Principles of Conflict of Laws
Author:
Spillenger, Clyde
Edition:
2nd
Copyright Date:
2015
17 chapters
have results for Conflict of Laws
Introduction 11 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Finally, in Chapter 8, we turn to Conflict of Laws in the international context. Just as the origins of American conflicts law is to be found in the law of nations and other “transnational” sources, it’s clear that the stage upon which the most important conflicts questions will appear in the next generation is the international sphere. Postponement of these issues to this book’s final chapter is, therefore, no comment on the importance of the topic. In keeping with the general focus of this book, most of Chapter 8 considers the question of international conflicts from the perspective of American courts. Examples include the extraterritorial application (by American courts) of U.S. law, the Act-of-State Doctrine, and recognition (by American courts) of foreign-country judgments. Most scholars and teachers of the subject agree that, over the next generation, a variety of international issues—for example, arbitration in international transactions, civil and criminal procedure in...
- underlying the law of Conflicts, which can be bewildering for experts on the subject, let alone students encountering it for the first time. Therefore, this is less a treatise or reference work that discusses every nook and cranny of conflicts law, or that summarizes hundreds of cases, than a discursive essay treating what I take to be the most salient aspects of Conflicts doctrine in the United States. In organizing the chapters that follow, I’ve been guided and motivated by the kinds of questions that have been raised by my students in the basic Conflicts course I have taught for a decade and a half. I’m hopeful that the approach I’ve taken here will also make this book useful for lawyers and law professors who know little about Conflicts but seek a basic introduction to the subject.
- The first four chapters concern choice of law. Chapter 1 treats the traditional or “territorial” approach to choice of law, which still informs much of modern conflicts law and which is the best vehicle for surfacing the basic conceptual problems raised by choice of law. Chapter 2 proceeds, in fairly conventional fashion, to consider more “modern” choice-of-law methodologies—those that have emerged in part as a reaction against the traditional approach. In Chapter 3, I focus briefly on a few topics of particular interest in present-day conflicts law. Since Chapters 1 and 2 tend to focus the reader’s attention on more general conceptual issues, Chapter 3 is designed to apprise the reader of specific conflicts issues that arise with some frequency today, and that raise particularly difficult problems. Chapter 4 concerns constitutional limits on choice of law—that is, limits on the power of the forum to apply forum law (rather than some other state’s law) to a dispute.
- The remainder of the book deals with more specific topics; I think that some exposure to each of these is important for conflicts students. Chapter 6 deals with the distinctive role of conflicts law, in particular interjurisdictional recognition, in the area of family law. The advent of same-sex marriage and the problems of interstate recognition that it raises makes this subject obviously quite topical, but interjurisdictional problems relating to child custody and support orders are equally pressing and have been for generations. Chapter 7 treats what is known as the “ has been the curricular possession of courses in Civil Procedure and Federal Courts and is not customarily treated as a conflicts issue, but I’ve discovered that my students no longer are exposed to my conflicts course, and I’ve included a chapter on it in this book as well. After discussing and its progeny, I briefly take up the issue of post- ...law, although I do so in much less detail than would an analogous...
- Chapter 5 treats the general area of Recognition of Judgments, which, after choice of law, is the most important component of American conflicts law. The question of judgments and is not confined, of course, to multistate problems (those in which the “recognition court” is in a different state from that in which the “rendering court” sits). Since an understanding of interjurisdictional recognition (which is a conflicts problem) relies heavily on an understanding of in the purely domestic context (which is not), I have devoted considerably more attention in Chapter 5 to a detailed review of the basics of than do the authors of most conflicts books. After that review, I proceed to a discussion of interjurisdictional preclusion, focusing on the constitutional principle of full faith and credit.
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Chapter 8. Conflict of Laws in the International Sphere 192 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Certainly we have seen conflicts between the law of a state and the law of another country treated as an ordinary problem of choice of law. We know, for example, from the New York line of “guest statute” cases, that at least in some instances the fact that one of the laws competing for recognition is the law of a foreign country makes no difference to the analysis. The conflict between the law of New York and the law of Ontario, Canada in those cases was treated in the same manner as was the conflict in , which involved a conflict between the law of New York and the law of Colorado. On occasion (see ) this has even resulted in the application by an American court of Canadian law. Whether it is because the basic premises of the Canadian legal system are considered close to those underlying American law, or because this matter of cross-border torts is not thought to trigger fundamental questions of sovereignty and foreign relations, American courts conceive these situations as raising...
