Chapter 9. International Banking 247 results (showing 5 best matches)
- With this section, we begin to focus on what might be called conflicts between extraneous public policy and international banking regulation. By “extraneous” we mean public policy not directly related to the policy values and objectives of banking regulation. Obviously, given the multinational character of banking regulation and the transborder nature of banking itself, conflicts of law and public policy are always a possibility in international banking. By and large, however, we expect to find a relatively high degree of agreement from system to system, at least in principle, over the basic policy values and objectives of banking regulation: maintenance of a safe and sound banking system, maintenance of the public confidence in the system, and the like.
- The provisions of Part D of the 1990 Supplement to the BIS Concordat deal with domestic bank secrecy laws that may impede transnational regulation and supervision of banking. The BIS Supplement is not binding, but to the extent its principles are followed, it has the effect of moderating the effect of bank secrecy laws. However, this effect is specialized to the concerns of bank regulators with respect to the availability of information for supervisory purposes. Thus, the BIS Supplement might not alter the outcome in policy conflicts involving the enforcement of nonbanking regulations.
- These issuances are intended to foster better information flows between national regulators and better national controls over the entry of a multinational banking enterprise into the national market supervised by the regulator. If these policies are effective, presumably the supervision of multinational bank failures could be more efficiently anticipated or managed. More recently, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, developed a set of core principles for effective banking supervision. The Core Principles consisted of twenty-five basic principles, ranging from preconditions for effective banking supervision (Principle 1) to principles for cross-border banking (Principles 23–25).
- The principles were, of course, not binding, but they did provide a basic reference point for supervisors. In April 2006, the Committee issued a proposed revision of the C After a comment period for banks and other institutions, the revised version of the C was issued in October 2006. The basic focus remains the same as in the original version, but a new “umbrella principle” advises banks to establish integrated risk management systems across the range of different risks that banks face (Principle 7). Criteria for evaluating liquidity (Principle 14), operational (Principle 15), and interest rate (Principle 16) risks have also been enhanced, and criteria with respect to money laundering, terrorist financing, and fraud prevention (Principle 18) have been strengthened. Bank supervisors from central banks and supervisory agencies in 120 countries endorsed the updated version of the Basel Core Principles.
- On their own terms, the application of such regulations to accounts held by foreign-situs branches of U.S. banks are vulnerable to attack under local host country law. However, the same choice-of-law principles that would counsel defeat of the sanctions as to foreign-situs blocked deposits ought to dictate vindication of the sanctions with respect to U.S.-situs assets. The complicating factor in our example is the gratuitous action of
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Chapter 5. Transactional Rules 189 results (showing 5 best matches)
- In contrast to the prior situation, in which a statutory provision for incidental powers of banking was one of the main authorities for activities of banks, the GLBA generally endorses the principle of functional regulation, positing that similar activities should be regulated by the same regulator. Hence, banking activities are regulated by federal and state bank regulators, securities activities by federal and state securities regulators, and insurance activities by state insurance regulators. GLBA imposes functional regulation on bank securities activities by eliminating the “bank exception” from the definitions of “broker” and “dealer” in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, thus subjecting an incidental banking power to the generally applicable securities regulation regime.
- The trust activities of commercial banks are governed by principles of the law of trusts, as they would affect any fiduciary. Overlaying the operation of these principles, however, is a system of federal regulation of trust activities. The Comptroller will in the first instance supervise and examine the trust departments and activities of national banks; the Fed will do the same for state member banks, the FDIC for state nonmember insured banks,
- Banks, and particularly national banks, have made significant inroads into the insurance industry.
- A member bank may also make “general limit” loans, extensions of credit not otherwise specifically authorized by statute, to any executive officer of the bank in an amount prescribed in a regulation of the member bank’s “appropriate Federal banking agency.” Aside from these loans, however, a member bank is prohibited from extending credit to a partnership in which one or more of its executive officers are partners, having either individually or together a majority interest.
