Preface 4 results
- This is not a text on criminal procedure, but rather about constitutional criminal procedure. As anyone who has followed the work of the Supreme Court in recent years well knows, we have, in many aspects of criminal procedure, about reached the point—to borrow Judge Henry Friendly’s phrase—where we may view “the Bill of Rights as a code of criminal procedure.” Whatever one may think of this significant development, it is apparent that most of the difficult problem areas in the field of criminal procedure are now constitutional in dimension. In concentrating upon the “constitutionalized” parts of the criminal justice process, we have avoided the task—almost impossible for a book of this size—of describing the various non-constitutional standards applied to the criminal justice process in the 50 states and our federal system. Those standards are treated in much larger works, such as Modern Criminal Procedure and our hornbook,
- Criminal procedure curriculums vary considerably from one school to another. Some schools offer a single course, focusing on constitutional regulation, and covering most of the major steps in the process. Our coverage matches the full range of such a course, and may well exceed it in certain chapters. Other schools divide the subject matter into two courses. The first concentrates on criminal investigations (and possibly also considers aspects of the right to counsel unrelated to investigations). Such courses also tend to focus on the constitutional regulation of the process. Our coverage here also provides a very good match; chapter 1 describes the general doctrinal foundation of constitutional criminal procedure, chapters 2–6 treat in greater depth the constitutional regulation of police investigations, chapter 8 adds material on self-incrimination issues presented in grand jury investigations, and chapter 7 considers various aspects of the right to counsel.
- This brief text is intended primarily for use by law students taking courses in the field of criminal procedure. In preparing these materials, we have attempted to set forth as succinctly and clearly as possible an analysis of the constitutional standards of major current significance. In doing so, however, we have not wavered from our firm conviction—which we believe is manifested in our casebook on
- By including more than is needed for some courses, we have managed (we hope) to provide coverage of use to students taking any of the different criminal procedure courses. Of course, even where a particular course does not deal with the subject matter considered in one of our chapters, there is no prohibition against reading that chapter and thereby acquiring a more complete backdrop for analyzing the role of the federal constitution (as interpreted by the Supreme Court) in the regulation of the criminal justice process.
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Chapter 1. The Constitutionalization of Criminal Procedure 30 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Two important doctrinal developments were prerequisites to establishing, through Supreme Court rulings, extensive constitutional regulation of the nation’s criminal justice procedures. First, the relevant guarantees in the Bill of Rights had to be made applicable in large part to state proceedings. Although federal criminal jurisdiction has been expanding over the years, almost 99% of all criminal prosecutions still are brought in the state systems. For the Constitution to have a major impact upon criminal justice administration, its criminal procedure provisions had to be held applicable to state as well as federal proceedings. That application eventually was achieved through the Supreme Court’s reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Although the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, it was not until the Warren Court adopted the “selective incorporation” doctrine in the 1960s, almost 100 years later, that the due process was held to make the major Bill of...
- Once the Court selectively incorporated almost all of the specific guarantees dealing with criminal procedure, the independent content of due process came to be known as “free-standing due process” (i.e., standing apart from the incorporated guarantees). Notwithstanding the extensive range of the incorporated guarantees, free-standing due process plays an important role in the constitutional regulation of state criminal procedures. Indeed, constitutional requirements grounded in free-standing-due process extend across all stages of the criminal justice process, including police investigations (see § 5.4), pretrial procedures (see §§ 9.2(b), 9.4), adjudication by guilty plea (see § 9.5), adjudication by trial (see § 9.8(f)), sentencing (see § 9.9(a)), and appeals (see § 9.9(b)). Many of these free-standing due process standards extend concepts found in the specific guarantees to procedural settings not covered by those guarantees. See e.g., § 7.2(a) (due process extension of right to...
