was permitted to convict Fichtner (D) of the crime of extortion on proof that he had induced Smith, by the threats alleged, to pay to Fichtner (D) more than he rightfully owed for goods that he had stolen, even though Fichtner (D) might have honestly believed that the amount that demanded from Smith was the amount that he rightfully owed. Fichtner (D) was not acting in his own behalf, but in that of his employer, in recovering what he believed to be rightfully due. The law does not authorize the collection of just debts by threatening to accuse the debtor of crime, even though the debtor is in fact guilty of the crime. It makes no difference whether the indebtedness for which a defendant demands repayment is one arising out of the crime of which he accuses the debtor, or is entirely independent of the crime that forms the basis of the accusation. The result in both cases is the concealment and compounding of a felony to the injury of the State.
- (Wenzel, J.) In my opinion, although the question is one as to which there is a conflict of authority, if Fichtner (D), citing without malice and in good faith, made an honest mistake, he was not guilty of the crime charged. There was no criminal intent.
- ...]. Fichtner (D) asked Smith to return to the store, and then threatened to call the police to have Smith arrested for petit larceny, with resulting publicity in the newspapers and over the radio, unless he paid $75 and signed a paper admitting that during the course of several months he had unlawfully taken merchandise from the store in that amount [hope that’s good coffee!]. Smith insisted that the only merchandise he had ever stolen was the jar of coffee that evening, and a $0.65 roll of bologna one week previously. However, he finally signed the paper admitting that he had taken $50 worth of merchandise from the store during a period of four months [pushover!]. That evening Smith paid $25 in cash and promised to pay the balance in weekly installments of $5. Smith testified that he was induced to sign the paper and make the payment because Fichtner (D) threatened to accuse him of petit larceny and to expose him to the disgrace of the criminal charge and the resulting publicity....
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Chapter Eight Exculpation 19 results (showing 5 best matches)
- rule, a court will not allow evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity as bearing on a defendant’s capacity to form specific intent.
- Criminal suspects challenged Israel’s methods of interrogation, which permitted physical shaking etc., and concept of “necessity” was asserted to permit such interrogation.
- The “necessity” defense may not be used to promulgate rules permitting certain conduct in advance of any criminal activity.
- Involuntary intoxication is no defense to criminal prosecution, though it may allow a lesser sentence.
- At a criminal trial incorporating an insanity defense, expert witnesses may change their conclusions of sanity or insanity without prejudice, if they do so in good faith, even without diagnosing a change in the defendant’s condition.
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People v. Unger 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Unger (D) was convicted of auto theft and imprisoned. While imprisoned. Unger (D) claims he was sexually threatened and assaulted by inmates, but never reported the incidents because he feared reprisals. When Unger (D) was transferred to the minimum security “honor farm,” he escaped, claiming he had received anonymous death threats and escaped to avoid being killed, but planned to return once he got help. Unger (D) was recaptured and charged with escape. At trial, Unger (D) argued his escape was justified to save his life. The judge instructed the jury to disregard any reasons Unger (D) gave for escaping, and refused to instruct the jury on both the affirmative defenses of compulsion and necessity. The jury convicted Unger (D), who appealed, contending the jury instructions erroneously failed to allow the defense of “choice of evils.” On appeal, the court held for Unger (D), finding his contentions constituted valid defenses which were erroneously disallowed by the trial court’s...
- Appeal from reversal of criminal conviction for escape, seeking reinstatement.
- COMPULSION: a.k.a. duress. Affirmative defense to criminal charge where defendant committed a crime but (i) reasonably believed the crime was necessary to avert a greater injury, to himself or others, than the injury resulting from his crime, and (ii) did not contribute to causing the risk of that greater injury.
- NECESSITY: Affirmative defense to criminal charge where defendant committed a crime because he reasonably believed he would be killed or severely injured if he did not commit the crime.
- (Ryan, J.) Yes. Prison escapees may claim the defenses of necessity and duress. Public policy has traditionally made courts reluctant to permit escapees these defenses, but our recent decisions have recognized their applicability. decision, the court held that escapees may claim the defense of necessity only if (i) they were faced with the threat of death, rape, or substantial injury in the immediate future, (ii) they either made several complaints to guards which proved futile, or had no time to complain, (iii) they had no time or opportunity to resort to the courts, (iv) they used no force against guards or bystanders, and (v) they surrendered to authorities after attaining a position of safety. These are relevant factors to be used in assessing claims of necessity, but we do not hold that each element is necessary as a matter of law, because the elements are, in our view, matters which tend to prove the defendant’s testimony, but the absence of any one does not necessarily
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Hufstetler v. State 4 results
- Appeal from the defendant’s conviction by the court on a charge of petit larceny.
