High Court Case Summaries on Property, Keyed to Cribbet
Author:
Publisher's Editorial Staff
Edition:
9th
Copyright Date:
2008
26 chapters
have results for High Court Case Summaries
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Chapter Eighteen. Traditional Land Use Controls 22 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal to the State’s highest court from the Appellate Division’s affirmation of the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the mobile home owner.
- Appeal to the State’s highest court from the trial court’s affirmation of the Planning Board’s denial of the application for subdivision.
- Appeal to the state’s highest court from the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and damages.
- A close read of the facts of this case seems to indicate that the proffered reasons for rezoning the tract of which Stone’s (P) land was a part may not have been completely legitimate. Stone (P) wanted to construct low-income, federally subsidized multi-family residences. Many people identify such projects with high crime rates and lowering property values of the surrounding land. The Court seemed aware of this prospect as indicated by its characterization of the proffered reasons for the rezoning as “alleged.” There is another theme in this case. The rule enunciated herein by the court is analogous to estoppel and reliance. Try to look at existing zoning classifications as a contract between a municipality and its citizens. When a landowner takes substantial steps to develop her land, in accordance with and in reliance upon the existing zoning classification, she has relied upon the continued vitality of that particular zoning classification. Whereas the law of estoppel and...
- Durant (P) owned a tract of land fronting Jewett Road, a State Highway. Desiring to divide this tract into several lots, Durant (P) submitted a subdivision plan (The Plan) to the State Water Supply and Pollution Control Commission (WSPCC), which approved it. Durant (P) then submitted her plan, along with the WSPCC’s approval, to the Dunbarton Planning Board (Board)(R), which denied it after a hearing, citing three reasons for the denial: (1) potential disruption of natural water courses, (2) potential sight distance problems from the driveways exiting onto a State highway, and (3) potential problems with subsurface septic systems due to an extremely high water table in the area. Durant (P) appealed the denial to the trial court, which affirmed.
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Chapter Fifteen. Non-Freehold Estates: Landlord and Tenant 72 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Covenants of continuous operation, generally inserted into commercial leases by the landlord, benefit the landlord in a number of ways. First, as may well have been the case in if a portion of the rent is determined by a percentage of business done by the tenant, a covenant of continuous operation benefits the landlord in that it may guarantee a higher amount of rent for each rental period. Perhaps more important, if a landlord owns more than one commercial property in a given area, the abandonment of a commercial premises by one party may adversely affect the other tenants in the area, and a covenant of continuous operation can preclude abandonment. An important issue raised in the present case is the implication or non-implication of a covenant of continuous operation when there is no such covenant expressly contained in the lease. ...not provide a whole lot of information on this issue, other than to say that in the present case, there is no reason to imply such a covenant....cases
- Appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court of a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of a town whose affordable housing ordinance was challenged by a company involved in the construction of residential housing.
- (Peterson, J.) Yes and yes. The resolution of this case turns, in part, on the rules of law enunciated in three recent Oregon cases. First, in a lessor is not required to mitigate damages when the tenant abandons the leasehold. Specifically, we stated that “whether [the landlord-tenant relationship is] regarded as arising out of contract or conveyance, a court of equity should require the [landlord] to do equity by making a reasonable effort to avoid damages.” Two years later, in we held that in mitigating damages, the landlord is not required to rent the premises below the fair rental value. To determine the appropriate resolution in the present case, we must address two additional issues in conjunction with the law just stated. Specifically, we must determine the effect of the landlord’s reletting or attempting to relet the premises for a different term than the unexpired portion of the abandoning tenant’s lease and at a higher rent. In the present case, there is no claim that...
- In addition to terminating the lease and seeking to have the defaulting tenant evicted, a landlord may seek damages from a tenant who, in one way or another, breaches the lease agreement. The present case addresses the landlord’s duty to mitigate damages. In the case of an abandoning tenant, that means the landlord must make a reasonable attempt to re-let the premises, and must do so within a reasonable period of time. This is exactly what the landlord did in this case. Instead of waiting for the lease to expire thirty-two months from the time of Homeland’s abandonment, the Schlesingers advertised the space and found a new tenant within a few months. To determine what the abandoning tenant owes, the courts will come up with a total monetary figure that the landlord would have received had the abandoning tenant honored the agreement and subtract anything that is to be paid by the newly found tenant. The abandoning tenant is then held responsible for the difference and no more....
- In the present case, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejects the Rule in
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Chapter Seventeen. Nuisance and Interests in Natural Resources 63 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Sipriano (P) and other landowners sued Great Spring Waters of America, Inc. (Great Springs) (D) for draining their water wells. Great Springs (D) filed a motion for summary judgment based on the common law rule of “capture.” Under this rule, landowners may pump as much groundwater as they want without liability to neighbors who claim that the pumping depleted their wells. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed.
- Certified appeal to state supreme court of summary judgment in action for injunctive relief and for damages.
- “ancient lights.” Under this doctrine, if a landowner had received sunlight for a specified period of time, the landowner acquired a negative prescriptive easement to receive sunlight. American courts are less receptive to protecting sunlight and have rejected the ancient lights doctrine based on the needs of development. Many states apply the private nuisance doctrine to protect access to light. Courts had been reluctant to protect access to light based on three policy considerations: (1) Guarding landowners’ right to use their property as they wish; (2) Valuing sunlight only for aesthetic enjoyment rather than for any practical purpose; and (3) Not restricting development. But these reasons no longer apply. Society has increasingly regulated land use. Sunlight is now seen as a source of energy. Unhindered private development is no longer as important. The flexible law of private nuisance is suited to resolving modern property development issues, as opposed to a rigid rule denying...
- Glenn Prah (P) owned a house with a solar heating system. Panels on the roof supplied energy for heat and hot water. Maretti (D) subsequently bought a lot next to Prah’s (P) and began plans for building a home. When Prah (P) learned of Maretti’s (D) plans, Prah (P) told Maretti (D) that the house would create a shadow on Prah’s (P) solar system and asked him to build the house a few feet over. They didn’t reach an agreement. The subdivision architectural committee and the city planning commission approved Maretti’s (D) plans and planned location for his house. There is some dispute about whether the proposed grade of the property was approved. Prah (P) sued Maretti (D) for injunctive relief and for damages. Prah (P) moved for a temporary injunction, which the court denied. Maretti (D) filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. Prah (P) appealed to the court of appeals which certified the appeal to the Wisconsin supreme court.
- Under the common law, landowners could do whatever they wanted with the surface water on their land even if they damaged adjacent properties. Later laws developed that applied the rules set forth in this case, the common enemy rule and the civil law rule. As this court explains, while these two rules are theoretically polar opposites, in application, courts made exceptions to the rules based on reasonableness. Thus, in essence, all courts apply the reasonable use rule.
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Chapter Twenty–Four. Title Assurance and Other Protections for the Grantee 79 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal from appellate court’s ruling affirming grant of summary judgment against party claiming easement and certification of issue to the Supreme Court.
- Appeal from trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of title insurer.
