Mass Communication Law in a Nutshell
Authors:
Carter, T. Barton / Dee, Juliet Lushbough / Zuckman, Harvey L.
Edition:
7th
Copyright Date:
2014
18 chapters
have results for Communications
Chapter 12. Regulation of Broadcasting 45 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Having been delegated broad powers to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out the mandate of its enabling legislation, the Commission faces the task, first, of attempting to satisfy the differing demands for communications frequency space in a modern industrial (indeed, post-industrial) economy. Although most familiar to the public in the role of a regulator of commercial and “public” broadcasting, the Commission has the equally demanding responsibility of regulating non-broadcast use of communications facilities such as interstate common carrier systems, radio systems for industrial use such as truck-to-truck communications, taxi cab networks, communications between central plant and repairmen or servicemen, communications between hospital and doctor, marine and ship radio, aviation frequencies, citizen band radio, international “ham” communications, police and fire communications networks, computer-to-computer communications, and emerging technologies such as cable, pay...
- The Federal Radio Commission created by the Radio Act of 1927 to supervise broadcasting was, pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, merged into what is today the Federal Communications Commission. The 1934 Act, modeled largely after the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, and embodying much of the law that had already been made by the 1927 Radio Act, remains the organic legislation which controls American commercial and non-commercial (“Public”) broadcasting. The Communications Act prescribes the basic task of the Federal Communications Commission to be that of “regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges for the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio
- The Commission handles the problem of allocation of frequencies between uses in a rather straightforward manner. Certain frequencies are specifically allocated to commercial “broadcasting uses”; other frequencies are specifically allocated to common carrier uses (i.e., telephone, telegraph and other communications services for hire); other frequencies are dedicated to uses such as industrial communication, marine and ship radio, aviation and medical services. These initial allocations are quite important for a number of reasons: (1) they help establish the relative “scarcity” of frequencies which is the basic justification for governmental action in the broadcasting realm, and (2) they are the warp and woof of the nation’s communication’s system. As much as any single factor, the FCC’s allocations policy determines the shape and content of our communications capabilities.
- The new structure is also based on the assumption that “U.S communications markets [will] be characterized predominately by vigorous competition that will greatly reduce the need for direct regulation.” Thus, additional goals of the proposed reorganization include eliminating barriers to entry in domestic markets, deregulating as competition develops, enforcing the rules so that businesses compete fairly, and promoting competition in international communications markets.
- The federal criminal code generally prohibited any station from broadcasting any information concerning a lottery. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1304. Section 73.1211 of the Commission’s rules essentially followed this criminal code section. A lottery is any game or contest which contains the elements of prize, chance and “consideration.” These elements are construed in terms of a type of federal common law of lotteries followed by the Federal Communications Commission, the Post Office Department and the Department of Justice. See Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 74 S.Ct. 593, 98 ...than merely a benefit to the contest operator. For example, the requirement of the listener mailing in a post card to a station would not be considered “consideration,” even though the station may thereby “benefit” by obtaining a list of members of its audience or by the contest enlarging the station’s audience. Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co....
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Title Page 4 results
Chapter 13. CABLE AND OTHER TECHNOLOGIES 30 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Unfortunately, communication technology changes far more rapidly than the law. The last major rewrite of the Communications Act was pre-broadband, long before Facebook and YouTube existed. It will be interesting to see how Congress, the FCC and state legislatures will address the need to reform communication law.
- (a) Was cable television subject to FCC jurisdiction? It was not in existence when the Communications Act was passed, and might be
- b. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
- Finally, the Communications Act imposes some requirements of its own. For example, § 612 requires each cable system with 36 or more channels to set aside a percentage of its channels for commercial lease. The percentage depends on the total number of channels available on the system (See 47 U.S.C.A. § 541).