- The Fed has the authority, by regulation or order, to permit exceptions to these five prohibitions, as it considers not contrary to the purposes of the anti-tying provisions. (1) The regulations extend statutory exceptions for traditional banking relationships to affiliates of banks. Thus, a bank may extend credit, lease or sell property of any kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of these financial services, on the condition that the customer obtain a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service from an affiliate of the bank, or provide to the affiliate some additional credit, property, or service that the bank could require to be provided to itself pursuant to the anti-tying provisions. (2) A bank may vary the consideration for any financial service or group of services based on a customer’s maintaining a combined minimum balance in certain products specified by the bank if the bank offers deposits, and of which are eligible under this rule; and,...bank
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Chapter 3. Branching 164 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Common control exerted by a holding company enterprise over constituent operating subsidiaries is often referred to as “group banking.” Group banking differs from chain banking in the formality of the control relationship. However, group banking is as vulnerable in principle as chain banking to the possibility that the regulator may consider it to be an impermissible evasion of branch banking regulation. Before the enactment of federal law in 1994 permitting interstate branch banking, this concern over group banking was an important issue for state regulators.
- The IBBEA requires the banking agencies to promulgate implementing regulations that include guidelines ensuring that interstate branches of an out-of-state bank reasonably help to meet the credit needs of the communities within the host state where the branches are located. The regulations must also require that, not later than one year after establishment or acquisition of an interstate branch in a host state, the branch must be appreciably serving the credit needs of its local community. If the appropriate agency determines that the bank’s level of lending in the host state is less than half the average of total loans in the host state relative to total deposits for all banks for which the interstate bank’s host state is the home state, the agency must then review the loan portfolio of the bank to determine if it is reasonably helping to meet the credit needs of the communities served in the host state.
- … The opinion of the Court leaves the impression that the McFadden Act created “competitive equality” between national and state banks across the board. But as we stated in the
- New technologies continue to emerge. Electronic technologies such as automation, the Internet, wireless communication, and the like have already had a substantial impact on the way in which financial products and services are delivered, and also on the substantive characteristics of many products and services. In May 2002, the OCC amended its regulations to facilitate the conduct of the business of national banks using electronic technologies, This amendment grouped together new and revised regulations addressing a series of basic concerns about e-banking: ( ) exercise of federally authorized powers through electronic means; ) the location, for purposes of federal banking laws, of a national bank that engages in electronic activities; ) disclosure requirements for national banks that provide customers with access to other service providers through hyperlinks in bank websites or other shared electronic space.
- If the “competitive equality” principle were carried to its logical extreme, the ability of a national bank to carry on an incidental activity such as the safe-deposit business would be limited to the same extent as a state bank’s ability to do so under state law. However, as we have noted, the legislative history of the McFadden Act rather clearly indicates that Congress intended national banks to be able to carry on a safe-deposit business without locational restrictions.
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Chapter 2. Entry Rules 220 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The significance of the differences between state and federally chartered institutions has diminished due to the prevalence of FDIC deposit insurance, which is a virtual necessity for state-chartered banks and savings associations.
- Conversion of a state savings bank that is a member of the BIF into a federal savings bank is permitted, subject to the provisions of the amended Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”) and pursuant to regulations promulgated by the OTS. The OTS is authorized to provide for the organization, incorporation, operation, examination, and regulation of such converted savings banks. The converted savings bank continues to be a BIF member until such time as it changes its status to membership in the SAIF.
- 12 U.S.C.A. § 321. On the constitutionality of the statutory provision for membership of state-chartered banks in the Federal Reserve System, see , 4 F.2d 374. The Fed has promulgated detailed regulations governing applications for, and conditions of, Fed membership of state-chartered banks. 12 C.F.R. Pt. 208. On the validity of these regulations and of conditions of membership imposed thereunder, see
- Convenience and needs of community
- The regulations also include the separate approval stages of “preliminary approval” of the proposed national bank. Typically, preliminary approval is subject to specified conditions that an applicant must satisfy before the OCC will grant final approval. Final approval occurs when the proposed bank has satisfied the conditions and the OCC a national bank to open for business. As a practical matter, therefore, it is unlikely that a bank in organization would proceed into transactions such as those involved in . However, there is no explicit statutory basis in the NBA for the two stages of “approval” established by the regulations.