- ...of all interests in coal, oil, gas or other minerals that have not been used for twenty (20) years. Use, under the statute, includes actual production, payment of rents, royalties or taxes or the filing of a claim in the dormant mineral interest record in the recorder’s office. The Act gave all mineral interest owners two years to file a claim to preserve their interests. The Act was intended to counter the uncertainties in title and impediment to development that unused mineral interests create. Under the Act, a mineral interest not used or claimed of record within twenty (20) years automatically reverts to the surface owner. The trial court concluded that the Act was unconstitutional because, among other things, it believed due process of law required notice and an opportunity to be heard before the interests could be terminated. We disagree. Mineral interests are interests in real estate and have long been considered vested property rights separate and distinct from... ...court...
- ...once owned all of the land at issue. In 1940, Coastal conveyed 390 acres to Bay County, which in turn conveyed it to the Panama City Airport Board. These 390 acres are now owned by the Panama City-Bay County Airport and Industrial District (“Airport”) (D). As a result of Coastal’s transfer of the 390 acres, a small parcel located on a peninsula, approximately eight-tenths of an acre, became water and land-locked. This small parcel, obtained by H&F Land, Inc. (P) in 1992, abuts the Airport’s (D) property. All parties agree that an implied easement by way of necessity was created over the Airport’s (D) property. However, notice of the easement was never filed in the public records or asserted by use. In 1996, 56 years after the easement was created, H&F (P) filed this action asserting for the first time the right to an easement by necessity across the Airport’s (D) land. The Airport (D) filed for summary judgment, arguing that Florida’s Marketable Record Title Act barred the...
- (Ryan, J.) No. Usually a builder-vendor argues that the implied warranty of habitability does not exist and that the long-standing rule of caveat emptor applies such that a purchaser cannot sue the buildervendor for defects. In this case, however, Hubschman (D) argues that the implied warranty of habitability applies, that the house in question is habitable and that therefore Petersen (P) wrongfully ] which stated that the implied warranty of habitability is satisfied where the home keeps the elements out and provides its inhabitants with a reasonably safe place to live. Petersen (P) argues, however, that Hubschman (D) has not substantially performed the contract and he was entitled to repudiate the contract and recover a money judgment. It is Petersen’s (P) position that there is no implied warranty of habitability in this case because a deed was never issued. Although this court has never considered whether the implied warranty of habitability applies in the context of a new home,...
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Chapter Nineteen. Land Use Planning: Eminent Domain and Regulatory Takings 60 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Certification to the United States Supreme Court from the state’s highest court reversal of the trial court’s determination that the Act as applied is unconstitutional.
- Certification to the U.S. Supreme Court from the reversal by the State’s highest court of the trial court’s ruling that there was a taking without compensation.
- This case demonstrates the inner workings of the judicial process. Given the apparent weakness of the majority’s “size” argument, it seems possible that it was not initially included in the opinion. It was probably written only after a draft of Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion was circulated in the Court, which opinion makes light of the insignificance of the taking. Appellate courts invariably operate in this manner so that the varying opinions in any given case do not fail to address the arguments of those of fellow jurists.
- (Souter, J.) Today the Court has placed the burden of producing evidence of relationship on the City (D), despite its usual rule in cases involving the police power that the government is presumed to have acted constitutionally. Having thus assigned the burden, the Court concludes that the City (D) loses based on one word (“could” instead of “would”), and despite the fact that this record shows the connection for which the Court looks.
- (Ginsburg, J.) Today the Court rejects the Rhode Island court’s determination that the case is unripe, finding “no uncertainty as to the [uplands’] permitted use.” This conclusion is both inaccurate and inequitable. Inaccurate because the record is ambiguous. Inequitable because, given the claim asserted by Palazzolo (P) in the Rhode Island courts, the State (D) had no cause to pursue further inquiry into potential upland development.
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Chapter Twelve. Freehold Estates 43 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Eager) (1) No. Although will provisions restraining marriage are generally disfavored, such a provision may be valid where, as in this case, the purpose is to provide support for a single person. In fact, recent case law has created so many exceptions to the general rule against provisions in restraint of marriage that the exceptions are consuming the rule. Searles (D) argued that the Winget decision controls the present case. In , the court held that the marriage provision was valid because its intent was to provide support for the devisee should she remain unmarried. Lewis (P) attempted to distinguish from the present case by arguing that, in , the court heard evidence concerning the circumstances under which the marriage provision was drafted. Lewis (P) argued that without similar evidence here, the court could not uphold the marriage provision. In the present case, however, the wording of the will itself evinces the testatrix’s intent to protect and support Lewis (P). Since...
- In 1960, Leeco Gas [“Leeco”] (P) gave fifty acres to Nueces County [the “County”] (D) by gift deed, with the condition “so long as a public park is constructed and maintained” on the property. The County (D) built and kept a park on the property, but initiated condemnation proceedings against Leeco’s (P) reversionary interest in 1983. Leeco (P) was awarded $10,000 in the condemnation proceedings. Leeco (P) appealed the condemnation commissioners’ decision to county court. The county court entered summary judgment against Leeco (P) on all issues except damages. Although Leeco (P) experts testified at a trial to determine damages that Leeco’s (P) interest was worth $3 to 5 million, the trial court awarded Leeco (P) only $10, designated nominal damages. Leeco (P) appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court decision. Leeco (P) appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, arguing that the County’s (D) knowing acceptance of a deed with a reversionary interest estopped the County (D...
- (Gonzalez, J.) No. Although the County (D) is not estopped from condemning Leeco’s (P) reversionary interest, the possibility that the County (D) would breach the conditions of the deed were not so remote as to justify an award of merely nominal damages. Since the acquisition of land for parks and recreation is a governmental function and since case law establishes that a governmental entity is not subject to estoppel when conducting legitimate governmental functions, the County (D) is not estopped from condemning the land. Resolution of the damages issue, however, requires a longer analysis and ...County’s (D) testimony regarding the park property. The general rule is that “a possibility of reverter has no ascertainable value” when the triggering event is not “probable within a reasonably short period of time.” The court of appeals decision affirming the nominal damages found that the County (D) was unlikely to ever breach the deed conditions while Leeco (P) had its... ...The court...
- This relatively straightforward case clearly illustrates that a court may apply a limitations statute quite strictly to a defeasible fee case. The advantages of this simple analysis are easy to see, especially for grantees who want certainty concerning their interest in a parcel of land. It is important to realize, though, that the possibly short duration of the limitations period means that the grantor may have to keep closer tabs on the grantee’s progress in fulfilling any required conditions or forego the right of reentry and forfeiture. This concern is interesting to consider in the case, although the court did not address it directly. While the court did not find enough evidence to support an allegation that Judge Johnson was unduly influenced in making his original conveyances, the court did note that he was quite elderly at that time. In a jurisdiction where a statute of limitations may cut off a grantor’s suit to terminate the grantee’s estate, it is very important that a...