- The evidence in this case is so clear-cut, it seems that the court could not have arrived at any other conclusion. Hufstetler’s (D) argument that the store owner voluntarily parted with the gasoline without payment is simply laughable. The court also embarks upon a means to distinguish among the offenses of larceny, false pretenses, and embezzlement. If a person honestly receives the possession of goods and then fraudulently converts them to his own use, that is embezzlement. If possession is obtained by fraud, and the owner intends to part with his title as well as his possession, that is the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses. Finally, if the possession is fraudulently obtained, with the owner’s intent to part
- (Carr, J.) Yes. The only question of critical concern is whether, on the basis of the evidence presented, the judgment of conviction can be sustained. Hufstetler’s (D) attorney urges that Whorton voluntarily parted with the possession and ownership of the gasoline [yeah, sure!]. In this case, the circumstances clearly show that by the application of the well known doctrine of aid and abet, Hufstetler (D) secured the possession of the gasoline by trick or fraud. The obtaining of the property by the consent of the owner under such conditions will not necessarily prevent the taking from being larceny. In other words, an actual trespass is not always required to be proven. The trick or fraud vitiates the transaction, and it will be deemed that the owner still retained the constructive possession. Additionally, it is certainly a logical conclusion that Whorton had no intention of parting with the ownership of the property until he had received pay therefore. The element of Hufstetler’s (...
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Hicks v. United States 5 results
- (Shiras, J.) No. The trial judge erred by giving the jury erroneous instructions. First, the judge failed to instruct the jury that any words or acts of Hicks (D) must have been made with the intent of encouraging and abetting Stand Rowe. The effect of Hicks’ (D) words is not relevant to the case. To be found guilty of murder, Hicks (D) must have intended the words to have such an effect. In addition, the fact that Hicks (D) intended to utter the words has no bearing on whether he intended encouragement. The statement attributed to Hicks (D) was ambiguous. Hicks (D) made the statement to Colvard, not to Stand Rowe, and Hicks (D) ...an otherwise proper instruction if there had been substantial evidence of a prior arrangement or conspiracy between Hicks (D) and Stand Rowe. This instruction assumes that Hicks (D) had a guilty intent; however, the instruction was erroneous because there was insufficient evidence of such an intent. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the...
- John Hicks (D) was a Cherokee Indian who was friends with Andrew J. Colvard, a white man who was married to a Cherokee woman and lived in the Cherokee nation. On February 13, 1892, Hicks (D) and Colvard rode on horseback down a road and were confronted by Stand Rowe, another Cherokee Indian. Witnesses saw the three men meet on the road, but they could not hear or understand everything that was said. Colvard and Stand Rowe talked as Hicks (D) listened some 30 or 40 feet away. During the conversation, Stand Rowe pointed his rifle at Colvard twice. The witnesses stated that they saw and heard Hicks (D) laugh aloud each time Stand Rowe raised his rifle and aimed it at Colvard. They also saw Hicks (D) take off his hat, slap his horse with it, and say to Colvard, “take off your hat and die like a man”. Stand Rowe then raised his rifle for a third time and shot and killed Colvard. The witnesses then saw Stand Rowe and John Hicks (D) ride off together. Stand Rowe, [who obviously had a...
- BILLS OF EXCEPTION: A written statement, signed by the trial court for presentation to the appellate court, of a party’s objections made during trial and their foundations.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal of a circuit court decision finding the defendant guilty of murder.
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State v. Kelly 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Wilentz, J.) Yes. When battered women kill their batterers and claim self-defense, expert testimony on battered woman’s syndrome is admissible to prove they faced imminent risk of injury, but inadmissible to prove their belief in that risk was objectively reasonable. Under the New Jersey criminal statutes, forcible self-defense is justifiable “when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” Deadly force is only justified when the actor “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm.” Here, Kelly (D) claimed self-defense, contending she believed she was in imminent danger of death. The expert testimony is relevant, since (i) it may support her testimony about the .... . . the jury could conclude that instead of casting doubt on the accuracy of her testimony about the severity and...
