Preface 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This fourth edition of MILITARY LAW IN A NUTSHELL returns the book to its original roots in military justice. Continued development of military law led us to separate it from the national security and counterterrorism law framework included in our NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY LAW IN A NUTSHELL (2003). A myriad of new developments in the national security and counterterrorism field will be treated in a separate Nutshell scheduled for publication next year.
- We have tried to make this volume a concise, accurate, and authoritative source of information about military law and justice for those seeking to understand the workings of the military’s distinctive legal system. In that sense, the NUTSHELL attempts to integrate the jurisprudence of the military, “a society apart from civilian society,” into an analytical framework comprehensible to civilians and useful to those with an intimate knowledge of the armed services. Many of the cases, a number of specific topics, and much of the organization of this book are new. The primary sources of this NUTSHELL include the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, executive orders, military regulations, and the decisions of courts adjudicating military criminal law matters.
- The primary audience for this volume is the law student taking a specialized course on military law and justice. We have tried to provide a straightforward presentation of the law that will complement recent casebooks on military law and justice such as Gregory E. Maggs and Lisa M. Schenck, MODERN MILITARY JUSTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS (West 2012) and Eugene R. Fidell, Elizabeth L. Hillman, and Dwight H. Sullivan, MILITARY JUSTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS (LexisNexis, 2d ed. 2012), both of which reflect renewed vitality in this field in legal education. Special thanks to Professor Maggs and Dean Schenck for permission to reproduce two charts on the military court system.
- Additional users of this volume will be practicing lawyers seeking a succinct overview of military law, cadets at military academies and in college R.O.T.C. programs, and lawyers preparing to enter the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Coast Guard Judge Advocate General’s Corps. News media reporters and now bloggers should also find the volume a valuable source of background and context. Finally, this volume will also prove useful to enlisted personnel
- Professor of Law and Co-Director, Volunteer Clinic for Veterans
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Chapter 3. The Military Criminal Justice System 98 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Another resource cited frequently in this Nutshell is Army Regulation 27–10, Military Justice (AR 27–10) available online through the Army Publishing Directorate website at www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r27_10.pdf. Military law incorporates regulations of the individual services, and all services publish regulations. These primary sources of law govern the disposition of cases arising in the military. Numerous resources on military law and military justice are available on Westlaw. These include publications of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, the Military Judges’ Benchbook, the Manual for Courts-Martial including subparts such as the Military Rules of Evidence, Rules for Courts-Martial, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It also includes published decisions by the military appellate courts in West’s Military Justice Reporter and unpublished decisions as well, and numerous secondary sources of...
- In other particulars however, military law and its processes diverge from civilian criminal law. As the Supreme Court noted in , 417 U.S. 733 (1974), “Just as military society has been a society apart from civilian society, so military law is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.”
- Any person can report a military offense. The report is to be forwarded to an accused’s immediate commander as soon as practicable. RCM 301. An accused may be subjected to three types of pre-trial restrictions that are unique to military law. In increasing order of severity, they are arrest (sometimes called restriction), apprehension, and confinement.
- More recently, a comment by President Barak Obama that those who commit sexual assault in the military should be “prosecuted, stripped of their positions, court–martialed, fired, [and] dishonorably discharged” has raised questions as to whether his words as commander in chief amounted to unlawful command influence. See Jennifer Steinhauer, “Remark by Obama Complicates Military Sexual Assault Trials,” NY Times, July 14, 2013, 2013 WLNR 113760. While at the time this Nutshell was undergoing revision it was impossible to gauge the full fallout of this event, the issue is emerging in , 2013 WL 3336975 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 2013) (Not reported in M.J.) (defense challenge for cause upheld following questioning during voir dire that elicited prospective court member’s knowledge of comments made by President Obama regarding sexual assault in the military).
- In many respects, this system parallels state and federal civilian systems for dealing with crimes. Like state and federal law, military law is hierarchical, both substantively and procedurally. Substantively, the United States Constitution is at the apex of the military law system, followed by federal statutory law, regulations promulgated by the President, the secretaries of defense and of the various armed services, and rules of various commanders. Court decisions interpret these laws. Procedurally, the military court system is organized much like civilian courts: trials are conducted by courts-martial with review by two tiers of appellate courts, the first comprised of appellate military judges, the second comprised of civilian appellate judges. Judgments of the highest military court are reviewable by the Supreme Court.