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Chapter 1. The Regulated Environment of Banking 237 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Current bank regulatory policy is still rehearsing the historical controversies surrounding the development of banking and bank regulation. Banking has, of course, longstanding European precursors to the American experience, but this book focuses on U.S. models of bank regulation.
- The creation of a “national” banking system marked the beginning of the second federal period of U.S. bank regulation. This second distinct federal period would continue after the monetary panic of 1907, with the eventual establishment of the Federal Reserve System. However, federal involvement in bank regulation during this period was at first simply a matter of expediency—the need to fund the war.
- With the eclipse of the Second Bank, a long period of state primacy in bank regulation set in, with disparate and inconsequential results. The emerging primacy of the state banks brought with it new problems for state governments. How were these institutions to be regulated? One of the first notable attempts at regulation during this period was in fact not governmental but private. Providing some of the protections of a central bank system, the so-called Suffolk system was instituted in Boston during the 1820s by a group of Boston banks. Suffolk Bank of Boston held deposits for outlying “country banks,” the notes of which could be redeemed at Boston at their par value. To police this system and avoid instability due to over-issuance of bank notes, the Boston banks would accumulate large number of notes from country banks that were not participants in the system. These notes would be presented to the nonparticipating country banks for payment. Faced with the possibility of these...
- The significance of to the development of constitutional theory is beyond dispute, but what do they tell us about the tensions inherent in the development of banking as a regulated industry in the United States? In the early stages of the history of U.S. bank regulation, arguments about the merits of federal bank regulatory policy were often couched in terms of constitutional theory. This was the case, for example, in President Jackson’s July 1832 message vetoing the bill to recharter the Second Bank.
- The environment in which depository institutions operate is decidedly regulatory in character. It is defined by a complex set of regulators that charter, supervise, examine, and in many cases specifically approve or disapprove the activities in which the institutions engage. The environment became even more complex after 12 November 1999, when the President signed the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act into law. This financial services reform effort is probably the most significant—and one of the most massive—pieces of federal banking legislation since the Banking Act of 1933. It affects, to some degree, every chapter of this book. The GLBA will be highlighted at appropriate points throughout the book. The GLBA generally endorses the principle of “functional regulation,” which posits that similar activities should be regulated by the same regulator. Accordingly, banking activities are regulated by federal and state bank regulators, securities activities by federal and state securities...
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Chapter 7. Securities Regulation 146 results (showing 5 best matches)
- To the extent that bank trust department activities are the functional equivalent of certain securities activities, they are of concern to the GLBA, which subjects financial activities to “functional regulation” by appropriate regulators of the activity involved. Conceivably, trust department activities may be the equivalent of securities brokerage, and as such would result in the bank being treated as a “broker” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). However, the GLBA excepts from the 1934 Act definition of “broker” a bank that effects transactions in a trustee or fiduciary capacity in its trust department or other department, regularly examined by bank examiners for compliance with fiduciary principles and standards, if the bank meets the following conditions:
- Congress decided to bring over-the-counter securities—and specifically, bank-issued securities—under the 1934 Act. The bank regulators resisted this change in the law. Their efforts were unsuccessful, but the bank regulators did extract one significant concession: they were granted administrative authority over the 1934 Act provisions that applied to depository institutions, with one important exception. With respect to securities issued by banks and savings associations, the registration, of the 1934 Act are administered by the depository institutions regulatory agencies, not by the SEC. Section 12(i) of the 1934 Act, added in 1964, contains a statutory mandate that, within 60 days of any amendments to pertinent SEC rules, these regulatory agencies issue regulations substantially similar to those issued by the SEC, unless such regulations would not be “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” ...the enactment of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley...