- Appeal from criminal conviction for reckless manslaughter, seeking reversal, remand, and admission of expert testimony.
- Technically, the testimony should be allowed here to show Kelly’s (D) subjective belief, but the testimony (which concerns her individual psychological state) seems irrelevant to prove/disprove what the objective/reasonable person (who is presumed not to suffer from battered persons’ syndrome) would do. However, cases based on the subjective/objective dichotomy usually fail to consider whether a reasonable/average person, thrust into the plaintiff’s situation, would not tend to act unreasonably given the situation’s psychological stress. It is very feasible that, in psychologically stressful situations, most reasonable people would succumb to irrationality. If the situation is so stressful. It seems unfair for the jury to convict a defendant for doing what most people would be driven to do by the circumstances. But that decision is mandated by the “reasonable person” standard. On remand, the prosecution allowed the expert’s testimony, but offered evidence to show Kelly (D) was not...
- Mrs. Kelly’s (D) husband beat her frequently. After one beating, as her husband ran up to her, Kelly (D) stabbed him fatally, possibly by accident, with scissors. Kelly (D) was indicted for murder. At trial, she asserted self-defense, claiming she feared her husband was armed and would hurt her or her daughter, and was only trying to scare him off with the scissors. The prosecution alleged Kelly (D) started the fight and chased her husband before stabbing him. Kelly (D) called an expert witness on battered-woman’s syndrome, to show that Kelly (D) lived in constant fear of beating but was unable to leave her husband. The expert testified that battered-woman’s syndrome is a psychological pattern which makes battered women unable to escape abusive relationships, because they gradually accept violence as normal, believe the battering will stop, become demoralized, may lack the money to live independently, are afraid to seek help, fear reprisals, etc. The trial court ruled this testimony...
- CASE VOCABULARY
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State v. Gladstone 4 results
- for the crime of buying marijuana. Gladstone’s (D) actions made it clear that he intended to assist Thompson in purchasing marijuana. However, since Thompson was an informant, Thompson cannot be considered a principal culpable of committing the crime of buying marijuana. Therefore, it is legally impossible for Gladstone (D) to be guilty of aiding the purchase of marijuana. As to the issue of aiding and abetting the sale of marijuana, without evidence of any communications between Gladstone (D) and Kent, there is no factual proof to ascertain whether Gladstone (D) intended to assist Kent. Instead, Gladstone (D) merely pointed Thompson in Kent’s direction. On the other hand, if Gladstone (D) had telephoned Kent to confirm whether he had marijuana to sell and then directed Thompson to Kent, there would be evidence that Gladstone (D) intended to assist Kent in his sale. Some states have dealt with this issue by creating the crime of criminal facilitation, which occurs when someone...
- ...’ s (D) conviction “rests solely” on the conversation between Thompson and Gladstone (D) regarding a possible sale of marijuana. This evidence does not establish that a crime was committed. A crucial element, “a nexus between the accused and the party whom he is charged with aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime,” is not present. Gladstone (D) is not charged with aiding or abetting Thompson’s purchase of marijuana, but with Kent’s sale of marijuana. Gladstone’s (D) culpability is determined by R.C.W. 9.01,030 [which “makes a principal of one who aids and abets another in the commission of the crime”]. An accomplice does not need to be physically present at the crime to be found guilty as the principal provided that there is evidence that the accomplice did something “in association or connection with the principal.” Similarly, a bystander can be found guilty, even without a prior agreement, if he associates “himself with the venture, that he participated in it as in...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Appeal of a trial court conviction of the defendant for the sale of marijuana.
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Chapter Four Rape 4 results
- A criminal defendant must be afforded the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him.
- A victim’s reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury will preclude the need to show force on the part of the attacker or resistance on the part of the victim.
- A man convicted of having carnal knowledge of a woman under age 14 brought an appeal for post conviction relief because the evidentiary laws in effect at the time of his trial left his counsel unable to effectively cross-examine the victim.
- A defense of mistake-of-fact must be based on a reasonable good faith standard.
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State v. Harrington 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A demand for settlement of a civil action, accompanied by a malicious threat to expose the wrongdoer’s criminal conduct, if made with intent to extort payment, against his will, constitutes the crime of blackmail.