- Efforts to adjudicate conflicts between state or federal law in the United States and the law of another country inevitably confront the fact that much of the rest of the world views conflicts from a different perspective—principally, a civil-law perspective— than does American law. An American court faced with an international conflict of laws might well be advised to be cautious about applying a “modern” choice-of-law method (which often embodies a preference for forum law) that much of the legal world outside the United States regards as something of a curiosity.
- The problem of conflict of laws, of course, long predates the creation of the American republic. The principles that have long influenced American conflicts law were developed and debated by civil-law jurists in large part to resolve conflicts between the laws of states that today we would call sovereign—states, that is, that were under no enforceable duty to respect or apply foreign law. And while most of this book has been preoccupied with conflicts in the American (or “domestic”) context, between the laws of different states of the United States, conflicts in the international sphere obviously remain an important issue—one that the process of globalization has made increasingly salient.
- There is nothing in any of these codifications of choice of law that would be unrecognizable to students and practitioners of American conflicts law. What is most apparent is that, outside the U.S., most industrialized nations adhere to a rule-based approach to conflicts rather than the looser methodologies often applied in American conflicts law—and this may reflect rather faithfully the more general difference between civil-law precepts and those of the common law.
- But—apart from the fact that, in an age of globalization, educated lawyers should know something about how other legal systems work—comparative conflicts law can be quite relevant to conflicts decisions made by U.S. courts. For example, knowledge of how other parts of the world handle conflicts—in particular, the circumstances under which courts elsewhere regard it as appropriate to apply the substantive or “internal” law of the forum—can assist a U.S. court in determining whether a particular extraterritorial application of U.S. law would be regarded elsewhere as exorbitant. As noted in our discussion of the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States advises that U.S. courts should not apply U.S. law extraterritorially if such application would be “unreasonable.” The “reasonableness” of an assertion of legislative jurisdiction depends in part on how other states with a plausible interest in the matter view
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Chapter 1. The Territorial Approach to Choice of Law: Concepts and Limitations 171 results (showing 5 best matches)
- plays but a small role in domestic American conflicts law. In the vast majority of cases, references to foreign law made by the forum’s choice-of-law rules are to the “internal” law of the foreign state, meaning its substantive rule of decision. By and large, American conflicts law does not mess around with applying foreign choice-of-law rules. That is good news, because application of foreign conflicts rules would further complicate an already intricate problem. In addition, the majority of American conflicts theorists have rejected the principle. For example, Joseph Beale, architect of the “vested rights” theory rationalizing the territorial approach to conflicts, rejected it. Since, on his view, the location of certain events at certain times fixed the parties’ rights pursuant to the law of that place, there was no reason for the forum to consider that state’s conflicts rules; the choice-of-law reference should simply be to that state’s substantive law. Proponents of a more “...
- “Choice of law” is the centerpiece of the study of conflicts, at least in the domestic sphere. Even the other topics that have traditionally formed part of the field of conflict of laws, such as jurisdiction and recognition of judgments, have close conceptual relationships with the problem of choice of law.
- is largely an anomaly in American conflicts law, courts and litigants still occasionally find ways of inserting it into the choice-of-law analysis. For that reason it is well to be aware of its presence, lurking in the shadows of American conflicts law.
- approach to conflicts in contract disputes, although it did distinguish (§ 332) between disputes involving contract validity (in which the law of the place of contract should apply) and disputes involving performance (in which the law of the place of performance should apply). Again, a series of provisions concerning more specific contract issues were set forth. Discussing comprehensively the numerous kinds of knotty problems to which the Restatement’s conflict rules for contract disputes—not to mention its rather formalistic conception of the law of Contracts itself—led, in theory if not practice, would be more tiresome than illuminating. Several provisions, such as that governing conflicts concerning whether there had been an actual acceptance of a contract offer where the acceptance was sent from one state to another, made reference to the “general law of Contracts” as discussed above. In truth, though, the First Restatement’s treatment of conflicts in the area of contracts was...
- As we have seen, the rule in American conflicts law is that the forum applies its own rules of choice of law. This, of course, will lead in certain cases to the application of foreign law. But just what does it mean for the forum to “apply foreign law”? One answer, which has been assumed in all of our analysis thus far, is that the forum applies the other state’s substantive or “internal” law. If, in a tort case, there is a conflict between State A and State B concerning the applicable standard of care (say, negligence vs. strict liability), and the forum’s choice-of-law rule directs the court to the law of State B, the forum simply applies State B’s law concerning standard of care—which is clearly “substantive” law. But an alternative view might be that, when the forum’s choice-of-law rule directs it to apply the law of State B, that reference is to the “whole” law of State B, which includes that state’s choice-of-law rules. As you can imagine, reference to State B’s choice-of-law...