- Issuance of securities in a public offering, involving the use of interstate instrumentalities, normally is subject to regulation by the SEC under the 1933 Act. However, despite the enactment of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), and its endorsement of functional regulation as a basic organizing principle, bank- and thrift-issued securities are exempt from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
- A commercial bank acting as a transfer agent for purchases and sales of securities may be subject to regulation of its activities both by a clearing agency agency.” For purposes of transfer agent regulation of commercial banks, the “appropriate regulatory agencies” are: (1) the Comptroller, for national banks and D.C. banks, and subsidiaries of such banks; (2) the Fed, for state member banks, subsidiaries thereof, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries of bank holding companies that are banks other than banks subject to the authority of the Comptroller or the FDIC; and, (3) the FDIC, for state-chartered nonmember insured banks and subsidiaries thereof.
- Nevertheless, even with the abolishment of the OTS, the problem of duplicative regulatory structure persists in U.S. securities regulation to date. Notwithstanding the enactment of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), and its endorsement of functional regulation as a basic organizing principle, not disturb the exemption of bank- and thrift-issued securities from the scope of regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),
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Chapter 5. Transactional Rules Part 2 306 results (showing 5 best matches)
- . § 375a(4). For regulations of the appropriate federal regulator with respect to insider and affiliate transactions, see, , 12 C.F.R. §§ 31.1–31.2, Appendices A, B (setting forth OCC regulations applicable to national banks), . Pt. 215 (setting forth Fed regulations applicable to member banks); . §§ 349.1–349.4 (setting forth FDIC regulations applicable to state-chartered, FDIC-insured banks).
- (E) any company that [the Fed] determines by regulation or order to have a relationship with the member bank or any subsidiary or affiliate of the member bank, such that covered transactions by the member bank or its subsidiary with that company may be affected by the relationship to the detriment of the member bank or its subsidiary.…
- , Board of Governors, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Memorandum SR–83–2 (SA) (Jan. 11, 1983), , 4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 37–659.
- . While this diversification effect remains at the heart of the public policy underlying federal lending limits, in 2001 the Office of the Comptroller issued a final rule amending its lending limits regulation to give special encouragement to community-oriented lending activities. 66 Fed. Reg. 31,114 (2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.2(i)–(s), 32.7, 32.3(c)(5)); 66 Fed. Reg. 55,071 (2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.2(f)(1)(iii)–(iv), (m)(1), 32.3(a), (b)(1)(i), (b)(5)) (correcting six cross-references in existing lending limits regulation to reflect community bank-focused regulation review pilot program). The rule establishes a three-year pilot program that creates new special lending limits for 1–4 family residential real estate loans and loans to small businesses. 12 C.F.R. § 32.7. For these purposes, the term “residential real estate loan” is defined to mean “a loan or extension of credit that is secured by 1–4 family residential real estate.” ...loan or extension of credit...
- See, e.g., NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.
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Chapter 4. Control Transactions 362 results (showing 5 best matches)
- The BHCA explicitly reserves to the states the exercise of “such powers and jurisdiction which [they] now ha[ve] or may hereafter have with respect to companies, banks, [bank holding companies], and subsidiaries thereof.” This reservation is merely preservative and does not broaden the permissible scope of state regulation beyond the general strictures of, for example, the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, it is permissible for a state to prohibit the formation of bank holding companies. State regulation may also reasonably limit the degree of entry permitted to bank holding companies, rather than prohibit them outright, subject to federal law concerning interstate bank holding company acquisitions (discussed in §§ 4.6–4.8, ). State regulation of bank holding companies may affect holding companies seeking to control national as well as state-chartered banks.
- State bank holding company regulation is not preempted by federal bank holding company regulation. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1846(a).
- The Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”) is the product of congressional concern that economic concentration could lead to conflicts of interest, self-dealing, involuntary tying arrangements, and generally to a derogation of competition. Bank holding company regulation at the federal level is uniformly administered by the Fed, without regard to the status of a holding company’s subsidiary banks, whether they are national, state member, or state nonmember insured banks.