- However, in an attempt to hasten the development of this new service the Commission in July, 1982 issued interim guidelines for DBS operators. Licenses would be granted for five years, and licensees would be required to meet international guidelines. DBS services with broadcast characteristics would be subject to the broadcast sections of the Communications Act, but not subject to non-statutory Commission policies with the exception of the Commission’s equal employment opportunity rules. DBS operators offering common carrier-type services were to be subject only to the common carrier sections of the Act. The interim guidelines were challenged in National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 239 U.S.App.D.C. 87 (D.C.Cir.1984) and were upheld except for the exemption from the broadcasting sections of the Communications Act of programmers leasing DBS channels.
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Chapter 2. Defamation and Mass Communication 35 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Published defamation is not actionable unless the complaining party can establish that it was he or she who was defamed. Very often the target of a defamatory communication is not clearly named therein and thus the identification of the complaining party with the communication becomes a problem of analyzing extrinsic circumstances.
- damages. These are catalogued by a leading authority as including (1) the nature of the defamation (irrational name calling or insinuation of serious wrongdoing); (2) the form and permanency of the publication (oral conversations between individuals or communication by the mass print or electronic media); (3) the degree of dissemination; (4) the degree to which the defamatory communication is believed; (5) the nature of the plaintiff’s reputation; (6) in certain cases, the good faith of the defendant in publishing the defamatory matter and (7) the defendant’s subsequent conduct in retracting the complained of communication or in making apology. Dan Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution 259–276 (1993).
- Moreover, the defense must be as broad in its reach as the communication complained of. The defense will fail if only a portion of the allegation is verified. For example, a newspaper charge that X is a habitual vice law offender is not justified by the paper establishing one conviction of X for a gambling violation. This does not mean that defendants have to verify every detail of their communication, however. The defense is available if the substance of the communication can be established. An individual who publicly accuses his
- Defamatory words can be presented in numerous ways. One need not attack with a verbal axe. The stiletto of ridicule may suffice. Provided that even one person other than the plaintiff understands the communication to be defamatory and such understanding is reasonable, given its content and context, a court may accept the plaintiff’s argument that it is defamatory. Of course, the defendant may attempt to show that the communication had at least one non-defamatory meaning and others understand it in that sense, or that the communication was made in jest and could not reasonably be taken seriously. Courts in Illinois, for example, have fashioned the “innocent construction rule” which gives defendants the benefit of the doubt; in other words, if there are two reasonable ways to interpret a statement, one defamatory and the other non-defamatory, the court will choose the “innocent” meaning. However, the great majority of states do not follow this rule.
- In this situation, it is clear that the communicator either intends that others overhear his or her accusation or is so uncaring whether it is overheard as to be deemed reckless in his or her conduct. Where one does not intend the communication to be conveyed to anyone other than the target of his or her attack, however, and the means chosen to convey the communication will in the normal course prevent reception by third persons, there is no publication. For instance, Able writes his former business partner Baker a letter in which he accuses Baker of causing the downfall of their business by “stealing the company blind.” Able places the letter in a sealed envelope, marks it “personal,” addresses it to Baker and mails it to his house. Baker’s son, curious about the letter from his father’s former associate, opens and reads the letter prior to Baker and without authority. There is no publication here and hence, no actionable defamation.
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Chapter 3. Privacy and the Mass Media 17 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The same legislation also outlaws unauthorized accessing or tampering with information storage facilities through which electronic communications services are provided, and outlaws the blocking of authorized access to the information while in electronic storage. By this legislation, Congress has recognized the need to protect privacy of communication in our high technology computer age.
- electronic surveillance or, as in the case of employees of the Federal Communications Commission, to monitor electronic communications, are generally exempted from the provisions of the legislation when acting within their proper authority.
- The use of concealed recording devices by both journalists and law enforcement officials has caused Congress to become increasingly concerned with government and private intrusions upon individual privacy. In 1968 Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–2520. Congress later amended this as the “Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,” also known as the Federal Wiretap Statute. This prohibits under criminal penalty the interception of any conversation carried over a wire or a non-wire conversation in a setting where one expects privacy. Congress amended the statute again in 1994 to include cellular and wireless communication within its protection.
- later pled guilty to two counts of stealing voice-mail messages; he had violated the Stored Communications Act in Title B of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c). (See also Chapter VIII for discussion of Gallagher’s betrayal of confidential source’s identity.)