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Chapter 2. Modern Approaches to Choice of Law 220 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The concept of the “unprovided-for case” is obviously problematic. It underscores a confusion or ambiguity that can easily arise when considering the interest analysis idea. Currie, of course, began with the observation that, in an apparent conflicts situation, the law of both states “applied” (in general, the laws did not specify any geographical limitation); interest analysis was a way of applying principles of interpretation and construction to resolve what is, in conventional parlance, a conflict of laws. But, having identified a false conflict, it is an easy (though questionable) step to the conclusion that the law of the state lacking a cognizable interest actually “apply” in the particular case. This seems confusing. A conflict of laws that interest analysis deems to be a “false conflict” is still a conflict of laws, isn’t it?
- This, though, was not all that Currie had to say about true conflicts. He recognized that identification of a false conflict was a happier outcome of the choice-of-law analysis than identification of a true conflict; it was better to conclude that only one state had a legitimate interest in the application of its law than that a choice between the two laws was necessary, especially if the instrument for doing so was going to be as blunt as the expedient: “[T]o assert a conflict between the interests of the forum and the foreign state is a serious matter.” He therefore urged that a court applying interest analysis have a “second look” at the interest of the forum, to determine whether it was truly implicated by the facts of the case, before concluding that a true conflict was at hand. This second look amounted to “a more moderate and restrained interpretation both of the [forum’s] policy and of the circumstances in which it must be applied to effectuate the forum’s legitimate...
- False Conflicts.
- Currie’s method of resolving such true conflicts was simply to apply forum law. This, of course, was one of the more controversial of Currie’s proposals. He acknowledged that, analytically, this resolution of true conflicts was not especially satisfying, but it followed from his view that the forum’s own law, as the law best known and most native to courts, should be the presumptive choice-of-law reference, to be displaced only when there existed very good reason for doing so; state courts had no business advancing another state’s interests at the expense of the forum’s. It also reflected Currie’s belief that the forum should not attempt to “weigh” the interests of the competing states in an attempt to determine which should prevail over the other; he insisted that this was an improper task for courts. Once it was determined that each state had at least some cognizable interest, a true conflict existed, and forum law should be applied. Of course, Currie’s ...conflicts was anathema...of
- It is important to be clear about what Currie meant by the phrase “false conflict.” It does mean that application of either of the two laws competing for recognition in a particular case would lead to the same result. Rather, as is spelled out in the text, Currie used the term “false conflict” to describe a situation in which the two laws do, at a formal level, “conflict” with one another, but in which the analysis of state interests reveals that only one of the states has a cognizable interest that would be advanced by application of its law.
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Chapter 3. A Few Areas of Modern Interest 108 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Today, legal disputes concerning the validity of a contract are less common than disputes concerning interpretation and performance. But it’s important to explore the problem of choice of law as it arises in the context of conflicts concerning the validity of a contract, because the way in which courts have resolved this problem says a lot about the nature of conflicts law in general. Of particular importance is the degree to which conflicts doctrine approves and even encourages the power of the parties to select, in their contract, the law to govern any disputes over the contract.
- Section 187 of the Second Restatement.
- Generally speaking, the law of products liability falls under the umbrella of tort law; therefore much of what we have said in Chapters 1 and 2 concerning choice of law in tort cases is relevant to products liability conflicts. But some of the structural complications that seem especially common in the products liability area can produce distinctive conflicts problems that are worth looking at briefly in their own right. Products liability cases frequently involve products that move through a complex chain of distribution, raising issues of joint and several liability whose specific legal treatment may vary from state to state. In addition, some products can produce injuries many years after their original manufacture and distribution; in such a situation conflicts of laws concerning the applicable periods of limitation and repose may be crucial. The interaction of product liability law with procedural rules governing party joinder and limitations periods can create difficult conflicts
- As we attempt to make sense of § 187(2), let’s remember two things. First, of course, the enforcement of a choice-of-law clause only arises as an issue if its operation would displace the law that would be selected by operation of the otherwise applicable choice-of-law rule. From a conflicts perspective, that’s the only situation that really interests us where a choice-of-law clause is concerned. Second, the “otherwise applicable choice-of-law rule” contemplated by § 187(2) is § 188, the Second Restatement’s basic choice-of-law provision for contract conflicts. Note, though, that a state might conceivably follow § 187 for issues concerning choice-of-law agreements, even though it has not adopted the Second Restatement more generally or § 188 in particular for contracts conflicts. In such a case, the law potentially displaced by the choice-of-law provision would be that chosen by whatever choice-of-law rule is usually applied by the forum for contracts conflicts, be it
- Enforcement of Contractual Choice-of-Law Provisions.