- (Wynne, C.J.) Yes. Although the language of the 1945 deed to grantee “and his assigns” may create a full fee title, this is not without reasonable doubt such that the purchasers (P) in this case had a right to reject the seller’s (D) deed and recoup their deposits. In common law jurisdictions, like Connecticut, a deed granting title “to grantee ‘and his assigns forever’ vests only a life estate in the grantee.” Deeds where the term “and his heirs” has been left out can be reformed to convey fee simple title if that was the parties’ clear intention. Since the court did not have the parties to the 1945 deed present, it could not determine those parties’ intentions. Although the seller (D) cited many cases indicating that the title was in fact a fee simple, this is not the issue. The more important question is ...P) reasonable doubt about the marketability of the title. In essence, to say as the trial court did, that the purchasers (P) must accept this title, puts the purchasers (P) in...
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Chapter Seven. Unauthorized Possession (Including Adverse Possession) 31 results (showing 5 best matches)
- ...three paintings that she had painted. The parties disagreed with respect to the facts of the case. According to O’Keeffe (P), the paintings were in her possession from the time that she painted them until 1946, when they were stolen from a gallery where they were on display. The paintings were uninsured and the theft was not reported until 1972, when O’Keeffe (P) authorized the reporting of the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. (ADAA), which maintained a registry of stolen paintings. In September of 1975, O’Keeffe (P) learned that the paintings were on display in a New York gallery, and on February 11, 1976, she further discovered that Ulrich A. Frank (D) had sold the paintings to Barry Snyder (D) and the Princeton Gallery of Fine Art the prior year for $35,000. The defendants, Snyder (D) and Frank (D), offered a slightly different view of the facts. According to Frank (D), the paintings were in his family’s possession from as early as 1941, a date prior to...
- Appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (the state’s highest court) of a ruling in favor of Freeland (D) in an action for replevin.
- Appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court of an Appellate Division decision granting summary judgment in favor of a painter who sought the return of some paintings by way of an action for replevin.
- In both cases, a nonowner entered a third-party’s tract of land and harvested timber found thereon, and in both cases the harvested lumber was subsequently converted by someone else not related to the owner of the tract from which the logs were taken. The decisions rendered by the courts, however, are very different in their results. In the Minnesota court held that one who has acquired possession of property, by whatever means, has a right to retain that possession against all but the rightful owner. In the court ruled that Russell (P) could not recover because he could not show good title to the timber, something that Anderson could not but was not required to do. Why the discrepancy? The difference possibly lies in the nature of the actions filed in the two cases.
- The court’s decision in ...repossession of property cannot be used to circumvent the effect of the statute of limitations. For example, if X takes Y’s television set without Y’s permission and keeps it for the duration of the limitations period for replevin actions, and Y, who knows about it, chooses to do nothing to get his television back, he cannot enter X’s home after the statute has run and take the set back. When the limitations period runs, Y no longer has any legal right to take the television back and any repossession of it will be a theft. The same is true of Freeland’s (D) counters in the present case. Chapin (P) gained ownership of and title to the counters when he purchased them from someone who had possessed them for the duration of the limitations period, and therefore any claim of right that Freeland (D) might have had to the counters was extinguished. The dissent disagrees with this outcome, and would hold that the running of the statute of limitations, while...
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Chapter Thirteen. Future Interests 64 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Schwab) (1) Yes. (2) Yes. (3) No. We must first determine the nature of the estate that passed to the City (P) under the deed from the corporation. The “magic” words “so long as” have generally been held to create a fee simple on a special limitation, also known as a fee simple determinable, or a base or qualified fee. Other common words used to create such an estate are “until” or “during,” or any other language that indicates an intent that the estate shall automatically end upon the occurrence of a designated event (i.e., a breach of condition.) Upon breach of the condition, the deed provided for a gift over to Schallock and Daggett, or their heirs and assigns. This gift over was an attempt to grant an executory interest since only an executory interest can follow an earlier grant in fee simple. However, the trial court correctly found that the gift over to Schallock and Daggett, their heirs and assigns, was void ...simple on a special limitation, the courts do not create an...
- .... This case of first impression requires us to determine whether a lease amendment, which provides for perpetual options to renew, is void because it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. Until it adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities in 1991, California law applied the Rule Against Perpetuities to commercial transactions, including options to renew. Now, under the Uniform Statutory Rule, commercial, nondonative transactions are expressly exempt from the Rule. The Rule provides: “A nonvested property interest is invalid unless one of the following conditions is satisfied: (a) When the interest is created, it is certain to vest or terminate no later than 21 years after the death of an individual then alive. (b) The interest either vests or terminates with 90 years after its creation.” The common law policy favoring alienation of property led to the establishing of the Rule Against Perpetuities—“No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than...
- ...executory interest, but instead is a racial restriction in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The covenant or agreement under consideration was dated May 9, 1942 and provided that the signatories to the contract agreed for themselves, their heirs, and assigns “not to sell or lease [the lots] to any colored person or persons, and covenant and agree not to permit any colored person or persons to occupy said premises during the period from this date to January 1, 1990.” It further provided that if any of the lots were conveyed or leased in violation of the agreement, the right, title or interest of the owner so in violation of the agreement would “be forfeited to and rest in such of the then owners of all of said lots and parcels of land not included in the conveyance or lease who may assert title thereto by filing for record notice of their claim.” Counsel for the owners of the other lots and interested financial institutions (D) contend that prior U.S. Supreme Court... ...cases...
- In this case, we learn about the legendary Rule In Shelley’s Case. Although at least thirty-nine states have abolished the Rule, the Texas Legislature had not done so at the time this case was decided. Texas finally abolished the Rule in 1964. The Rule’s name comes from the old English case of (1581), which provided that when a will or deed gave a remainder to the “heirs” of a person who received a prior freehold estate by the same will or deed, that person also took the remainder. Simply put, although a deed or will “to A for life, and then to his heirs” creates a remainder in A’s heirs, the Rule shifts the remainder interest to A, the heirs’ ancestor. The issue in this case was whether the words “heirs of his body” were used in their technical sense, which the court held they were. If the will had said to Fred’s children, the Rule would not apply, since the language applied to specific persons, rather than heirs in general.
- COURT MUST APPLY THE RULE IN SHELLEY’S CASE EVEN IF ITS APPLICATION IS CONTRARY TO THE INTENTION OF THE TESTATORS
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Chapter Four. Role of Property in Society 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Certification to the U.S. Supreme Court of two constitutionally-based challenges to judicial enforcement of a race-based restrictive covenants after the states’ highest courts found the covenants enforceable.
- (Vinson, Ch.J.) Yes. This is a question with which this Court has not yet dealt. It cannot be doubted that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the Framers as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to guarantee. Thus, § 1978 of the Revised Statutes, from § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, provides: “All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” It is likewise clear that restrictions like the one sought to be created by the private agreements in these cases could not be squared with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state statute or local ordinance. But this is not the case here; these agreements do...
- A court sometimes attempts to take the easy way out when dealing with a controversial subject. When one of the cases here was before the trial court in Missouri, that court, rather than deal with the racial segregation/discrimination issue directly, instead chose not to enforce the covenant on the ground that its formation was procedurally defective, it lacked all signatures and was therefore void. The Missouri Supreme Court chose to not follow the trial court’s approach, choosing instead to decide the case on its merits, but it got the answer wrong, according to the U.S. Supreme Court. What other avenues might a court have relied upon to provide Shelley (P) the relief sought? One possibility may have been to refuse to enforce the restrictive covenant on the ground that it was against public policy. This decision occurred long before the civil rights movement of the 1960s, but there were expressions of public policy upon which the court might have relied. On the other hand, at the...