- These states are “all-party consent” states, meaning that all parties to a wire or oral communication must give prior consent before a conversation is tape-recorded. The other states are “one-party consent” states, meaning that participant recording is permitted, provided there is no intent to commit a tort.
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Preface 2 results
- In this book we attempt to meet a continuing need for a basic text in communication law, not only for law students but journalism and communication students as well.
- To appreciate the interrelationship of law and mass communication, just check the news feed on your smart phone. Each day one is likely to find news of important court decisions, news of proposed legislation and news about the President’s executive orders. Even the sports page may contain as much news about lawsuits between team owners, unions and players as about team performance. Starting in the 1960s, there has been a veritable explosion in media coverage of legal issues. The media’s increasing influence resulted in more problems for them, especially in the areas of First Amendment protection and Federal Communications Commission regulation. With the emergence of the Internet and other new technologies, the legal questions multiplied, starting with deregulation and re-regulation.
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Chapter 1. The First Amendment in Perspective 13 results (showing 5 best matches)
- However, technology does not exist in a vacuum. It operates in organized societies governed by laws. These societies may be open ones in which the members are relatively free to express themselves and to communicate with others by whatever means available, or they may be relatively closed, with the modes of communication tightly controlled by a very few persons. Gutenberg’s invention of moveable type gave promise of spreading both literacy and ideas to the masses, but in Elizabethan England and beyond, licensing acts severely limited access to the printing press to a few printers considered “safe” by the ruling authorities. It was this legal restriction on the utilization of the first technology of mass communication that led the great poet John Milton to make his stirring call for a free press in ...for years because of the complex of statutes and Federal Communications Commission regulations designed to reign in this new technology in order to protect existing economic interests...
- For the majority, Justice Powell asserted that corporations had rights of free speech equivalent to those of individual citizens. Here the speech involved the essence of self-government. In response to the state’s argument that “communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same communication” by other types of corporations, Justice Powell noted that banks and other corporations might be better informed on economic issues than media corporations.
- Thus, while technology is the necessary antecedent to mass communication, a society’s laws ultimately determine how the technology will be developed and how “mass” will be its reach.
- proliferation of new communication technologies is forcing the Court to address the issue more frequently. See Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission, 520 U.S. 180, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (Upholding the must-carry rules for cable); Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (Holding restrictions on indecent material transmitted over the Internet unconstitutional). As the number of new communication technologies continues to grow and the technologies continue to converge (e.g., what is the difference between a movie transmitted over the Internet accessed by a cable modem, and regular cable programming?), the Court may find it more and more difficult to differentiate them in terms of appropriate First Amendment standards.
- The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) included a provision making it a federal crime for a corporation or labor union to expend general treasury funds to pay for any “electioneering communication,” which was defined as any broadcast, cable or satellite communication referring to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, made within 60 days before a general special or runoff election or 30 days before a primary election, convention or caucus. The provision was originally upheld by the Supreme Court. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003).
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Chapter 9. Freedom to Gather News and Information 8 results (showing 5 best matches)
- This exemption is designed to protect working papers, studies and reports prepared within an agency or circulated among government personnel as the basis of an agency’s final decision. Communication between an agency and its legal counsel is also shielded from disclosure.
- Parallel to the Federal Freedom of Information Act are federal and state “government in the sunshine” statutes which require federal, state and local governmental units to conduct their business in the open. In 1976 Congress passed the Government in the Sunshine Act, the federal open meetings law. P.L. 94–409, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b. This statute affects about 50 federal boards, commissions and agencies that are required to conduct their business meetings in public. The law also prohibits informal communication between officials of an agency and representatives of companies with whom the agency does business unless this communication is recorded as part of the public record.
- claimed that the e-mail messages comprised privileged communication under Exemption 5, and the federal district court judge agreed; thus, the eight U.S. attorneys could not learn the true reasons for why they had been dismissed. Democratic National Committee v. United States Department of Justice, 539 F.Supp.2d 363 (D.D.C.2008).