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Chapter 4. Courts-Martial 148 results (showing 5 best matches)
- While a detailed discussion of all issues of evidence in courts-martial is beyond the scope of this Nutshell, a discussion of some major points is in order. For a detailed analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence consult Appendix 22, MCM, “Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence.”
- The general rule that court–martial jurisdiction does not extend over civilians was established long ago. In , 71 U.S. 2 (1866), a civilian was tried and convicted by a military commission for conspiracy, insurrection, and other crimes relating to an alleged plan to organize a secret military force in Indiana to aid the Confederacy during the Civil War. On petition for habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that the military commission was without jurisdiction, stating: “This court has judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal authority was always unopposed, and its courts always open … and no usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any offense whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military services.” The important factors which led the Court to provide the full Constitutional safeguards of civilian courts were that Milligan: (1) was a citizen of a Union state not under military siege; (2) could have been tried, convicted, and punished
- Exception 3: Private contractors “serving with” or accompanying an armed force during a declared war or contingency operation are subject to courts-martial. UCMJ, Article 2(a)(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10). The jurisdiction of the military to try civilians has waxed and waned. Prior to the founding of this country, the British Articles of War of 1765 provided for jurisdiction over “[a]ll Suttlers and Retainers to a Camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with Our Armies in the Field.” British Articles of War of 1765, section XIV, art. XXIII,
- General courts-martial consist of a military judge and no fewer than five members, unless the accused requests trial by military judge alone. RCM 501(a)(1)(A). In death penalty cases, however, a military judge may not sit alone. Procedures for general courts-martial parallel those for special courts-martial. The only notable differences are that in general courts-martial (1) appointed trial lawyers are always certified military lawyers and (2) military judges are always detailed. RCM 1103(b)(2)(B). Procedures for both special and general courts-martial are examined later in more detail.
- The military judge has the authority to enter contrary findings of not guilty after the court members’ verdict in order to set aside findings of guilty that are incorrect as a matter of law. Article 51(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 851(b). For example, consider a case in which an accused was acquitted of a charge alleging sale of marihuana, but found guilty of the charge of conspiracy to sell marihuana. Because the sale was the only overt act alleged in the conspiracy charge, the court members’ verdict was inconsistent and the conspiracy charge, as a matter of law, could not stand. The military judge who is responsible for ruling “upon all questions of law … arising during the proceeding,” would otherwise be compelled to submit legally erroneous findings of guilty (in this case, of a conspiracy). , 12 M.J. 509 (A.C.M.R. 1981).
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Chapter 1. A Brief History of American Military Law 57 results (showing 5 best matches)
- As this Nutshell goes to press, two issues confront military justice in the twenty-first century. These have arisen because of lax punishment for a rising tide of cases of sexual harassment and sexual abuse in the armed forces. The first issue concerns the prosecutorial function of commanders. Currently, and consistent with the history of military law, commanders initiate the prosecutorial process and appoint the court members who will pass judgment unless the accused opts for a trial by military judge alone. The second issue comes at the other end of the process. The court-martial’s decision as to guilt and sentence can be reviewed and set aside by the commander. The commander cannot overturn a finding of “not guilty,” but a finding of guilty can be overturned and a sentence recommendation reduced or disregarded altogether. The power of the commander remains strong, but Congress may trim that power.
- Military law, particularly the international laws governing the conduct of warfare, has been heavily influenced by and is deeply indebted to the military code promulgated April 24, 1863, as General Order No. 100 “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.” These instructions, appropriately known as the “Lieber Code” because of Francis Lieber’s role in their preparation, were unlike a traditional military order in that they were informational rather than directory in nature. The Lieber Code, appropriately called the “earliest official government codification of the laws of war,” provided a documentary foundation for further development of the law of war and identified military necessity as a general legal principle to limit violence.