- It would take far more space than we have available to restate even in the briefest fashion all of the Supreme Court rulings that have shaped the constitutional standards currently applicable even as to the investigative stage alone. Prior to the 1960s, space limitations would not have been a problem. Indeed, those constitutional rulings applicable to the state criminal justice systems—which produce the vast bulk of criminal investigations and criminal prosecutions in this country—could readily have been surveyed in less than a quarter of these pages. That changed during the latter half of Chief Justice Warren’s tenure (basically 1961–69), when the Court issued an extensive body of rulings expanding federal constitutional regulation of the state criminal justice processes. The expansion was so great that commentators described it as the “criminal-justice-revolution” of the Warren Court. Since that time, no field of constitutional adjudication has consistently occupied a more...criminal
- Taken together, the various Bill of Rights provisions offer an obvious potential for extensive constitutional regulation of the criminal justice process. Constitutional provisions, however, are not self-defining. Their ultimate impact depends, in large part, upon how they are interpreted by the judiciary in the course of adjudicating individual cases. Thus, it was not until the Supreme Court came to adopt certain critical interpretations of the Constitution’s criminal procedure guarantees that the potential for substantial constitutionalization of the criminal justice process was realized.
- Originalism has a long-standing role in the interpretation of the criminal procedure guarantees, which has increased in prominence over the last few decades (particularly since Justices Scalia and Thomas were added to the Court). One aspect of originalism that has divided the Court in recent years is the choice of the appropriate level of generality at which the guarantee’s original design should be understood. That choice has particular significance in two settings: (1) where the founding generation viewed a guarantee as aimed at prohibiting a particular procedural practice and the modern day procedure being challenged is deemed analogous to that prohibited practice; and (2) where the modern day procedure being challenged is identical to, or analogous to, a procedure known to the founding generation and thought not to be prohibited by the particular guarantee.
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Chapter 4. Police Interrogation and Confessions 15 results (showing 5 best matches)
- No area of constitutional criminal procedure has provoked more debate over the years than that dealing with police interrogation. In large measure, the debate has centered upon the extent of police abuse in seeking confessions and the importance of confessions in obtaining convictions—two matters on which conclusive evidence is lacking.
- warnings were not required because the questions were asked as “part of a routine tax investigation where no criminal proceedings might even be brought,” but the Court ruled otherwise because there is always the possibility that criminal prosecution will result.
- (1) These rules are required to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination, and thus must be followed in the absence of “other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”
- is grounded in the privilege against self-incrimination, it protects only against compulsion “in any criminal case.” Thus the exclusionary rule applies in criminal cases at stages of the proceedings having to do with guilt or punishment.
- applicable to questioning by persons not primarily responsible for criminal law enforcement. , 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (IRS “civil investigator,” where a possibility “his work would end up in a criminal prosecution”).
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Outline 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
Chapter 8. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 25 results (showing 5 best matches)
- , 161 U.S. 591 (1896), a sharply divided Court concluded that precluding reliance on the privilege by granting witness immunity from criminal prosecution was entirely consistent with the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege, as illustrated by historical practice. The English had adopted an immunity procedure, known as providing “indemnity” against criminal prosecution, soon after the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination became firmly established, and a similar practice was followed in the colonies. So too, the self-incrimination privilege had been held inapplicable where the witness’ compelled testimony would relate only to an offense as to which he had been pardoned or as to which the statute of limitations had run. The thesis of these rulings, like that of the indemnity practice, was that where the witness was assured that his truthful testimony could not lead to his criminal prosecution, the privilege was not available, as the danger against which the privilege...
- majority distinguished the cases that had allowed witnesses in civil and administrative proceedings to refuse to testify when their prospective testimony might be used against them in subsequent criminal prosecutions. The six justices in the majority divided, however, in their characterization of those rulings. Four justices described those rulings as establishing a prophylactic procedure (see § 1.4(e)), based on the need to “memorialize the fact” that the witness is not willing to testify voluntarily. Two other justices characterized those rulings as establishing “a law outside the Fifth Amendment core,” reflecting the “judgment that the core guarantee, or the judicial ...Under either characterization, the majority agreed, there was no need to expand the supplementary protection of the Fifth Amendment right to include a damage remedy where a compelled statement had never been used in a criminal case (although a due process damage remedy might be available if the compulsion in...