- The U.S. Department of Labor successfully invoked Exemption 6, however, when the Los Angeles Times requested the names of civilian contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Labor feared that the contractors and their families could be targeted by al Qaida and the Taliban, and a federal district court in California agreed that releasing this information to the Los Angeles Times would be an unwarranted invasion of the contractors’ privacy. Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC v. United States
- More recently, CompTel, a trade association of competitive telecommunications providers, requested documents suggesting that AT&T might have overcharged the government for AT&T’s services. AT&T argued that the documents were exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7(C), but the U.S. Supreme Court held corporations have no “personal privacy” under Exemption 7(C) because it applies only to human beings. Thus AT&T’s failed in its attempt to stop the FCC from releasing AT&T’s e-mail messages and billing records to CompTel. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, “We trust that AT&T will not take it personally.” Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S.Ct 1177 at 1185, 179 L.Ed.2d 132 at 142 (2011).
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Index 17 results (showing 5 best matches)
Outline 7 results (showing 5 best matches)
Chapter 6. Restraint of Obscene and Indecent Expression 15 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Although concerns about pornography had traditionally been focused on adult books and NC-17-rated movies, in the 1980s the FCC became concerned with “dial-a-porn” telephone services, in which callers could listen to sexually explicit recorded phone messages or hold an indecent two-way conversation with someone for a fee. In 1988 Congress amended Sections 223(b) and (c) of the Communications Act of 1934 with the Telephone Decency Act. This amendment banned all dial-a-porn services, including indecent as well as obscene speech. Sable Communications, a dial-a-porn provider, filed suit, and the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the provision barring indecent telephone messages, although it upheld the provision barring obscene telephone messages. Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989). Congress then made another attempt at dial-a-porn
- 1. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT
- Although not contained in the Communications Act of 1934, the Criminal Code of the United States (18 U.S.C.A. § 1464) contains a specific prohibition against broadcast stations presenting any material which is “obscene,” “indecent,” or “profane.” Rarely invoked, the “obscenity” section of the statute has been held constitutional because the First Amendment does not protect obscenity. Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 515 F.2d 397, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 166 (D.C.Cir.1974).
- In 2004 the FCC issued a series of record fines against various group owners airing such shows as “The Howard Stern Show,” “Bubba the Love Sponge,” and “Mancow Morning Madness.” Clear Channel Communications, the largest group owner, responded by cancelling “Bubba the Love Sponge,” dropping “The Howard Stern Show” from the six Clear Channel stations that carried it, and reaching a $1.75 million consent decree with the FCC covering all outstanding indecency complaints. Clear Channel also agreed to an extensive compliance plan to prevent future airing of indecent material. Commissioner Michael Copps dissented, arguing that the FCC did not have a full record of Clear Channels’ violations and that until it did, the FCC should not eliminate the possibility of license revocation should the record warrant it. Clear Channel Communications, 2004 WL 1274412 (F.C.C. 2004).
- Communications Commission, 535 F.3d 167 (3rd Cir.2008). The High Court remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the FCC’s forfeiture order of $550,000. CBS Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 663 F.3d 122 (3rd Cir.2011). The FCC appealed the Third Circuit’s ruling, but the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case again. Federal Communications Commission v. CBS Corp., 132 S.Ct. 2677 (2012).
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- 2. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
- The Federal Communications Commission licenses radio and television broadcasters to operate in the “public interest, convenience and necessity.” This includes broadcast advertising, but historically the FCC has relied on self-regulation by the broadcasters to avoid the specter of government censorship forbidden by Section 326 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934. For a long time there was an absence of any clear boundary between the FCC’s authority over advertising through commercial broadcasting facilities and the FTC’s general authority over advertising. This issue was finally resolved by agreement between the two agencies. The FCC has responsibility for assuring that commercials are neither objectionably loud nor excessive in number and that a separation is
- Thus, while the Constitution limits governmental regulation of commercial speech, there is no guarantee that it will be heard if the speaker is dependent on private means of communications controlled by others. The exception occurs where the media outlet in question has monopoly power and refuses advertising for the purpose of furthering that monopoly. For example, in Home Placement Service, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274 (1st Cir.1982), the Providence Journal refused to accept advertising for a rental referral service. Because the newspaper was the only daily newspaper in the city and Home Placement was a direct competitor for real estate advertising, the court held that the refusal to accept Home Placement’s advertising violated § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act.