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Chapter 6. Conflict of Laws and Domestic Relations 121 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Family law has long presented difficult problems for conflict of laws. Marriage, divorce, child custody, and child and spousal support, as well as issues of estate law that are ancillary to the law of domestic relations, can be enormously complex even when multiple jurisdictions are not involved; when they are, conventional conflicts principles often seem poorly adapted to the problems raised. (Most of the important conflicts problems involving family law pertain to recognition of judgments, rather than choice of law.) The judgments rendered by courts dealing with domestic relations issues are not always as “neat and clean” as judgments that pertain to traditional common-law actions for damages; the interjurisdictional effect of divorces or custody or support decrees can raise unexpected difficulties.
- Long before the founding of the American republic, the jurists of civil-law nations developed a basic principle to deal with such conflicts of laws: “Marriages valid where celebrated are valid everywhere” (this is essentially a rule of for questions of a marriage’s validity). Observation of this principle meant that the forum would often recognize a marriage performed outside the forum as legal and valid, even though forum law did not itself recognize such a union as legal. Like all traditional conflicts principles, this one assumed that the forum retained authority to disregard it in cases where recognition might threaten public order or undermine the forum’s fundamental policy. The idea was that, all in all, it will ordinarily be better for the forum to recognize marriages valid where performed, even if they are not valid under forum law; enormous disruptions might arise if, for example, a couple’s children were regarded as legitimate in one place but not in another. Provincial...of
- It is thus no exaggeration to say that full faith and credit and the complexities of our federal system have played an important, if secondary, role in the development of the law of divorce in the United States. The importance of interstate recognition problems was amplified by the fact that not all states substantially liberalized their divorce laws, and at any rate did not do so at the same pace; under these circumstances, problems of conflict of laws and, in particular, recognition of judgments, grew fruitful and multiplied.
- Once we put the question this way, one could see the problem actually as one of choice of law (although the Court did not explicitly describe it in these terms). We have a conflict between two legal rules, those belonging to Nevada and North Carolina respectively, concerning the legal meaning of “domicile”—just as we might have a conflict concerning what kind of behavior constitutes negligence or acceptance of a contractual offer. Seen in this light, the Nevada court would have been in the position of deciding, in the first instance, whether Nevada or North Carolina law should apply to whether Williams and Hendrix had established “residence” or “domicile” in Nevada. We might suspect that, in light of the lovebirds’ long residence in North Carolina and the location there of their marriages, the natural conclusion is that the Nevada court should apply North Carolina law governing domicile for purposes of divorce—presumably resulting in a refusal to render the divorce decrees. Of...
- of the issuing court’s order. The choice-of-law issue is simple where modification is concerned: In cases of spousal support, the problem essentially does not even exist, since the issuing court retains exclusive modification jurisdiction for the life of the order. With respect to child support orders, if a tribunal outside the issuing state properly concludes, pursuant to UIFSA’s jurisdiction provisions, that the issuing state has lost exclusive modification jurisdiction, and that the forum can properly assert jurisdiction, forum law (which the statute refers to as “local law”) will apply to subsequent modification. But enforcement is a different story (with respect to both spousal and child support orders): If the issuing court’s order is simply registered in a new state for purposes of enforcement there, and the issuing court has not lost its exclusive modification jurisdiction, then the law of that issuing court, not that of the enforcement court (called the “responding court”)...
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Chapter 4. Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law 99 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Although rarely understood as such, other constitutional provisions and doctrines themselves embody what appear to be choice-of-law principles. For example, the Supremacy Clause obliges courts (not to mention other governmental actors) to give effect to federal law when it comes into conflict with state law. In these situations, the Supremacy Clause functions as a sort of constitutional choice-of-law rule. The Commerce Clause, particularly in its “dormant” aspect, operates to displace certain state laws affecting interstate commerce, even if the competing federal policy is a “non-policy.” The general doctrine of pre-emption embodies some of the same ideas. And the “ doctrine,” to be discussed in Chapter 7, is often (if somewhat imprecisely) regarded as addressing a conflicts problem, by dictating the application of state (rather than federal) law in certain cases falling within the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction. Some conflicts problems potentially involving the law of...