- The letter that Harrington (D) wrote and marked “personal and confidential,” makes a private accusation of adultery in support of a demand for a cash settlement. An incriminating photo was enclosed for the avowed purpose of demonstrating that Harrington (D) and Mrs. Morin “have all of the proof necessary to prove adultery beyond a reasonable doubt.” According to the writing itself, cost of refusal would be public exposure of incriminating conduct in court. The evidence establishes beyond dispute that Harrington’s (D) participation was with preconceived design. The incriminating evidence that his letter threatens to expose was willfully contrived and procured by a woman hired for that purpose. These factors are sufficient to sustain a finding that Harrington (D) acted maliciously and without just cause, within the meaning of the criminal statutes. The sum of the evidence supports the further inference that the act was done with intent to extort a substantial contingent fee to...
- the efficacy of the act. Harrington (D) also urges that the totality of the evidence does not exclude the inference that he acted merely as an attorney, attempting to secure a divorce for his client on the most favorable terms possible. This, of course, was the theory of the defense. However, quite clearly, the veiled threats in Harrington’s (D) letter exceeded the limits of his representation of Mrs. Morin in the divorce action. A demand for settlement of a civil action, accompanied by a malicious threat to expose the wrongdoer’s criminal conduct, if made with intent to extort payment, against his will, constitutes the crime alleged in the indictment. Judgment affirmed.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- CONTINGENT FEE: Charge for attorney’s services which are dependent upon a successful outcome in the case.
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McQuirter v. State 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- PURELY INNOCENT CONDUCT MAY CONSTITUTE CRIMINAL ATTEMPT IF INTENT TO COMMIT CRIME IS PROVEN, EVEN IF BY INFERENTIAL EVIDENCE
- Appeal from criminal conviction of attempt to commit assault with intent to rape.
- rape, but McQuirter (D) denied making such statements. The jury was allowed to consider other evidence in order to infer intent. This other evidence was the fact that the victim was white and the defendant was black. Note that had this case been tried today, the results may have been different. The defendant’s only conduct was walking up and down the street and standing on comers or next to telephone poles. The conduct was innocent, but the jury was permitted to believe the testimony of the police chief and consider racial factors in order to infer intent.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL: Motion made post verdict or post decision by court to have the matter tried again.
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State v. Abbott 5 results
- Appeal from criminal conviction for aggravated assault and battery seeking reversal of conviction for improper jury instructions.
- The duty to retreat, formerly labeled as a minority rule, has been codified in some states under the influence of the Model Penal Code. As the court notes, the main objection is that it is unfair and humiliating to require a man to retreat from wrongful attack, but the law is usually unconcerned with preserving the defendant’s dignity, and generally leans toward outlawing private violence. Those jurisdictions that follow the no-retreat rule are no longer the majority. About half the states now require retreat when possible, some treat the possibility of retreat as a factor to be considered, and others permit the person to stand his ground.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- Neighbors Abbott (D) and Nicholas Scarano got into a fistfight, which Abbott (D) allegedly started. Nicholas’s parents, Michael and Mary Scarano, allegedly attacked Abbott (D) with a hatchet, knife and fork. [Dinner is served.] In the struggle, the Scaranos were all struck with the hatchet. Abbott (D) claimed their injuries were accidental, but the prosecutor alleged they were intentional, and charged Abbott (D) with atrocious [aggravated] assault and battery against all 3 Scaranos. At trial, the judge gave jury instructions on the duty to retreat, which were allegedly confusing. The jury convicted Abbott (D) of atrocious assault and battery against Nicholas Scarano only. Abbott (D) appealed, alleging the jury instructions improperly explained his duty to retreat.