- Similarly, an insured savings association that was an affiliate of a bank on 1 July 1994, is permitted to act as agent for the bank in the same manner as an insured bank affiliate could act. However, the agency activities must be conducted only: (1) in a state in which the bank is not prohibited from operating a branch, and the savings association maintained an office or branch and conducted business as of 1 July 1994; or (2) in a state in which the bank is not expressly prohibited from operating a branch under a state law prohibiting interstate bank mergers, and the savings association maintained a main office and conducted business as of that date. Any such agency relationship must be consistent with safe and sound banking practices, and all applicable regulations of any appropriate federal banking agency.
- . § 1831u(d)(1). However, IBBEA has required the federal banking agencies to promulgate regulations prohibiting any out-of-state bank from using any authority to engage in interstate branching primarily for the purpose of deposit production.
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Chapter 7. Securities Regulation Part 2 250 results (showing 5 best matches)
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a5–2 (providing conditional exemption from definition of “dealer” to allow banks to engage in certain transactions involving securities exempted from registration by Reg S). This new 1934 Act rule corresponds to Rule 771 of Regulation R under the 1933 Act, which permits banks to engage in certain Regulation S transactions on an agency basis without being “brokers.” Rule 771 “recognizes that non-U.S. persons generally will not rely on the protections of the U.S. securities laws when purchasing Regulation S securities from U.S. banks, and that non-U.S. persons can purchase the same securities from banks located outside of the U.S.” 72 Fed. Reg. at 56,563 (citing 71 Fed. Reg. at 77,552, discussing proposed version).
- OF B 367–544 (1988) (providing seminal study of securities regulation of depository institutions); Michael P. Malloy,
- The rule specifically defines an “eligible security” as a security that is not being sold from the inventory of the bank or an affiliate of the bank, and not being underwritten by the bank or an affiliate of the bank on a firm-commitment basis unless the bank acquired the security from an unaffiliated distributor that did not purchase the security from the bank or an affiliate of the bank. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a5–2(b)(2). For these purposes, the term “distributor” is defined to have the same meaning as in Rule 902(d). . § 230.902(d) (defining “distributor” to mean any underwriter, dealer, or other person who participates, pursuant to contractual arrangement, in distribution of securities offered or sold in reliance on Regulation S).
- GLBA, §§ 201–202 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(4)(A)–(E), (5)(A)–(C)) (subjecting bank broker-dealer activities to SEC regulation, with specified exceptions). GLBA, § 221(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(2)) (concerning treatment of bank common trust funds under Securities Act of 1933); GLBA, § 221(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(12)(A)(iii)) (concerning treatment under Securities Exchange Act of 1934). §§ 7.14–7.30 (discussing regulation of securities market activities of depository institutions).
- may be defined as “the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.” . For discussion of reputational risk, see BIS, Committee on Banking Supervision,
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Chapter 6. Holding Company Activities 117 results (showing 5 best matches)
- (2) An activity that the [Fed] determines to be so closely related to banking, or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto, including any incidental activities that are necessary to carry on such an activity, if the bank holding company has obtained the prior approval of the [Fed] for that activity in accordance with the requirements of this regulation.
- Permissible activities that are “financial in nature” are authorized by the GLBA by inclusion of an activity in the list of “K4 activities,” . In March 2000, the Fed published an interim rule amending the FHC rules to include a list of financial activities permissible for FHCs under the GLBA. ) Activities previously determined by Fed regulation to be “closely related to banking” ) Activities that are usual in connection with the transaction of banking abroad, as determined by Fed regulation in effect on November 11, 1999. A joint Fed–Treasury rule later expressly added securities underwriting, merchant banking, and investment banking activities to the permitted activities of FHCs. By final rule, the Fed later added acting as a finder to the list of activities that are permissible for an FHC, under a streamlined, post-transaction notice procedure.
- Both the statute and the implementing regulations provide for a limited period of time for action on an application (or “notice,” in current Fed practice). In general, a notice is deemed approved 60 days after filing of a complete notice with the Fed, unless the Fed acts on the notice before the end of that period. The period may be extended for an additional 30 days by the Fed, with additional extensions subject to agreement with the bank holding company that has filed the notice. , activities not listed in the regulations as being closely related to banking
- One final set of differences between the BHCA and HOLA provisions concerns the applicability of HOLA to certain entities. First, upon application, a savings bank or cooperative bank may be treated as a savings association for purposes of the holding company provisions of the HOLA, if the OTS determines that the bank is a qualified thrift lender. Second, a bank holding company subject to the BHCA, or a company controlled by such a bank holding company, is exempt from the HOLA provisions.