- Which type of discrimination is more troubling—that in which an out-of-state party gets an outcome less favorable than an equivalently situated in-stater, or that in which the application of interest analysis seems systematically to favor forum law at the expense of foreign law? That is a question as to which reasonable people will disagree. Defenders of interest analysis, at least the form of interest analysis that posits a more neutral solution for true conflicts than simply , argue that, so long as the interests of the out-of-state party’s state are given their proper due in the analysis—possibly (though not necessarily) resulting in application of that state’s law—there is no meaningful discrimination, regardless of which state’s law is ultimately applied and regardless of which party ultimately prevails. Interest analysis, and for that matter most modern choice-of-law methodologies, simply take as a given that the domicile of the parties is a legitimate consideration in... ...of...
- has come to stand for “the proposition that if a State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional.” suggests that he had no such broad principle in mind, although that principle may proceed logically enough from his analysis. He may not even have thought of as a case about “conflict of laws” as such. Brandeis nowhere in his opinion refers to “conflict of laws,” “choice of law,” “law of the forum,” “ ,” or any of the conventional terms in use by jurists at the time when discussing the law of conflicts. What seems essential to Brandeis is Texas’s “attempt to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon and to seize property in payment of the imposed obligation.” “[D]eprivation of property without due process of law” are the words used by Brandeis. This is the language of “substantive due process” and the rights of contract and property, ...power to apply forum law to a case, and previous...
- Most of the cases discussed in this chapter thus far have involved statutes of limitations, state regulation of insurance policies, or workers’ compensation. The obvious exception is , and the distinguishing feature of that case is the presence of a nationwide class action, which plainly presents a great challenge to the application of conventional choice-of-law methodologies. It is not surprising that these rather idiosyncratic problems have been the ones that have pushed the Court to define its constitutional approach to questions of choice of law. It is worth speculating, though, as to what other kinds of conflicts cases might raise new constitutional issues in the future. When states embody drastically different social policies in their respective laws, “extraterritorial” application of one of those laws may raise serious objections. For example, suppose a state gives to the parents of a minor child a cause of action against a physician for performing an abortion on the minor...law
- Nevertheless, the constitutional limitations on the domestic choice-of-law methodologies are supplied by the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. This is what conflicts casebooks have in mind in their chapters entitled “Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law.”
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Chapter 7. The Law Applied in Federal Courts 171 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Is Not Really a Choice-of-Law Problem.
- A very important case decided by the Supreme Court in the wake of , the Court ruled that, in diversity cases, a federal court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. That is, the federal courts sitting in diversity may not develop and apply, in common-law fashion, their own choice-of-law principles concerning which state’s substantive law should apply. (Note how the rule differs from the traditional conflicts rule that the law of choice of law is the law of the forum.) Since lawsuits featuring citizens of different states frequently raise conflicts issues, the Court’s holding in is an important one. On the surface, its decision seems simple and sensible enough. One alternative—which, to be sure, some eminent commentators have strongly advocated—would be for federal courts to develop and apply their own choice-of-law rules for diversity cases. Developing a nationally uniform set of rules in this manner would be a cumbersome and slow-moving process at best,...
- • An important part of the rationale for the —is the importance of avoiding craven forum shopping and the “inequitable administration of the laws” that would result if a party could benefit from a choice between a federal rule in federal court or a state rule in state court. In cases like (choice of law) and (statute of limitations), where the plaintiff will often have a clear rationale militates in favor of applying the state rule in cases where there is actually a conflict between applicable state and federal rules. It is difficult to argue that this principle is decision itself was; as noted, it would seem perfectly constitutional for Congress to provide the federal courts with a choice-of-law principle or a federal limitations period, so there truly is a conflict between the federal rule and the state rule in itself, that no constitutionally valid federal law is even involved). The source of law directing the application of the state rule in these cases would seem most...
- case itself, federal courts sitting in diversity have no constitutional authority to develop federal law, common-law-style, as to “substantive” areas of law concerning which Congress itself has no constitutional authority to legislate wholesale. , there is no conflict between federal and state law because there is no constitutionally valid federal law at issue. State decisional law (like state statutes) must govern the case, by command of the Rules of Decision Act.