- (Weintraub, J.) No. In “retreat” jurisdictions, persons confronted with force must attempt to retreat before using deadly defensive force, if they know they can retreat with complete safety. The question whether one who is neither the aggressor nor a party to a mutual combat must retreat rather than using defensive force has divided authorities. Critics of the duty-to-retreat rule condemn it as unrealistic, since most reasonable men would not retreat, and society should not demand what smacks of cowardice. Adherents of the retreat rule reply it is better that the assailed retreat than that the life of another be needlessly spent, and a rule so requiring will induce adherence to that worthy standard. While the retreat rule may be the minority rule, it is embraced by both our appellate court and
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People v. Brown 5 results
- : The mental state accompanying a criminal act.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (Garoute, J.) No. The court told the jury that larceny may be committed even though it was only the intent of the party taking the property to deprive the owner of it temporarily. This instruction is erroneous. We think the authorities form an unbroken line to the effect that the felonious intent must be to deprive the owner of the property permanently. If the boy’s story is true, he is not guilty of larceny in taking the bicycle; yet under the instruction of the court, the words from his own mouth convicted him. For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that the judgment and order be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
- of the taking party need not necessarily be an intention to convert the property to one’s own use, it must still be an intent to wholly and permanently deprive the owner of possession. The early courts found that, where the thing taken was abandoned or recklessly exposed to loss by the taker, this fact was not only evidence of an intent to effect a permanent deprivation, but would sustain larceny even if a permanent taking was not the object of the defendant’s acts.
- Brown (D), a seventeen-year-old boy, entered an acquaintance’s house and took a bicycle. He testified that he intended to return the bicycle, but that he just took it temporarily to get even with the other boy. The other boy had thrown oranges at Brown (D), and Brown (D) was angry with him. Before Brown (D) could return the bicycle, he was arrested. He was convicted of burglary on an information charging that he entered a house with intent to commit larceny.
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Table of Contents 5 results
Chapter Six The Significance of Resulting Harm 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Fleeing criminal suspect, Acosta (D), was pursued by police in a 48 mile car chase, and the two police helicopters assisting in the chase collided and killed three people.
- Conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime, and is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent may establish attempt.
- The common law definition of murder does not encompass the act of intentionally providing the means by which a person commits suicide.
- A doctor was indicted on two counts of murder after he assisted two terminally ill women in committing suicide.
- Drag racers were racing along a highway when deceased attempted to pass Root’s (D) car by driving on wrong side of road and was hit by an oncoming truck.
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Chapter Ten Discretion 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A state prosecutor carried out a threat to reindict Hayes (D) under the state’s Habitual Criminal Act if Hayes (D) did not plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged.
- The imposition of a death sentence for murder in the first degree is not void under the Due Process Clause solely because the trial court, before imposing sentence, considered additional information obtained through the court’s probation department and other sources.
- Courts are reluctant to interfere with prosecutorial discretion.
- Armstrong (D) and others were indicted on several charges involving possession and intent to distribute crack cocaine, as well as using a firearm. Armstrong (D) moved to compel discovery to show that he was singled out for prosecution because of his race.
- In selective-prosecution claims based on race, in order to obtain discovery, the claimant must produce preliminary evidence that similarly situated offenders of a different race could have been prosecuted but were not.
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Robinson v. California 4 results
- Appeal from criminal conviction for narcotics addiction, challenging constitutionality of statute criminalizing addiction.
- (White, J.) The majority opinion frustrates public policy. It effectively removes California’s policy to deal with addiction where there is ample evidence of past use, but it is unclear where the use occurred. This decision also leaves unclear the precise limits on state’s powers to institute drug control policies.
- While this landmark opinion is known for its holding that states may not constitutionally outlaw drug addiction without evidence of an affirmative act within the state, it also highlights the Supreme Court’s recognition that drug addiction is a “disease” rather than an offense. This view presents the interesting contradiction that drug possession or use may be criminalized, while drug addiction (which is manifested by past or attempted drug use/possession) may not be criminalized.
- ...issue here is not the State’s broad power to regulate drug traffic within its borders, but rather the power to criminalize the “status” of drug addiction. This statute does not punish drug use, purchase, sale, or possession, or behavior resulting from drug use, and does not provide or require medical treatment, but merely punishes the “status” of drug addiction. Further, California courts have interpreted it to mean a person can be found continuously guilty of addiction “at any time before he reforms,” even if he never uses or possesses narcotics within the state or performs any antisocial behavior there. It would be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, for any state to criminalize being mentally or physically ill, and we cannot but consider this statute to be of the same category. The prosecution (P) recognizes that narcotics addiction is an illness, which may even be contracted innocently or involuntarily (e.g., from birth...
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Barber v. Superior Court 6 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Removal of life support equipment from a comatose patient who is unlikely to recover is not an affirmative act, but an act of omission, that, if in accord with the patient’s or surrogate’s wishes, does not give rise to criminal liability.