- One important structural difference is that the HOLA incorporates by reference activities approved by the Fed for bank holding companies. These activities are authorized for savings and loan holding companies unless the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) prohibits or limits such an activity by regulation for savings and loan holding companies. However, BHCA-authorized activities still require the prior approval of the OTS.
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Chapter 9. International Banking Part 2 256 results (showing 5 best matches)
- IBBEA, § 107(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 3104 Note) (requiring review of regulations by federal banking agencies and revision of regulations under § 3104 to equalize competitive opportunities for U.S. and foreign banks). The IBBEA also clarifies that domestic consumer protection laws apply to foreign banks with U.S. operations. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3106a(b) (1)(A), (2)(A).
- . § 211.8(g)(3)(iv). In any event, the acquired company may not engage in activities in the United States that consist of banking or financial operations, . § 211.23(f)(5)(iii)(B), or types of activities permitted by regulation or order under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(c)(8), except under regulations of the Fed, or with its prior approval. 12 C.F.R. § 211.8(g)(3)(iv).
- On multilateral efforts to foster convergence in bank regulatory standards, see Brian P. Volkman,
- and Swiss Banking Regulations
- The law of the European Union as it affects, among other things, bank regulation, is of considerable interest in this regard. , 107 Banking L.J. 148 (1990). Certain recent EU developments may significantly restrict or modify entry of U.S. banks into the single integrated EU banking market. , Int’l Fin. L. Rev. (April 1988) (discussing integration of EU markets). Under the Second Banking Directive (1988), reciprocity of treatment of EU banks is the basis on which U.S. and other non-EU based banks are permitted to enter the single European market.
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Acknowledgements 31 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Can 10b–5 for the Banks? The Effect of an Antifraud Rule on the Regulation of Banks
- Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation
- Public Disclosure as a Tool of Federal Bank Regulation
- The Regulation of Bank Brokerage Activities: Was Rule 3b–9 Benign?
- Capital Regulation and International Banking
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Chapter 10. Bank Regulation and Social Policy 201 results (showing 5 best matches)
- , the Supreme Court held that the mortgage business of a national bank conducted by a non-banking operating subsidiary of the bank was subject to the exclusive (and preemptive) supervisory jurisdiction of the OCC, and not to the licensing, reporting, and visitorial authority of any state in which the subsidiary operated. Preemption of the state law regime was required because of the “unduly burdensome and duplicative” nature of the state regulation. This analysis was bolstered by the fact that federal statutory law barred national banks from being subject to any “visitorial powers” of the states except as authorized by federal law. The fact that this ban referred only to national banks, not to
- , 12 C.F.R. § 7.400(a)(3)(i)–(ii), (b)) (interpretive provisions of OCC regulations with effect of strengthening preemption). The preemption initiative of the OCC generally invoked the exclusive “visitorial” powers of the federal regulator under U.S.C.A. § 484. On the Comptroller’s exclusive visitorial authority over national banks and its relationship to the dual banking system,
- Introduction to the 1996 Annual Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law
- Few areas of depository institutions regulation have engendered the commentary and controversy that has accompanied the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”). One central feature has been the continuing debate over whether state and federal CRAs can effectively achieve their objectives. Empirical studies in the mid–1990s, focusing on the Texas market, suggested that CRA regulations had not increased the availability of banking services in low-income communities, and that the number of branches in low-income areas actually decreased in the period following the relevant regulatory changes. Other commentators have tentatively argued that it remains to be seen whether the state and federal CRAs and related policies can offset the effects of current federal interstate banking and branching policy and the emerging industry consolidation increasing the CRA burden on insured institutions, but in the view of some commentators these developments are unlikely to satisfy advocates of CRA public...