- As will be seen, earlier history was marked by an emphasis on discipline that was short on substantive and procedural fairness. As a phrase associated with Dr. Martin Luther King has it, however, “The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends toward justice.” In more recent times that arc has bent toward justice for members of the military service. Safeguards of due process and fair treatment have entered military law supported by Congress and the courts. Gradually, a system largely relying on commanders who were professionals at arms, but who were legal amateurs, has been augmented by a corps of trained lawyers in all branches of military service whose task is to support the military’s mission in a way that comports with the values of a democratic society guided by a written constitution. The nature of the commander’s role in military justice continues to undergo examination prompted by significant changes in the military itself, notably, the end of racial discrimination in...
- Numerous excellent sources on the history of American Military Law are available for those desiring more detail. They include: Jonathan Lurie,
- Thereafter, Vallandigham sought review by the Supreme Court, which held that it lacked the power to review the proceedings of military commission by certiorari. Justice Wayne’s opinion assessing the authority to conduct trials by military commission notes that Burnside acted “in conformity with the instructions for the government of the armies of the United States, approved by the President … [which] were prepared by Francis Leiber [sic].” For the military, Lieber’s Code may have been informational rather than directory, but for the Court, it was law-binding and prescriptive. Time would secure within the military and the law of war the beachhead Lieber’s Code gained early on in the Supreme Court. Even the unfortunate effect on judicial review of military commissions was temporary, for the Court soon allowed habeas review of a military commission conviction in
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Chapter 6. Military Criminal Justice System Constitutional Safeguards 38 results (showing 5 best matches)
- MRE 315(d) allows the issuance of an “authorization to search” by an impartial commander or other officer in a position of command or by a military judge or magistrate. The search authorization, which must be based upon probable cause, grants permission to search a person or area for specified property or evidence or for a specific person. MRE 315(b), (f). A search authorization may be issued for a search of persons subject to military law, military property, persons and property within military control, and non-military property in a foreign country. MRE 315(c).
- Military law distinguishes between “inspections” and “searches.” Under MRE 313, inspections are lawful only if (1) they are not conducted primarily to obtain evidence to use in a court-martial or disciplinary proceeding and (2) they are ordered and conducted primarily to ensure the security, fitness, or good order and discipline of the military unit. In , 2 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1976), the court said that the “traditional military inspection which looks at the overall fitness of a unit to perform its military mission is a permissible deviation from what may be tolerated in civilian society generally.” However, “shakedown inspections” instituted “in search specifically of criminal goods or evidence is not such a permissible intrusion into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, even in the military setting.” Thus, the commander who tailors a barracks or field area inspection for legitimate military reasons can search entire group without probable cause. But, a commander who expressly...
- The warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached official acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. See United States v. Sloan, 30 M.J. 741 (A.F.C.M.R.1990) (neutrality and detachment of a commander). The warrant must be based upon probable cause and be limited at least as to the place to be searched and the things to be seized. However, military officials generally do not obtain civilian search warrants because military law also recognizes as reasonable a search conducted pursuant to a military commander’s properly granted authority.
- , 346 U.S. 137, 142 (“The military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation of his constitutional rights.”) (plurality opinion). The only explicit textual difference between civilian and military criminal defendants’ rights in the Bill of Rights is the Fifth Amendment’s exception of the requirement for grand jury indictment “in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the Militia when in actual service in time of War or public danger….” U.S. Const., Amend. V. Yet the scope of constitutional protections for servicemembers has never been fully defined by the Supreme Court. However, military appellate courts have held that servicemembers enjoy extensive Bill of Rights protections: “It is now settled that the protections of … the entire Bill of Rights, are applicable to the men and women serving in the military services of the United States unless expressly or by necessary implication they are made...
- Military law gives the accused the right to counsel before a general or special court-martial or at an Art. 32 investigation. Article 38(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 838(b). Military regulations do not extend this right to summary courts-martial, RCM 1301(e), and in , 425 U.S. 25 (1976), the Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional right to counsel in summary courts-martial. The Court avoided the issue of the Sixth Amendment’s general applicability to the military by deciding that summary courts-martial are not “criminal proceedings” because of the limits on penalties imposable, the procedural distinctions present between summary and other courts-martial, and the historical differences between the military and civilian communities. At the same time that it found no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in summary courts-martial, the Court declined to find any deprivation of due process under the Fifth Amendment. Thus, summary courts-martial may be held without any involvement of...