- [This opinion involves two cases appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court from the respective states’ highest court.] On February 16, 1911, thirty of thirty-nine owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue in the city of Saint Louis signed an agreement which, for fifty years henceforth, restricted the owners of the district from allowing their lots to be purchased or occupied by any minorities, particularly “people of the Negro or Mongolian Race [s].” The entire district included fiftyseven parcels of land with the thirty owner-signatories holding title to forty-seven. At the time of the agreement, five of the parcels were owned by Negroes, one of which had been occupied since 1882. The trial court found that seven of the nine southside owners had failed to sign the covenant in 1911. On August 11, 1945, the Shelleys (P), who are Negroes, received from the Fitzgeralds and for valuable consideration a warranty deed to the parcel in question. On October 9, 1945, Kraemer (R) and...
- What the Court basically says here is that when North America was “discovered” by the Europeans, the discoverers gained title to the entirety of the discovered land, subject only to the right of Native Americans to occupy the land. The European sovereigns, or the United States, could gain actual possession of Native American-occupied land by either purchasing occupation rights from them or by conquering them and pushing them aside. In either case, the Native Americans could not transfer title to the lands they occupied to any person or entity other than the United States or the several states. In other words, proper legal title of land owned by Native Americans can be gained only through and from the government. What is obviously ignored here, however, is the falsity of the idea that Europeans discovered the New World. The underlying suggestion, touched upon in the Court’s somewhat rambling opinion, is that true power flows from the barrel of a gun.
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Chapter Twenty–One. Real Estate Contract 129 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal from trial court judgment granting motion for summary judgment in action for rescission and recovery of earnest money.
- [relief from forfeiture], a party who incurs a forfeiture due to default on a contract may avoid forfeiture by fully compensating the other party, “except in case of grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty.” Under [prevents enforcement of forfeiture] a court may not grant specific or preventive relief to enforce a penalty or forfeiture. Whether these code sections apply here depends on how the California courts have construed them. Early cases either overlooked or ignored these code sections and applied a strict rule of forfeiture against defaulting buyers under contracts that made time of the essence. For [restitution requires surprise, mistake or fraud], with no reference to these code sections, established that a defaulting buyer could only recover restitution of payments made upon an equitable showing of surprise, mistake, or fraud. Courts also quieted title against defaulting buyers without requiring restitution of payments made. However, courts did...
- ...ice storm destroyed a substantial part of the land constituting the subject matter of the contract while it was still executory. While the parties may have provided in the contract for who should bear the risk of loss in such a case, they did not do so. The majority rule, established in England in 1801, is that after the parties execute a contract for the sale of realty, the buyer bears the risk of loss. This rule is based on the principle that the contract gives the buyer ownership of the land, while, during the gap before performance, the seller retains possession, rents and profits, and legal title as security for the purchase money. Under the rule, for example, the buyer is entitled to the proceeds from condemnation proceedings. However, this rule does not apply unless the seller is willing and able to convey the property. The buyer is not the owner from the contract date unless the seller is prepared to convey clear title and is not in default. The minority view in this...
- (Wilkins) No. The states are divided over whether out-of-pocket loss or benefit-of-the-bargain damages are the appropriate measure of damages for a breach of contract for the sale of land. Some award benefit-of-the-bargain damages only when the breaching party acted in bad faith, while others award them whether the breach was in good faith or bad faith. Smith (D) argues that, although Utah has not expressly taken a position on this issue, case law does indicate that the good faith-bad faith distinction applies. Since the trial court found that he acted in good faith, Smith (D) argues that out-of-pocket loss is the correct measure of damages. However, the case law on which Smith (D) relies does not support his position, and in fact indicates that courts have awarded benefit-of-the-bargain damages regardless of good faith. Even in cases where the court awarded only out-of-pocket losses, the court noted that these were the only damages the buyers sought, and that benefit-of-the-bargain...
- This case discusses some remedies available when a buyer defaults on an installment contract. In the past, courts would enforce forfeiture clauses, so upon default the buyer could lose not only the property but also everything he already paid under the contract. Sometimes the court would permit the buyer a period of time to pay the remainder due on the contract, accelerating the due date so that all the remaining principal and interest were due at once. If the buyer could not make the payment on time, the court would enforce the forfeiture and title would go to the seller. As courts began to recognize the injustice that often resulted from forfeitures, they began to use other remedies. One, preferred by the seller here, was restitution. This remedy would mean that the seller would get to keep the property and any payments made to the extent of the fair rental value of the property for the time the buyer had possession of it. If the payments exceeded this fair rental value, the...
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Chapter One. What is Property? 12 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Ninth Circuit review of the federal district court’s grant of summary judgment in the defendant’s favor.
- Having had no success collecting from Cohen (D), Kremen (P) sought another liable party—Network Solutions (D), the domain name registrar. Kremen (P) sued Network Solutions (D) for breach of contract, violations of Network Solutions’ (D) cooperative agreement with the National Science Foundation (NSF), violation of his property rights, and the tort of conversion. The trial court granted Network Solutions’ (D) motion for summary judgment on all counts, and Kremen (P) appealed.
- In other recent California cases, the courts recognized the tort of trespass to chattels in intangible property cases involving telecommunications and electronic commerce. Trespass to chattels is a lesser form of conversion, arising when an intentional interference with the possession of personal property proximately causes injury to the plaintiff. Although trespass to chattels originally required physical contact with another’s property, these decisions determined that electronic signals touching a server or telephone system were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action. It is unlikely, however, that the court in this case would have been willing to recognize a trespass to chattels claim under the facts presented, unless a physical locus, such as a server, existed that could be trespassed by electronic signals. Cohen (D) did not trespass on Kremen’s (P) server with electronic signals; rather, he usurped Kremen’s (P) domain name and used his own servers to create...
- The conversion-by-bailee claim is not separate from the conversion claim, but the complaint states a viable claim for conversion, so the district court’s judgment is reversed as to that count and the case remanded.
- Appeal by Defendants to the State Supreme Court after the Appeals Court ruled that a cause of action in conversion was properly plead and could be sustained under the law.
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Chapter Two. Attributes of Property 16 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Appeal from a court of appeals decision affirming summary judgment for the plaintiff.
- Hamidi (D) was formerly employed by Intel Corp. (P), which maintained an electronic mail system for communicating with internal employees and others outside the company. On numerous occasions, from his home computer, Hamidi (D) used the mail system to deliver to other employees messages critical of Intel’s (P) employment practices, without breaching company security or causing physical damage to any computer. Hamidi (D) refrained from sending such messages to any Intel (P) employee wishing not to receive the messages, but substantial discussion and conversation resulted among Intel (P) employees. Intel (P) sued Hamidi (D) for trespass to chattels. The trial court granted Intel’s (P) motion for summary judgment to enjoin Hamidi (D) from sending further communications, and the court of appeals affirmed. Hamidi (D) appealed to the California Supreme Court.