- In striking down the Virginia statute, Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, appeared to reject the balancing process when he said, “There is no claim … that the prohibition on prescription drug price advertising is a mere time, place, and manner restriction. We have often approved restrictions of that kind provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information…. Whatever may be the proper bounds of time, place, and manner restrictions on commercial speech, they are plainly exceeded by this Virginia statute, which singles out speech of a particular content and seeks
- In contrast, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001) the Court struck down Massachusetts regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising or inside advertising visible from outside of tobacco products within 1,000 feet of a school or playground and requiring all point of sale advertising in those areas to be a minimum of five feet from the floor. The Court found that the regulations, as applied to cigarettes, were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. As applied to cigars and smokeless tobacco products, the Court held that the regulations failed the fourth part of the Central Hudson test. The areas where the advertising was prohibited constituted a substantial, and in some cases almost complete, portion of major metropolitan areas. In addition, the regulations even covered oral communications regarding these products. Thus, there was no evidence of narrow tailoring.
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Chapter 10. Newspersons’ Privilege, Subpoenas, Contempt Citations and Searches and Seizures 2 results
- In 2006 the Federal Election Commission (FEC) issued new rules regulating campaign ads under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81, March 27, 2002). The FEC’s new rules specifically exempted blogs from regulations regarding political advertising. These new rules effectively treated blogs like news media, holding that they fell under the news media exemption. 11 C.F.R. Part 109 [Notice 2006–10], Coordinated Communications, Effective July 10, 2006. See also Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 367 U.S.App.D.C. 185 (D.C.Cir.2005).
- ...in their language and provisions, these statutes usually address the following essential questions: (1) who should be protected against testimonial compulsion (reporters only or others communicating to the public and those aiding and abetting in such communication); (2) which kinds of media should be covered (newspapers only or radio, television, motion pictures); (3) what information should be protected (the identity of confidential sources or other unpublished material as well); (4) at what types of government proceedings and at what stages in these proceedings is the privilege against testimonial compulsion available (judicial proceedings alone or legislative, executive and administrative proceedings); (5) whether there are any exceptions or conditions to the availability of the privilege (such as the need for regular publication and general circulation, thereby excluding many non-establishment publications); and (6) whether the reporter waives the privilege by disclosing...
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- Subsequent criminal punishment of the news media may be just as harmful to the media’s ability to inform the public about judicial matters as prior restraints or “gag orders.” In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unduly restrictive of press freedom a Virginia statute making it a crime to divulge information regarding proceedings before a state judicial review commission that was hearing complaints alleging the incompetence or misconduct of sitting judges. In this case the Virginian Pilot was convicted of violating the statute when it accurately reported on a pending commission inquiry and identified the judge involved.
- ...the more notorious the crime, the less would be the likelihood of obtaining a valid conviction in this age of mass communication. For example, had Lee Harvey Oswald lived, he could not have been convicted for the assassination of President Kennedy because a fair trial would have been impossible anywhere. However, the judicial system will not allow itself to be paralyzed. If the presumed prejudice is rebutted on voir dire examination of the prospective jurors and the circumstances surrounding the trial do not betray inflamed community sentiment, there is no denial of a fair trial merely because of the publicity. In Irvin v. Dowd, the judge excused 268 of the 430 veniremen, as compared with only 20 of the 78 potential jurors questioned in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). In Murphy, unlike the Sheppard, Rideau and Estes cases, the conduct of the trial and atmosphere in the courthouse were proper. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court held...
- The judge also enjoined CNN from further broadcasting privileged communications in the tapes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied CNN relief from the restraining order and directed CNN to relinquish the tapes. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari a week later. The district court judge ultimately lifted the restraining order against CNN after reviewing the tapes and concluding that CNN’s broadcast of them would not interfere with Noriega’s right to a fair trial. In 1994, however, the U.S. Attorney’s office in Miami filed criminal contempt of court charges against CNN, and a federal judge fined CNN for the original broadcast. United States v. Cable News Network, Inc., 865 F.Supp. 1549 (S.D.Fla.1994). At present no other jurisdiction has chosen to follow the Eleventh Circuit decision.