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Chapter 7. Military Law Crimes, Defenses, and Punishments 87 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Much of the majority opinion rested on differences between military and civilian law and the need for immediate obedience and discipline in the military: “Just as military society has been a society apart from civilian society, so military law is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.” Additionally, the opinion cited several factors narrowing the broad language of the general articles. Furthermore, the court concluded that numerous examples in the MCM have imparted “accepted meaning to the seemingly imprecise standards of Articles 133 and 134” and that: [e]ach of these articles has been construed by the [C.M.A.] or by other military authorities in such a manner as to at least partially narrow its otherwise broad scope….”
- Many offenses specified in the UCMJ are strictly military in nature. Other offenses, denounced by military law rather severely because of the nature of military duty and martial responsibilities, would be minor offenses under civilian law. These offenses can be organized into the following four categories:
- The so-called “common law crimes” in the military are in fact codified in great detail. However, the military does not draw the felony/misdemeanor line often drawn under state law. Rather, punishments
- In , 59 M.J. 859 (A.Ct.Crim.App. 2004) (accused’s asserted fear of immediate death or serious bodily injury rendered his guilty plea to desertion improvident), the accused raised a defense of duress, RCM 916(h) which the Army Court of Criminal Appeals accepted as a partial excuse for his absence charge under Article 85, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 885. A duress defense is unavailing for refusal to obey an order to perform dangerous military duty. , 17 M.J. 1127 (N.M.C.J.R. 1984) (accused’s belief that entry into reactor compartment of nuclear submarine would expose accused to hazardous levels of radiation did not establish defense of duress to a charge under Article 90, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 890, of willfully disobeying an order of a superior commissioned officer. The duress defense is distinct from its civilian counterpart, the defense of necessity (conduct was a choice between the “lesser of two evils”). , 37 M.J. 700 (A.C.M.R. 1993) (“necessity defense” is not part of military law). There have...
- Not surprisingly, this divergence between civilian law and the general articles has spawned constitutional challenges to their validity. Until 1974, most commentators argued that the general articles were constitutionally defective because of vagueness, overbreadth, potential for abuse of prosecutorial discretion, and lack of delineation of punishment. Those who disagreed, including various military courts, relied primarily on court decisions construing the articles, statutory language limiting the possibilities for abuse, a long military custom and history behind the articles, special constitutional standards applicable to military law, and restraint by the military in use of the articles.
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Chapter 8. Rights of Servicemembers 155 results (showing 5 best matches)
- [417 U.S. 733 (1974)] reiterated the point that differences between the military community and the civilian community result in military law that “regulate[s] aspects of the conduct of members of the military which in the civilian sphere are left unregulated.” [citation omitted] But the Supreme Court upheld Article 134, UCMJ, against constitutional attack for vagueness and overbreadth
- With respect to members of the armed services, early cases painted a starker picture: “To those in the military or naval service of the United States, the military law is due process.” , 219 U.S. 296 (1911). An even earlier case, , 61 U.S. 65 (1857), concluded from Congress’ power to regulate the land and naval forces (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8) and the grand jury exception for “cases arising in the land and naval forces” (U.S. Const. Amend. 5) that Congress has more, and the courts less, constitutional authority than in civilian affairs. held that the power to prescribe rules for those in the armed services “is given without any connection between it and the 3d Article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed, that the two powers are entirely independent of each other.” A member of the armed services is “subject to military law and the principles of that law; as provided by Congress, [constitute] for him due process of law in a constitutional...
- In the event a default judgment is entered against a servicemember protected the SCRA, the law provides for reopening it. 50 App. U.S.C. § 521(g). To be eligible for opening under the SCRA, the default judgment must have been entered during the servicemember’s period of military service (or within 60 days after termination of or release from such military service). The court that entered the default judgment shall, upon application by or on behalf of the servicemember, reopen the judgment for the purpose of allowing the servicemember to defend the action if it appears that the servicemember was materially affected by reason of that military service in making a defense to the action; and the servicemember has a meritorious or legal defense to the action or some part of it. An application to reopen under this provision of the SCRA must be filed not later than 90 days after the date of the termination of or release from military service.