- Property rights are rarely absolute. Instead, they tend to be overshadowed by the courts’ judgment of what the public interest requires. The Supreme Court often allows intrusion on private property that has been historically a “public forum” (e.g., campuses, streets) to promote free speech and assembly. In each case, the court weighs the interests of the landowner (in privacy, productivity, and security) against the public interest. While a few courts still believe that owners have the right to do almost anything they want with their property, most courts consider the effect on the public interest.
- AMICUS CURIAE: (“Friend of the court.”) In litigation, a non-party who files a supplementary “amicus” brief on behalf of a party, because the non-party (usually a government agency or interest group) has an interest in the case’s outcome and precedent.
- (Stewart) Yes. Congress may ban private owners from racially discriminatory sale of their property. I. This case does not implicate the a detailed law which prevents discrimination in many situations, including housing. II. Prior case law held [state court cannot enforce private agreement to not sell houses to blacks]. Yet this is the first time we consider whether
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Chapter Fourteen. Concurrent Ownership 66 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Motion for summary judgment in trial court in action for specific performance of real estate purchase agreement and liquidated damages.
- In the previous case, possession of a mineral estate was at issue. Here, it is possession of a common interest. In both cases, adverse possession is possible, but the bar is substantially higher than for ordinary adverse possessors. To possess common property adverse to other cotenants, one must put them on notice that the possession is adverse. This essentially requires a showing that the other cotenants had actual notice that the possession was adverse. Thus, unless there is no reason to suspect that cotenancy exists, or where a good faith effort has been made to notify other cotenants or the other cotenants have actual knowledge that the possession is adverse, one cotenant in possession cannot adversely possess the interests of his other cotenants. The difficulty with these special estates and adverse possession has led some states to enact statutes completely prohibiting the adverse possession of an unusual or unique estate like a cotenancy. Others, like New York, require that...
- Condominium association rules and restrictions generally pertain to maintenance, prohibited activities, budgets, and, as in this case, restrictions on transfers of individual units. The pre-emptive right generally afforded associations gives a right of first refusal when an owner indicates an intent to sell a unit. The association is generally given the right to match the purchase price. This type of restraint on alienation has been upheld by the courts. In this case, the association (P) unsuccessfully argued that the reverter clause was the equivalent of a pre-emptive right, and therefore lawful. The court rejected the argument because the reverter clause did not require the association (P) to compensate the unit owner within a reasonable time after it withholds consent. The court noted that a potential purchaser would not be willing to purchase the property without the association’s (P) consent, if apprised that consent is required, and without it, the sale is void. Thus, under...
- The court here concluded that Oklahoma’s slayer statute required it to hold that a joint tenancy is terminated by murder by one joint tenant of the other joint tenant. A tenancy in common is thereupon created, whereby one-half of the property goes to the heirs of the murdered joint tenant and the other one-half to the murderer, or heirs when deceased. The court mentioned the various ways that different states address the issue presented by murder of one joint tenant by the other. It is interesting that the Oklahoma Supreme Court found it “inconceivable” that Duncan (P) could not have known about his daughter’s murder at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed to him, nevertheless, it remanded the case to the trial court to give him the opportunity to prove that he was a bona fide innocent purchaser for value, at the same time indicating how judgment should be entered if he was unable to so prove.
- This condominium case requires some basic understanding of tort liability. The decision by the trial court was that pro rata liability was appropriate, thus limiting the damages imposed against Dutcher (D) to his specific ownership interest in the common elements (i.e., 1.572%). The court of appeals, however, held that joint and several liability was the appropriate means of imposing liability, thus potentially requiring Dutcher (D) to pay the entire judgment. In other words, a plaintiff can be made whole and collect the judgment from just one defendant. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In so doing, it acknowledged the two forms of ownership that exist in condominiums: a fee simple in the particular unit and a tenancy in common among the co-owners of the common elements. The court also based its holding on the degree of control (or lack thereof) that a co-owner has in the common areas. Clearly Dutcher (D), living in...
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Chapter Twenty. Exclusionary Zoning 31 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (Batchelder, J.) 1) No. 2) Yes. The Town (D) argues first that the Ordinance does not exceed the powers allowed under the Act, as the trial court ruled. Specifically, the Town (D) asserts that the Act does not require it to zone for the low-income housing needs of the region beyond its boundaries, and further, that even if it were required to consider regional housing needs, the Ordinance is valid because it provides for an adequate range of housing types. These arguments fail to persuade us. The Act authorizes a local legislative body to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance in order to promote “the general welfare of the community.” The Town (D) asserts that the term “community” as used in the Act refers only to the municipality itself. We disagree. This Court has previously held that growth controls must not be imposed simply to exclude outsiders, especially those of any disadvantaged social or economic group, because each municipality should bear its fair share of the burden of...
- ...action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes for rarely can it be said that a decision was motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the “dominant” or “primary” one. In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial discrimination is not just another competing consideration. When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified. Determining whether such an intent or purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action may provide an important starting point for sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges. However, absent such...
- THE HIGH COURT CLARIFIES THE RULES WITH RESPECT TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
- only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Similar oversight is due when a law impinges on personal rights protected by the Constitution. Classifications based on gender also call for heightened review, but we have declined to extend such review to different treatment based on age. His is because, even though the aged have not been completely free of discrimination, such persons have not experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. One lesson we’ve learned is where individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational...
- A claimed violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will normally draw rational basis review from the Court. This is the most lax type of review a court can apply. But given that MHDC (R) was claiming racial discrimination, why did the Court not apply strict scrutiny? The answer to this question is the central theme of the case. When a court applies strict scrutiny the result is usually a declaration that the challenged governmental action is unconstitutional. There are, however, numerous instances where some action, for whatever non-discriminatory reasons, results in a disparate impact on a racial minority. Were strict scrutiny to be applied in each instance, the vast majority of such governmental actions would be invalidated, in spite of all the nondiscriminatory reasons undergirding the action. Rather than allow such a situation the Court chose instead to require a showing that the action is motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory purpose or...
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Chapter Three. Objects and Classifications of Property 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
- INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL: Appeal of a non-final court decision in the case. For example, an appeal challenging the court’s ruling that certain evidence is inadmissible; the ruling does not end the case, but of course may influence it.
- (Stanley) Yes. Courts may order surveying of a cave, if there is evidence that it passes under another’s land. Since case law on caves is sparse, we turn to mining law. The ancient rule is that landowners are entitled to the unfettered control of their land above, on, and beneath the surface, under the maxim “to whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths.” Thus, whatever is in a direct line between the land’s surface, down to the earth’s center, and up into space, belongs to the land’s surface’s owner. Ordinarily, that ownership cannot be infringed. However, there are limitations on any owner’s right to use his property, such as when its use harms a neighbor or burdens adjoining land. Under mining law, courts may compel surveys to reveal whether mining trespasses on adjoining land, as long as the plaintiff sues in good faith and presents evidence suggesting trespass, and the defendant has opportunity to be heard. We will apply this analogous law here....