- this must be the answer—that is, what source of law dictates the result in ? The question of whose choice-of-law rule—state or federal—should apply in diversity cases differs in important ways from the tort-law question presented in the case. Choice-of-law rules are somehow less “substantive” in nature than tort-law rules; that is why choice of law is governed by in ordinary conflicts cases. In particular, Congress almost certainly has the power to legislate choice-of-law rules for federal courts sitting in diversity cases, should it wish to do so. This is a big difference from the case. Congress lacks constitutional power to provide a comprehensive code of tort law for federal courts sitting in diversity, but it would be odd to say that Congress can create lower federal courts, invest in them the authority to decide cases between citizens of different states, yet not have the power to provide for them choice-of-law rules to determine ...law should apply in those cases.... ...-of...
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Index 451 results (showing 5 best matches)
Chapter 5. Recognition of Judgments 259 results (showing 5 best matches)
- “Recognition of Judgments” is, after choice of law, the most important general topic in the modern conflict-of-laws class. Of course, many conflicts students will already have encountered the topic of “judgments” in their first-year class in Civil Procedure, as part of the study of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). All problems of recognition of judgments involve an effort by a party to deploy the results of Case A
- Now, at last, we turn to claim and issue preclusion specifically as those concepts relate to the subject of Conflict of Laws. As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, problems of claim and issue preclusion always involve a Case A and a Case B (where “A” is the first case and “B” is the second case); the question is whether, and to what extent, matters determined in Case A are barred from relitigation in Case B. Where both Case A and Case B are heard in the courts of the same state, the various preclusion issues obviously are governed by that state’s law. Claim and issue preclusion, and the general subject of recognition of judgments, become matters of interest to Conflict of Laws when Case A and Case B, respectively, are heard by the courts of states. To what extent are the courts of State B obliged to give effect to the judgments rendered by the courts of State A? In general, this problem is known as . The basic doctrine governing the problem is that of ...the central topics of...
- Technically, the “adequacy of representation” that is required for the certification of any class action refers to the adequacy with which the named plaintiffs will represent the interests of all members of the class. Nevertheless, the line between the adequacy provided by the has been substantially blurred in the case law. Allegations of inadequate representation are addressed as often to the conflicts on the part of class as to the conflicts on the part of named plaintiffs who do not share all the interests and incentives of the absent plaintiffs.
- Most of the cases and examples we use to illustrate conflicts principles are conventional or “garden-variety” cases of “A versus B,” heard by a state trial court of general jurisdiction and involving traditional private law causes of action for money damages. Our leading case on full faith and credit, , is a good example: It concerned enforcement of a simple common-law judgment for contract damages. Many of the more difficult issues in preclusion, however, involve interstate recognition of non-traditional remedies, or of judgments rendered by administrative tribunals that typically apply only the forum’s rules of law. One area in which interjurisdictional preclusion has caused particular difficulty is that of workers’ compensation.
- When both Case A and Case B are heard by the courts of a single state, there is no conflicts problem. Recognition of judgments becomes a topic of interest to Conflict of Laws, however, when the court deciding Case B is from a state different from that in which Case A was decided. This problem has come to be known as “interjurisdictional preclusion” (or, sometimes, “interstate preclusion”), and it is the subject of this chapter. As you will see, the study of interjurisdictional preclusion requires a careful understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
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Table of Contents 62 results (showing 5 best matches)
Summary of Contents 37 results (showing 5 best matches)
- G. Comparative Choice of Law: Conflicts Law Outside the United States
- D. Conflict of Laws and the Uniform Commercial Code
- Chapter 6. Conflict of Laws and Domestic Relations
- Chapter 8. Conflict of Laws in the International Sphere
- D. Identifying False Conflicts in New York: Guest Statutes and Beyond
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Advisory Board 9 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Professor of Law Emeritus, University of San Diego Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan
- Professor of Law, Chancellor and Dean Emeritus, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
- Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles
- Earle K. Shawe Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
- Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law,
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Copyright Page 2 results
- The publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other professional advice, and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional.
- Printed in the United States of America
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Table of Cases 15 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Publication Date: August 4th, 2015
- ISBN: 9780314286420
- Subject: Conflict of Laws
- Series: Concise Hornbook Series
- Type: Hornbook Treatises
- Description: This Concise Hornbook guides students through the complex concepts and principles underlying the law of domestic and international conflicts. The book is an indispensable aid to students and practitioners seeking to better understand the basic principles of choice of law, recognition of judgments, and the law applied in federal courts, as well as more specific developments concerning conflicts in family law, cyberspace, and international transactions.