- (Compton, J.) No. If Barber (D) lawfully and intentionally killed Herbert, malice is presumed regardless of motive. Euthanasia is neither excusable nor justifiable in California. It is conceded by all that Herbert was not dead by either statutory or historical standards, since there was still minimal brain activity. If Herbert were “brain dead,” this prosecution could not have been instituted. We conclude that cessation of “heroic” life support measures is not an affirmative act, but a withdrawal of treatment. Although the treatments are self-propelled to a degree, each pulsation of the respirator or each drop of fluid from the IV device is comparable to a manually administered injection or medication. The authority cited by the Government (P) holds that a murder charge may be supported by the failure to feed a child. This case is easily distinguishable. The parent in that case had a clear duty to feed an otherwise healthy child. Here, faced with a vegetative patient with little...
- The court in seems to get around the issue of euthanasia by an act/omission analysis, but some scholars are not convinced by the court’s reasoning. Herbert was still alive after the respirator was turned off—what killed Herbert was the denial of food and water. Thus, some commentators argue that the physicians caused Herbert’s death, just as if Herbert’s wife starved her comatose husband at home. The court brings up the issue of omission and the doctor’s duty to the comatose patient, asserting that burdens of treatment outweighed the benefits, so that it was not worth continuing treatment. The family made the decision after consulting with the physicians. Clearly, the physician is faced with a difficult task that presents many moral concerns that must be carefully balanced.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- (Physician) v. (Trial Court)
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Gebardi v. United States 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- A person cannot be convicted of conspiracy to violate a law if it is impossible for the person to violate the law in the first place. For example, the underage party cannot be prosecuted for statutory rape, only the older party can. As a result, since Gebardi (D1) did not conspire with anyone else that could be convicted under the act, he was never a part of any conspiracy. This principle is known as the “Wharton rule.” Where a crime requires the consent and voluntary agreement of two parties, the two persons cannot be convicted as conspirators for the offense if it is not possible for one of them to commit the offense. Such crimes include statutory rape and adultery, and the rule has also been applied to gambling, bribes, and drug trafficking. An exception to the Wharton rule exists where the agreement to commit the offense involves more than the minimum number of persons required to carry out the offense. Thus, Gebardi (D1) may have been found guilty if a third person agreed to...
- A CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE A LAW CANNOT TAKE PLACE WHERE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE CO-CONSPIRATOR TO ACTUALLY VIOLATE THAT LAW
- A conspiracy to violate a law cannot take place where it is impossible for the co-conspirator to actually violate that law.
- Can a conspiracy to violate a law take place where it is impossible for the co-conspirator to actually violate that law?
- CASE VOCABULARY
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Kotteakos v. United States 4 results
- Appeal of a district court conviction and appellate court affirmation.
- Simon Brown (D1) was a loan broker who arranged loans, for a commission, for Kotteakos (D2) and other defendants under the National Housing Act. Brown (D1) knew that these loans were not going to be used for the purposes stated in the applications. This was in violation of the National Housing Act. The other defendants obtained loans from Brown, but none of them were aware of the others and there was no evidence showing any connection between them. Brown (D1) was the only common figure in all the loan transactions. Of the 32 persons indicted for the illegal loans, seven were found guilty. Brown (D1) pled guilty. Kotteakos (D2) and other defendants were brought to trial. The trial court instructed the jury that there was only one conspiracy. The jury found all of them guilty of a single conspiracy. The Court of Appeals found that there was not a single conspiracy, but, at least, eight separate conspiracies between the individual defendants and Brown (D1). The government described the...
- CASE VOCABULARY
- The conspiracy in this case has been called the “hub of the wheel conspiracy”. Brown (D1) was the agent that entered into several different, but similar, conspiracies. However, none of these conspiracies had any connection besides Brown’s (D1) handiwork. If there is a common conspiracy, the acts and statements of a single defendant can be used against all other defendants found to be members of the conspiracy. But should the statements be used against new conspirators even before there is a finding that they were part of the conspiracy?
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United States v. McDermott 4 results
- Given that there was no agreement among McDermott (D), Gannon, and Pomponio, the Government (P) could not sustain the conspiracy charges against McDermott (D). Yet, Pomponio was convicted of conspiracy to commit insider trading based on his agreement with Gannon to use the information she obtained from McDermott (D). . As the court explains, while a conspirator need not know the identity of all co-conspirators, he is liable for the conspiracy so long as he knows
- CASE VOCABULARY
- On appeal to review the defendant’s conviction.