- This case illustrates the traditional rule that, when you buy land, you also acquire the airspace above it (to some degree) and all underground land below it, straight to Earth’s core. Lawyers would say that, when you buy “surface rights,” you also get rights to the “air” and “subsurface.” Such rights can also be divided. For example, you can build a house on the surface, but sell subsurface rights to a mining company. This issue comes up in mining disputes, when a mineral vein can run under two owners’ property. In this case, each owns the portion directly under his land.
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- Separate lawsuit seeking injunction against court-ordered survey from prior suit.
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Chapter Sixteen. Easements, Covenants, Servitudes, and Related Interests 76 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The Hays (D) owned an ocean-front resort on Cannon Beach. They built a fence around the “drysand” area [the area between the high tide point and the vegetation line] in front of their resort for use only by resort guests. The area was included in the legal description of the Hays’ (D) property. The State of Oregon (Oregon) (P) sued them for specific performance to prevent them from building a fence or other improvements on that area. Oregon (P) claimed either that the public had an easement over the area or that Oregon (P) had the power to prevent the construction pursuant to its zoning laws. The Hays (D) agreed that the area lying seaward of the high tide line, the wetland area, was state recreation area. The trial court found that the public had acquired an easement for recreational purposes on the dry-sand area. The Hays (D) appealed.
- This case succinctly explains the implied easement by prior use doctrine. However, not all courts agree with this doctrine. Some courts have held that easements may not be implied because they violate the statute of frauds and recording laws. Other courts hold that necessity should be looked at only at the time the parcel is sold. Also at issue in this chapter is whether easements can be implied for sewers, utilities, and views.
- McMillan and others (collectively McMillan) (P) owned lots in a subdivision. Iserman (D) also owned a lot and contracted with Alternate Living Programs and Health Assistance, Inc. (ALPHA) (D) to build a state-licensed group residential facility. In 1958, a restrictive covenant was included in the deeds for the subdivision providing that a vote by 3/4 of the property owners in the subdivision could amend the deed restrictions at any time. After Iserman (D) bought his property and contracted with ALPHA (D), 3/4 of the owners agreed to restrict such facilities. McMillan (P) sued Iserman (D) for an injunction, claiming the facility would violate the amended deed restriction. Iserman (D) filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the deed restriction discriminated against mentally impaired people and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial court granted the motion. McMillan (P) appealed. Iserman (D) also appealed, challenging the court’s...
- Most American law is created by legislation or the courts, but here it was based on the fact that the public had been doing something for generations. Custom as a basis for creating easements has passed federal constitutional scrutiny. After this case, the Hays (D) argued in federal court that the outcome here constituted a taking of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. However, the court ruled against them. Nonetheless, the doctrine of custom has not necessarily been followed, and has been criticized. Other courts have allowed the public to use beaches based on implied dedication. But, as the court in stated, for dedication, the landowner’s intent is required. Some courts infer that intent from the landowner’s apparent acquiescence while the public uses the beach. Why didn’t the court here base its decision on easement by prescription? An easement by prescription would apply only to the land at issue in the suit, and would not apply to all of Oregon’s beaches. Thus...
- It makes sense that judicial action should be considered state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. It certainly is considered state action for procedural purposes. Otherwise, state courts could discriminate against and deny certain races due process of law. However, here, the Court takes a further leap and holds that, while private citizens are free to discriminate with impunity, they cannot use the courts to enforce their discrimination. The breadth of this holding is potentially infinite. Nearly all private activity can be made the subject of a court case. However, the Court has not extended the holding of the court skirted the Fourteenth Amendment issue to determine that land owners could not prohibit a neighbor from building a home for mentally handicapped people pursuant to a restrictive covenant.
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Chapter Eight. Improving Another’s Property by Mistake (Accession) 15 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This particular case presents some of the interesting policy issues that have to be weighed in cases arguably involving the doctrine of title by accession. In this case, Burroughs’s (D) right to decide what structures were to be built on his land was taken away from him by the court’s decision. Burroughs (D) was ordered either to pay for the value of the house or sell the land to Hardy (P). But what if Burroughs (D) did not have enough money to pay for the entire house? That would leave him no choice but to sell the land to make good on the debt the court says was owed for the construction of the house that he did not ask to be built. Is it appropriate for the court to order, in such a case, the owner to sell his land to another person? What if the land had some sort of sentimental value that could not be recouped by means or a sale price? Is it fair, in that situation, to order the sale of the land? At least one judge didn’t think so. In ...case with similar facts, Judge Caplan,...
- court determined that the doctrine of title by accession applied to the dispute between Wetherbee and Green for two reasons: (1) the nature of the converted property was different enough from that of the original property that the original timber could not simply be retaken; and (2) there was such a great disparity in value between the pre-conversion and post-conversion property that it would have been unfair to allow Green to take the hoops in payment for his lost timber. In this case, written by the same Justice Cooley (now Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court), the court does not address the degree of change in the property, but focuses solely on the disparity or lack of disparity in value between the standing timber and the cord wood produced by Hertin’s (P) labor. Specifically, the court determines that there is “no such disparity in value between the standing trees and the cord wood … as was found to exist between the trees and the hoops in ...not apply in this case...
- DEFENDANTS IN ERROR: An archaic term for the party who, in a case that has been appealed, prevailed in the lower court.
- ....) Yes. As a general rule, one whose property has been appropriated by another without authority has a right to follow and recover it; and if, in the meantime, it has been increased in value by the addition of labor or money, the owner may still reclaim it. There must, however, be some limit to the right to follow and reclaim materials which have undergone a process of manufacture. According to Justice Blackstone, that limit is reached when the converted property is changed into a different species of property. In those instances, if the conversion is made in good faith and is not an intentional wrong, the party appropriating the property is only required to make satisfaction to the former owner for the materials converted, and not to turn over the newly-converted property. In this case, the important question appears to be whether the standing trees, when cut and manufactured into hoops, are to be regarded as so far changed in character that their identity has been destroyed. It...
- introduces the doctrine of title by accession, which doctrine holds that a trespasser who has in good faith expended his own labor upon converted property can gain title to the converted property when the circumstances are such that it would be grossly unjust to permit the true owner to receive the full benefit of that labor. In this case, the court determined that the doctrine applied for two reasons: (1) the nature of the converted property was different enough from that of the original property that the original timber could not simply be retaken; and (2) there was such a great disparity in value between the standing timber and the hoops that Wetherbee (D) had made (the pre-conversion and post-conversion property) that it would have been unfair to allow Green (P) to take the hoops in payment for his lost timber. Justice Cooley wrote: “[To] inflict upon a person who has taken the property of another, a penalty equal to twenty or thirty times its value, and to compensate the owner...