- Fuelled by the phenomenal expansion of the Internet and access to it from almost anywhere in the world, the “underground” newspapers of prior years and prior wars have given way to blogs, on-line discussion sites which are available to anyone with a computer and Internet access. Thanks to an array of editing tools, bloggers can produce blogs that are quite polished and professional. These include blogs by military servicemembers or “Milblogs.” Milblogs, such as the mudvillegazette.com, allow servicemembers (as well as family members or those with an interest in the military) platforms from which to reach a world-wide audience for their views. Blogs present problems requiring treatment beyond the scope of the Nutshell. For a detailed analysis of the first amendment issues regarding blogging, see Major Frederick D. Thaden, “Blogs v. Freedom of Speech: A Commander’s Primer Regarding First Amendment Rights As They Apply to the Blogosphere,” 33 No. 2 The Reporter 19 (June 2006).
- The rationale for a more limited right of free speech in the military was aptly identified early on: “An army is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier.”
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Chapter 5. Review of Courts-Martial 35 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Both civilian and military appellate review processes are designed to correct errors in individual cases and establish a body of law for application to subsequent cases. However, the military review system is more protective of the rights of convicted persons than state or federal review systems because several military reviews are automatic. Moreover, some military reviews correct factual errors and exercise clemency as well as reviewing questions of law and “clearly erroneous” factual findings. Appointment of new counsel at government expense to handle appeals also encourages a thorough and detached review of the court–martial trial process. Finally, defense counsel is mandatory when requested by the accused, when the United States is represented by counsel, or when the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) has sent the case to the C.A.A.F.
- , 346 U.S. 844 (1953), is both the seminal case on civilian review and the source of most of the confusion in this field. In , a plurality of the Court found it appropriate to review whether the military courts had “dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised” in the habeas corpus petition. It was inappropriate, said the plurality, for civilian courts to reexamine and weigh the evidence in a court-martial. In dicta, the Court noted that “in military habeas corpus the inquiry … has always been more narrow than in civil cases” and that “this court has played no role in [military law’s] development; we have exerted no supervisory power over the courts which enforce it.” In , various concurring or dissenting members of the Court argued (1) that the federal courts have only the more limited function of seeing whether the military court had jurisdiction, (2) that the case should be reargued; and (3) that federal courts
- Because a court-martial is not an Art. III court, critics have continued to question the judicial independence of military judges, e.g., Major Fansu Ku, “From Law Member to Military Judge: The Continuing Evolution of an Independent Trial Judiciary in the Twenty-First Century,” 199 49 (2009) and Frederic Lederer & Barbara S., “An Independent Military Judiciary—A Proposal to Amend the UCMJ,” 3
- Finally, considerations of comity will preclude civilian courts from granting injunctive relief for an accused while a court-martial or the military appellate processes are in progress. The comity doctrine of , 401 U.S. 37 (1971), premised upon federal non-intervention in ongoing state criminal proceedings, was applied in Court noted that this deficiency was supplied by equally compelling factors: the separateness of military and civilian societies and the mission of the military to fight or be ready to fight wars. Congress, noted the Court, attempted to balance military necessities and demands for fairness by placing a court comprised of civilian judges with lengthy tenure at the apex of the military court hierarchy.
- The C.C.A. judges have neither tenure nor fixed terms of appointment but serve, as do court–martial judges, at the pleasure of TJAG. This method of “detailing” judges has been attacked for failure to satisfy requirements of the United States Constitution. In. , 35 MJ 450 (1992), cert den. 510 U.S. 1085 (1994), the accused argued that the lack of a fixed term of office violated the necessary independence for the judiciary under the Fifth Amendment. In ., 510 U.S. 163 (1994), the defendants contended that, because military judges are not confirmed by the Senate, their appointments violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that duties of military judges were not significantly different than those of other servicemembers: initial appointment as a commissioned officer of one later detailed to serve as a judge was sufficient to satisfy the Appointments Clause and in a military context, fixed judicial terms were not required since “Congress has achieved
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Copyright Page 4 results
- Nutshell Series, In a Nutshell
- This publication was created to provide you with accurate and authoritative information concerning the subject matter covered. However, this publication was not necessarily prepared by persons licensed to practice law in a particular jurisdiction. The publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other professional advice, and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional.