- also advanced an analysis suggesting that a person compelled to give testimony in any judicial proceeding was protected by the privilege, even where that proceeding was not itself part of a “criminal case”. The compulsion of testimony and the use of that testimony in a criminal case need not occur simultaneously. The privilege, noted, protects against compelling the testimony of a person in any proceeding where that testimony could later be used by the government in a criminal case brought against that person (thereby making him a “witness against himself”). Based on this reasoning, the Court later held that the privilege protects witnesses in a variety of settings not part of the criminal case (e.g., civil cases and administrative hearings), provided that the testimony that would be compelled from the witness might realistically be used against the witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution, see § 8.2(c).
- The privilege prohibits the use of the compelled statement only as to a “criminal case.” It does not prohibit use in non-criminal proceedings, and a witness cannot claim the privilege when the potential use of the statement does not include use in a criminal case. See § 8.2(e); , 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (potential civil disabilities and social stigma, no matter how severe, do not justify reliance on the privilege to refuse to testify). A criminal case necessarily involves the determination of criminal liability and the imposing of criminal sanctions. Thus,
- First, the government’s interest in the records must arise out of a regulatory scheme rather than a criminal law enforcement objective. Thus, the doctrine could not be used to impose a reporting requirement on professional gamblers, a “group inherently suspect of criminal activities.” Most states make gambling a crime, and looking to the “characteristics of the activity” and “the composition of the group to which inquires are made,” the Court could not say that Congress was dealing here with “an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area.”
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Chapter 6. The Exclusionary Rules and Their Application 23 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Decisions dealing with exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence from proceedings other than the criminal trial have dealt primarily with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. In part, this is because evidence of the kind typically obtained through practices other than searches (e.g., identification procedures) is less likely to have much bearing in related civil or quasi-criminal proceedings. So too, the Fifth Amendment by its very terms eliminates certain scope-issues left unresolved in the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule; the self-incrimination clause bars the use of compelled testimony only in a “criminal case.” See §§ 4.5(c), 8.1(f). As for the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the overall approach of the Court majority has remained consistent from one area of possible application to another. The Court has relied upon what it has described as a “pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule’s usefulness in the particular context,” weighing the additional...
- ...issuance of an injunction, or the imposition of administrative sanctions. But within the criminal justice process itself, such violations have their most direct impact in the exclusion of evidence. Indeed, the very issue of whether a particular police practice does constitute a violation is almost invariably raised by a defense motion challenging the prosecution’s attempt to introduce at trial evidence obtained through that police practice. The constitutionality of a search will be raised by a motion seeking suppression of evidence obtained in that search. The constitutionality of an arrest ordinarily will be presented by a motion seeking suppression of evidence obtained through a search of the person or a place incident to that arrest. The legality of electronic surveillance (including, but not limited to, its constitutionality) will be raised by a motion under § 2515 of Title III of the Crime Control Act, which states that no illegally intercepted communication and “no evidence...
- it is the product of identification procedures so suggestive as to violate due process. See § 5.4. Indeed, in this situation, it presumably is the use of the evidence rather than the identification procedure itself that violates due process. In contrast, in the case of prohibited interrogation techniques that are likely to produce an untrustworthy confession (e.g., police brutality), the offensive police practice presumably violates due process in itself. Nonetheless, exclusion of the confession here too is mandated, apart from any attempt to remedy the deprivation of personal dignity inflicted by the prohibited police practice, by the danger to a fair trial posed by prosecution use of the potentially unreliable confession.
- While “the Fourth Amendment [is] applicable to the activities of civil as well as criminal authorities,” should not apply: the arrest officer acted reasonably in relying on the computer record and thus was not in need of deterrence, and exclusion would not deter such errors by court clerks, who “have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.”