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Chapter Five. Finding 32 results (showing 5 best matches)
- was based on the landowner’s control over the land he possessed. The court there reasoned that since the landowner had the right to exclude others and prevent their interference with things on his land, he had control over the things on his land and therefore was presumed to have possession of them. While here the court described as focusing on the fact that the finder was the landowner’s servant, the real basis for the decision was the landowner’s control of his land. It is also on this basis that the court actually decides this case and distinguishes it from did. The house in this case was under the control of the troops that occupied it. Since Peel (D), though the owner of the house, exercised little, if any, control over it, the court found the case more akin to
- This case limits There, a lost bracelet was found in an airline’s executive lounge. The lounge was not entirely private or entirely public. The airline permitted certain categories of people and excluded others, based on membership or ticket status. The court decided the case based on the type of control the airline exercised. Since the airline did not assert control over lost articles, the court decided that any articles found should belong to the finder rather than the airline. This result is appropriate in light of the semi-public nature of the lounge. Any passenger with a firstclass ticket or membership in the club was invited to enter the lounge. The exclusion of certain categories of people is not as important as the invitation to other categories of people to come and go freely.
- To acquire title by occupancy over a thing, a person must both intend to exert exclusive control over it and actually do so. Intent and actual possession must occur together. This case demonstrates that simply manifesting an intent to possess (using buoys to mark the wreck) is not an act of possession. And as the court stated in for example, the court stated that it would suffice if Brazelton (P) put his boat over the wreck with means to raise the lead, and made efforts to do so. This makes good policy sense in the shipwreck salvaging context, since it would hardly encourage people to go to all the trouble and expense to recover shipwrecks if someone else could come along and grab the goods after they had done most of the recovery work, but before they had complete control. The general rule is that the degree of control possession requires as much control as the nature of the goods and the situation permit, considering the customs and practices of the industry.
- is distinguishable. In that case, the property was not voluntarily placed somewhere and then forgotten. Rather, in that case, the property was lost. In this case, since the property was not lost but mislaid, McAvoy (P) can claim no title. Judgment affirmed.
- Appeal from decision by court of appeals reversing judgment of trial court in action to recover property and damages.
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Chapter Ten. Transfers of Ownership by Gift 28 results (showing 5 best matches)
- IN RE “[In the] matter of.” Used to introduce cases in certain specialty courts. E.g., probate court.
- showed that, while inter vivos (living) gifts should ideally involve transfer on the spot, courts will sometimes recognize a valid transfer even when the item is not delivered immediately. This case goes one step further, holding that a current promise to transfer an item is valid, even if the transfer does not happen until the donor’s death. Note that this comes very close to violating the maxim that promises to give a gift later are not valid. Of course, in practice, there is little difference between the future promise and the promise in this case.
- In probate action, summary judgement for plaintiff, affirmed on appeal, appealed again.
- [dying woman’s note to ex-husband to take property she stashed in the house they share is not valid “delivery”], (ii) a suicide’s gift causa mortis is invalid, because the person retains control of the peril, and (iii) there was no acceptance. At trial, Scherer (P) won summary judgement. On appeal, the court affirmed. Executor (D) appeals again.
- This case illustrates the ancient doctrine of gifts causa mortis, which essentially allows deathbed transfers to be valid without a will’s formalities. However, this is a rare exception to the statute of wills, and thus the gift must meet many strict requirements to be valid. The most contentious of these requirements is delivery. As the dissent indicates, state courts are split on this rule. The majority impose stricter definitions of delivery for such deathbed gifts than for living gifts, perhaps to discourage challenges, which are difficult to prove once the donor is dead. However, this requirement can have the effect of invalidating the dying person’s intent, as seems to be the case here.
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Chapter Six. Creation of Bailments 4 results
- (Harbison) Yes. Several courts have struggled with the legal relationship created in park-and-lock cases. In one leading case, [no bailment is created between a garage owner and its customer, but the garage owner does have a duty of reasonable care], the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that rather than consider the possession and control elements in the context of bailment, it was more useful to consider them in defining the duty of care of a garage operator to its customers. The Court found that garage owners are usually better situated to protect the parked car and to distribute the cost of protection through parking fees. Further, the Court found that owners usually expect to receive their cars back in the same condition in which they left them. ...and the expectations of the car owners, the Court concluded that operators of parking garages have a duty of reasonable care to their customers. Since proof of negligence would be difficult because the car owner is generally...
- Appeal from judgment of appellate court after trial court judgment in negligence action for damages.
- The reason the designation of the relationship between the parking garage and its customers as a bailment is so significant is that it provides the bailor who sustains a loss with a presumption of negligence. In most cases, to overcome this presumption the bailee must prove that the loss did not result from his negligence. Even if he manages to do this, the case is not over, the bailee only succeeds in removing the presumption and shifting the burden back to the bailor. In some cases, a bailment may also give rise to strict liability. As explained in
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Chapter Twenty–Two. The Deed 42 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In 1949, Parr (P) conveyed land to Worley (D). The deed described the land conveyed as lying to the east of the highway, and containing 25 acres, more or less. The actual area of the land was 25.80 acres if measured from the eastern edge of the highway, and 31.57 acres if measured from the center of the highway. Parr (P) tried to convey the mineral interests under the highway to a third party. He also recorded mineral leases covering the land under the highway. Parr (P) sued Worley (D) to quiet title. Worley (D) counterclaimed to quiet title in himself. Parr (P) argued that he owned all the land under the highway; Worley (D) argued that he owned the land up to the middle of the highway. Parr (P) filed a summary judgment motion, which the court granted.
- This case contradicts to a certain extent. In that case, the court held that if a deed’s granting clause conflicts with other parts of the deed and the parties’ intent cannot be determined, the estate conveyed in the granting clause should prevail. However, here, there was evidence of the parties’ intent. Mae (D) argued that A.J. and Minerva said that they were going to convey the property to both G.P. and Mae (D). And the court added its own suggestion that only a wife would be able to take care of the elderly couple. Thus, we see that the rule of construction providing that the granting clause prevails has been increasingly rejected. Indeed, most canons of construction yield to evidence of the parties’ intent. Most courts today look at the parties’ intent based on the language of the deed itself and extrinsic evidence.
- It’s a common occurrence for a deed to be poorly drafted and confusing. Thus, this case sets forth various rules of construction that help determine how an ambiguous deed should be interpreted. First and foremost, the court should look at the parties’ intent. Where, as here, the parties are dead and no evidence of their intent is available, the larger estate should be granted. Thus, the grantee usually wins. This makes sense when you consider that the grantor usually drafts the deed, and ambiguities in a document are usually interpreted against the drafter. However, if a deed is so ambiguous, a court may declare it void. In , the court did not apply the rule of construction applied by this court, i.e., that the estate conveyed in the granting clause prevails.
- Courts are about evenly split on the issue in this case. About half the courts have abolished the common law rule prohibiting reserving title for third parties and about half still follow it. The common law prohibition may easily be circumvented if the grantor conveys the easement to the third party first and then conveys the property to the grantee in a separate deed. The court concluded that the common law rule protects the rights of bona fide purchasers and avoids conflicts of ownership. But the question remains that if the common law rule can be circumvented so easily, why keep it? Although this procedure avoids frustrating the grantor’s intent, there is no reason to force the grantor to do in two steps what could otherwise be done in one. The common law seems to function as an obstacle to conveying interests in land, but this is not a function consistent with the modern preference for effecting the grantor’s clear intent.