- © West, a Thomson business, 2003 © 2013 by LEG, Inc. d/b/a West Academic Publishing
- Printed in the United States of America
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Chapter 2. Enlistment, Discharge, and Separation 77 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Subject to the review of the Secretary, the DRB can change a discharge or dismissal to a higher one or issue a new discharge. The review is based on the servicemember’s military record and any other relevant evidence presented by the petitioner. The petitioner may appear in person, with or without counsel, and offer testimony. Generally, the petitioner must establish that the discharge was improperly or inequitably issued under the standards of law and discipline of the military department, or that new standards have been promulgated which are retroactive in application.
- Historically, under military regulations homosexuality was considered to be “incompatible with military service.” Thus, in , 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), which challenged that policy, the court deferred to the Army’s conclusion that the presence of gay, lesbian, or bisexual servicemembers would be detrimental to the morale of the armed forces. In 1993, when President Clinton announced his intention to eliminate the military’s ban on service by gays and lesbians, Congress forced a compromise that became known as “don’t ask, don’t tell,” which meant that the military should not inquire about a servicemember’s sexual preferences and individuals should not disclose those preferences. This policy was ultimately incorporated in a federal statute, 10 U.S.C. § 654, that authorized the services to deny enlistment or dismiss servicemembers who engaged in or attempted to engage in homosexual acts or who stated that they were homosexual or bisexual. However, the law did not affect those who...
- Like an enlisted member of the armed services, a commissioned officer has no constitutional right to remain in the service and may be separated from the military through one of several methods. Some merely terminate the officer’s status in a particular military component, while others sever all connection with the military. Administrative separations of officers are much less common than enlisted separations. Ordinarily, if an officer’s misconduct is serious enough to warrant an administrative discharge, it will be grave enough to warrant court-martial.
- An accused must first exhaust all military appeals before seeking relief in federal court. , 405 U.S. 34 (1972). In the event there is no court–martial conviction and sentence to appeal, the service member must show that all available intra-service administrative remedies have been exhausted unless pursuit of intra-service remedies would be futile or cause irreparable harm. , 327 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] military service member must exhaust all intra-military remedies before applying for a writ of habeas corpus seeking discharge from the military under the terms of his or her enlistment contract, unless the application falls within a limited number of exceptions to the exhaustion principle.”)
- Whenever a servicemember’s record reflects acceptable military service and performance of duty, an honorable discharge is issued. An honorable discharge signifies adequate military performance. It is not a mark of distinction or meritorious service, which are generally recognized through medals and awards. An honorable discharge entitles the recipient to both tangible and intangible benefits such as veteran’s benefits and favorable consideration by civilian employers.
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Outline 41 results (showing 5 best matches)
Title Page 5 results
Index 26 results (showing 5 best matches)
Advisory Board 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law,
- Professor of Law Emeritus, University of San Diego Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan
- Professor of Law, Chancellor and Dean Emeritus, Hastings College of the Law
- Professor of Law, Yale Law School
- Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Publication Date: September 27th, 2013
- ISBN: 9780314907189
- Subject: Military Law
- Series: Nutshells
- Type: Overviews
The fourth edition of Military Law in a Nutshell by Charles A. Shanor and L. Lynn Hogue has been thoroughly revised and updated. It is designed to make available to law students and military lawyers a succinct summary of military law and military justice. It has been adapted to serve as a companion to current casebooks in the field, as well as to provide an authoritative resource for those seeking an introduction to the unique aspects of military law and military justice.
The new edition takes account of changes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), such as, Article 2(a)(10), extending court-martial jurisdiction over civilian contractors, and cases marking its application, e.g., United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012), evolving issues regarding public access to court-martial proceedings, e.g., Center for Constitutional Rights v. United States, ___M.J.___, 2013 WL 1663084 (C.A.A.F. 2013) and the impact of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and its amendments.
As in earlier editions, the Nutshell traces the history and development of military law, its sources, the nature of military status, rights of members of the Armed Forces, and provides an exhaustive yet accessible review of the military justice process.