- , 524 U.S. 357 (1998) held the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule inapplicable to parole revocation proceedings on reasoning that appears to govern probation revocation proceedings as well. The Court there concluded that the cost of applying the exclusionary rule, altering “the traditional flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings” was not worth the “minimal” additional deterrence that would result. As for searches conducted by police officers, even if the officers are aware that the suspect is a parolee and the evidence discovered can be used in a parole revocation proceeding, their “primary” interest “is in criminal investigation and adequate deterrence therefore is provided by exclusion at the criminal trial. As for searches by parole officers, who admittedly are” not engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, sufficient deterrence there is provided by “departmental training and discipline and the threat of damage actions.”
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Chapter 5. Lineups and Other Pretrial Identification Procedures 21 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Although not protected by the Fifth Amendment, some identification procedures (such as speaking or writing for identification) require the active participation of the suspect. But, what if the suspect will not cooperate? One possibility, feared the dissenters in is that “an accused may be jailed—indefinitely—until he is willing to” cooperate. Indeed, some courts have utilized civil contempt and criminal contempt as a means to coerce or punish the suspect who failed to comply with a court order to participate in some identification proceeding. Another possibility is that the prosecution may be permitted to comment at trial on the lack of cooperation. Cf. ...S. 553 (1983), holding refusal to give a blood sample is admissible at a criminal trial, as the refusal “is not an act coerced by the officer.” But comment on the defendant’s refusal to speak for identification is improper if it was the direct result of a prior police warning of the right to remain silent, for then the silence...
- If an identification was “suggestive” (e.g., a one-on-one confrontation) and also “unnecessarily” so (i.e., there was no good reason for foregoing more reliable procedures), that alone does not require the exclusion of evidence. The Court declined to hold otherwise as to an identification that predated the the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification “include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.”
- If a suspect drastically alters his appearance between the time of the crime and of identification procedures, this is admissible at trial as an indication of consciousness of guilt. Also, the identification procedure may be conducted in such a
- (a) Procedures required
- “broad prophylactic rule” in the absence of evidence that improper police practices at lineups were widespread. They also expressed concern that the delays required to comply with the procedures prescribed by the majority would make prompt and certain identification impossible.
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Chapter 7. Right to Counsel 34 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is by its terms a right that extends only to “the accused” in a “criminal prosecution.” The Court has held that the starting point for the criminal prosecution—i.e., the point at which the individual becomes “an accused”—is the initiation of “adversary judicial proceedings.” investigative procedures, and we have discussed it previously in that connection. See §§ 4.3(e), 5.2(e). An arrest alone, without the filing of charges in court or the presentation of the arrestee before the magistrate, does not constitute the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not arise simply because counsel’s assistance at the particular stage would be helpful, but only to “protect the unaided layman at a critical confrontation with his adversary” following the point at which “the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified.” ...aimed at developing criminal charges). That point clearly occurs where a...
- , 422 U.S. 853 (1975), “has been understood to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process.” Accordingly, state action, whether by statute or trial court ruling, that prohibits counsel from making full use of traditional trial procedures may be viewed as denying defendant the effective assistance of counsel. In considering the constitutionality of such “state interference,” courts are directed to look to whether the interference denied counsel “the opportunity to participate fully and fairly in the adversary factfinding process.” If the interference had that effect, then the overall performance of counsel apart from the interference, and the lack of any showing of actual prejudice, are both irrelevant.
- Once started, the criminal prosecution continues through to the end of the trial stage, including sentencing. See (§ 7.3(g)). After that point, however, the criminal prosecution has come ) was not a stage in the “criminal prosecution” for Sixth Amendment purposes.
- , 491 U.S. 617 (1989), recognized that other administrative considerations may justify restrictions that impair (or altogether deny) the defendant’s capacity to retain counsel of choice. The Court there upheld a pretrial freeze of those assets of the defendant allegedly subject to forfeiture as the proceeds of a continuing criminal enterprise. The Court assessed the freeze and forfeiture provisions under the assumption that the defendant would not have other assets and therefore would be unable to retain the attorney of his choice” (or any retained attorney). However, the defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to use funds that did not truly belong to him, as the government was fully entitled to “separate a criminal from his ill gotten gains” and thereby strip the criminal enterprise of “undeserved economic power,” including the “ability to command high priced legal talent.”