- McDermott (D), the president of a prominent investment bank, engaged in an extramarital affair with Gannon, an adult film star. During the course of their relationship, McDermott (D) made numerous investment suggestions to Gannon who, unbeknownst to McDermott (D), passed them along to New Jersey businessman Pomponio, with whom Gannon was also having an affair. Together, Gannon and Pomponio earned around $170,000 in profit based on McDermott’s (D) tips. All three were indicted for conspiracy to commit insider trading. At trial, the government introduced circumstantial evidence linking telephone conversations between McDermott (D) and Gannon to trading activity by Gannon and Pomponio during the times charged. McDermott (D) was convicted of the conspiracy charge and appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support his conviction.
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People v. Burton 4 results
- CASE VOCABULARY
- On appeal to review the defendant’s conviction.
- The court’s decision demonstrates that, for purposes of the felony-murder rule, not all underlying felonies are treated alike. The felony-murder rule cannot be used to elevate an included offense to murder merely because a victim died. Indeed, the only material distinction between assault with a deadly weapon and murder is the very fact that the victim died. Not every burglary, however, involves the intent to physically harm necessary to implicate the merger doctrine.
- ...felony-murder rule must involve an independent felonious purpose. California courts have established that assault with a deadly weapon and burglary with the intent to assault with a deadly weapon are lesser included offenses of murder and are therefore insufficient underlying felonies to support a felony murder charge. Armed robbery, however, is quite different. While the purpose of an assault with a deadly weapon is the very conduct that results in the death of another, armed robbery involves an independent felonious purpose. It is the purpose of the conduct, not the fact that death results, that determines its character. Indeed, burglary—defined as the entry of a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony therein—merges with a murder charge only when the intended felony is assault with a deadly weapon. Any other felonious intent serves the deterrent purpose of the felony-murder rule. Because Burton’s (D) intent was to obtain money by unlawful means and not to inflict...
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Alphabetical Table of Cases 4 results
Martin v. State 3 results
- Police officers arrested Mr. Martin (D) at his home and took him onto a public highway. While on the highway, Mr. Martin (D) used loud and profane language in a manner that suggested that he was intoxicated. Mr. Martin (D) was convicted for violating a statute that prohibited appearing in a public place in an intoxicated condition and manifesting that condition with indecent conduct or loud and profane language. Mr. Martin (D) appealed the conviction.
- (Simpson, J.) Yes. A defendant must perform the physical act for each element of a crime that has an actus reus component. Mr. Martin (D) was convicted for violating a statute that provides that an individual in an intoxicated condition who appears in a public place where one or more persons are present and manifest his intoxication by boisterous or indecent conduct, or loud and profane language shall be fined upon conviction. On its face, the statute requires voluntary appearance in a public place. The State (P) cannot prove an accusation of public drunkenness by establishing that the arresting officer, while the defendant was in an intoxicated condition, involuntarily and forcibly carried him to a public place. Reversed and rendered.
- him onto the public highway. Therefore, the required actus reus for this element does not exist. Second, the accused must manifest his drunken condition at the public place he appeared. Since Martin (D) voluntarily used loud and profane language while he was on the highway in an intoxicated condition, the required actus reus for this element exists. However, a crime did not occur, because the statute requires a coincidence of voluntarily appearing in public and manifesting an intoxicated condition through certain conduct.
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- Publication Date: May 6th, 2018
- ISBN: 9781640209251
- Subject: Criminal Law
- Series: High Court Case Summaries
- Type: Case Briefs
- Description: Kadish’s High Court Case Summaries on Criminal Law, 10th, contain well-prepared briefs for each major case in this casebook. High Court briefs are written to present the essential facts, issue, decision and rationale for each case in a clear, concise manner. While prepared briefs can never substitute for the insight gained by actually reading a case, these briefs will help readers to identify, understand, and absorb the core “take away” knowledge from each case. Moreover, these briefs are followed by a useful legal analysis, which provides extra tips and contextual background about each case, connecting the case to the broader concepts being developed throughout the casebook. This book also supplies case vocabulary, which defines new or unusual legal words found throughout the cases.