- In the decade leading up to the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, federal preemption principles were frequently applied against the application of state consumer protection law to federally regulated entities or their affiliates. In January 2004, the Comptroller adopted regulations asserting broad preemptive authority based on his “visitorial” powers, the OTS Chief Counsel took the position that federal law preempted state restrictions on business agents of federal savings associations with respect to any agent with an exclusive relationship with an association, if the agent agrees to significant supervision by it and works to advance the association’s deposit and lending activities.
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Chapter 8. Resolution of Institution Failures 311 results (showing 5 best matches)
- One neglected aspect of the response to the subprime crisis is state consumer protection law. This neglect stems in large part from the Federal Government’s aggressive preemption initiative against state regulation of financial services, epitomized by Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. The initiative blunted any “early warning response” that state regulation might have provided. In those instances where state authorities were able to intervene, the results have often been dramatic.
- (2) the end of any period established under state law during which the out-of-state bank holding company may not be treated as a bank holding company whose insured bank subsidiaries’ operations are “principally conducted” in the state for purposes of acquiring other insured banks or establishing bank branches.
- If the target is in danger of default, somewhat different conditions apply. In this case, one or more out-of-state banks or holding companies are permitted to acquire and retain shares or assets of an insured bank in danger of default if it has total assets of $500 million or more. In addition, such banks or holding companies may acquire two or more affiliated insured banks in danger of closing if the targets have aggregate total assets of $500 million or more, or if the aggregate total is equal to or greater than 33 percent of the aggregate total assets of all such affiliated insured banks. In either case, if the 33 percent test is met, the acquirors may also acquire and retain shares or assets of the holding company that controls the affiliated target banks or any other affiliated insured banks.
- , 12 U.S.C.A. 1821(d)(2)(B)(ii) (power of FDIC as conservator or receiver to collect obligation and money due the institution). , 235 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir.2000) (acknowledging limitation of negligence theories in FDIC suit against director of failed savings association for director’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in allegedly causing association to enter into transactions in which director had personal interest); , 916 F.2d 874, 889 (3d Cir.1990) (FDIC as receiver has power to pursue derivative claims against officers and directors of failed institution); , 982 F.2d 104 (3d Cir.1992) (1989 legislation did not amend or subordinate federal securities law cause of action). , 967 F.2d 703 (1st Cir.1992) (FDIC attachment of certificate of deposit as security on loan agreement within FDIC’s discretion under 1821(j)). Under 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(j), courts are generally prohibited from taking “any action, except at the request of the [FDIC] Board of Directors by regulation or...
- Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation
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Table of Contents 59 results (showing 5 best matches)
List of Figures 19 results (showing 5 best matches)
- 1–1 Contemporary Developments in U.S. Bank Regulation
- 6–3 Nonbanking Activities: Structure of the Regulations
- 6–6 HOLA: Structure of the Holding Company Regulations
- 5–2 Usury Rates: National Bank Act Alternatives
- 9–1 Depository Institutions and their Regulators: International Banking Activities
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Preface to the Second Edition 2 results
- The pace of change and development in depository institutions regulation has continued to be fast and furious in the few years that have intervened since the first edition of this book appeared in 1999. In November of that year, the president signed into law the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, which worked remarkable changes in the field. The effects of those changes are still being implemented through regulatory amendment and litigation. In September 2001, the tragedy of terrorist attacks upon the United States of America and its citizens prompted, among other things, regulatory, statutory and multilateral responses that are having a significant impact on the provision of financial services—domestically as well as internationally. These events are dramatic, but they represent only the highlights of a constant stream of developments. Indeed, in the twenty years since I began teaching bank and financial services regulation, the field has transformed itself in so many ways that it almost...
- Once again I thank my wife, Susie A. Malloy, for her encouragement, critique and inspiration—to say nothing of her patience. I also thank past student research assistants, particularly Mr. Michael P. Battin, of the Fordham University Class of 1996; Mr. Edward Miklautsch, of the Fordham University Class of 1997; and Ms. Suzanne Uzelac, of the McGeorge Law School Class of 1998 for all of their invaluable assistance in bringing this project to first light.