- a person subjected to custodial interrogation has a right to consult with counsel prior to and during such interrogation. See § 4.4(b). Once the adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated, the Sixth Amendment applies, and the individual may not be subjected to police action designed to elicit potentially incriminating statements without an appropriate waiver of counsel. See § 4.3. So too, the accused may not be subjected to eyewitness identification in a lineup or show-up without having counsel present or having waived that right. See § 5.2. On the other hand, that right does not extend to other identification procedures involving an accused (e.g., the taking and analyzing of blood samples) as those procedures do not present a “critical stage.” See §§ 5.3(b); 7.1(e).
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Chapter 3. Wiretapping, Electronic Eavesdropping, and the Use of Secret Agents 13 results (showing 5 best matches)
- , 374 U.S. 23 (1963), is to guard the entering officer from attack on the mistaken belief he is making a criminal entry, and this danger is not present in most eavesdropping cases—including all which do not require a trespass. (2) Another reason for notice is so that the individual will be aware that a search was conducted, but in the more typical search case may have been unwilling to uphold all eavesdropping without notice on this ground, this “exigency” is sufficiently established upon a showing that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,” as required by Title III. An extensive footnote (n. 16) on the subject in
- The Supreme Court has held that techniques of encouragement may not reach the point where they constitute “entrapment”; if they do, the presence of entrapment constitutes a defense to the defendant’s otherwise criminal act. The exact definition of entrapment is a matter of dispute, but it clearly includes the situation in which “the criminal design originates with the [police agents] and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.” , 503 U.S. 540 (1992). So far, the Court has based the defense upon other than constitutional grounds; some of the Justices have relied upon general principles of substantive criminal law and others upon the supervisory power of the Court over the administration of justice in federal courts.
- § 3.4 THE USE OF SECRET AGENTS TO “ENCOURAGE” CRIMINAL CONDUCT
- Secret agents—sometimes undercover police officers but very often private citizens acting as informants—are frequently utilized to “encourage” others to engage in criminal conduct. Such tactics are for the most part confined to the crimes of prostitution, homosexuality, liquor and narcotic sales, and gambling; normal detection methods are virtually impossible as to these offenses, as they are committed privately with a willing victim who will not complain. The encouragement very frequently involves little more than a feigned offer by the agent to purchase criminal services from the suspect, but on occasion the agent may use considerably more pressure to gain the suspect’s agreement to commit an offense.
- ...or is about to commit one of the enumerated offenses; probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception; that normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed to reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; and probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person. Each interception order must specify the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted; the nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted (except that a so-called “roving tap” may be authorized upon a particularized showing of need); a particular description of the type...
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Chapter 9. The Post-Investigatory Process: From Bail to Appellate Review 26 results (showing 5 best matches)
- held that due process was not violated where a state eliminated all independent screening procedures, allowing the prosecution to file felony charges directly in the trial court upon a prosecutorial oath that the charges were fairly grounded. Although were decided during the early stages of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to state criminal justice systems, the Court has continued to cite those decisions with approval. See
- (§ 9.6(e)), the majority found that the likely prejudicial impact upon the jury of a cumbersome and conspicuous televising procedure eliminated the need for a showing of specific instances of “isolatable prejudice.” Indeed, four members of the majority expressed the view that public television of a trial was inherently prejudicial, but the fifth justice limited his concurrence to “criminal trial[s] of great notoriety” such as that involved in
- The Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”. As discussed in § 9.9(a), this “double jeopardy” prohibition bears upon the imposition of multiple sentences, but its primary significance lies in its restriction of successive prosecutions. To be subject to the double jeopardy prohibition, a criminal prosecution must meet four prerequisites. First, it must be a second instance in which the individual was placed in jeopardy of “life or limb.” That jeopardy is not limited to possible conviction for an offense carrying a capital or corporal punishment, but it does require a possible conviction for a “crime” (including crimes subject to lesser penalties). ...g., heavy fines), will be subject to the double jeopardy clause only upon “the ‘clearest proof’ that the penalty [actually] * * * is punitive.” Accordingly the double jeopardy clause does not bar the combination of a criminal prosecution and a...