- Appeal of summary judgment granted in action to quiet title.
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Chapter Twenty–Three. Systems for Recording Property Transfer 39 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Recording an invalid deed does not make it valid. But what about the innocent third party who relied on the recorded deed and assumed it was valid? In this case the court held that the b.f.p. (bona fide purchaser) was out of luck. Different states have different statutes regarding the legal effect of deeds that do not comply with the recording statutes. For example, the North Dakota court held in that a recorded deed that was not properly acknowledged did not give proper notice to a.b.f.p. On the other hand, the Indiana court in
- Here the court held that $5 and love and affection was adequate consideration to protect Josephine and her subsequent grantees under the recording laws. This case is an exception. Most courts hold that love and affection or a familial relationship is insufficient consideration to make one a bona fide purchaser for value. While the consideration does not have to equal the property’s market value, nominal consideration or a mere recital of consideration in the deed is not sufficient. Most courts also protect grantees under a quitclaim deed, despite the fact that a quitclaim deed conveys only the interest the grantor actually owns, if any. Buyers of land who discover a prior unrecorded conveyance and who are paying the purchase price in installments are usually protected on a pro tanto basis, i.e., only to the extent of the payments made before they received notice.
- (Folta, J.) Yes. Courts differ on this issue, and one case 76 years ago held that indexing was not a part of the record. However, I believe that all the steps combined, including indexing, constitute registration. As the number of deeds increases, the only practical way to give notice is through the index. It is unreasonable to require potential buyers to examine every page of many volumes. In addition, to hold otherwise would be to deny the statute requiring that an index be maintained. One case rendered 76 years ago, when now life is faster and the population is more transient, should not control. I hold that the failure to index the deed to Anglin was insufficient to give constructive notice to Lingo (D).
- There are three main types of recording acts. In a pure race jurisdiction, as in the case here, the holder of the first recorded instrument prevails, even if he or she is not a bona fide purchaser (b.f.p.). In a race notice jurisdiction, the holder of the second instrument prevails if he or she is a b.f.p. and records first. In a pure notice jurisdiction, the holder of the second instrument prevails if he or she is a b.f.p. While these are the three general types of recording acts, note that the language of a specific state’s statute controls, subject to any court interpretation.
- A recorder’s office may have thousands of volumes of recorded deeds. Thus, some type of index is necessary to sort through the volumes. Most states have a “name index” system where two indexes are maintained. One is by the name of the grantor and one is by the name of the grantee. A few states maintain a tract or parcel index, which sets forth the chain of title of each tract of land. Thus, if the deed had been properly indexed in a name index in this case, Lingo (D) could have looked in the grantor index for the name of his grantor, McCain, and been referred to the book and page number of the deed book where the deed to Anglin could be found. The search procedure is usually begun by .... The searcher then looks up each grantor in the grantor index to see if any of them conveyed the property to someone other than a grantee discovered in the grantee index. All the deeds in the chain of title must then be examined to determine whether they are proper. Many courts, however, hold...
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Chapter Nine. Bona Fide Purchase 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Motion for summary judgment seeking declaratory relief in dispute over ownership of property.
- Equitable estoppel precludes a party from denying a material fact that he has induced another, excusably ignorant of the true facts, to rely upon. Thus, if an owner invests another with indicia of ownership or apparent authority to sell his property, such that a bona fide purchaser would be induced to rely upon that apparent ownership or authority, equitable estoppel will preclude the owner from denying the other’s authority to sell, and he will not be able to recover against the bona fide purchaser. However, as this case shows, merely transferring possession is not enough to induce reliance by a bona fide purchaser. For equitable estoppel to bar recovery, the owner must be blameworthy in inducing reliance, the buyer must be innocent and excusably ignorant. Here, neither was the case. ...not only to decline to inquire into the ownership of works of art, but even to withhold details about ownership. The court found this commercial standard unreasonably low, and therefore refused...case
- [defines good faith] “good faith” in the case of a merchant includes both “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.” Good faith cannot permit indifference as to the history of ownership or the right to possess or sell an object d’art. Feigen (D) did not confirm or even investigate whether Wertz (D) was an art merchant, and made no effort to verify whether Wertz (D) owned the Utrillo or was authorized by the owner to sell it. Feigen’s (D) employee had a catalogue of the artist’s work that would have raised a doubt as to Wertz’s (D) right of possession, calling for further verification before completing the purchase, but the employee made no inquiry. Thus, Feigen (D) was not a buyer in the ordinary course of business, and the trial court correctly concluded that statutory estoppel was not a defense available to Feigen (D). (2) No. We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that equitable estoppel bars recovery. The Court...
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- This case illustrates the ancient right of escheat, which holds that, since land was originally granted by the Crown/State, the government automatically reclaims it if the land “owner” lacks heirs. Originally, escheat occurred because the Norman (French) King William, after conquering the Saxons (English) by force, announced that he was now sole owner of all land in England, but would essentially give select families the right to live there. However, it was thought that, if the original family died out, they had no further claim to the land, and the king should be free to reassign it. This case demonstrates that, as antiquated as this notion may be, it is still the law. However, its holding on the secondary issue—whether inheritance taxes must be paid on escheated property—is not definitive; other cases have held otherwise.
- CASE VOCABULARY
- PROBATED: Litigated in probate (will/inheritance) court.
- Nebraska landowner O’Connor died, without a will or heirs. Thus, O’Connor’s land escheated to Nebraska (D), by law. Adams County (P), where the property was apparently located, sued Nebraska (D) to collect an inheritance tax, contending the escheat is a taxable transfer. Nebraska (D) defended, claiming escheat is different from a taxable transfer, and is not covered by inheritance tax laws. At trial, the District Court held for Adams County (P). Nebraska (D) appeals.
- ...to the state, as original and ultimate proprietor of real estate, for failure of persons legally entitled to hold it. The theory is that the state is the original proprietor of all land, and the final one; what is termed land “ownership” is really just tenancy, contingent upon legally-recognized rights of tenure, transfer, and succession. Nebraska law has continued to recognize this doctrine; its Constitution recognizes escheat. The relevant inheritance tax law shows it intended a tax upon a right of succession by inheritance, will, or transfer in contemplation of death. This is distinguishable from reversion, where the title holder dies without will, without heirs, and without such transfer. We cannot interpret the tax statutes to abridge the right to reversion, because it is a longstanding right clearly guaranteed in our Constitution, and should not be surrendered without clear legislative intent. This holding renders moot all other issues in this case. Judgment for Adams...
- Open Chapter
- Publication Date: September 23rd, 2008
- ISBN: 9780314198815
- Subject: Property
- Series: High Court Case Summaries
- Type: Case Briefs
- Description: This publication contains briefs for each major case in this casebook. The briefs present the essential facts, issue, decision, and rationale for each case in a clear, concise manner and will help readers to identify, understand, and absorb the core knowledge from each case. They are followed by a useful legal analysis. The book also supplies case vocabulary and a corresponding memory graphic for each brief, providing a visual representation of the relevant facts or law of the case.