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Preface to the Third Edition 3 results
- And so the project for the past three years—and doubtless for many years to come—has been to devise ways and means to recover from this financial disaster, to extract practical lessons from the experience of the collapse, and to establish new safeguards for the financial services markets. As to this last task, Congress only lately responded by enacting the Dodd–Frank Act, which touches on virtually every aspect of the regulation of depository institutions, the subject of this book. By its own terms, many of the most significant changes initiated by the act will take years to implement fully. This is the result of effective dates of key provisions that stretch out over two years following the enactment of Dodd–Frank, as well as a lengthy and complex process of regulatory implementation of the provisions of the act. As a result, in this book we examine the current rules governing the financial services sector, while we also confront together the likely future direction of regulation...of
- I remain, as always, thankful for the support and encouragement of my wife, Susie A. Malloy, during my work on this new edition. The success of the work owes much to the groundwork provided by my past student research assistants, especially Mr. Michael P. Battin, of the Fordham University Class of 1996, Mr. Edward Miklautsch, of the Fordham University Class of 1997, and Ms. Suzanne Uzelac, of the McGeorge Law School Class of 1998. I thank them for all of their invaluable assistance in bringing the project to first light, and I also thank the many students who have participated in my banking courses over the past fifteen years and have made my interest in financial services law a source of continuing delight.
- Since the publication of the second edition of this book appeared in 2003, dramatic challenges have loomed up out of the haze of fast-moving commercial activities to confront the financial services sector. The pace of change and expansion seemed to tick up from moment to moment, until disaster overtook us in the Fall of 2008, when the residential mortgage market collapsed. Not only did that collapse manage to take with it iconic financial services firms like Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, but also—because “securitization” of mortgage-related products had spread mortgage risk directly into the securities markets—the collapse of the mortgage market led to a meltdown of U.S. capital markets. The meltdown itself reverberated through many major non-U.S. capital markets as well.
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Preface to the First Edition 2 results
- Depository institutions regulation is subject to a fast pace of change and development. In the past twenty years alone, for example, federal statutes governing this area have been broadly amended at least seven times. These legislative changes and the increasingly frequent intervention of the Supreme Court have repeatedly rearranged the furniture. In addition, the growing overlap in competition among depository institutions, insurance companies and securities firms has further complicated regulatory policy. As a result, we all remain students of the subject, no matter how long our experience. That may be one of the things that makes the regulation of depository institutions law so fascinating and, at times, so frustrating. This book is intended to help law students satisfy their fascination with the subject without the frustration.
- I thank my wife, Susie A. Malloy, for her encouragement, critique and inspiration. I also thank my student research assistants, Mr. Michael P. Battin, of the Fordham University Class of 1996; Mr. Edward Miklautsch, of the Fordham University Class of 1997; and Ms. Suzanne Uzelac, of the McGeorge Law School Class of 1998.
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Advisory Board 10 results (showing 5 best matches)
- Professor of Law, University of San Diego Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan
- Professor of Law, Chancellor and Dean Emeritus, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
- Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles
- Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley
- Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law,
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Copyright Page 2 results
- Thomson Reuters created this publication to provide you with accurate and authoritative information concerning the subject matter covered. However, this publication was not necessarily prepared by persons licensed to practice law in a particular jurisdiction. Thomson Reuters does not render legal or other professional advice, and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional.
- Printed in the United States of America
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- Publication Date: May 5th, 2011
- ISBN: 9780314194565
- Subject: Banking/Financial Institutions
- Series: Concise Hornbook Series
- Type: Hornbook Treatises
- Description: This title examines depository institution regulation and how federal statutes governing banking have been subject to constant amendment in recent years, especially since the mortgage market collapse and the ensuing worldwide crisis. It discusses the growing overlap in competition among depository institutions, insurance companies, and securities firms that has further complicated regulatory policy. Additional discussion covers the regulated environment of banking, entry rules, branching, control transactions, transactional rules, holding company activities, securities regulation, resolution of institution failures, international banking, and more.