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- With the advent of social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook, texting, Twitter and cell phone cameras, these new media that permit instantaneous communication have raised serious questions about what constitutes on-campus speech among junior high and high school students in cases of cyberharassment and cyberbullying. School districts and state legislatures have had to scramble to put new policies in place to deal with these problems. When students file suit claiming that school districts have abridged their First Amendment rights in such cases, the courts have relied on four U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving student speech; these four decisions have come to be known as the “quartet” of student speech cases.
- Finkel filed a defamation suit against Facebook for $3 million. She also sued the members of “90 Cents” and all of their parents; her complaint argued that the parents were guilty of negligent supervision of their children. The Supreme Court of New York in New York County held that Facebook had immunity from liability based on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996; thus, the court dismissed the case against Facebook (Finkel v. Facebook, 2009 N.Y. Slip Opinion 32248(U), N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Sept. 16, 2009).
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- ...“The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We’re Telling It.” United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 990 (W.D.Wis. 1979). Federal district court Judge Robert Wills Warren in Wisconsin issued a preliminary injunction against publication after concluding that some of the information would probably violate the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The Justice Department contended that Morland’s manuscript contained “Restricted Data,” defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as “all data concerning the design, manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2104(y). This law specifically forbids anyone possessing “restricted data” about nuclear weaponry from disseminating it in a way that might be utilized “to injure the United States” or “secure an advantage to any foreign nation.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2274. It also authorizes the Attorney General to request a court order to enjoin communication of such restricted data. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2280. Although the Progressive’s attorneys...
- A number of citizens including Carolyn Jewel joined Tash Hepting to file a class action suit against the National Security Agency (NSA) and AT&T, charging that they had been subjects of warrantless surveillance. In 2008, however, Congress passed an amendment to FISA, Section 802, that provided immunity for AT&T and all the telephone companies that had cooperated with the NSA’s warrantless surveillance. The NSA invoked the state secrets privilege, refusing to confirm or deny whether Jewel, Hepting or the other plaintiffs had been the subjects of telephone surveillance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld Section 802 as constitutional; thus, AT&T and the other telephone companies were immune from suits by individual citizens. In re: National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 669 F.3d 928 (9th Cir.2011).
- ...5, 2013. Snowden had been a consultant with the firm Booz Allen Hamilton in Hawaii, which had done computer work for the NSA. Snowden’s documents revealed that the NSA has been collecting information on the telephone calls (“metadata”) and Internet use of millions of U.S. citizens each day. At first Snowden’s revelations merely seemed to confirm the 2006 USA Today news story discussed above about the NSA secretly working with AT&T, Verizon and other telephone companies to gather “metadata,” meaning whom we call and how long we talk with them, but not the actual content of our calls. Later, however, the American public learned about the NSA’s Internet surveillance programs such as PRISM and the fact that the NSA had implanted software in nearly 100,000 computers around the world that allowed the United States to secretly conduct surveillance. New York Times, January 15, 2014 at A1. In addition, Snowden revealed that Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) secretly...
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- Publication Date: August 27th, 2014
- ISBN: 9780314280633
- Subject: Communication/Media Law
- Series: Nutshells
- Type: Overviews
- Description: Mass Communication Law in a Nutshell satisfies the need for a basic text in communication law, not only for law students but for journalism and communication students as well. Highlights of the Seventh Edition of the popular book include a discussion of the USA Patriot Act, the Critical Infrastructure Information Act exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, government initiatives such as warrantless eavesdropping on telephone calls following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and recent FCC regulations authorizing a low-power radio service, digital television (DTV), high-definition television (HDTV) and digital must-carry regulations. Further highlights include Congress' passage of the Broadcast Indecency Enforcement Act following Janet Jackson's "wardrobe malfunction," litigation involving filtering software and the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), Congress' attempts to control "spam" on the Internet.