- Although states are not constitutionally required to provide for independent screening of the prosecution’s decision to charge by grand jury or preliminary hearing, once such a procedure is imposed under local law, it cannot be conducted in a manner that denies equal protection. Thus, the Supreme Court has long held that an indictment is subject to constitutional challenge if the grand jury selection procedure operated to discriminate on racial grounds. See
- held that protecting minor victims of sex crimes “from further trauma” was such an interest, but it would not justify a general statutory prohibition requiring exclusion whenever a victim under 18 testified. To ensure that closure is narrowly tailored to that interest, a state procedure must require the trial court to “determine on a case-by-case basis” whether closure is “necessary” to protect the particular minor. So too, acknowledged that a prospective juror’s privacy interest as to personal matters might justify closing a very limited segment of the voir dire, but the proper procedure was to inform the prospective jurors of their opportunity to make such a request, and to have the judge respond to such a request by first deciding if there is a “valid basis” for the juror’s concern, and if so, to then decide whether to excuse the juror or order limited closure.
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Chapter 2. Arrest, Search and Seizure 31 results (showing 5 best matches)
- , 287 U.S. 206 (1932). Generally, a longer time will be allowed as to an ongoing criminal enterprise as compared to a one-shot criminal episode. Thus 49 days is not too long re a search for forged tax stamps being used in an elaborate and extensive counterfeiting scheme, but 4 days might be deemed too long as to a one-time illegal sale of liquor. It is also generally true that more time will be tolerated when the search is for items having continuing utility and not strongly incriminating. Thus, the passage of 3 months from a bank robbery is not too long as to search for clothing worn by the robber, but is too long as to search for the bank’s money bag. Likewise relevant is the extent to which the criminal would have had access to the place to be searched during the time that has elapsed.
- Also related to the booking/intake process is the question whether “routine” strip searches may be employed against all classes of arrestees as part of jail intake procedure, answered in the affirmative in , 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012) on the ground that “undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from the more invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband.” Four Justices cautioned that there
- If the police have lawfully impounded a vehicle (e.g., because it was found illegally parked in such a way as to constitute a traffic hazard), they may, pursuant to an established standard procedure, secure and inventory the vehicle’s contents in order , 479 U.S. 367 (1987) the Court held vehicle inventory procedures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without regard to the existence of such “alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.”
- , 449 U.S. 411 (1981), the Court stated that the essence of the standard is that “the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” The Court’s emphasis in was upon the situation “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” If this language is compared with that usually employed to describe the evidentiary test for arrest, it appears that some difference exists in the degree of probability required. As for probable cause to arrest, sometimes said not to required the care that “a preponderance standard demands” , 420 U.S. 103 (1975), it is nonetheless commonly assumed that, as to the showing of criminality, facts as consistent with innocent as with criminal activity will not suffice, while the probability that the arrestee committed the crime merely requires a quite narrow focus, e.g.,
- the standards applied have been somewhat different than those applied to searches conducted in the course of criminal investigations.
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- Publication Date: January 22nd, 2014
- ISBN: 9780314288929
- Subject: Criminal Procedure
- Series: Nutshells
- Type: Overviews
- Description: This nutshell is intended for use by law students of constitutional criminal procedure. It is a succinct analysis of the constitutional standards of major current significance. This is not a text on criminal procedure, but rather about constitutional criminal procedure. It avoids describing the non-constitutional standards applied in each state and federally. The text provides the scope and highlights you need to excel in understanding this field. This will enable you to answer exam questions more quickly and accurately, and enhance your skills as an attorney.